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Judgment
Following reliefs have been prayed in this petition:-
“10.1This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the petition filed by the petitioner;
10.2That, the impugned order bearing SA/A/1915/2020 date 29.03.2023 and SA/A/1935/2020 dated 29.03.2023 passed by the Respondent no. 2 be quashed or set aside to the extent of the Petitioner is concerned.”
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the impugned orders passed by respondent No.2, particularly the order imposing penalty upon the petitioner in his capacity as Public Information Officer, are not in accordance with law. It is submitted that the second appellate authority has not recorded any finding as to whether the petitioner had acted mala fide or had deliberately and intentionally failed to furnish the information sought by the Information Seeker within the prescribed period. In the absence of such a finding, imposition of penalty upon the petitioner is unsustainable in law.
Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2, per contra, submits that from a perusal of the impugned orders, it would be evident that the petitioner failed to furnish the information within the prescribed period and such failure was deliberate. It is, therefore, submitted that the penalty imposed by respondent No.2 is justified and calls for no interference.
Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3 submits that the impugned order is legal and proper and does not warrant any interference by this Court.
Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 submits that the information sought by the Information Seeker has subsequently been furnished by the petitioner, though there was some delay in furnishing the same.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.
The issue which arises for consideration is whether the penalty imposed upon the petitioner, who was functioning as the Public Information Officer, could have been sustained without recording a finding that the failure to furnish the information within the prescribed period was deliberate or mala fide.
It is not in dispute that the information sought by the Information Seeker has already been furnished. However, mere delay in furnishing the information, by itself, would not be sufficient to sustain the penalty unless the competent authority records a finding that such delay was deliberate, intentional or attributable to mala fide conduct on the part of the Public Information Officer.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Manohar S/o Manikrao Anchule Vs. State of Maharashtra and another, reported in (2012) 13 SCC 14, while considering the scope of penalty under the Right to Information Act, has emphasized the requirement of establishing a deliberate failure or neglect on the part of the Public Information Officer. The authority imposing penalty is required to consider whether the default was without reasonable cause and whether the conduct of the Public Information Officer warranted imposition of penalty.
In the present case, on perusal of the impugned order, this Court finds that respondent No.2 has not recorded any specific finding that the petitioner deliberately or mala fide failed to furnish the information sought by the Information Seeker. The impugned order proceeds essentially on the basis of the delay in furnishing the information. There is no categorical finding demonstrating that such delay was intentional or that the petitioner had deliberately withheld the information.
Further, the fact that the information sought has already been furnished is also a relevant circumstance which ought to have been considered while examining whether the petitioner had deliberately or mala fide withheld the information. In the absence of a specific finding regarding deliberate or mala fide failure on the part of the petitioner, the penalty imposed upon him cannot be sustained merely on the ground that there was some delay in furnishing the information.
In view of the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manohar (supra), this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order dated 29.03.2023, insofar as it relates to the imposition of penalty upon the petitioner, is not sustainable in law.
Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed.
The impugned order dated 29.03.2023 passed by respondent No.2, insofar as it relates to the petitioner, is hereby quashed.
In view of the above, I.A. No.02/2026 for condonation of delay in payment of process fee is dismissed as withdrawn, as the parties have already entered appearance.
No order as to costs.
