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Judgment
This case has had long litigative history. The petitioner is a society registered under the Societies Regfstration Act. When the petitioner-Society came to know that 20477 square yards of land (hereinafter referred to as ''the subject land'') comprised in town Sy. Nos. 42, 43/2 and RS No.21/5 situated at Mogularajapuram, Vijayawada Urban Agglomeration was declared to be excess land under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short ''the Act'') made an application to the Government for assignment of the above land. The Government issued G.O. Ms. No.l 156, dated 20-12-1991 assigning the subject land. The entitlement of the petitioner-society to seek assignment of the land and certain collateral issues were subject matter of the judicial review before this Court. The learned single Judge of this Court held that assignment was bad in law because, the assignment was made after receipt of the interim order passed by this Court. The matter was carried to Division Bench in WA Nos.455 of 1994 and batch. The Division Bench of this Court disposed of the above appeal and batch on 11-8-1995 and held that since the petitioner-Society was registered under the provisions of Societies Registration Act and not under the provision of A.P. Cooperative Societies Act, the members of the petitioner-Society cannot be considered to be weaker sections or Class IV or low income groups, and not entitled to seek assignment of the land in terms of G.O. Ms. No.840, dated 16-6-1982. The Division Bench also held that none of the members of the petitioner-Society belong to weaker sections or Class IV or low income groups. The validity of the judgment of the Division Bench was assailed before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos, 19704 and 19705 of 1995. Those Civil appeals were disposed of by the Supreme Court on 11-9-1995, The order reads as follows:
"We see no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. Learned Counsel for the petitioner states that the High Court was not justified in reaching the finding that the petitioner-Society did not belong to the persons from weaker sections.
Be that as it may, it will be open for the petitioner society to approach the State Government and the State Government shall decide the claims of the persons/societies for the allotment of the land in dispute in accordance with law."
As permitted by the Supreme Court, the petitioner-Society made applications to the Government on 18-9-1995, 17-8-1996 and 24-9-1996 for assignment of the subject land. The Government passed the order dated 5-6-1997 rejecting the applications of the petitioner-Society. Hence, this writ petition.
In response to Rule Nisi, the respondents have filed counter-affidavit contesting the claim of the petitioner-Society.
Sri Subrahmanya Reddy, learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner placed two contentions while asserting the validity of the Government Order dated 5-6-1997. The learned senior Counsel firstly contended that the impugned order cannot be sustained solely on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice and fair play in action. Elaborating his contention, he would draw the attention of the Court to what is stated in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents, in paragraph 6 thereof, and would maintain that the factor which prompted the Government to reject the applications of the petitioner-Society is that the members of the petitioner-Society do not belong to weaker sections of society and this satisfaction of the Government is based on a report submitted by the District Collector, Krishna District. In the reply filed by the petitioner-Society, he would also draw the attention of the Court and assert that the District Collector did not issue any notice to the petitioner-Society and the petitioner-Society had no opportunity to putforth its case and no copy of the report was made available to the petitioner before the impugned order was passed. The learned senior Counsel secondly contended that having regard to the statutory intendment to achieve the common good envisaged under sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the Act, rejection of the applications of the petitioner-Society solely on the ground that the petitioner-Society docs not come under the purview of G.O. Ms. No.840, dated 16-6-1982 is arbitrary, and would maintain that the list of priority groups appended to the State Government Order shall not preclude the Government from considering the application from others seeking assignment of the land.
On the other hand, learned Government Pleader for Revenue contended that the application of the petitioner itself is mis-conceived inasmuch as the subject land is not yet vested in the Government, and the issue whether the subject land should vest in the Government being excess land or not is pending for adjudication before the appellate authority under the Act. Alternatively, the learned Government Pleader for Revenue contended that the reason given by the Government to reject the application is sound and unexceptionable.
I find force in the submission of Sri Subrahmanya Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the District Collector and the Government should have given an opportunity to the petitioner-Society to have its say in the matter before recording an adverse rinding that the members of the petitioner-Society do not belong to weaker sections. . The counter-affidavit filed by the respondents discloses what weighed with the Government in rejecting the application apart from the reason stated in the impugned order. It is trite to state that the Government was apparently influenced by the fact that the members of the petitioner-Society do not belong to weaker sections. It is needless to state that this finding is quite adverse to the petitioner-Society and its members. Since the Government had directed the District Collector to conduct an enquiry in pursuance of the direction of the Supreme Court, the Government as well as the District Collector were under obligation to practice the principles of natural justice and fair play in action before taking any action adverse to the petitioner-Society. It is not even the case of the respondent-State Government that before passing the impugned order, a copy of the report of the District Collector was sent to the petitioner. On that ground itself, the Court would have quashed the impugned order and remanded the proceedings to the Government to reconsider the applications of the petitioner de novo after disclosing adverse materials collected by it through the District Collector to the petitioner and giving an opportunity to the petitioner to have its say in the matter. But, if the reason given by the Government in the impugned order is valid and can be sustained, remand of the proceedings to the Government for re-consideration does not arise. Therefore, it becomes necessary for the Court to record its opinion on the second contention put-forth by the learned senior Counsel for the petitioner.
Section 23 of the Act deals with disposal of vacant land acquired under the Act. Sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 23 read as follows:
"Section 23(1): It shall be competent for the State Government to allot by order, in excess of the ceiling limit any vacant land which is deemed to have been acquired by the State Government under this Act or is acquired by the State Government under any other law, to any person for any purpose relating to, or in connection with, any industry or for providing residential accommodation of such type as may be approved by the State Government to its employees of any industry and it shall be lawful for such person to hold such and in excess of the ceiling limit.
Section 23(4): Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), all vacant lands deemed to have been acquired by the State Government under this Act shall be disposed by the State Government to sub-serve the common good on such terms and conditions as the State Government may deem fit to impose."
Both sub-sections (1) and (4) are enabling provisions arming the State Government to dispose of the vacant land acquired under the Act for certain purposes and for achieving certain objectives. As could be seen from sub-section (1) of Section 23, the State Government is armed with necessary power to dispose of the vacant land acquired under the Act for any purpose relating to, or in connection with, any industry or for providing residential accommodation of such type as may be approved by the State Government to its employees or for any industry. Subsection (4) of Section 23 mandates that the action that may be taken by the State Government should subserve the common good. However, sub-section (4) empowers the State Government to prescribe terms and conditions in the matter of disposal of vacant land.
Keeping the statutory provisions and intendment, the validity of the reason given by the State Government in the impugned order that the petitioner-Society is not a society registered under the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act and, therefore, it is not entitled to seek assignment of land in terms of G.O. Ms. No.840, dated 16-6-1982 has to be reviewed. The preamble to the above Government Order declares that the Government in supersession of the earlier allotment procedure issued in different earlier G.Os. directed that the Central pool of excess vacant land taken over by the Government under the provisions of the Act be created and such lands shall be allotted to the "''various organisations" (emphasis is supplied by the Court) u/s 23 of the Act according to the priorities specified in the order. The Government Order nowhere declares that only four categories of legal persons mentioned in the order are entitled to seek assignment of the land under the G.O. If the statutory intendment contained in subsection (4) of Section 23 of the Act and the preamble to the Government Order in G.O. Ms. No.840, dated 16-6-1982 are kept in mind conjunctly, it becomes clear and quite apparent that the Government Order in G.O. Ms. No.840 docs not preclude the other categories of institutions or legal persons applying for assignment of the vacant land. Even otherwise, there is a sound reasoning for construing the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 23 of the Act and the Government Order in the manner indicated above. The crux of the matter is that when the State Government proposes to part with or dispose of the vacant land pooled under the provisions of the Act, its action should intend to achieve the social good or common good or to meet the essential needs of the society at large. There is no prohibition in our law that a society registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act cannot be a housing society. If that is so, in a given case, if the members of the society registered under the Societies Registration Act actually belong to most weaker sections of the society and they are in dire need of house sites. Can they be precluded from consideration for assignment of the vacant land pooled under the provisions of the Act? In my considered opinion it cannot be. If it is held otherwise, it would violate the fair play in action on the part of the Government as well as postulates of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Be that as it may, as pointed out supra, there is nothing either u/s 23 or in the Government Order in G.O. Ms. No.840 which could reasonably suggest that only four categories of legal persons incorporated in the order are entitled to apply for assignment of the vacant land and not others. Therefore, the rejection of the application of the petitioner solely on the ground that the petitioner-Society is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and not under the provisions of the A.P. Cooperative Societies Act should be held to be irrational, arbitrary and contrary to the statutory intendment under sub-section (4) of Section 23 of the Act.
In taking this view, I am fortified by the observations of the Supreme Court in Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji Ors. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , and the decision of this Court in Mahamooda Begum v. Revenue Department, 1997 (3) An.WR 582.
In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 5-6-1997 is quashed. The applications of the petitioner-Society shall stand remitted to the State Government with a direction to consider the applications of the petitioner-Society afresh after famishing the adverse materials collected by it through District Collector, Krishna District to the petitioner, and after giving an opportunity to the petitioner to have its say in the matter provided the subject land ultimately vests in the State Government after the order of the appellate authority. No costs.