High CourtsDivision Bench(1930) 07 MAD CK 0010

Konda Reddi and Others vs Mangala Babanna

Madras High Court · Decided on 14 July 1930 · Citation: AIR 1930 Mad 854 : (1931) ILR (Mad) 63 : (1930) 32 LW 534 : (1930) 59 MLJ 458

HON’BLE JUDGES
Horace Owen Compton Beasley, C.J

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

45 paragraphs · 1,087 words

Horace Owen Compton Beasley, C.J.—Four persons including the appellants in Criminal Revision Case No. 968 of 1929 (Accused 2 and

3) and the appellant in Criminal Revision Case No. 969 of 1929 (Accused 5) were convicted by the Joint Magistrate of Penukonda for offences

under Sections 347 and 384, Indian Penal Code, for wrongful confinement to extort property and extortion.

2.

The facts can be dealt with quite shortly and they are that on the 3rd December, 1927, a document was registered by the District Registrar at

Anantapur, the material portions of which ran as follows:

Deed of sale caused to be written and given to Nethi Narayanappa of Pandurthi. To discharge debts due to others for the purchase of mango

trees, I have received from you in cash this day Rs. 300. The land sold to you for this sum is S. No. 882, extent O.71 acres with the various fruit

trees standing therein. I have put you in possession this day, Henceforward you will have all my rights. My heirs and I will have nothing 1o do with

it.

3.

Then there is the mark of Mangala Babanna who admittedly was an illiterate person and the two witnesses are accused 2 and 3. Upon this

document were founded the two charges against the accused, the prosecution case being that Mangala Babanna was by confinement and

extortionate methods made to execute that document, that he as a matter of fact was not the owner of the property at all and that it was a spurious

document got for the purpose of defrauding others. In support of the prosecution case some evidence was given to show that whereas in the body

of the document Rs. 300 was stated to have been paid by way of consideration, none in fact was paid. Though the question of consideration was

quite an irrelevant one to the two charges then before the Court, because both the charges could be supported equally well, whether there had

been consideration passing or not, the Joint Magistrate considered it as of some importance as supporting the case for the prosecution and dealt

with it. This resulted, as before stated, in the conviction of four of the accused, three of whom are the appellants here. The case then came up

before the learned Sessions Judge of Anantapur and he, after going very carefully into the facts in a very lengthy and elaborate judgment, came to

the conclusion, to put it quite shortly, that the evidence certainly did not support the conviction of the accused of either offence. He then resorted to

a procedure which is called in question here. Having come to the conclusion that no conviction under Sections 347 and 384, Indian Penal Code,

could be supported upon the evidence, he dealt with the evidence given with regard to the consideration which passed for the document and

decided for reasons which he has given in his judgment that a charge could be framed u/s 423, Indian Penal Code, and that in order that such a

charge might be framed there should be additional evidence before him; and he accordingly made an order that the Joint Magistrate should take

evidence on the question as to whether or not the Rs. 300 consideration or any part of it passed on the date or at about the time of the execution

of that document. The result of that enquiry was that he proceeded upon the additional evidence which came before him and found that no

consideration for the sale did pass: He thereupon framed charges against the appellants u/s 423, Indian Penal Code, acquitting the other accused

who remained before him; and having framed those charges, he proceeded at once, for the reasons which he has given in the earlier part of his

judgment, to convict the appellants and ordered them to pay fines amounting in the case of the 3rd accused to Rs. 500 and in the case of the 2nd

and the 5th accused to Rs. 1,000 each, in default of which there was to be a term of imprisonment.

4.

The matter reduces itself to this, was the procedure adopted by the learned Sessions Judge a proper one or not? It is, of course, conceded that

u/s 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure an appellate Court in dealing with an appeal under the chapter in which the section appears may, if it

thinks it necessary, order additional evidence to be recorded after stating its reasons for so doing and either may take the evidence itself or direct it

to be taken by a Magistrate and it was purporting to act under this section that the additional evidence was ordered to be taken by the learned

Sessions Judge. The strong criticism that is made here by Mr. Jayarama Aiyar is that the accused had been convicted under Sections 347 and 384,

Indian Penal Code, and had appealed to the Sessions Court of Ananta-pur against their conviction for those offences and none other and that there

was no appeal against any conviction u/s 423, Indian Penal Code, because there had not been any conviction or any trial even for an offence under

that section. He contends that Section 428, Criminal Procedure Code, merely deals with an appeal against a conviction and does not enable the

appellate Court to substitute an offence in respect of which there has not been a conviction and then say that additional evidence must be called

which may support such an offence. We think that that criticism is clearly correct and well founded and that Section 428, Criminal Procedure

Code, merely enables an appellate Court, if it thinks it necessary, to call for additional evidence which will explain or clear up or perhaps

supplement within limitations the evidence for the prosecution in support of a charge which has resulted in conviction and which conviction is the

subject of an appeal and that it does not enable an appellate Court to adopt the procedure adopted in this case by the learned Sessions Judge. He

might- although we say nothing about its being proper in this case, it is merely an indication of a possible procedure-have indicated that a charge

u/s 423, Indian Penal Code, might be framed and sent the case back again for retrial. But in this case he did not adopt that procedure and we are

of the opinion that this petition must be allowed. The convictions Will be set aside and the fines paid will be refunded to the appellants.