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Judgment
[PER: HON'BLE AJAY BHANOT, J.]
The instant appeal arises out of the judgement dated 27.03.2017 rendered by the learned Sessions Court in Sessions Trial No. 425 of 2010 State vs. Krishan Kumar and Others. The FIR which culminated in the impugned judgment was registered as Case Crime No. 34 of 2010 under Section 498-A, 304-B IPC and ¾ of Dowry Prohibition Act at P.S. Malwa, District Fatehpur.
The learned trial court by the impugned judgment has found the appellants in the respective appeals guilty of offences under Section 304-B IPC and has imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. The appellants in the respective appeals have also been convicted under section 498A IPC and sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, and in case of default in payment of fine the appellants are liable to undergo additional simple imprisonment for one month. Furthermore, the appellants have been convicted under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and sentenced to undergo six months' rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, and in case of default in payment of fine, the appellants are liable to undergo additional simple imprisonment for 15 days. All the aforesaid sentences shall run concurrently.
The Criminal Appeal No.2167 of 2016 (Krishan Kumar Vs. State of U.P.) is being pressed before this Court. In Criminal Appeal No. 2163 of 2017, appellant No.1-Shivlal died during the pendency of the appeal. By order dated 23.04.2026 the appeal of appellant No. 1, Shivlal stood abated. Learned counsel for the appellants now presses the appeal only on behalf of appellant No. 2, Smt. Chhediya in respect of Criminal Appeal No.2163 of 2017.
The following appellants who have been convicted by the learned trial court are before this Court in the instant appeal:
Krishan Kumar
Smt.Chhediya
Both the aforesaid appeals are being heard together and are being decided by this judgment.
F.I.R- Prosecution Case
Briefly put the prosecution case set out in the F.I.R. dated 02.03.2010 is that Rukmini the daughter of the first informant got married to Krishan Kumar on 06.07.2008. The marriage was solemnized commensurate with the financial capacity of the first informant. After few months of the marriage, in-laws of the deceased including her husband-Krishan Kumar; father-in-law-Shiv Lal (since deceased), Mother-in-law-Chhediya, Aunt-in-law-Nanki, Brother-in-law-Ramswaroop, wife of brother-in-law-Raj Kumari started making dowry demands. The first informant gave a sum of Rs. 40,000/- and a cycle to them. The amount was drawn using a credit card in November.
Thereafter, when his daughter came to her maternal house on Khichdi festival, she informed them that her in-laws were demanding Rs. 40,000/- for house construction. The first informant went to village Bhadwa and told them that he does not have the financial capacity to pay the aforesaid amount. He also pleaded with the in-laws not to assault the victim. However, the accused persons refused to relent. They informed him that in case the demand was not fulfilled, they would not keep his daughter and would kill her. When his daughter returned to her maternal home on Khichdi festival, she told them of her plight. The accused persons demanded Rs.40,000/-, assaulted her on a daily basis and denied her food. The accused persons started torturing and harassing the daughter of the first informant on account of non-fulfillment of the demand of Rs. 40,000/-. His daughter would inform them about the said demand whenever she came home. However, because of financial destitution, he could not satisfy the demands and the torture of the victim went on unabated.
On 15.02.2010, the daughter of the first informant was murdered by the accused persons at about 11:00 AM. After murdering the deceased, the accused persons burnt her body. The first informant party came to know from village Bhadwa about the incident and reached the site to confirm the news. The daughter of the first informant was lying burnt to death in a small room.
After lodgement of the said FIR, police investigation was on foot. Charge-sheet was filed against the accused appellants under sections 498A, 304B IPC and Section ¾ of Dowry Prohibtion Act on 28.03.2010. Cognizance of the offences was taken by the learned trial court on 08.04.2010.
Charge:
The charges were framed against the appellants on 05.02.2011 while alternative charges were framed on 08.07.2011. The same are extracted below:
“ Charges
I, Mukhtar Ahmad, Sessions Judge, Fatehpur, do hereby charge you:
1.Krishan Kumar (husband)
2.Shiv Lal (father-in-law)
3.Smt. Chhediya (mother-in-law) as follows: Firstly, that you all on 15.02.2010 at about 11 A.M. and prior to it since marriage of deceased Smt Rukmini, in village Bhadwa, within the limits of PS. Malwan, district Fatehpur subjected her to cruelty for demand of cash of Rs 40,000/- in dowry and thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 498A IPC and within the cognizance of this court.
Secondly, that you all on the aforesaid date, time and place caused the death of the deceased Smt. Rukmini within 7 years of marriage in unnatural circumstances and soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry of cash of Rs 40,000/- and thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 304 IPC and within the cognizance of this court.
Thirdly, that you all on 15.02.2010 and prior to it since marriage demanded Rs 40,000/- cash in dowry from the deceased and her parents and thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act and within the cognizance of this court.
And I hereby direct that you be tried by this court on the said charges. Dated- 05.02.2011"
Alternative Charges
आरोप
मैं अरविन्द कुमार मिश्र, सत्र न्यायाधीश, फतेहपुर आप
1.कृष्ण कुमार
2.शिवलाल
3.श्रीमती छेदिया को निम्न आरोप से आरोपित करता हूँ (वैकल्पिक)
यह कि दिनांक 15.02.2010 को समय 11:00 बजे दिन स्थान मकान आप अभियुक्तगण स्थित वहद ग्राम भदवा अन्तर्गत थाना मलवाँ जिला फतेहपुर में आपलागों ने सामान्य आशय के अग्रसरण में वादी मुकदमा फगुनी की पुत्री एवं आप अभियुक्त कृष्ण कुमार की पत्नी श्रीमती रूकमिनी को जलाकर उसकी हत्या कारित की। इस प्रकार आपलागों ने ऐसा कृत्य किया जो भारतीय दण्ड संहिता की धारा 302 सेप्टिट धारा 34 के अन्तर्गत दण्डनीय अपराध है, और इस न्यायालय के प्रसंज्ञान में है।
एतद् द्वारा आपको निर्देशित किया जाता है कि उक्त आरोपों के अन्तर्गत आपका विचारण इस न्यायालय द्वारा किया जाएगा। दिनांक - 08.07.2011"
The appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges and the case went to trial.
Evidences:
Tabular charts depicting the evidences adduced by the prosecution during the trial are as under:
Oral Evidence:- List of prosecution witnesses
Prosecution Witnesses
| Sr. No | Witness No. | Name of Witness | Nature of Witness |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | PW-1 | Faguni | First Informant |
| 2 | PW-2 | Shanti | Mother of Deceased |
| 3 | PW-3 | H.C. 24 Avdhesh Kumar | Author of the Chik |
| 4 | PW-4 | Dr A S Khan | Doctor who conducted the Post Mortem |
| 5 | PW-5 | Dinesh Kumar Mishr | Tehsildar who narrated the Inquest |
| 6 | PW-6 | Pradeep Kumar Dubey | Investigating Officer |
Documentary evidences:
| S No. | Documents | Proved by | Date | Exhibit |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Written report | PW-1 Faguni | 02.03.2010 | Ka-1 |
| 2 | FIR | PW-3 Avdhesh Kumar | 02.03.2010 | Ka-2 |
| 3 | Kayami Nakal Rapat No. 14 of Chik | PW-3 Avdhesh Kumar | 02.03.2010 | Ka-3 |
| 4 | PM report | PW-4 Dr A S Khan | 16.02.2010 | Ka-4 |
| 5 | Panchayatnama | PW-5 Dinesh Kumar | 16.02.2010 | Ka-5 |
| 6 | Photo Nash | PW-5 Dinesh Kumar | Ka-6 | |
| 7 | Chalan Nash | PW-5 Dinesh Kumar | Ka -7 | |
| 8 | Sample Seal | PW-5 Dinesh Kumar | Ka -8 | |
| 9 | Letter CMO | PW-5 Dinesh Kumar | Ka-9 | |
| 10 | Site Plan | PW-6 Pradeep Kumar Dubey | 04.03.2010 | Ka-10 |
| 11 | Recovery Memo of ‘Pipiya’ with kerosene oil | PW-6 Pradeep Kumar Dubey | 16.02.2010 | Ka-11 |
| 12. | Chargesheet | PW-6 Pradeep Kumar Dubey | 28.03.2010 | Ka -12 |
FIR
A. First Tehrir/Written Report:
The first informant received information about the death of his daughter on 15.02.2010 at 10:00 AM from a villager. The first informant-Phaguni/father of the deceased reached the site of the incident at 11:00 AM on 15.02.2010.
PW1/First informant-Phaguni has deposed before the trial court that he went to Bhadwa with his family members and some persons from the village. According to the testimony of PW1, he reached the police station at about 01:30 P.M. on 15.02.2010. P.W.1 also stated that he dictated the first Tehrir/written report to Rajendra Kumar, a lad from the village on 15.02.2010 at about 16:30 hours. P.W.1 thereafter submitted the Tehrir at the police station.
The first tehrir thus submitted by P.W.1 was entered in the G.D. as Rapat No. 24 at 16:30 hours on 15.02.2010. The said GD entry was in the record of the trial court and registered as paper-book No. 8-Ka-3. G.D. entry No. 24 contains the transcription of the first Tehrir. The aforesaid G.D. was proved by the Constable 16-Anand Prakash Singh who was introduced by the defence as D.W.1.
D.W.-1 in his testimony stated that he had earlier worked with the Head Muharrir, Awadhesh Kumar who had transcribed the said G.D. entry no. 24 and he recognized the handwriting of the author of the said GD. D.W.1 proved the G.D. entry as secondary evidence as original was destroyed. The said GD was marked as Exh. Kha-1. It is noteworthy that the prosecution avoided to prove the said document.
Second Tehrir and F.I.R.:
The second tehrir was tendered by the P.W.1-Faguni/father of the deceased 15 days after the death and submission of the first tehrir. PW1 testified that he dictated the said tehrir to a typist who typed the same. PW1 identified his signatures on the second tehrir. PW1 proved the second tehrir and its contents and the document was marked as Exh. Ka-1. Pursuant to the second tehrir the F.I.R. was got registered which was later marked as Exh. Ka-2.
The FIR was registered on 02.03.2010 at about 09:30 hours by Faguni, father of the deceased under Sections 498A, 304B IPC and Section ¾ of Dowry Prohibition Act at Police Station Malwa, District Fatehpur. PW3/H.C. 24 Awadhesh Kumar stated that the chik FIR was recorded by him. PW3 identified his handwriting and signatures on the chik FIR which was marked as Exh. Ka-2.
PW3 also testified that he had made the GD No. 14 on 02.03.2010 at 09:30 hours in his hand. GD Rapat No. 14 depicted the lodgement of the FIR. A carbon copy of GD Rapat No. 14 which was in the record of the trial was identified by him. The original GD was produced by PW3 in court. After comparing the original GD entry with the carbon copy of the same in the court record, PW3 proved the carbon copy of GD Rapat No. 14 which was then marked as Exh. Ka-3.
Time, Place of Incident and Cause of Death:
A. Inquest Report
On receipt of the aforesaid first Tehrir a police party was constituted which reached the spot to conduct the inquest proceedings. The inquest report was drawn up by the then Naib Tehsildar-Dinesh Kumar Mishra-P.W.5. on 16.02.2010.
P.W.5 proved the inquest report. Recitals in the inquest report disclose that inquest proceedings had commenced on 16.02.2010 at 11:15 hour and continued till 12:30 PM. The inquest report was proved by P.W. 5 and marked as Exh Ka-5
B. Recovery
PW-6/IO/Pradeep Kumar Dubey recovered one white colored plastic bottle containing about one and a half litres of kerosene oil from the site of the incident. The aforesaid recovery memo was proved by the I.O. PW-6 and marked as Ex. Ka-11. The aforesaid material exhibit was not produced and not proved before the learned trial court.
C. Site Plan
The site plan was drawn up by the PW-6/IO at the pointing out of PW1/first informant. The PW-6 identified his signatures on the site plan and proved the same, which was then marked as Ex. Ka-10.
D. Movement of Body for Post-mortem:
After the conclusion of the inquest proceedings, the body was wrapped up in a cloth which was then stitched and sealed in a cloth. Thereafter, the body was made over to Constable 228 Vijay Shankar and Home Guard 438 Shiv Bhawan. The said police personnel took it to the hospital for post mortem.
Relevant documents which were drawn up for movement of the body to the hospital for post-mortem and which were proved by P.W.-5-Dinesh Kumar Mishra/Tehsildar included Photo Nash marked as Exh. Ka-6, challan nash marked as Ex. Ka-7, sample seal marked as Ex. Ka-8 and letter to C.M.O. marked as Ex. Ka-9
Cause of Death-Post Mortem Report
The post mortem was conducted on 16.02.2010 at 4:30 PM by Dr. A.S. Khan-PW-4. The post mortem report records that the body was smelling of kerosene oil and that the deceased was having three months old pregnancy. PW-4 proved the post mortem report and its contents. The postmortem report was then marked as Ex. Ka-4.
The ante mortem injuries, cause of death and time of death as depicted in the post mortem report which were also confirmed by P.W.-4 which are extracted herein:-
"Ante Mortem Injuries:
1.Superficial to deep burn all over the body excepts both arm pits, both soles
2.Lower part of both legs line of redness present
3.Scalp Hair singeing present
Cause of Death- Death is due to shock as a result of ante-mortem burn injury
Time of Death- About One and Half Day"
Oral Testimonies
P.W.1-Faguni/First Informant
Faguni-Father of the deceased/first informant entered the witness box as P.W.1. P.W.1 deposed that his daughter Rukmini got married to the accused-Krishan Kumar about three years ago. P.W.1 has stated that at the time of the marriage he had given dowry according to his financial capacity. However, the in laws were not satisfied with the same. When his daughter came to her maternal home two months after her marriage she informed them that the accused persons, namely, Krishan Kumar-husband, Shiv Kumar-Father-in-law, and Chhediya-mother-in-law, Nanaki-aunt-in-law, Ram Swaroop-brother-in-law and Raj Kumari/sister-in-law demanded Rs.50,000/-towards dowry. He had withdrawn Rs.40,000/- from Kisan credit card and gave the amount along with the cycle to the in-laws.
P.W.1 then states that the said amount did not satiate the in-laws and the accused persons started demanding Rs.40,000/-for construction of house. P.W.1 told the in-laws of his daughter that he was not in a position to pay that amount. The in-laws of his daughter continued to assault and torture for his daughter for failure to make good the said demands. Just prior to her death his daughter had come home for the festival of khichadi and informed them about all accused persons demanding dowry and torturing them on that account. He consoled his daughter and she returned to her matrimonial home. However, ten days later the accused persons murdered his daughter for failure to fulfill their demands.
P.W.2-Shanti
Shanti, mother of the deceased entered the witness box as PW-2 and deposed before the trial court that her daughter Rukmini was married to Krishan Kumar in 2008. Dowry was given to the in-laws of her daughter as per their resources, but that did not satisfy the former. The in-laws of her daughter namely, Shiv Lal (Father-in-law), Chhediya (Mother-in-law), Nanki (Aunt-in-law), Ram Swaroop (Brother-in-law), Rajkumari (Sister-in-law) demanded Rs. 50,000/-towards dowry. Her husband withdrew 40,000/- from the Kishan Credit Card facility and gave the amount to them along with a cycle. However, the accused persons were not content and started demanding Rs. 40,000/- for house construction. The accused persons assaulted and tortured her daughter for failing to satisfy the dowry demands. Whenever her daughter came home, she informed them that the aforesaid six persons demanded dowry and tortured her. P.W.-2 further stated that they had told her in-laws that they would be unable to satisfy the demands because of lack of financial capacity. Just prior to her death, she came to her maternal house for the festival of Khichadi. On that occasion too, she informed them that all the accused persons were demanding Rs. 40,000/- dowry and had tortured her in that regard. Three days later she went back to her matrimonial house. Her daughter died one month after returning to her matrimonial house.
Submissions from the Bar:
Arguments on behalf of appellant
Shri Swetashwa Agarwal, learned Senior Counsel and Amicus Curiae, assisted by Sri Sushil Dwivedi, learned counsel for the appellant have canvassed the following submissions in favour of the appellant as under:
I. In the first Tehrir given immediately after the incident, there was no demand of dowry mentioned.
II. The second Tehrir was submitted by the P.W.1 after 15 days which was got registered as the F.I.R.
III. Delay in the F.I.R. has not been explained by the prosecution.
IV. Vague and omnibus allegations were made in the F.I.R. against all the in-laws to bring them within the sweep of Section 304B I.P.C.
V. The prosecution deliberately withheld the first Tehrir which was got introduced as evidence by the defence and proved. The first Tehrir did not depict any dowry demand.
VI. The F.I.R. was lodged after due deliberation and as an afterthought.
VII. The inquest report insofar as it relates to the cause of death given in the opinion of the Panchas, is unreliable in view of specific denial of the same by P.W.1 (who is also a panch witness) who also put handwriting on the documents.
VIII. The post mortem report demolishes the prosecution case that the deceased was throttled to death and thereafter burnt.
IX. The post mortem report does not indicate any other injury. In fact, the bangles on the body were intact which shows that the deceased was not forcibly assaulted or done to death.
X. There are material contradictions in the statement of P.W.1 and P.W.2 which renders them unreliable.
XI. P.W.1 and P.W.2 have made general allegations of demand of dowry against the accused persons on the footing that all of them reside together. However, the witness could not withstand the cross-examination and finally stated that the deceased and her husband resided separately.
XII. The prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The foundational facts of Section 304 I.P.C. have not been satisfied by the applicable standards of evidence so as to draw presumption under Section 113 B of the Evidence Act.
XIII. The foundational facts regarding specific allegations were laid in the examination-in-chief of P.W.1 as well as P.W.2. However, under cross-examination, when their testimonies were shaken P.W.1 as well as P.W.2 tried to embellish the prosecution.
XV. P.W.1 deliberately withheld the Kisan Bahi Credit Card which was used for satisfying the dowry demand available with him and adverse inference is liable to be drawn against the prosecution.
XVI. Various specific incriminating circumstances regarding demand of dowry and cruelty and harassment arising out of same were not to put to the appellants in the proceedings under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
XVII. The prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Arguments on behalf of the State
Shri Paritosh Kumar Malviya, learned A.G.A-I and Shri Chandan Agarwal, AGA-I have vehemently opposed the submissions of learned Senior Counsel and have made following submissions:
I. The prosecution has proved the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
II. P.W.1 and P.W.2 are reliable witnesses who proved the case by producing two witnesses who consistently stated that demand of dowry was made and deceased was tortured for non-fulfillment of the same.
III. The deceased died in unnatural circumstances within seven years of her marriage.
IV. The ingredients of Section 304B I.P.C. read with Sections 498-A as well as Section ¾ of Dowry Prohibition Act have been established.
V. The prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt.
Appraisal of Evidences
FIR and Tehrir: Delay
The first Tehrir in respect to the incident was submitted by the first informant before the Police Station Malwa, District Fatehpur on 15.02.2010 at about 16:30 hours. The aforesaid Tehrir was not produced by the prosecution.
The said Tehrir was a critical piece of evidence which was suppressed by the prosecution for no satisfactory reasons or any good cause. The GD bearing the contents of the first tehrir (Exh. Ka 1) tendered and proved by the first informant is a clinching piece of evidence to determine the truth of the matter. In the facts of this case an adverse inference is liable to be drawn against the prosecution for suppression of material evidence under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act. An adverse inference drawn to the effect that had the said Tehrir been produced by the prosecution, the same would have contradicted the prosecution case.
The corresponding entry made in pursuance of the aforesaid Tehrir in the G.D. (Exh. Ka 1) was produced and proved in defence evidence through DW-1 Constable 16 Anand Prakash Singh. DW-1 identified the hand writing and signatures of Head Moharrir Awadhesh Kumar who has made the aforesaid G.D. entry. DW 1 refuted the suggestion he had never seen Head Moharrir Awadhesh Kumar writing or was unfamiliar with his hand writing.
The said G.D. entry (Exh. Ka-1) contained the contents of the first tehrir. As per the contents of the GD the first tehrir did not record any dowry demand made by the appellants. The said GD entry has not been refuted by the prosecution. In this manner defence evidence corroborates the earlier adverse inference drawn against the prosecution, and strengthens the defence case that no dowry demand was made by the appellants.
The FIR was got registered on 02.03.2010 at about 09:30 A.M. PW-1, in his testimony, admitted that he had tendered a written report/Tehrir at the Police Station at about 01:30 P.M. He had dictated the second Tehrir to Rajendra Kumar, who had reduced it to writing. The said second Tehrir was submitted before the Police Station on this day his daughter died. Under cross examination PW-1 stated that he had tendered the Tehrir before the S.O. at the Police Station. However, the FIR was not registered and he was asked to compromise the matter. According to the PW-1 thereafter he submitted an application before the Court. The case was not got registered on orders of the Court. The case was registered on orders of the S.P.
The application made before the competent Court for lodgement of FIR by PW1 was never produced in evidence. There is no evidence to show that the FIR was registered on the orders of the S.P. On the contrary, the prosecution evidence shows that the FIR was got registered on the second Tehrir dated 02.03.2010 submitted by PW-1 before Police Station Malwa, District Fatehpur. The manner of lodgement of FIR as deposed to by P.W. 1 is contradicted by the evidence in the record.
Both the tehrirs submitted by PW1 contain contrary versions and cannot be reconciled. The explanation for the delay in lodgement of FIR given by the PW-1 in his testimony before the Court below suffers from serious contradictions and lacks credibility. In fact reasons for the delay stated by PW1 are found to be false. The FIR which introduces dowry demands for the first time was registered after inordinate delay and as an afterthought.
The cumulative impact of the adverse inference drawn against the prosecution for suppressing the first tehrir and false testimony of PW 1 regarding registration of FIR, renders the unexplained delay in the FIR fatal to the prosecution case. Further there is absence of dowry demands in the first tehrir/written report submitted by the PW 1. The dowry demands were introduced for the first time in the second tehrir submitted 15 days later by PW 1. The contrary versions regarding dowry demands in the respective tehrirs by PW 1 casts a doubt on the prosecution story stated in the FIR.
Inquest Report:
The inquest report which is Exh. Ka-5 records that inquest proceedings were conducted on the Tehrir submitted by the PW-1 dated 15.02.2010. The PW-1 was a witness to the inquest report. The inquest report records that in the opinion of the Panchas the deceased was done to death by throttling and thereafter set on fire. Recitals in the inquest report also state that the deceased was subjected to harassment and cruelty on account of failure to make good the dowry demands. PW-1 in his testimony has categorically denied giving any such opinion to the PW-5 when the inquest report was being drawn up. Testimony of P.W.1 falsifies the aforesaid recitals regarding dowry demands in the inquest report.
The inquest report also records that the bangles which the deceased was wearing were intact. This fact itself contradicts the recitals in the inquest report that the deceased was throttled to death and thereafter her body was burnt.
There is another aspect to the matter. The inquest report is transcribed in three distinct handwritings which were not reconciled by the prosecution. There is merit in the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that the introduction of dowry demand in the inquest report was made much belatedly and is an interpolation.
In the wake of the aforesaid facts this Court finds that the dowry demands referenced in the inquest report are disputed by PW 1 and appear to be interpolated. The aforesaid endorsement pertaining to dowry demand in the inquest report is accordingly disbelieved.
Material Exhibits:
Material Exhibits were not produced and proved before the trial court.
Cause of Death:
According to the FIR, inquest report, testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 the deceased was assaulted and throttled to death by the accused. The deceased was thereafter burnt by the accused persons.
As seen earlier the inquest report records that the bangles of the deceased were intact when her body was being examined during the inquest proceedings. The aforesaid recital in the inquest report clearly refutes the prosecution case that she was assaulted and throttled to death before being set on fire.
Similarly the postmortem report and the deposition of PW-4 Dr. A.S. Khan discloses that the deceased did not suffer any ante-mortem injuries other than burn injuries. This evidence also rules out the possibility of the victim being assaulted and throttled to death. The soot particles in the trachea as depicted in postmortem report also prove that the deceased was not done to death by throttling before she was burnt.
The medical and other documentary evidences in the record thus clearly repudiate the prosecution case depicted in the FIR and the testimonies of PW-1 and PW 2 regarding physical assault as the cause of death.
The evidence in the record shows that PW-1 had made false claims regarding the cause of death in the FIR as well as in his testimony.
The inconsistencies in the documentary evidence, including the inquest report, post-mortem report, FIR as well as in the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 is of great significance in the facts and evidences of this case. The aforesaid contradictions established in the preceding discussion strengthen the defence case that a false prosecution was belatedly brought against them by fabricating the cause of death.
Credibility of P.W. 1:
PW-1 Phaguni who is the father of the deceased in his testimony has made sweeping allegations of dowry demands against the husband and in-laws of the deceased. PW-1 has nominated the deceased’s husband (Krishan Kumar), father-in-law (Shiv Lal), mother-in-law (Chhediya), aunt-in-law (Nanki), brother-in-law (Ram Swaroop) and sister-in-law (Raj Kumari) individually and collectively. PW-1 testified that all the accused persons lived together in one house to support the aforesaid general allegations of dowry demands made against all the in-laws of the deceased.
However, under cross-examination PW 1 resiled from his earlier depostion and he admitted that the in-laws of the deceased had two houses. PW 1 also admitted before the trial court that the deceased and her husband lived separately from other members of her husband’s family. The distance between the houses is half kilometer. The testimony of PW1 regarding common residence of all accused persons under cross examination again shook his reliability.
PW-1 has testified before the trial court that no dowry demand was made from him directly, but such demands were made only from his daughter. However, under cross-examination PW-1 yet again failed to hold his ground when he deposed that a Panchayat had taken place at his instance to discuss the dowry demands. He also testified thereafter that he tried to negotiate with the in-laws regarding the dowry demands.
PW-1 also deposed that no dowry demands were made either prior to marriage or at the time of marriage by the accused persons. PW-1 had testified that he gave Rs.800/- at the time of marriage. According to PW 1 demand of dowry was made for the first time after two months of marriage. PW-1 and his family came to know about the same when his daughter returned home after two months. However under cross-examination PW-1 stated that the first demand was made six months after marriage. There is a clear discrepancy in the timing relating to the demands of dowry in the statements of PW-1.
Apart from this, as per the statement of PW-1, there was a gap of almost 11 months between the date of incident and the last demand of dowry as told to her parents. This statement shows that the demand was not insistent.
In his examination-in-chief, PW-1 stated that the amount of Rs. 40,000/- which was withdrawn from Kisan Credit Card was given to the in-laws. However, under cross-examination, he modified the statement and stated that the amount was paid to his daughter and son-in-law for construction of a house. He also gave the a cycle to the couple. His statement shows that he had made voluntary gifts to the children.
According to the PW-1 the first demand was made for construction of a house. Later, PW-1, in his examination-in-chief, also stated that the second demand for construction of a house to the extent of Rs. 40,000/- was made without giving any specific time. Under cross-examination, he again modified the statement and stated that the second demand of Rs. 40,000/-was made 2–3 months after the first demand was satisfied.
The PW-1 was searchingly cross-examined on the issue of making good the dowry demand of Rs. 40,000/-. He claimed under cross-examination that he had a pass book of his Kisan Credit Card Account. However, the pass book was not produced and the withdrawal of money from the Kisan Credit Card could not be established by PW-1 before the trial court. The proof of withdrawal of the amount of Rs. 40,000/- becomes all the more significant in view of the fact of the admitted destitute financial status of PW-1 and his family. (PW 1 spent Rs. 800/- at the marriage). PW 1 was rightly challenged in the dock about his capacity to muster the amount. PW 1 could not withstand the cross examination on this issue.
The best evidence to establish the satisfaction of dowry demand by payment of Rs 40,000/- was suppressed by the PW-1. In these facts, the court finds the application of Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act to be of relevance in the facts and evidences before this Court. An adverse inference is accordingly drawn against PW-1 in respect of payment of Rs 40,000/- towards dowry demand of Rs. 40,000/-, PW 1 suppressed Kisan Credit pass book as the same would have rebutted the prosecution case.
In wake of the preceding discussion, the testimony of PW-1 improved and changed from time to time. There are also material contradictions in the statements made by PW-1 in examination-in-chief and in cross-examination. Moreover, PW-1 had made vague and general demands against all members of the family. Failure to specify roles of individual family members in making dowry demands discredits the prosecution case as common residence of all accused persons has been disproved. He also tried to change the tenor under cross-examination by stating that his son-in-law had made demands of dowry. PW1 was repeatedly shaken under cross examination on material aspects of the prosecution.
The credit of PW-1 has been successfully impeached. He is an unreliable witness. Accordingly, his testimony in so far as it implicates the appellants is entirely discarded. Testimony of P.W.1 is unsafe to be relied upon for convicting the appellants.
Credibility of P.W. 2:
P.W.2 in her statement has stated that her daughter was married to the accused-Krishan Kumar in the year 2008. They had given dowry at the time of marriage according to their capacity. However, the in-laws of the deceased were not satisfied with the dowry so given. P.W.2 in her examination-in-chief too made general and sweeping allegations of dowry demands against all members of the family of the husband of the deceased. According to P.W.2, the first demand of dowry was made by Krishan Kumar (husband), Shiv Lal (father-in-law), Chhediya (mother-in-law), Nanki (aunt-in-law), Ramswaroop (brother-in-law), Raj Kumari (sister-in-law) to the extent of Rs. 50,000/-. The aforesaid demand was satisfied by her husband who withdrew an amount of Rs. 40,000/- and gave the amount in cash to all the accused persons along with a cycle. Despite realizing the aforesaid amount, the accused persons were not satisfied and continued to escalate their dowry demands. According to P.W.2, the second demand of dowry was to the extent of Rs. 40,000/- for construction of a house.
The time line and purpose of dowry demands as stated by P.W.2 is inconsistent with those stated by P.W.1.
P.W.2 in her cross-examination has also stated that a second demand of Rs. 50,000/- was made after 5-6 months of marriage for investment in business. According to P.W.2, Rs. 50,000/- was paid to the in-laws towards satisfaction of dowry demands. P.W.2 has also stated that the amount was demanded by the daughter as well as the son-in-law.
The sweeping nature of the allegations and lack of material particulars regarding the dowry demands as deposed to by P.W.2 renders her testimony suspect. This is most damaging to the prosecution since common residence of all accused was falsified. Moreover, under cross-examination she stated that both the daughter and the son-in-law asked her and her husband for money. P.W.2 in her testimony clearly lost sense of the timeline of the marriage and dowry demands, which also makes her testimony doubtful.
There are material contradictions in the testimonies of PW1 and PW2. PW1 has categorically testified that no demand of dowry was made at the time of the marriage and for a while even thereafter. However, PW2 has specifically deposed that dowry was given when the marriage was solemnized. The said mutual contradictions cannot be reconciled and the said inconsistencies dent the credibility of the witnesses.
The deposition of PW2 that Rs. 50,000/- was paid to the in-laws of the deceased is again contrary to the statement of PW1. Further, as seen earlier the payment of the amount could not be proved by the prosecution.
In this manner credit of PW 2 was repeatedly shaken. For the above reasons PW2 is an unreliable witness and her testimony is disbelieved. It is unsafe to rely on the testimony of P.W. 2 to return the guilt of the appellants.
The prosecution has not been able to establish cruelty, or harassment for dowry demands made by the appellants soon before the death of the deceased as per applicable standards of evidence and in a manner which would satisfy the ingredients of Section 304B I.P.C. In the instant case bald allegations of demand of dowry were made belatedly by P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 and are not liable to be believed. The credibility of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 has been successfully impeached which is fatal to the prosecution case.
The purpose of introducing the concept of presumptions in law is to dispense with proof of certain facts which cannot be proved by the prosecution or those which are in the special knowledge of the persons of the household. The foundational facts for invocation of the presumption under Section 304B I.P.C. read with Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act have to be strictly proved beyond reasonable doubt. Failure to establish the foundational facts in the manner stated above will prevent the prosecution from attracting the presumptions under Section 304B IPC read with Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act.
The bar of proving the foundational facts to invoke the presumption under Section 304 IPC read with Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be so high as to make an impossible demand on the prosecution; but at the same time, the standard of proving the foundational facts should also not be a low hanging fruit where the presumption can be drawn at the mere asking of the prosecution without determining the credibility of prosecution evidence.
Foundational facts which have to be established beyond reasonable doubt for bringing the death within the ambit of dowry death under Section 304B IPC with the aid of Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act are as under:
A. The death of the woman has to be caused by burns, bodily injuries or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of marriage.
B. It has to be established that soon before her death, the victim/deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any other relative in connection with any demand of dowry.
In summation for drawing the presumption of dowry death, the prosecution has to establish that the death was caused by burns, bodily injury or occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. Secondly, the proximity and a live nexus between the death and the harassment or cruelty in connection with the said demand for dowry are essential ingredients to attract the presumption under Section 304-B IPC read with 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act.
The prosecution has to be held rigorously accountable to the standards of evidence of proving the foundational facts for the presumption of dowry death beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution cannot be relieved of the burden of establishing the foundational facts or essential ingredients before bringing the incident within the ambit of dowry death. In the same breath, the prosecution cannot be allowed to use the provisions for drawing the evidential presumptions as contemplated in Section 304B read with 113B of the Indian Evidence Act to lower the standards of evidence applicable in criminal trials. Any attempt by the prosecution to reduce the rigor of evidential standard of beyond reasonable doubt by evading the obligation to prove the prerequisites for invoking Section 304B IPC read with 113B of the Evidence Act cannot be countenanced by the courts.
Prosecution could not prove the foundational facts of demand or torture for dowry and also that there was a live nexus and proximity between dowry demands and death of the deceased. The prerequisites of invoking the presumption under Section 304-B IPC read with Section 113-B of Indian Evidence Act have not been established in the manner provided by law. The appellants cannot be convicted under Section 304-B with the aid of Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act.
Section 313 Cr.P.C.
In the proceedings taken out under Section 313 CrPC the substance of the prosecution case to the effect that the deceased was married to the accused Krishan Kumar on 06.07.2008; and that after the marriage the deceased was subjected to regular physical and mental cruelty and torture for her failure to fulfil the demand for dowry of ₹40,000/- and a bicycle was put to the accused.
Thereafter, the accused persons were confronted with the fact that, on 15.02.2016 at about 11:00 a.m., on account of the failing to fulfil the dowry demands, the deceased was subjected to mental and physical torture and was murdered by the accused persons and thereafter her body was burnt. Among others, the following questions warrant the attention of this Court:
"प्रश्न नं० 1:- अभियोजन पक्ष की साक्ष्य है कि आप अभियुक्तगण कृष्णकुमार के साथ वादी मुकदमा फगुनी की पुत्री रुकमिणी की शादी 6 जुलाई सन् 2008 को हुयी थी शादी के बाद से आप लोगों ने वादी व उसकी पुत्री से अतिरिक्त दहेज के रूप में 40,000/- रुपये व एक साइकिल की माँग किया और दहेज की माँग पूरी न होने पर वादी की पुत्री रुकमिणी को हर आये दिन मारते पीटते रहे और उसको शारीरिक व मानसिक रूप से प्रताड़ित किया इस सम्बन्ध में आपको क्या कहना है?"
प्रश्न नं० 2:- अभियोजन पक्ष की साक्ष्य है कि दिनांक 15-2-2010 को समय लगभग 11 बजे दिन में ग्राम भदवा थाना मलवां जिला-फतेहपुर में अतिरिक्त दहेज की माँग पूरी न होने पर वादी की पुत्री रुकमिणी को शारीरिक व मानसिक रूप से प्रताड़ित करते हुये उसको जान से मार डाला और मारने के बाद आग से जला दिया इस सम्बन्ध में आपको क्या कहना है?"
It is noteworthy that the aforesaid questions were posed to the appellant in an omnibus fashion without alerting them to the specific incriminating evidences in the testimonies of PW 1 and PW 2. This is important in view of the contrary depositions of the said witnesses against them. Thereafter, in the proceedings under Section 313 CrPC bald references were made to the tehrir, chik FIR, panchayatnama, postmortem report, documents pertaining to the postmortem namely photo nash, challan nash, namuna mohar, letter to the CMO, one can of kerosene oil. Lastly, an omnibus statement was made that the accused persons had heard testimonies of PW1 to PW6 and their responses to the same were elicited.
Proceedings under Section 313 CrPC are the most significant safeguard of the rights of defense of an accused and are integral to a fair trial. Proceedings are not to be completed in a mechanical manner or as a matter of formality. The accused persons have to be alerted to specific incriminating evidences against them as well as their respective roles in the offence.
In the instant case, as seen above, the appellants were not alerted to the specific incriminating evidences and the respective roles attributed to them in the prosecution evidence. The proceedings under Section 313 CrPC were conducted in a mechanical manner and as a mere formality.
The scope of Section 313 Cr.P.C. and adverse impact of non-compliance thereof have been stated in authorities of long standing.
The Supreme Court in Nar Singh Vs. State of Haryana1 examined significance and propounded the scope of Section 313 Cr.P.C. by holding:-
“10.There are two kinds of examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The first under Section 313 (1) (a) Cr.P.C. relates to any stage of the inquiry or trial; while the second under Section 313 (1) (b) Cr.P.C. takes place after the prosecution witnesses are examined and before the accused is called upon to enter upon his defence. The former is particular and optional; but the latter is general and mandatory. In Usha K. Pillai v. Raj K. Srinivas & Ors., (1993) 3 SCC 208 , this Court held that the Court is empowered by Section 313 (1) clause (a) to question the accused at any stage of the inquiry or trial; while Section 313(1) clause (b) obligates the Court to question the accused before he enters his defence on any circumstance appearing in prosecution evidence against him.
11.The object of Section 313 (1)(b) Cr.P.C. is to bring the substance of accusation to the accused to enable the accused to explain each and every circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. The provisions of this section are mandatory and cast a duty on the court to afford an opportunity to the accused to explain each and every circumstance and incriminating evidence against him. The examination of accused under Section 313 (1)(b) Cr.P.C. is not a mere formality. Section 313 Cr.P.C. prescribes a procedural safeguard for an accused, giving him an opportunity to explain the facts and circumstances appearing against him in the evidence and this opportunity is valuable from the standpoint of the accused. The real importance of Section 313 Cr.P.C. lies in that, it imposes a duty on the Court to question the accused properly and fairly so as to bring home to him the exact case he will have to meet and thereby, an opportunity is given to him to explain any such point.
16.Undoubtedly, the importance of a statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., insofar as the accused is concerned, can hardly be minimised. The statutory provision is based on the rules of natural justice for an accused, who must be made aware of the circumstances being put against him so that he can give a proper explanation to meet that case. If an objection as to Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement is taken at the earliest stage, the Court can make good the defect and record additional statement of the accused as that would be in the interest of all. When objections as to defective Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement is raised in the appellate court, then difficulty arises for the prosecution as well as the accused. When the trial court is required to act in accordance with the mandatory provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C., failure on the part of the trial court to comply with the mandate of the law, in our view, cannot automatically enure to the benefit of the accused. Any omission on the part of the Court to question the accused on any incriminating circumstance would not ipso facto vitiate the trial, unless some material prejudice is shown to have been caused to the accused. Insofar as noncompliance of mandatory provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C., it is an error essentially committed by the learned Sessions Judge. Since justice suffers in the hands of the Court, the same has to be corrected or rectified in the appeal.
20.The question whether a trial is vitiated or not depends upon the degree of the error and the accused must show that non-compliance of Section 313 Cr.P.C. has materially prejudiced him or is likely to cause prejudice to him. Merely because of defective questioning under Section 313 Cr.P.C., it cannot be inferred that any prejudice had been caused to the accused, even assuming that some incriminating circumstances in the prosecution case had been left out. When prejudice to the accused is alleged, it has to be shown that accused has suffered some disability or detriment in relation to the safeguard given to him under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Such prejudice should also demonstrate that it has occasioned failure of justice to the accused. The burden is upon the accused to prove that prejudice has been caused to him or in the facts and circumstances of the case, such prejudice may be implicit and the Court may draw an inference of such prejudice. Facts of each case have to be examined to determine whether actually any prejudice has been caused to the appellant due to omission of some incriminating circumstances being put to the accused.”
A similar view was taken in Sujit Biswas Vs. State of Assam2:-
“12.It is a settled legal proposition that in a criminal trial, the purpose of examining the accused person under Section 313 Cr.P.C., is to meet the requirement of the principles of natural justice, i.e. audi alterum partem. This means that the accused may be asked to furnish some explanation as regards the incriminating circumstances associated with him, and the court must take note of such explanation. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the same is essential to decide whether or not the chain of circumstances is complete. No matter how weak the evidence of the prosecution may be, it is the duty of the court to examine the accused, and to seek his explanation as regards the incriminating material that has surfaced against him. The circumstances which are not put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., cannot be used against him and must be excluded from consideration. The said statement cannot be treated as evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act, as the accused cannot be cross-examined with reference to such statement.
14.Whether the abscondance of an accused can be taken as a circumstance against him has been considered by this Court in Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2010 SC 3638 , wherein the Court observed: “27. In Matru alias Girish Chandra v. State of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 1050 , this Court repelled the submissions made by the State that as after commission of the offence the accused had been absconding, therefore, the inference can be drawn that he was a guilty person observing as under: ‘19. The appellant's conduct in absconding was also relied upon. Now, mere absconding by itself does not necessarily lead to a firm conclusion of guilty mind. Even an innocent man may feel panicky and try to evade arrest when wrongly suspected of a grave crime such is the instinct of self-preservation. The act of absconding is no doubt relevant piece of evidence to be considered along with other evidence but its value would always depend on the circumstances of each case. Normally the courts are disinclined to attach much importance to the act of absconding, treating it as a very small item in the evidence for sustaining conviction. It can scarcely be held as a determining link in completing the chain of circumstantial evidence which must admit of no other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. In the present case the appellant was with Ram Chandra till the FIR was lodged. If thereafter he felt that he was being wrongly suspected and he tried to keep out of the way we do not think this circumstance can be considered to be necessarily evidence of a guilty mind attempting to evade justice. It is not inconsistent with his innocence.’ 28. Abscondence by a person against whom FIR has been lodged, having an apprehension of being apprehended by the police, cannot be said to be unnatural. Thus, in view of the above, we do not find any force in the submission made by Shri Bhattacharjee that mere absconding by the appellant after commission of the crime and remaining untraceable for such a long time itself can establish his guilt. Absconding by itself is not conclusive either of guilt or of guilty conscience.” While deciding the said case, a large number of earlier judgments were also taken into consideration by the Court, including Matru (supra); and State of M.P. thr. CBI & Ors. v. Paltan Mallah & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 733.”
The Supreme Court in State of U.P. Vs. Mohd Iqram & Anr.3 has held as under:-
“12.So far as the issue of rape of the deceased prior to her murder by Suresh Kumar, accused, her ex-husband, is concerned, the trial court has recorded findings of fact on this aspect in the negative. Undoubtedly, post-mortem report contains such observations, but Dr. G.R. Sharma (PW.1) has not made any such reference either in his examination-in-chief or cross-examination. Nor this aspect had ever been put to either of the three accused in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called ‘Cr.P.C.’). We fail to understand as under what circumstances it was permissible for the High Court to make such observations about the post-mortem report. Accused Suresh Kumar has been acquitted by the trial court. The State, for reasons best known to it, did not prefer any appeal against the said order of acquittal. We are of the considered opinion that it was not permissible for the High Court to castigate the accused Suresh Kumar with such observations holding him guilty of committing rape and subsequently murder of his ex-wife Rashmi. Undoubtedly, the post-mortem report had been proved but that does not mean that each and every content thereof is stood proved or can be held to be admissible. Such observations cannot be termed to be a substantive piece of evidence. Dr. G.R. Sharma (PW.1) did not even whisper about the same in his statement made in the court which is the only substantive piece of evidence in law. The court cannot place reliance on incriminating material against the accused, unless it is put to him during his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Thus, the High Court committed an error by taking into consideration the inadmissible evidence for the purpose of deciding the criminal appeals and holding the person guilty who had already been acquitted by the trial court. The post-mortem report had been examined at the time of framing of the charges. The trial court did not frame any charge under Section 376 IPC or Section 376 read with Section 511 IPC. More so, no witness had ever mentioned anything in this respect. Thus, it is beyond any stretch of imagination of any person, how such observations could be made by the High Court.”
The mechanical conduct of proceedings under Section 313 Cr.P.C. in the instant case is in the teeth of the law laid down in preceding case laws. In light of the cases on point non compliance of Section 313 Cr.P.C. in the spirit of the precedents discussed earlier vitiates the impugned judgement.
In the ordinary course of things, the matter was liable to be remitted for conducting fresh proceedings under Section 313 CrPC to ameliorate the miscarriage of justice which has happened as a result of non-compliance of the mandate of Section 313 CrPC. However, the custody report of the appellant Krishan Kumar discloses that the actual undergone custody period by Krishan Kumar is nine years, nine months, thirty days. Furthermore, a long period has elapsed since the incident and the conclusion of trial and in view of other infirmities in the prosecution, it will not be in the interest of justice to remand the matter for fresh initiation of proceedings under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
In this wake, the Court does not deem it appropriate to remand the matter for fresh proceedings under Section 313 CrPC at this stage.
Impugned Judgment of the Trial Court:
Learned trial court in the impugned judgment erred in law by placing exclusive reliance on the testimonies of PW1 and PW2 to return a conviction against the appellants. As seen above, the aforesaid reliance by the learned trial court was misconceived inasmuch as PW1 and PW2 were wholly unreliable witnesses to implicate the appellant. The trial court also neglected to consider the consequences of inordinate and unexplained delay in the lodgment of the FIR. The material inconsistencies in the cause of death depicted in the prosecution case in various documentary evidences and testimonies of witnesses was also overlooked by the learned trial court.
The learned trial court erred in law by drawing the presumptions under S 304B Indian Penal Code read with S 113 Indian Evidence Act. The impugned judgment of the learned trial court is liable to be set aside and is set aside.
Conclusions:
The prosecution has failed to prove the charges under Sections 304B and 498-A IPC as well as Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The accused appellants are acquitted of the charges which were laid against them by the trial court and which are the subject matter of this appeal.
The appellants- Krishan Kumar and Smt. Chhediya are on bail, their bail bonds and surety bonds are canceled and sureties shall stand discharged.
The Criminal Appeal is allowed.
A copy of this judgment translated in Hindi to be served upon the appellants by the Secretary, District Legal Services Authority.
