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Judgment
Mohammed Nias C.P., J.
This Second Appeal is preferred against the dismissal of A.S.No. 125/2023 on the file of the Additional District Court-I, Kozhikode, consequent to the dismissal of I.A.No. 3/2023, an application to condone the delay of 3733 days in filing the said appeal.
O.S.No. 820/2009 was filed by respondents 1 and 2 herein against one Rajagopalan Nair for enforcing an agreement for sale dated 18.4.2009 for a total consideration of Rs.12,50,000/- out of which an amount of Rs.10,00,000/- was paid as advance. Alleging that the seller Rajagopalan Nair failed to act in terms of the conditions in the sale agreement, respondents 1 and 2/the plaintiffs filed the suit for specific performance.
Pending the suit, Rajagopalan Nair died and since he was unmarried and issueless, his mother Kalliyaniamma, the sole legal heir, was impleaded as the supplemental 2nd defendant. She contested, and after a full-fledged trial, the suit was decreed as prayed for on 19.8.2013. Respondents 1 and 2 filed an application to get the sale deed executed in their name, in which notice was served on Kalliyaniamma, and the Court accordingly executed the sale deed in their name as per document No.2533/2017 dated 28.10.2017 of SRO, Chathamangalam.
Respondents 3 and 4, who are also the legal heirs of Kalliyaniamma, filed I.A.No. 3323/2023, a claim petition under Order XXI Rule 59 of the CPC, relying on a settlement deed dated 28.9.2011 executed by Kalliyaniamma during the pendency of the suit. The said application was dismissed after enquiry and was confirmed by this Court in OP(C). No. 1318/2022 dated 29.3.2023, holding that the settlement deed executed during the pendency of the suit was hit by the principle of lis pendens and that there was a statutory charge over the plaint schedule property.
Respondents 1 and 2 filed an execution petition, E.P.No. 26/2020 to get delivery of the property, in which the present appellants filed E.A.No. 277/2023 in E.P.No. 26/2020, raising a claim which was also rejected as per order dated 15.9.2023. After the dismissal of the claim petition, the present appellants filed A.S.No. 125/2023 before the Additional District Court-I, Kozhikode, against the judgment and decree dated 19.8.2013 in O.S.No. 820/2009 with a delay condonation petition to condone the delay of 3733 days. The Appellate Court took note of the reasons put forth and held that there was no sufficient cause at all, and dismissed I.A.No.3/2023, the delay condonation petition, on 18.3.2025. The appellants then preferred O.P.(C) No.1306/2025 in which they obtained a stay on 5.6.2025 which continued till 15.7.2026 when the OP(C) was dismissed.
The Appellate Court considered the fact that it was after a full-fledged trial that the suit was decreed on 19.8.2013 and that Kalliyaniamma has not challenged the decree. The sale deed was executed in a proceeding with notice to Kalliyaniamma, and it was only thereafter that the execution proceeding for delivery was filed, which was after the death of Kalliyaniamma. But, even in the said execution proceeding, respondents 3 and 4, who are the other legal heirs of Kalliyaniamma, contested the matter upto the High Court. Under such circumstances, the contention of the present appellants that they were not aware of the proceedings and the delay of 3733 days ought to have been condoned cannot be accepted at all. It is also relevant to note that the title of the property now vests with respondents 1 and 2 since 28.10.2017 and that the attempt of the appellants and respondents 3 and 4 all along was to obstruct the execution of the decree. It is also relevant to note that DW1, the witness examined in the case, was none other than the son of the first appellant, Kousalya Amma.
Given the above facts, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that they were not parties to the suit and therefore, the delay must be condoned cannot be accepted at all. I find substantial force in the contention of the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 that the appellants and respondents 3 and 4 had exhausted all their attempts to thwart the execution of the decree.
As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several decisions, grounds seeking condonation of such enormous delay have to be considered carefully, and lack of bonafides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. The concept of liberal approach cannot be made to a stage of totally unfettered free play. The delay of 3733 days is certainly an enormous delay, and the vested rights of respondents 1 and 2 could not be taken away by condoning the delay where no reason, much less any acceptable reason, was shown. The law of limitation is founded on public policy to ensure that the parties to the litigation do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek legal remedy promptly. When the sufficient cause pleaded is proved to be wrong or false, the appellants do not deserve any leniency in the matter of condonation of delay, in the light of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
The Appellate Court had considered the facts and circumstances of the case and considered the delay condonation petition based on the applicable law. The very contention of the appellants that they came to know of the proceedings only at the time of filing of the First Appeal was liable to be rejected, as rightly done by the Appellate Court. There is no question of law, much less any substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The Second Appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.