Kishore Lal And Sons & Anr. vs Rajiv Gupta HUF & Ors.

Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, J.

The present Revision Petition, under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958^{11.DRC Act}, has been filed seeking to set aside the Judgement and Order dated 11.11.2025^{22.Impugned Order} passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller, Patiala House Court, Delhi^{33.Learned ARC}, in RC ARC NO. 1067/2014 (renumbered as RC ARC NO. 78598/2016)^{44.Eviction Petition}.

The learned ARC, by way of the Impugned Order, has allowed the Eviction Petition preferred by the Respondent No. 1 and directed the eviction of the Petitioners from the property being one shop bearing No. 4328 and a Kothri bearing No. 4330/3, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi, 110002^{55.Subject property}.

Aggrieved by the Impugned Judgement, the Petitioners have preferred the present Revision Petition.

The present Revision Petition finds its genesis in the Eviction Petition instituted by the Respondent before the learned ARC under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the DRC Act, seeking eviction of the Petitioners/tenants therein from the subject property.

As stated, the said Eviction Petition came to be filed on the ground of bona fide requirement of the Respondent, stating that the space that was being used by the Respondent and his Wife for running their business was not sufficient in view of the large machines and equipment that were installed in the premises and the number of employees that were working there. It is stated that due to paucity of space, the paper used for the printing and publishing businesses of the Respondent and his Wife, had to be stored on the first floor, which was unfeasible since taking the paper to the first floor was not only cumbersome but also led to increased costs. Therefore, it is stated in the Eviction Petition that the tenanted premises/subject premises was required for the furtherance, expansion and ease of the business of the Respondent and his Wife.

Upon Notice being issued on the Eviction Petition, the Petitioners preferred their Application seeking leave to defend which came to be allowed vide Judgement and Order dated 11.12.2019.

The Petitioner herein, in his Written Statement filed before the learned ARC, had taken the following objections against the said Eviction Petition:

a. No landlord-tenant relationship between the parties;

b. No bona fide requirement established and availability of alternative accommodation.

Thereafter, upon completion of pleadings, evidence was led by both the parties and final arguments were advanced. At the time of final arguments, the Petitioner herein fairly conceded and did not dispute the landlord-tenant relationship.

The learned ARC vide Judgement and Order dated 11.11.2025 allowed the Eviction Petition, and the eviction order came to be passed as against the Petitioner herein. Aggrieved by the same, the Petitioner has preferred the present Petition, impugning the Judgement dated 11.11.2025.

Learned counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the Respondent No.1 has sufficient space available with him on the ground floor as well as the first floor of the subject property and, therefore, does not require the tenanted premises for installation of the alleged new machines or for expansion of his business. It would be submitted that the availability of such accommodation goes to the root of the alleged bona fide requirement set up by Respondent No.1.

It would be submitted that Respondent No.1, in his Eviction Petition as well as in his evidence affidavit, had stated that the total area available with him on the ground floor was approximately 400 sq. ft., but , in his cross-examination, Respondent No.1 admitted that the ground floor of the property measures approximately 100 sq. metres, equivalent to about 1076 sq. ft. It would be submitted that the Respondent further admitted that the Petitioner herein was in possession of approximately 200 sq. ft. and the second tenant, namely, Mr. Mani Ram, was in possession of approximately 220 sq. ft. on the ground floor. Thus, even after accounting for the portions in possession of the two tenants and the staircase area, an area of approximately 631 sq. ft. remains available with Respondent No.1. It would, therefore, be contended that Respondent No.1 deliberately understated the area available with him and falsely projected a requirement for additional space of approximately 300 sq. ft. for installation and operation of the new machines. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would argue that the learned ARC has not taken into consideration the concealment done by the Respondent and therefore the Impugned Order needs to be set aside on this ground alone.

Learned counsel would further submit that the bona fide nature of the alleged requirement of Respondent No.1 is further belied by the availability of the first floor of the subject property. Learned counsel would submit that the aforesaid material discrepancy between the area disclosed by Respondent No.1 in the Eviction Petition and the area admitted by him during cross-examination has not been properly appreciated or adjudicated upon by the learned ARC. The learned ARC, it would be contended, failed to reconcile the admissions made by Respondent No.1 in his cross-examination with the averments contained in the Eviction Petition and his evidence affidavit and, consequently, failed to examine whether the alleged requirement for additional accommodation was, in fact, bona fide. It would be submitted that the learned ARC ought to have considered whether the area admittedly available with Respondent No.1 was itself sufficient to meet the requirement projected by him. The failure to undertake such an assessment has resulted in an erroneous finding on the question of bona fide requirement and, therefore, vitiates the Impugned Judgment, which is liable to be set aside on this ground alone.

Learned counsel would submit that the learned ARC failed to properly examine the evidentiary basis of Respondent No.1's assertion regarding the alleged possession of Mr. Nitin Gupta and the consequent unsuitability of the first floor. It would be contended that, in the absence of any documentary material substantiating such assertion, and particularly in view of the admissions of Respondent No.1 regarding the commercial use of the first floor, the learned ARC ought to have scrutinised the said defence with greater circumspection. Instead, it is submitted, the learned ARC accepted the explanation furnished by Respondent No.1 without recording a cogent finding as to why the first-floor accommodation could not be utilised. It is urged that such failure to consider and appreciate the material evidence has resulted in a perverse and unsustainable finding on the issue of alternative accommodation and therefore, the Impugned Order deserves to be set aside.

Learned counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the learned ARC has proceeded to accept the averments of Respondent No.1 regarding his alleged bona fide requirement without properly scrutinising the evidence led by him. Reliance would be placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sarbate T.B. v. Nemichand^{66.1966 MPLJ 26,}, to contend that the burden of establishing the genuine requirement of the landlord lies upon the landlord himself and that a mere assertion that the premises are required for his own use does not raise any presumption that such requirement is bona fide. It would be submitted that Respondent No.1 has failed to discharge the initial burden of establishing his bona fide requirement for additional accommodation.

Learned counsel for the Petitioner would therefore submit that, contrary to the aforesaid settled legal position, the learned ARC has effectively proceeded on the basis that the assertion of Respondent No.1 as to his requirement was sufficient to establish bona fide need, without first examining whether the initial burden of proving such requirement had been discharged. It would be argued that the learned ARC failed to appreciate the contradictions in the evidence of Respondent No.1 and the availability of alternative accommodation while determining whether the requirement pleaded was genuine and bona fide and that the Impugned Order, having been rendered without properly applying the aforesaid principle of law to the evidence on record, is consequently liable to be set aside.

Learned counsel would further submit that the learned ARC has mechanically proceeded on the premise that the landlord is the best judge of his requirements, without examining whether the alternative accommodation available with Respondent No.1 was reasonably suitable for the purposes asserted by him. Reliance would be placed upon the judgment of this Court in Khem Chand & Ors. v. Arjun Jain & Ors.^{77.2013 IX AD (Delhi) 89}, wherein it has been held that the principle that the landlord is the best judge of his requirements cannot be applied as an inflexible rule in every case and that the Court is required to examine the reasonableness and suitability of the alternative accommodation available to the landlord on the facts of each case.

It would thus be contended that the learned ARC, while repeatedly observing that the landlord is the best judge of his requirements, failed to undertake the corresponding judicial exercise of examining the reasonableness and suitability of the alternative accommodation admittedly available with Respondent No.1. Learned counsel would further submit that the said principle cannot operate to dispense with the requirement of the landlord establishing the bona fide nature of his need, particularly where material evidence has been brought on record indicating the availability of other accommodation.

It would, in view thereof, be submitted that the learned ARC's failure to properly scrutinise the alternative accommodation and to test the landlord's claim against the evidence on record has resulted in a mechanical application of the aforesaid principle and has materially affected the adjudication of the Eviction Petition rendering the Impugned Order vulnerable to interference.

Learned counsel for the Petitioner would also submit that the Petitioner, before the learned ARC, had stated that the Respondent had also not taken previous permission from the Slum Authority to carry out structural changes as the Respondent No.1 intended to integrate and join the tenanted premises with his adjoining portion of the subject premises. He would submit that the Respondent has not brought anything on record to show that such a permission has been taken and hence, the learned ARC has erred in not dismissing the Eviction Petition at the very threshold for the want of permission of the competent authority for instituting the said Eviction Petition.

It would lastly be submitted that the Eviction Petition itself was liable to be rejected at the threshold for want of necessary pleadings constituting the cause of action under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. According to learned counsel, Respondent No.1 failed to plead a necessary ingredient of Section 14(1)(e), namely, that he had no other reasonably suitable alternative accommodation available with him. It would be submitted that the learned ARC erred in holding that even if Respondent No.1 had concealed certain facts, the same would not constitute a ground for dismissal of the Eviction Petition since the parties had an opportunity to lead evidence. Learned counsel would contend that the defect in the present case was not confined to concealment of material facts but went to the very root of the eviction petition, inasmuch as the necessary averment regarding the absence of alternative suitable accommodation was itself not pleaded.

Learned counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the learned ARC has failed to appreciate the distinction between a case of concealment of material facts and a case where a necessary ingredient constituting the cause of action has not been pleaded at all. It would be contended that the absence of a specific and necessary pleading regarding the non-availability of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation could not have been cured merely by permitting the parties to lead evidence. The learned ARC, therefore, erred in treating the issue as one of mere concealment and failed to adjudicate upon the fundamental objection as to whether the eviction petition disclosed a complete cause of action under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. Such an erroneous approach, it would be submitted, goes to the root of the maintainability of the Eviction Petition and renders the Impugned Order unsustainable in law.

To conclude, learned counsel for the Petitioner would seek to place reliance upon the judgments of this Court in Dr. (Mrs.) N.D. Khanna v. M/s Hindustan Industrial Corporation^{88.AIR 1981 Delhi 305}, and Abdul Hamid & Anr. v. Nur Mohammad^{99.AIR 1976 Delhi 328}, to buttress the argument that the absence of necessary pleadings constituting a statutory cause of action cannot be cured merely by leading evidence. It would, therefore, be submitted that the Eviction Petition, having failed to disclose a complete cause of action under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, was liable to be dismissed.

Learned counsel would submit that the learned ARC has failed to consider the aforesaid judgments in their proper perspective and has erroneously proceeded on the premise that the opportunity to lead evidence could cure the absence of the foundational pleadings necessary to constitute a cause of action. It would be contended that the learned ARC's approach has resulted in the statutory requirement of pleading the essential ingredients of Section 14(1)(e) being rendered nugatory. The failure to adjudicate this fundamental objection to the maintainability of the Eviction Petition constitutes a material error of law and has caused grave prejudice to the Petitioner. On this ground as well, the Impugned Order is liable to be set aside.

This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, and with his able assistance, perused the Impugned Order as well as the material placed on record.

Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.^{1010.(1998) 8 SCC 119}, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh^{1111.(2014) 9 SCC 78}, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua^{1212.(2022) 6 SCC 30}, has consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.^{1313.2024:DHC:9322}, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover^{1414.2025:DHC:11285}.

In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25B of the DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is, therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process, including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent Controller merely because another view on the material available on record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court read as under:

In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court, upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an absence of adjudication warranting interference.

In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute. Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left unconsidered or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be warranted.

It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional scrutiny that the grounds urged on behalf of the Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.

At this juncture, before adverting to the discussion on merits of the present Petition, this Court deems it apposite to advert to the analysis undertaken and the findings returned by the learned ARC in the Impugned Order. The relevant portion thereof is reproduced herein below for ready reference:

Having considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the Petitioner and upon the perusal of the reasoning rendered by the learned ARC, this Court is of the view that the present Revision Petition does not disclose any ground warranting interference with the Impugned Order in exercise of the limited revisional jurisdiction of this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

The principal thrust of the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the Petitioner is that the learned ARC failed to appreciate the availability of alternative accommodation with Respondent No.1 and did not properly scrutinise the evidence relating to the area available on the ground floor and the alleged availability of the first floor. It has also been contended that the learned ARC failed to appreciate the alleged discrepancy between the area stated to be available in the Eviction Petition and the area purportedly admitted by Respondent No.1 in his cross-examination. According to the Petitioner, the aforesaid aspects materially undermine the bona fide requirement pleaded by Respondent No.1.

The aforesaid submissions, however, do not withstand a perusal of the Impugned Order. The learned ARC has dealt with the question of availability of alternative accommodation in considerable detail. The issue of the accommodation allegedly available with Respondent No.1, including the contention regarding the area available on the ground floor, has specifically been considered by the learned ARC. The learned ARC has noticed the contention that Respondent No.1 was allegedly in possession of approximately 800 sq. ft. on the ground floor and has thereafter examined the material placed on record in support thereof. The learned ARC has also taken note of the fact that the counter-site plan relied upon by the Petitioner was not tendered in evidence and that no dimensions had been indicated therein to substantiate the claim regarding the availability of 800 sq. ft. of space. Upon an appreciation of the material before it, the learned ARC concluded that the area available with Respondent No.1 was approximately 400 sq. ft. and that there was no contradictory material on record sufficient to displace the site plan relied upon by him.

Thus, the contention that the learned ARC failed to consider the alleged discrepancy in the area available with Respondent No.1 is factually incorrect. The learned ARC has considered the very objection which is sought to be urged before this Court and has returned a finding thereon. The Petitioner, in substance, seeks a re-appreciation of the evidence and a different conclusion on the basis of the same material. Such an exercise, however, would fall outside the permissible scope of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

Equally, the contention regarding the availability of the first floor and the alleged occupation thereof has also been duly considered by the learned ARC. The learned ARC has examined the evidence of Respondent/PW-1 therein in this regard and has noticed his deposition that the concerned portion was in the occupation of his nephew, Nitin Gupta, since 1999 and, prior thereto, was in the occupation of his sister. The learned ARC has further considered the alternative submission of the Petitioner that, even if the said portion were assumed to be vacant, the landlord could be directed to utilise the same. Relying upon the settled principle that it is for the landlord to determine which portion of his property is reasonably suitable for his business and that the tenant cannot dictate the manner in which the landlord should utilise his premises, the learned ARC rejected the said contention.

The finding returned by the learned ARC cannot be characterised as one rendered without consideration of the material on record. The learned ARC has examined the question of alternative accommodation and has recorded reasons for concluding that the accommodation relied upon by the Petitioner was either not shown to be available or was not demonstrated to be reasonably suitable for the bona fide requirement projected by Respondent No.1. Merely because the Petitioner seeks a different appreciation of the evidence or considers the reasons recorded by the learned ARC to be insufficient does not, by itself, furnish a ground for exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

The submission that the learned ARC mechanically proceeded on the premise that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement is also without merit. A perusal of the Impugned Order demonstrates that the learned ARC did not rest its conclusion solely upon the aforesaid principle. The learned ARC considered the various properties relied upon by the Petitioner, including the properties situated at Ghaziabad, the property at Dayanand Vihar, the portion allegedly in the occupation of Nitin Gupta and the space stated to be available on the ground floor. The learned ARC thereafter examined the evidence and the absence of cogent material demonstrating the availability of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation. The principle that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement was applied in the context of the findings rendered on the facts of the case and cannot be construed as having been invoked to dispense with the requirement of establishing bona fide need.

The reliance placed by learned counsel for the Petitioner upon the judgments, including Sarbate T.B. v. Nemichand and Khem Chand & Ors. (supra), also does not advance the case of the Petitioner. The learned ARC has considered the issue of bona fide requirement and alternative accommodation on the basis of the pleadings and evidence led by the parties. The fact that the learned ARC may not have expressly referred to every judgment cited by the Petitioner, or may have applied the legal principles emerging therefrom differently, cannot, in the absence of an error apparent on the face of the record or a manifestly erroneous approach, constitute a ground for interference under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

The challenge founded upon the alleged absence of necessary pleadings regarding non-availability of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation is also liable to be rejected. The learned ARC has specifically noticed the said objection and has considered the judgment relied upon in support thereof. The learned ARC has thereafter returned a finding that, even assuming that certain facts had not been disclosed by the landlord, the Petitioner had been granted leave to defend and the parties had thereafter proceeded to trial and had an opportunity to lead evidence on all relevant aspects. The learned ARC, therefore, declined to non-suit Respondent No.1 on the ground of alleged concealment.

At first blush, the contention that there arises a “legal question” regarding the “lack of pleadings in respect of lack of suitable alternate accommodation” may appear attractive. But a perusal of the pleadings would show that the requirement projected by the landlord was in respect of space occupied by the Petitioner/ tenant and which space was required due to the need for installation of machines and equipment in the premises which is situated in an area which is a publishing hub and which forms the base for the bulk of the Landlord’s business/ clients. It is implicit in the said pleadings that there was no “other accommodation” which would be suitable for the Landlord given the nature of his business and the geographical presence of his principal clients. The defence set up by the Petitioner was that the landlord had filed a petition for “additional space” and not for “bona fide need” and also that he had other accommodation which would satisfy his purpose. Admittedly, these other accommodations were in other areas and not in the publishing hub and these were strenuously projected as being able to satisfy the need of the Landlord. Effectively, the Petitioner/Tenant attempted to dictate that the landlord move out of the area most conducive for the landlord’s business, since there was other alternate accommodation available for the same. The law militates against the same and the attempt of the Petitioner to question the entire factual matrix relating to the suitability of the accommodation by seeking to project an alleged “question of law” is ingenious, but does not impress the Court.

This Court is conscious that there can be no quarrel with the proposition that the landlord is required to establish the ingredients of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act and that the issue of availability of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation is a substantive aspect of the determination of bona fide requirement. Equally, the mere fact that the parties have proceeded to trial cannot, in every case, render a material suppression or concealment irrelevant. The question would necessarily depend upon the nature of the alleged concealment and, in particular, whether the accommodation allegedly concealed was in fact available to the landlord and reasonably suitable for the requirement pleaded.

In Nalini Kant Gupta v. Lajja Gupta^{1515.2017 SCC OnLine Del 10247}, this Court, while considering the effect of alleged concealment of alternative accommodation, took note of the fact that the tenant had been granted leave to defend and had thereafter been afforded a full opportunity to lead evidence on the relevant aspects. The Court, relying inter alia upon the judgements passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singhal^{1616.(2001) 2 SCC 355}, Bhairab Chandra Nandan v. Ranadhir Chandra Dutta^{1717.(1988) 1 SCC 383}, and S. Harbant Singh Sahni v. Vinod Sikari^{1818.2012 SCC OnLine Del 2362}, held that where the parties have gone to trial on all relevant facts and the tenant has had an opportunity to establish the availability and suitability of the allegedly concealed accommodation, the eviction petition cannot be dismissed merely on the ground of suppression, particularly where no prejudice has been caused to the tenant.

The aforesaid principle, however, cannot be understood as laying down an absolute proposition that the fact of concealment becomes wholly irrelevant once leave to defend has been granted. The subsequent decision of this Court in Durga Devi Jain v. Dr. Harish Chander Banga^{1919.2026:DHC:4460}, is instructive in this regard. The Court, while considering the line of authorities dealing with non-disclosure of alternative accommodation, examined whether the property alleged to have been concealed was actually available and reasonably suitable for the requirement pleaded. The focus, therefore, continues to remain upon the materiality of the alleged concealment and its bearing upon the bona fide requirement of the landlord.

In the present case, however, this Court finds that the learned ARC has not rejected the Petitioner's objection merely on the ground that the parties had already gone to trial. On the contrary, the learned ARC has specifically considered the objection regarding the alleged absence of alternative accommodation and has adjudicated the same on the basis of the evidence led by the parties.

It is, therefore, apparent that the objection raised by the Petitioner regarding alternative accommodation was not shut out or rejected merely by invoking the principle that the parties had already gone to trial. Rather, the learned ARC undertook a substantive examination of the very issue which the Petitioner seeks to reagitate before this Court. The learned ARC considered the properties relied upon by the Petitioner, the evidence regarding their availability, the question of their suitability and the material, or absence thereof, brought on record by the Petitioner in support of his assertions.

In these circumstances, the judgment in Durga Devi Jain (supra) does not advance the case of the Petitioner. Rather, the approach adopted by the learned ARC is consistent with the principle that the Court must examine whether the allegedly concealed or otherwise relied-upon accommodation is actually available and reasonably suitable for the bona fide requirement pleaded. Having undertaken that exercise, the learned ARC found, on the evidence before it, that the Petitioner had failed to establish the availability of any such reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.

This Court is conscious that the absence of an essential pleading cannot ordinarily be equated with a mere deficiency in proof and that evidence cannot be permitted to travel beyond the pleadings. However, the present case does not warrant interference on that principle. The issue of alternative accommodation was not an issue foreign to the pleadings or the trial. It was specifically raised by the Petitioner, was contested by Respondent No.1, and was the subject matter of evidence and adjudication before the learned ARC. The Petitioner has also not demonstrated any prejudice occasioned to him by the manner in which the issue was adjudicated.

What the Petitioner essentially seeks before this Court is a different appreciation of the evidence relating to the availability and suitability of the alternative properties and a different conclusion from that reached by the learned ARC. Such an exercise would necessarily amount to appellate re-appreciation of the evidence, which is impermissible in the limited revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

The learned ARC has thus considered and adjudicated the Petitioner's objection regarding the alleged concealment and availability of alternative accommodation. The findings returned cannot be said to suffer from any failure of adjudication, perversity or manifest illegality. Merely because the Petitioner seeks to place a different interpretation upon the evidence already considered by the learned ARC does not constitute a ground for interference in revision. Accordingly, the contention founded upon the alleged absence of necessary pleadings or concealment of alternative accommodation does not persuade this Court to interfere with the Impugned Order. The learned ARC has undertaken the requisite adjudicatory exercise and has returned findings on the basis of the evidence led by the parties. No jurisdictional error or error apparent on the face of the record has been demonstrated warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

The submission of learned counsel for the Petitioner that the Eviction Petition was liable to be dismissed at the threshold for want of prior permission from the competent authority under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, is also devoid of merit. The learned ARC has specifically considered this objection and has dealt with the same in paragraph 22 of the Impugned Order. It has been noticed that, although the property falls within a slum area, the requirement of obtaining prior permission of the competent authority under the Slum Act does not arise in respect of an eviction petition instituted under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.

In this regard, the learned ARC has rightly placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shafait Ali v. Shiva Mal (Dead) by LRs.^{2020.AIR 1988 SC 214}, wherein, while considering the interplay between the provisions of the DRC Act and the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, it was held that the provisions of the DRC Act, including Section 14(1)(e) read with the special procedure under Chapter IIIA thereof, override the provisions of the Slum Act to the extent of any inconsistency. Consequently, no prior permission of the competent authority under Section 19(1)(a) of the Slum Act is required before instituting an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.

The mere assertion of the Petitioner that Respondent No.1 intended to integrate the tenanted premises with the adjoining portion and that such integration may entail structural changes does not alter the legal position. The requirement of prior permission under the Slum Act cannot be imported into a petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act when the same is otherwise expressly excluded by the applicable statutory scheme. The maintainability of the Eviction Petition, therefore, cannot be made dependent upon the Respondent first obtaining permission from the Slum Authority.

The learned ARC has, in any event, separately considered the aspect of the alleged structural changes and has noticed the categorical deposition of Respondent No.1/PW-1 that no structural changes were required to be carried out and that access to the adjoining portion could be achieved merely by opening a door in the partition wall between the premises. Thus, the factual premise on which the Petitioner's objection is founded has also been specifically examined by the learned ARC and does not warrant any interference in the present proceedings.

It is, therefore, evident that the learned ARC has considered both facets of the objection raised by the Petitioner—first, the alleged requirement of prior permission from the Slum Authority and, second, the alleged structural changes contemplated by Respondent No.1. Upon consideration of the applicable statutory framework and the evidence on record, the learned ARC has returned a reasoned finding rejecting the said objection. The Petitioner has not been able to demonstrate any jurisdictional error, manifest illegality or perversity in the said finding.

The submission that the Eviction Petition ought to have been dismissed at the threshold is, therefore, untenable. The objection raised by the Petitioner was duly considered and adjudicated upon by the learned ARC, and no error apparent on the face of the record has been demonstrated in the approach adopted by the learned ARC. This Court, in exercise of its limited revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, finds no justification to revisit the said finding or to substitute its own view for that of the learned ARC.

The Petitioner may seek to contend that the aforesaid approach of the learned ARC is erroneous in law and that the alleged defect pertains to the absence of a foundational pleading rather than mere concealment. However, this Court is unable to accept that the learned ARC failed to adjudicate upon the objection itself. The Impugned Order demonstrates that the objection was expressly noticed, the legal position was considered, and a reasoned conclusion was returned. Whether the said conclusion could have been arrived at differently is not the test to be applied in the exercise of the limited revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

It is also pertinent to note that the Petitioner was granted leave to defend and thereafter participated in a full-fledged trial. The Petitioner led evidence and had the opportunity to challenge, by way of cross-examination, the assertion of Respondent No.1 regarding his bona fide requirement and the availability or suitability of alternative accommodation. The learned ARC, after considering the evidence brought on record by both sides, has returned findings on each of the objections raised by the Petitioner. The present Revision Petition, therefore, cannot be permitted to operate as a substitute for an appeal merely because the Petitioner seeks a reappraisal of the evidence and a different conclusion on the merits.

In the considered opinion of this Court, the Impugned Order reflects due application of mind to the rival contentions and the material placed on record. The learned ARC has considered the objections regarding the alleged availability of additional space on the ground floor, the alleged availability of the first floor, the properties relied upon as alternative accommodation, the issue of additional accommodation and expansion of business, as well as the objection regarding the absence of necessary pleadings. Each of the aforesaid contentions has been dealt with and adjudicated upon by the learned ARC by recording reasons therefor.

This Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, is not required to sit as a Court of appeal over the findings of the learned ARC or to undertake a fresh and independent appreciation of the evidence merely because another view may, conceivably, be possible. The jurisdiction is intended to ensure that the decision-making process is legal, proper and free from material irregularity. In the present case, no jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, perversity or failure to consider any material contention has been demonstrated.

The Petitioner has, in effect, invited this Court to re-examine the evidence on the question of the area available with Respondent No.1, the suitability of the first floor, the availability of alternative accommodation and the bona fide nature of the requirement. These are precisely the aspects which were raised before and considered by the learned ARC. The mere fact that the findings returned by the learned ARC are adverse to the Petitioner cannot justify interference in revision.

This Court is, therefore, of the view that the learned ARC has duly considered and adjudicated upon the contentions raised by the Petitioner and has arrived at its conclusions upon an appreciation of the material available on record. No error apparent on the face of the record or any infirmity in the decision-making process has been demonstrated so as to warrant exercise of the limited revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

Accordingly, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the Impugned Judgement dated 11.11.2025 passed by the learned ARC.

The present Revision Petition is, consequently, dismissed and disposed of, along with pending Application(s), if any, in the aforesaid terms.