K.R. Kumaraswami Chettiar vs Krishnaswami Chetty

Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.—The only question raised by the petitioner in this revision petition is whether the suit filed by him which was dismissed by the learned District Munsif of Tiruppur is barred by limitation as held by the Court below.

The transactions out of which this suit arose came about this way. The plaintiff used to entrust certain metal sheets to the defendant who is a metal worker for fabricating vessels. This practice went on for a considerable Lime. But the last dealing had between the parties was in 1944-45. The present suit has been filed in 1951 for the recovery of Rs. 268-5-0 claimed to be the balance due to the plaintiff on account of these transactions resuming from non-delivery to him either of the fabricated vessels or the return of the sheets supplied by him. The learned District Munsiff has dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The contention raised on behalf of the plaintiff was that the case was governed by S. 10. Limitation Act the allegation being that there was an express trust for a specific purpose created by the entrustment of the metal sheets to the defendant. The learned District Munsif held that it was an ordinary case of bailment to which S. 10 did not apply and applying any other article of the Limitation Act the suit was clearly barred. The contention which was repelled by the Court below has been urged here by learned counsel for the petitioner. He has drawn my attention to the decision in - ''Kishtappa Chetti v. Lakshmi Ammal,'' AIR 1923 Mad 978 (A). But the facts of that case have nothing to do with the case here. The whole scheme of the Indian Limitation Act proceeds upon a sharp distinction between bailment as such and an express trust for a specific purpose covered by S. 10 . Articles 31, 32, 48, 48-A and 49 Limitation Act would make this point clear. In all these cases, there is a bailment. Specific property belonging to the plaintiff gets into the hands of the defendant and the defendant is under an obligation to return that property but either by negligence or by misconduct there is a loss caused to the property belonging to the plaintiff. All these cases are governed by the articles which I have set out and not by S. 10. To extend the provisions of S. 10 to the cases of ordinary bailments would revolutionise the entire law relating to limitation. Learned counsel for the petitioner is not able to place before me any case in which to a case of ordinary bailment, as we have here, the provisions of S. 10 have been applied. I am not surprised at it. The judgment of the Court below is correct. The Civil revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs.