Kishorkumar Dayalal Doshi vs The State Of Maharashtra & Ors.

Rule. Rule returnable forthwith with the consent of the parties taken up for final disposal.

Heard Mr. T.S. Deshpande, learned counsel for the applicant, Mr. A.V. Bhide, learned counsel for non-applicant nos. 2 and 3 and Mr. Ghogre, learned APP for non-applicant no.1/State.

The present revision application has been filed by the applicant challenging the judgment dated 18-02-2022 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Yavatmal, in Criminal Appeal No.16/2020, whereby the appeal preferred by the applicant against the judgment dated 14-07-2020 passed in R.C.C. No.394/2011 by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Yavatmal, was dismissed. By the said judgment dated 14-07-2020, the learned trial Court had acquitted the non-applicants of the offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

Learned Counsel for the applicant Mr. Deshpande, submits that the appellate Court has failed to appreciate the evidence led by the prosecution. According to the learned Counsel, though the appellate Court re-appreciated the entire evidence on record, it failed to consider the case of the complainant, in its proper perspective. Consequently, the appeal came to be dismissed without due consideration of the material evidence adduced by the prosecution. Learned Counsel further submits that the appellate Court proceeded on an erroneous premise that the earlier proceedings had culminated in an acquittal of the accused and, therefore, extended the benefit of Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Cr.P.C.” for short) to them. It is submitted that the complaint in the earlier proceedings was in respect of alleged forgery of the Will executed by the father of the applicant, whereas the present complaint pertains to the alleged forgery of the Will executed by the mother. Thus, according to the learned Counsel, the allegations in the two proceedings are entirely different, and the earlier acquittal could not have operated as a bar to the present proceedings under Section 300 of the Cr.P.C. It is, therefore, submitted that the findings recorded by the appellate Court are erroneous to the evidence on record. The impugned judgment, therefore, warrants interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, and the accused persons deserve to be convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

I have gone through the judgment passed by the learned trial Court dated 14-07-2020, whereby the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Yavatmal, acquitted the respondents/accused of the offences alleged against them. Perusal of the judgment shows that the learned trial Court has considered the case of the prosecution in detail. The first informant examined three witnesses, namely, Kishorkumar (himself) (CW-1), Anil Kotrange (CW-2) and Dinkar Naktode (CW-3). It was the case of the applicant/complainant that the accused persons had fabricated two Wills dated 31-05-2001, bearing registration Nos. 2092 and 2093, one executed in the name of Dayalal and the other in the name of Indumati, who were the parents of the complainant as well as accused No.1. Accused No.1 is the elder brother of the complainant, Kishorkumar, whereas accused No.2 is the wife of Tarunkumar and accused No.3, Ashishkumar, is the son of Tarunkumar. Accused Nos.3 and 4 had allegedly put their signatures on the said documents, whereas accused Nos.5 and 6 had recorded Mutation Entry No.4856 on the basis of the aforesaid Wills. The original complaint had culminated in the acquittal of the respondents/accused. The complainant alleged that both his parents were not present before the Registrar at the time of execution and registration of the Wills and that their signatures had allegedly been forged by accused Nos.1 and 2. It was further alleged that the attesting witnesses were not mentioned in the Register. The complainant relied upon the report of the handwriting expert, according to which the signatures appearing on the Wills were different from the admitted signatures of Dayalal and Indumati. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, it was contended that the documents had been fabricated by the accused persons and that the ingredients of the offence of cheating were consequently made out.

The learned trial Court, after considering in detail the evidence adduced by both the prosecution and the defence, arrived at a conclusion that both the Wills were executed and registered on 31-05-2001 as per the free will of Dayalal and Indumati. The said Wills were duly proved and exhibited before the trial Court as Exhibit Nos.143 and 158. The defence set up by the accused persons was that Dayalal and Indumati had visited the office of the Registrar on 31-05-2001 and had voluntarily executed the said Wills. Dayalal died on 29-03-2003. Thereafter, the complainant lodged a private complaint bearing No.540/2005, which culminated in the police filing a ‘B’ summary report. Further, Indumati-the mother of the complainant and accused No.1, had executed an affidavit dated 20-10-2006, wherein she categorically stated that the Wills had been executed by herself and her husband- Dayalal, on 31-05-2001, according to their own wish. It is further seen from the record that the applicant had instituted a civil suit, being R.C.S. No.137/2005, challenging the validity of the said Will, which was subsequently withdrawn. Thus, having considered the evidence on record, the learned trial Court found that the complainant had failed to establish his case against the accused persons by leading cogent evidence. Consequently, the accused persons came to be acquitted by the judgment dated 14-07-2020. Having perused the judgment of the learned trial Court and the evidence on record, I do not find any error in the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court. The learned trial Court has duly considered the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defence and has applied its mind to the material available on record before arriving at the conclusion that the complainant had failed to prove the case against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt.

Perusal of the impugned judgment dated 18-02-2022 passed by the learned appellate Court also shows that the learned appellate Court has undertaken a detailed assessment of the evidence on record. The learned appellate Court has specifically considered the affidavit filed by the mother of the complainant-Indumati, after the death of Dayalal, wherein she had categorically stated that she had visited the office of the Sub-Registrar along with Dayalal and had executed the Wills according to their own wish. The said Wills were registered bearing Registration Nos.2092 and 2093. The learned appellate Court has also considered the handwriting expert's report relied upon by the first informant. The said report was found to be contrary to the affidavit of Indumati, which was marked as Exhibit-168, wherein she had specifically clarified that the Wills had been executed and registered by herself and Dayalal by their own wishes. The learned appellate Court further took into consideration the fact that, after the complaint was lodged by the applicant, the signatures appearing on the Wills were referred to the handwriting expert for verification and upon comparison the signatures of the executants were found matching with their admitted signatures. The learned appellate Court also considered the contention regarding the signatures of the attesting witnesses and found that, though their signatures appeared on the subsequent page of the registration document. The learned appellate Court also considered the correction made in the Will whereby the name “Dharamkumar” was corrected to “Tarunkumar”. The said correction was considered in the context of the intention expressed in the Will to transfer the property in favour of accused No.1-Tarunkumar, who is the real brother of the applicant.

Thus, it appears that both the learned Courts below have, upon proper appreciation of the evidence on record, arrived at concurrent findings of fact to the effect that the complainant/informant has failed to establish the case against the respondents/accused beyond reasonable doubt. The findings recorded by both the Courts below are based on the evidence available on record and do not suffer from any perversity or illegality warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. Consequently, the respondents/accused were rightly acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

The scope of interference in a revision against an order of acquittal is extremely limited. In an appeal against acquittal, the appellate Court is entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record and arrive at its own conclusions. In exercise of revisional jurisdiction, this Court cannot ordinarily re-appreciate the evidence merely because another view is possible. Interference is warranted only where there is a patent illegality, manifest error, gross irregularity, perversity, or miscarriage of justice in the findings recorded by the Courts below. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v State of Bihar (now Jharkhand), reported in (2002) 6 SCC 650 was pleased to hold as under :-

Thus, taking into consideration the findings recorded by both the Courts below, I do not find any patent error, perversity, irregularity or illegality committed by the learned Courts below in acquitting the respondents/accused. The scope of interference under revisional jurisdiction is extremely limited and is confined to exceptional cases where interference is warranted in the interest of justice, particularly for correction of a manifest illegality or prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. Taking into consideration the settled legal position and the precedents laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various judgments, it is well settled that the High Court would not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has committed an error in appreciating the evidence. In my opinion, therefore, the present revision application is devoid of substance and, even otherwise, fails on merits. The revision application is accordingly dismissed.

Rule stands discharged in above terms.