KRISHAN BANSAL And OTHERS vs H.U.D.A.,HISSAR

THE unsuccessful complainants have preferred this appeal against the order of the District Forum, Hissar, dismissing the complaint preferred by them.

THE controversy here pertains to plot No. 1592-93 located in Urban Estate II, at Hissar. THE original allottee thereof was Sh. Lakhmi Chand Gogia who had raised a construction thereon as well. On the 11th of July, 1991 he made an application to the respondent HUDA for permission to transfer the said house to the appellants which was granted on the 23rd of July, 1991 subject to the necessary conditions. THE relevant Affidavit and Indemnity Bonds were also submitted and he further executed a Sale Deed in favour of the complainants at Delhi on the 25th of July, 1991. Subsequently the said house was re-allotted to the appellants by the respondent H.U.D.A on their compliance with the necessary conditions of executing an Affidavit and Indemnity Bond. The Appellants thereafter submitted a revised plan for raising new additional construction on the said plot and were thereafter issued a notice to pay an extension fee of Rs. 17269.85 in all as the pre-condition for such sanction. The appellant''s challenged the demand of the extension fee primarily on the ground that the same was liable to be paid by the original allotted Sh. Lakhmi Chand Gogia and not by them.

In the reply filed by the respondent it was stressed that the appellants had duly filed attested Affidavits, a undertaking to pay the amount and any further liability towards the said plot, and also executed Indemnity Bond in the same terms. It was the case that on calculation it was found that an amount of Rs. 5703/- was due from Sh. Lakhmi Chand Gogia during 1990 and further amount of Rs. 11560/- was due for the year 1991 which had to be paid. The stand was that the building plan could be sanctioned only after due payment of extension fee.

THE District Forum noticed that the Appellants had filed their Affidavits and Indemnity Bond wherein it was clearly mentioned that they would be liable to make the payment of all outstanding dues against the said plot at any stage. It was noticed that this position was not in dispute and consequently it was concluded that the demand for the amount of extension fee was justifiable. Inevitably, the Complaint was dismissed. Mr. R.K. Jain, the learned Counsel for the appellant faced with the up-hill task of assailing the order under appeal had with considerable vehemence and erudition projected his client''s case. Resting himself primarily on the communication of, the Estate Officer, HUDA, dated 23rd of July, 1991 addressed to Shri Lakhmi Chand Gogia, Counsel submitted that this did not in terms mention any out- standing extension fee. On that premises, it was the case that the respondent-HUDA was now stopped from claiming any extension fee from the Appellants. In any case the stand was that the same would be payable by the said Shri L.C. Gogia only. Basic reliance was placed on the well known case on promissory estoppels AIR 1979 Supreme Court 621 "M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others.

DESPITE the ability with which a crumbling case had been presented, we are unable to find any merit in the aforesaid plea. What merits pointed attention is the conceded fact that on the very same date of the 23rd of July, 1993, the appellants had in no uncertain terms submitted an affidavit wherein paragraph 2 was in the following terms : "That we further undertake to make payment of all the outstanding dues or such amount as may be due or become liable/due against this plot at any later stage."

It bears repetition that apart from the aforesaid categorical undertaking, the appellants filed an Indemnity Bonds in similar terms also executed by the transferor and the transferee of the plot. Once that is so, it appears somewhat plain that the Appellants now cannot wriggle out of the clear undertaking unreservedly and voluntarily given by them on the basis of the specious plea of promissory estoppel. Indeed it appears to us that such an argument would boom-rang on the appellants because having given the affidavit and executed the necessary documents, they are now stopped from pleading anything contrary to their own deed and signatures. The alternative plea of the learned Counsel for the appellants that their predecessor-in-interest Shri L.C. Gogia alone would be liable is equally untenable. Once it is held that Shri Gogia was to be rightfully levied with extension fee, the appellants cannot possibly claim a title better than their predecessor-in-interest. It is well settled that a transferee would stand in the transferor''s shoes and in the context of a clear undertaking given to that effect, he would be equally liable for the dues of his transferor. It is somewhat elementary that nobody can derive a better or superior title than the original holder.

.YET again, it is common ground herein that the appellants had secured the transfer of valuable property in their favour on the basis of the executed sale deed and the re-allotment in their favour on the basis of the Affidavits and Indemnity Bonds clearly taking over all liabilities pertaining to the property i.e. the relevant plot. In this situation, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellants that they have benefits of the title to the property, but have no liability with regard thereto. It is axiomatic that the benefit and the burden of a transaction always goes together.

IN all fairness, one must also notice the spirited reply and the plea of Miss Deppa Puri on behalf of the respondent. It was forcefully pointed out that extension fee is payable from year to year and becomes livable from the month of January of each year. It was forcefully submitted that the liability for the extension fee fell directly on the appellants also because of non-completion of the construction on the plot which was a basic requirement of the terms and conditions under which it was transferred. Equally, it was pointed out that some inadvertence or a clerical error in not mentioning the extension fee for each particular year with regard to the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants would be no bar at all against its recovery on the admitted undertaking given by the appellants. It bears repetition that the appellants had undertaken not only to pay outstanding dues, but also any amount as may be due or may become due in the future with regard to the plot in question at any later stage. For the fore-going reasons, the appeal must fail and is hereby dismissed. However, we refrain from burdening the consumer-appellant with any costs. Appeal dismissed.