Kisan Rice and General Mills and Others vs United Commercial Bank and Others

D.V. Sehgal, J.—This revision petition is directed against the order dated May 24, 1986, passed by the learned Sub-Judge, 1st Class, Batala, whereby an application filed by the plaintiff-bank under Order VI, Rule 17 and Order I, rule 10, CPC (for short " the Code ") has been allowed. It appears that, under the general power of attorney of the bank, Shri Vinod Kumar Kalia, a principal officer and Branch Manager of the Bank, and Shri J.K. Sharma, Assistant Branch Manager of the Bank, were authorised to institute the suit, to sign and to verify the pleadings. The suit was, however, filed through Shri Vinod Kumar Kalia, Branch Manager, alone.

An objection was taken on behalf of the defendant-petitioner that Shri Vinod Kumar Kalia alone, by himself, could not institute the suit. It was debated before the learned trial court whether or not he alone could institute the suit. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the tenor of the power of attorney shows that Shri Vinod Kumar Kalia and Shri J.K. Sharma were jointly authorised to institute the suit. The suit instituted by one of them alone could not be maintained. To meet this objection, the bank filed the instant application for amendment which has been allowed by the learned trial court.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Mr. Sanjay Majithia, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that by the date the application for amendment was filed, the claim of the bank had already become barred by time and even if a properly instituted suit had been filed on that date, it could not be maintained. He, therefore, submits that a valuable right has accrued to the petitioner. By seeking the aforesaid amendment, the bank wants to validate the institution of the suit. This, according to him, cannot be done, as it would rob the petitioner of the right which has accrued in its favour. For this proposition, he relies on Haridas Girdhardas and Others Vs. Varadaraja Pillai and Another, .

There is no quarrel with the proposition that where, by lapse of time, a valuable right has accrued to the opposite party, an amendment cannot be allowed to take away that right. But here the position is altogether different. The power of attorney in favour of Shri Vinod Kumar Kalia, one of the principal officers of the bank, through whom the suit was filed, was without doubt executed long before the institution of the suit. The power of attorney authorised two officers to institute the suit--the other being Shri J.K. Sharma. When an objection regarding the proper institution of the suit was taken, the bank sought an amendment through the instant application. This was simply to remove the technical objection. Section 196 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, provides for ratification of the actions of the agent by the principal. It lays down that where acts are done by one person on behalf of another, but without his knowledge or authority, he may elect to ratify or to disown such acts. If he ratifies them, the same effect will follow as if they had been performed by his authority. Thus, it is to be taken that Shri Vinod Kumar Kalia had been given the authority to file the suit, which the bank intended to ratify. Otherwise also, since the power of attorney had been executed in favour of two principal officers of the bank, by way of amendment, the institution of the suit was also sought to have been done through Shri J.K. Sharma. In my view, no valuable right of the petitioner has been taken away by the amendment allowed by the learned trial court. It is simply ratification of the act of the agent by the bank. The bank intended to file the instant suit. It had been filed through one of its agents. Addition of another agent in the body of the pleadings to show that it has been instituted by both of them is simply to bring it in accord with the power vested by the general power of attorney. The suit of the bank should not fail merely on this technical ground. The ends of justice have been met by the amendment allowed through the impugned order.

Consequently, I find no ground to interfere with the order passed by the learned trial court. The revision petition is, therefore, dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

The parties, through their counsel, are directed to appear before the learned trial court on December 5, 1988.