Krishan Kumar Paliya vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

Heard on IA. No.12446/2026, an application for amendment in the Memo of Writ Petition.

The first question which arises for consideration is whether the proposed amendment can be permitted at this stage of the proceedings.

It is true that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court is not strictly governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. However, the principles underlying Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC may be kept in view while considering an application for amendment. The power to permit amendment is discretionary and the Court has to examine whether the proposed amendment is necessary for determining the controversy already involved in the writ petition or whether it introduces a new factual foundation, cause of action or relief. The amendment sought by the petitioner cannot, in the facts of the present case, be treated as a mere consequential or formal amendment. The original writ petition was instituted challenging the non-payment of salary and non-acceptance of the petitioner's joining. The principal grievance raised therein was that the petitioner who according to him had been continuously working and had also been extended the benefit of Viniymatikaran, was being prevented from discharging his duties. The relief sought was consequently for release of salary and permitting him to work. The proposed amendment, however, seeks to introduce an independent challenge to the enquiry report/order dated 30.06.2026 on the ground that the same was passed in violation of principles of natural justice and without giving the petitioner an effective opportunity to place his case and relevant documents. The petitioner further seeks quashing of the said report and consequential relief of continuation/joining in service and salary. Thus, the proposed amendment is not confined to supplying better particulars of the original grievance. It seeks to bring into question the validity of a subsequent enquiry and the findings recorded therein. The validity of the enquiry, the opportunity allegedly afforded to the petitioner, the documents considered by the enquiry committee, the procedure followed and the correctness of the findings recorded therein would all become matters requiring separate consideration. The respondents have already filed their pleadings in the original writ petition. Permitting the proposed amendment at this stage would require the respondents to file a fresh and detailed response to the allegations regarding the enquiry proceedings and alleged violation of natural justice. The scope of the proceedings would consequently stand enlarged and the respondents would be required to meet a substantially different case from the one originally pleaded.

It is also relevant that the petitioner is not without a remedy against the subsequent order/report dated 30.06.2026. If the petitioner seeks to challenge the validity of the said enquiry report on the ground of violation of natural justice or on any other ground, he may raise such grievance in an appropriate and properly constituted proceeding where the validity of the enquiry and the findings recorded therein can be examined on the basis of the complete record.

The mere fact that the subsequent enquiry was conducted during the pendency of the present writ petition does not, by itself, confer an absolute right upon the petitioner to incorporate every subsequent grievance into the pending proceedings. The Court has to examine whether the proposed amendment is necessary for deciding the original controversy or whether it would introduce a fresh and substantially different controversy. In the present case, permitting the proposed amendment would require this Court to examine a fresh factual controversy relating to the enquiry proceedings, the opportunity granted to the petitioner, the material considered by the enquiry authority and the legality of the findings recorded on 30.06.2026. Such an exercise would substantially enlarge the scope of the present writ petition. Learned Senior Counsel for petitioner in support of his amendment application has relied on order dated 05.05.2026 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in WA. No.1389/2026 [Jagdish Singh Jatav Vs. State of M.P. And Others].

There is yet another important aspect. The respondents have taken a specific stand that the petitioner has failed to establish the existence of any valid foundational appointment order and that the departmental record does not disclose a lawful selection or appointment process. The enquiry has also examined the legality of the appointments of the petitioner and other similarly situated employees. The proposed amendment would, therefore, require adjudication of several factual aspects relating to the petitioner's initial appointment and the subsequent enquiry, which cannot appropriately be introduced into the present proceedings through the proposed amendment.

This Court is conscious that procedural rules are intended to advance the cause of justice and ordinarily a subsequent event arising during pendency of a writ petition may, in an appropriate case, be brought on record. However, such discretion cannot be exercised where the proposed amendment substantially alters the nature and scope of the proceedings and requires adjudication of a fresh factual controversy.

In the considered opinion of this Court, the proposed amendment is not merely consequential in nature. It seeks to introduce a fresh challenge to the enquiry report dated 30.06.2026, based upon alleged violation of natural justice, and also seeks a new substantive relief for quashing the said report and consequential benefits. The same would enlarge the scope of the present writ petition and require adjudication of issues which were not part of the original controversy. The order relied on by petitioner in Jagdish Singh Jatav (supra) is not applicable in the present case as in the said order the Division Bench of this Court has specifically observed that the proposed amendment does not change the nature of case whereas in the present case position is not the same.

Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the amendment application cannot be allowed. Consequently, I.A. No.12446/2026, filed by the petitioner seeking amendment in the writ petition, is hereby rejected.

This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been filed seeking the following relief (s): -

The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a direction to the respondents to release the salary of the petitioner from March, 2024 and to permit him to join and discharge his duties as Pump Driver. The petitioner has also challenged the action of the respondents whereby he was not permitted to continue in service without passing any formal order of termination. During pendency of the petition, an enquiry was conducted pursuant to the order passed by this Court and the respondents have brought on record the outcome thereof. The petitioner has thereafter sought amendment of the writ petition to challenge the enquiry report/order dated 30.06.2026. The original grievance of the petitioner was that despite his long service, his salary was withheld and he was not permitted to join.

The case of the petitioner is that he was initially appointed on 24.04.1993 on the post of Pump Driver and has thereafter continuously discharged his duties. He relies upon his service book and further submits that he was granted the benefit of the Government policy dated 07.10.2016 relating to Viniymitikaran by order dated 18.08.2017. According to the petitioner, after having been treated as a Sthayi Karmi and having been extended the benefit of the aforesaid policy, the respondents could not stop his salary or prevent him from discharging his duties without giving him an opportunity of hearing.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there is no allegation of any misconduct against the petitioner. It is argued that the alleged enquiry before the Lokayukt against certain officers of the Department has no connection with the petitioner and he cannot be made to suffer for any alleged irregularity committed by such officers. It is further submitted that the petitioner has continuously worked for several years and his services were subsequently regularised/classified under the Government policy. On these grounds, it is contended that withholding of salary and restraining the petitioner from joining service is arbitrary and unsustainable.

Per contra, the respondents have opposed the petition. In their return as well as additional return, the respondents have specifically taken the stand that the petitioner has failed to produce any valid appointment order, engagement letter, selection record or approval of the competent authority. It is stated that upon scrutiny of the departmental record, no appointment or engagement order in favour of the petitioner could be traced. According to the respondents, in absence of the foundational documents establishing a lawful appointment, the alleged engagement of the petitioner itself is doubtful and unauthorised.

The respondents have further stated that a three-member committee was constituted for examining the legality of the appointments, including that of the petitioner. The respondents maintained that the scrutiny was not based merely upon an oral complaint but was followed by examination of the available departmental records, which revealed absence of a valid appointment order. It is also their case that the petitioner has not produced any document showing that his appointment was made through a lawful selection process or against a sanctioned post.

This Court, vide order dated 16.04.2026, had directed the competent authority to finalise the enquiry within the stipulated period. The compliance report filed by the respondents records that the enquiry was thereafter finalised and an order dated 30.06.2026 was passed. The respondents have placed the said order on record as Annexure R/1.

From the subsequent report/order placed on record, it is stated that the enquiry examined the appointments of the petitioner and 21 other similarly situated employees. The finding recorded therein is that the prescribed recruitment procedure was not followed, appointment orders were not available in the record and the names of the concerned persons were also not found in the classification employee list. On the basis of the material available on record, the appointments of all 22 persons, including the petitioner, have been found illegal.

During pendency of the petition, the petitioner has sought amendment of the writ petition for challenging the enquiry report/order dated 30.06.2026. The proposed amendment proceeds on the basis that the enquiry report has serious civil consequences and that the petitioner was not granted proper and effective opportunity to place his case and relevant documents before the enquiry authority. The petitioner, therefore, seeks quashing of the enquiry report insofar as it concerns him and consequential permission to continue/join service with consequential salary and other benefits.

The principal question which now arises for consideration is whether, in the facts of the present case, the petitioner has established a legally enforceable right to continue in service and claim salary merely on the basis of his long service, service book and subsequent benefit of Viniymitikaran, despite the categorical finding recorded by the competent authority that the foundational appointment itself was not made in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

In the considered opinion of this Court, the answer has to be in the negative. The petitioner claims his initial appointment from 24.04.1993. However, when the legality of that appointment was specifically examined, the petitioner was unable to establish the existence of the appointment order or any other foundational record demonstrating that his appointment was made by the competent authority through the prescribed process. The respondents, on the other hand, have specifically stated that no such appointment order is available in the official record.

The mere fact that the petitioner has worked for a considerable length of time cannot, by itself, validate an appointment which was not shown to have been made in accordance with law. Length of service may establish the fact that the person worked, but it cannot, in the absence of a lawful initial appointment, by itself establish a legal right to continue in public employment.

The petitioner has placed considerable reliance upon his service book. However, the respondents have rightly pointed out that a service book is an administrative record maintained during the course of service and cannot, by itself, substitute the foundational appointment order or establish that the initial appointment was made by the competent authority in accordance with the prescribed recruitment procedure. Even past payment of salary or continuation in service cannot confer legality upon an appointment which was otherwise unauthorised.

The same principle applies to the subsequent benefit granted to the petitioner under the Viniymitikaran Policy dated 07.10.2016. The respondents have specifically pleaded that classification under such a policy presupposes an underlying engagement which is legally recognisable and traceable to the competent authority. The petitioner has not placed before this Court the foundational document showing that his original appointment was made through the prescribed procedure.

The mere subsequent grant of a benefit under a policy cannot, in the facts of the present case, be treated as an independent source of appointment so as to dispense with proof of the legality of the original engagement. More particularly, when the competent authority, after an enquiry directed by this Court, has examined the relevant records and has recorded a categorical finding that no appointment order was issued and that the prescribed recruitment procedure was not followed, the petitioner cannot claim a right to public employment merely on the basis of his past continuance.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the principle of natural justice and has contended that no effective opportunity was granted to him before the enquiry report dated 30.06.2026 was passed. The petitioner has accordingly pleaded violation of natural justice in the amendment application.

However, the nature of the exercise undertaken by the respondents is also required to be kept in view. The enquiry was directed to ascertain the legality of the petitioner's initial engagement on the basis of the official record. The respondents have not proceeded on the basis of any alleged misconduct committed by the petitioner during service. The fundamental issue examined was whether there existed a lawful appointment in his favour. The report records absence of appointment order and non-following of the prescribed recruitment procedure.

The petitioner cannot derive a positive right to continue in public employment merely because no misconduct has been attributed to him. The absence of misconduct is a different matter from the existence of a lawful appointment. Where the very foundation of appointment is found to be absent, the question of permitting continuation merely because the employee has not committed any misconduct does not arise.

It is also significant that the respondents have complied with the direction issued by this Court to finalise the enquiry. The Court had earlier noticed that the enquiry report had already been submitted and directed the competent authority to take a final decision after taking the petitioner's explanation. Thereafter, the respondents have placed the outcome of the enquiry and the order dated 30.06.2026 on record.

In these circumstances, this Court finds no justification to issue a mandamus directing payment of salary for the period during which the petitioner was not permitted to work, particularly when the very basis of his appointment has subsequently been found illegal. The principle of payment of salary for work rendered cannot be invoked to create or continue a substantive right to public employment where the underlying appointment itself has not been established as lawful.

The contention of the petitioner that he has been made a scapegoat for the alleged misconduct of certain officers also does not advance his case. The enquiry report, as placed before this Court, is not founded merely upon the alleged guilt of the officers. The respondents have relied upon examination of the departmental records and the absence of the appointment and recruitment records relating to the petitioner and similarly situated persons.

It is, therefore, not a case where the respondents have denied the petitioner his right merely because some other officer was found guilty. The question before the Court is whether the petitioner can establish his own lawful appointment. On the material placed on record, he has failed to do so.

This Court is conscious of the fact that the petitioner claims to have served the Department for a long period. However, equitable considerations arising from long service cannot override the requirement that appointment to public service must have a lawful foundation. Public employment cannot be continued only on the ground that an employee has remained in service for a long period, if the appointment itself is found to have been made contrary to the prescribed procedure.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds that the petitioner has failed to establish any enforceable legal right to payment of salary from March, 2024 or to continuation in service on the basis of the documents and pleadings placed before this Court.

Consequently, the writ petition is found to be devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.

It is made clear that the dismissal of the present writ petition and rejection of the amendment application shall not prevent the petitioner from filing a fresh petition in accordance with law against enquiry report/order dated 30.06.2026.

Needless to observe, this Court has considered the controversy on the basis of the material placed on record in the present proceedings and has not expressed any opinion regarding the rights, if any, of any other employee who is not before this Court.

Pending interlocutory applications, if any, are also disposed of.