Krishan Kumar Sharma vs State of Punjab and Another

Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.—The appellant''s challenge to the order dated August 1, 1975 by which he was reverted to his parent Department, having been negatived by the learned Single Judge, he has come up in this Letter Patent Appeal.

The appellant was recruited as, a Constable on December 2, 1960. On July 18, 1973, the appellant was appointed as a Prosecuting Sub Inspector on purely ad hoc basis for a period of six months. The period of ad hoc appointment was extended. The prosecution agency in the State was separated from the Police Department. Persons who were working as Prosecuting Sub Inspectors including the appellant were appointed as Assistant District Attorneys Grade II with effect from April 1, 1974. Vide order dated December 9, 1974, the period of ad hoc appointment of the appellant was extended for another six months. Some time later, a special report regarding his performance was called for. After the receipt of the report, the tenure of his ad hoc appointment was not extended beyond March 31, 1975. He was ordered to be reverted to his parent Department.

The sole contention raised before the learned Single Judge was that the reversion was punitive as it had been ordered on the ground that the record of service was not good. It was rejected. It was found that the appellant was working on a purely ad hoc basis and in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kushal Kishore Shukla 1991(1) S.L.R. 606, his claim could not be sustained. Hence this appeal.

The solitary contention raised by Mr. Bhandari, counsel for the appellant before us is that the persons junior to the appellant having been retained in service as Assistant District Attorneys, the action in reverting him was violative of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

We are unable to accept this contention. Firstly, this contention was not raised before the learned Single Judge. Even if this aspect is ignored. Mr. Bhandari has not been able to show that the appellant and the alleged juniors were similarly placed. An order of reversion can be challenged on the ground of violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution only if it is shown that equals have been treated unequally. In other words, if the record of service is identical and yet the senior is reverted while his junior is allowed to continue, it may be possible to urge that the action suffers from the vice of discrimination. However, in the present case it has not been shown that any one whose record of service was similar to that of the appellant, had been allowed to continue as an Assistant District Attorney Grade II. Thus it cannot be said that persons similarly situated have been treated differently or that the appellant was discriminated against.

In view of the above, we find no merit in this appeal. It is dismissed in limine.