K.S. Sethu vs P.K. Manigandan

Arunachalam, J.—Both these petitions are disposed of together by a common order. Since the contentions raised, are identical and the petitioner and respondent are the same. The petitioner in Crl.M.P.No.1411 of 1984 is the accused in STC No.40 of 1983, on the file of the Special Judge, Essential Commodities Act cases, Madurai. The petitioner in Crl.M.P.No.1439 of 1984, who is the same person in Crl.M.P.No.1411 of 1984 as well is the accused in STC No.41 of 1983, pending on the file of the same Special Judge, Madurai.

The prosecution against the petitioner in both these summary trial cases had been initiated by the respondent, who was then the Assistant Director of Agriculture (Training), Nilakottai. The petitioner is stated to have violated clause 3(3) of the Sugar Cane (Control) Order. 1966 punishable u/s 7(1)(a) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. According to the complaint in each one of these cases, the petitioner was reappointed as Managing Director of Madurai Sugar Mills Limited, Pandiarajapuram u/s 173(2) of the Companies Act. He continued to be the Chairman of the said Sugar Mills, Madurai Sugar Mills Limited was manufacturing Sugar and the petitioner used to purchase sugarcane from the sugarcane growers within his jurisdiction. The sugarcane growers will have to register their names and execute agreements with the Sugar Mills for supply of Sugarcane. These two complaints relate to sugarcane growers, E. Bangarusamy, A.M. Subba Reddiar; M.R. Alagarsamy; C.R. Muthukrishnan; K. Sathiyamoorthy and A. Appayan. Though these sugarcane growers had supplied sugarcanes to the petitioner, he had not paid the entire arrears within 14 days from the date of delivery of sugarcane, to the seller, as ordained under Clause 3(3) of the Sugarcane (Control) Order. Inspite of repeated demands the petitioner did not choose to pay the arrears and hence these prosecutions were initiated.

In these petitions filed u/s 482 Cr.P.C. to call for the records and quash the pending prosecutions as not maintainable and an abuse of process of Court. Mr. M. Ravindran, learned Counsel representing the petitioner in each of these petitions, submitted that a prosecution for violation of the provisions of Clause 3(3) of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, will arise only if there was no agreement in writing to the contrary between the parties. The complaint does not refer to this specific ingredient of clause 3(3) of the Order. Further he submitted, that u/s 3(3a) of the Order, the producer was bound to pay interest in the event of non-payment within 14 days of the date of delivery of sugarcane and under Clause 3(7) of the Order for the reasons stated therein, the producer was entitled to deposit price of sugarcane which remained unpaid, on the last day of the sugar year in which cane supply was made to the factory, to the Collector of the District, in which the factory was situated. He pointed out that before the last day of the sugar year, these prosecutions had been launched.

On these contentions I have heard Mr. S. Shanmughavelayutham, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, he contended that an offences under Clause 3(3) of the Sugarcane (Control) Order was complete, on non-payment of the price of sugarcane, on the expiry of 14 days of supply. He contended that Clause 3(3A) of the Order, cannot erase the offence u/s 3(3) of the order, and the producer was bound additionally to pay interest if payment had not been made within 14 days of delivery of sugar. He then submitted that Clause 3(7) of the Order may not apply to the instant case for the cane suppliers had come forward with their claims. The words "or for any other reason" found in Clause 3(7) will not ensure in favour of the petitioner.

After hearing arguments of both the learned Counsel, on several occasions, punctuated with case law, I directed the learned Additional Public Prosecutor to satisfy that there was no agreement in writing to the contrary between the parties, which is a necessary ingredient u/s 3(3) of the Sugarcane (Control) Order. A few adjournments were afforded to facilitate the prosecution to find out about agreements if any, to the contrary. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has placed before Court a communication dated 28.12.91 from the District Revenue Officer to the Commissioner of Sugar, Madras wherein it is stated, that in respect of sugar growers six in number, concerned in these two petitions, they were unable to trace the copies of the cane supply agreements inspite of efforts to trace them. Copies of model agreements entered into by Madras Sugars with other sugarcane growers have been appended to the said communication. Obviously model agreements will not be useful to prove the case against the petitioner in both these prosecutions. To succeed in these two prosecutions, the respondent must be able to prove clinchingly, that there was no agreement in writing to the contrary, between the petitioner and the sugarcane growers. Only then an offence under Clause 3(3) of the Sugarcane (Control) Order will stand committed. This ingredient is very basis and necessary without which the prosecution cannot expect to succeed, in both the pending cases. Now that it has been made clear that the agreement are not traceable, foundation of these prosecutions, gets smashed and at this distance of time nearly 9 years after the alleged commission of offence, no purpose would be served in allowing both the prosecutions to be proceeded with, especially when the prosecution has clearly stated, that agreement copies between sugarcane growers and petitioner referred to in these two prosecutions, are not traceable. Further both Counsel stated that by Ordinance No.18 of 1983 dated 26.12.83, the Sugar Mill had been taken over by the State Government. The State Government had also paid the sugarcane price to the growers concerned in these prosecutions, for the State Government had taken the assets and liabilities of Madura Sugars.

Due to the serious infirmity pointed out by me earlier, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the pending prosecutions to survive any longer. In that view, the question whether Clause 3(3A) and Clause 3(7) of Sugarcane (Control) Order will ensure in favour of the petitioner in each one of these petitioner, need not have to be probed into.

In the result both these petitions are allowed and all further proceedings in STC Nos.40 of 1983 and 41 of 1983 pending on the file of the Special Judge. Essential Commodities Act Cases, Madurai shall stand quashed. Communication dated 28/12/91 referred to in this order shall form part of the Court record.