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Judgment
Devadoss, J.—The point argued in this appeal is that the learned Judge was wrong in excluding from consideration Ex. A relied on by the
plaintiff in support of his claim. The plaintiff is the appellant here. The learned District Judge though he held that he could not exclude Ex. A from
the record, held that inasmuch as it was a copy of a copy he could not hold that the contents of the document were relevant. The document, Ex. A
purports to be a copy of a document in the taluk office. The plaintiff who claimed to have had a grant of the land on dharkast in the year 1894
relied upon Ex. A as evidence ""of the grant in 1894. This document was put in evidence in the proceedings, previous to the institution of the suit. In
the plaint he relied upon this document and when it was produced in Court and filed, no objection was taken by the defendant to its reception on
the ground that it was not a proper copy. The plaintiff succeeded in the First Court and the defendants appealed to the District Court, even in the
Memorandum of Appeal he did not take exception to this document. Evidently, this objection was raised at the time when the appeal was argued
before the lower Appellate Court. It is argued on behalf of the respondent that Ex. A being a copy of a copy is not admissible in evidence under
any circumstances, and, secondly, that the contents could not be held to have been proved by the production of such a copy. The rules as regards
the production of documents and strict proof of documents as contained in the Evidence Act can be dispensed with by consent of parties and
when the parties agree to treat a document as evidence it is not open to one side or the other to object to such a document in appeal or at a later
stage. Any document may be objected to if it is an irrelevant document; where the document is relevant and the contents are relevant, it is open to
the other party to dispense with strict proof; and in this case both parties went to trial dispensing with the proof of the original order of the
Tahsildar. In appeal the learned Judge held that being a copy of a copy, there was no proof of the contents of the document, in other words there
was no proof that an order as extracted in col. 16 was really made by the Tahsildar. This being a public document which purports to have been
signed by the Tahsildar there is no reason to suppose that things were not done as they should have been or anything was done which ought not to
have been done. There is a presumption in favour of the genuineness of public documents and that acts of public servants were done properly and
according to procedure. That being so, I fail to understand how the learned Judge could have held that the contents of the document were not
proved. The document is put in for the purpose of proving the contents. When this document was allowed to go in without being challenged by the
other side and when the other side consented to its being filed as it was, it cannot be said that the contents should be separately proved by other
evidence. The learned Judge has erred on this point and dismissed the plaintiff''s suit solely on the ground that the contents of Ex. A have not been
proved. I reverse the judgment of the lower Appellate Court and direct the District Judge to restore the case to his file and dispose of it according
to law.
The appellant will have costs of this appeal. The appellant will also have a refund of the Court-fee paid in this Court.
