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Judgment
(Hybrid Mode) [ORAL JUDGMENT: Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma, Member (Judicial)] 13.04.2026
These two company appeals have been preferred by Kineta Global Limited, the Successful Resolution Applicant of Blue Park Seafoods Private Limited. Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No. 22/2026 would be taken as to be the lead appeal, where the Appellant challenges the impugned order of 13.06.2025, that was passed by the Ld. Adjudicating Authority, in IA(IBC)/24 /2025, in IA(IBC)/407/2023 in CP (IB)/77 /9/AMR/2021, by virtue of which the claim preferred by EPFO, Respondent-1 herein was allowed. In Company Appeal (AT)(CH)(Ins) No. 21/2026, the Appellant challenges the order of Ld.
NCLT dated 20.08.2025, that was passed, in IA(IBC)/272/2025, that was preferred in IA(IBC)/24/2025 in IA(IBC)/407/2023, in CP(IB) No. 77/9/AMR/2021, whereby the application filed by the Appellant / SRA seeking recall of the order passed by Ld. NCLT on 13.06.2025 in IA/24/2025 was rejected. The facts which engage consideration in both the appeals are common. Hence, they are required to be commonly read for both the company appeals.
Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against Corporate Debtor was initiated with filing of the application under Section 9 of I&B Code by M/s. Pattabhi Enterprises. The said application was admitted by Ld. NCLT by the order dated 26.10.2022 and CIRP was commenced in respect of the Corporate Debtor. The Resolution Professional, who was appointed by an order dated 14.12.2022 to conduct the CIRP, took the necessary steps such as issue of public notice, invitation of claims and collation of the same and constitution of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) and after taking the approval of the CoC, invited Expression of Interest (EoI) for submission of Resolution Plans.
The Appellant, submitted his Expression of Interest (EoI) and was declared as a Prospective Resolution Applicant. Subsequently, he was asked to submit a Resolution Plan in accordance with the provisions of the Code and he duly submitted the same for consideration of CoC. In all, four Resolution Plans including the resolution plan submitted by the Appellant were put up before the CoC for consideration. The CoC deliberated upon the said four plans, and ultimately, approved the plan that was submitted by the Appellant by 100% voting on 10.11.2023. Thereafter, the Resolution Professional filed the application IA(IBC)/407/2023 in the CP (IB)/77 /9/AMR/2021 on 18.11.2023, seeking an approval of the Resolution Plan submitted by the Appellant, which stood approved by the Ld. Adjudicating Authority vide its order of 07.05.2024.
It is revealed from the records that the Resolution Professional, in the process of receiving claims from the creditors and other stakeholders, received a claim from the Employees Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) for an amount of Rs. 92,86,949/- on 24.01.2023. The said amount as claimed was qua the amount payable under Section 7A of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 1952, wherein the assessment of dues relating to the claim was pending inquiry, and final orders were yet to be passed by the competent authority under EPF&MP Act. The inquiry proceeding against the Corporate Debtor under Section 7A of the EPF Act was initiated by Respondent No. 1 on 15.07.2022 and the said inquiry proceedings continued during the CIRP period despite operation of the moratorium which is borne by the fact that on 14.02.2023, the notices were issued to the RP by Employee's Provident Fund Officer. Further, the final order on the said 7A proceedings was passed on 30.04.2024 and the same was communicated to the Resolution Professional. Meanwhile, the resolution plan submitted in IA(IBC)/407/2023 was approved by Ld. NCLT on 07.05.2024.
The records further reveal that on receiving no response from the RP in respect of its claim submitted and upon learning that the resolution plan has already been approved on 07.05.2024, EPFO, the Respondent No. 1 herein filed an application being IA (IBC)/24/2025 on 05.01.2025, in IA(IBC)/407/2023 by invoking Section 42 of the Code, in which it prayed for condonation of delay in filing the said application and for issue of a direction to the RP to admit its claim of Rs. 92,86,949/- on the ground that it was a statutory due and that as per the provisions of section 36(4)(a)(iii) the said claim represents 3rd party asset in the possession of the CD. Ld. NCLT, after hearing the parties, passed the order dated 13.06.2025 in IA (IBC) 24 / 2025, admitting the full claim of Rs.92,86,949/- and directing the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) to pay the same to EPFO on the grounds that as per the ratio laid down by NCLAT in Jet Aircraft Maintenance Engineers Welfare Association v. RP of Jet Airways, in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 752 of 2021, the SRA is required to pay the claim in full to EPFO, with liberty to approach the Central Board of Trustees only for waiver of the damages levelled under Section 14B of the EPF Act. The relevant portion of the said order is extracted below:
Accordingly, the SRA is directed to pay the outstanding provident fund dues amounting to Rs.92,86,949/-(Rupees Ninety-Two Lakhs Eighty-Six Thousand Nine Hundred and Forty-Nine only) within two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this Order. It is, however, clarified that the SRA shall be at liberty to approach the Central Board to waive only the damages levelled under Section 14B of the EPF Act.
The Registry, is directed to communicate the copy of this Order to the SRA and the SRA shall file a compliance of the order.
With the above directions, the instant application, i.e., IA (IBC)/24/2025 in IA (IBC)/407/2023, stands allowed.
List the matter on 29.07.2025 for taking on record the compliance by the SRA."
The grievance of the Appellant, while he questions the impugned order is that, in the Application IA(IBC)/24/2025 preferred by the EPFO, Respondent No. 1 herein under Section 42 of the Code, he was not made as a party by EPFO even though the application prayed for admission of a claim which was submitted subsequent to the approval of the Resolution Plan on 07.05.2024,
The Appellant, accordingly sought recall of the order of 13.06.2025 as passed in IA (IBC)/ 24/2025 by filing the recall application IA (IBC)/272/2025 in IA(IBC)/24/2025 on 31.07.2025. At this stage, we will have to bear in mind that, the order under Section 42 of the Code, was passed on 13.06.2025 and if at all there was any grievance, the appeal against the same should have been filed within 30 days from the date of passing of the order, i.e., on or before 12.07.2025. However, the recall application itself was filed by the Appellant on 31.07.2025, which is after 45 days from the date of passing of the order and beyond the time period prescribed (including the condonable period) for filing of the appeal. Now the question would be that, when the recall application itself has been preferred after the expiry of the limitation period prescribed under law to prefer an appeal against the order of 13.06.2025, whether recall itself would be maintainable. The answer would be that “no recall would lie” if it is filed beyond the limitation period prescribed for preferring of an appeal, particularly when the proceedings are being held under IBC where time is of utmost importance.
What is more surprising is that, for the purposes of recall of the order of 13.06.2025, the Appellant in para 4 of his recall application, had sought recall of the order on the following grounds: -
I. The Appellant was not impleaded as a party in the proceedings.
II. The order was passed without issuance of notice to him.
III. The order was passed without giving him an opportunity of being heard.
We find that these grounds exclusively taken in the recall application can be answered at this juncture itself, by reproducing the extracts of the finding recorded in the order of 13.06.2025 passed in IA(IBC)/24/2025 itself. The said order observes in paragraph-5 as under:
The Counsel appearing for the SRA submitted that after approval of the Resolution Plan, the SRA is not liable to the dues pertaining to the pre-CIRP period."
This confirms that the Appellant was participating in the proceedings and therefore, he would be deemed to have knowledge and also there would be a strong presumption that he was heard too. Besides that, recording in para-7 confirms that arguments were also extended by the Appellant, which is extracted hereunder:
"Based on the pleadings of the parties and arguments made by the counsel of EPFO, RP and SRA, we note the following chronology of events and facts:"
Further, the finding recorded in para 11 and 12 of the said order also point to the presence of the Appellant and his active participation in the proceedings of IA(IBC)/24/2025, which reads as under:
Accordingly, the SRA is directed to pay the outstanding provident fund dues amounting to Rs.92,86,949/-(Rupees Ninety-Two Lakhs Eighty-Six Thousand Nine Hundred and Forty-Nine only) within two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this Order. It is, however, clarified that the SRA shall be at liberty to approach the Central Board to waive only the damages levelled under Section 14B of the EPF Act.
The Registry, is directed to communicate the copy of this Order to the SRA and the SRA shall file a compliance of the order.
From the above extracts, we can logically conclude that, in the proceedings of IA(IBC)/24/2025, the Appellant was present in the proceedings, he participated in the proceedings, his version was considered, and even further, the order was directed to be communicated to him by the Registry of the Ld. Tribunal. Therefore, the contention raised by the Appellant in his recall application IA(IBC)/272/2025 is not at all sustainable. Besides that, the recall application IA (IBC) 272/2025, has been found to have been preferred by the Appellant beyond the period of limitation prescribed , for preferring an appeal and hence it would not be maintainable. Therefore, we are of the view that Ld. NCLT rightly rejected the recall application by the order dated 20.08.2025 which is impugned in CA(AT)(CH)(INS) No. 21/2026.
Aggrieved against the said order of 20.08.2025, for reasons best known to Appellant, he had preferred a Writ Petition before the Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, being Writ Petition No. 30061 of 2025, Kineta Global Limited and Other v. Employees' Provident Fund Organization & Ors. In the said WP proceedings, the Division Bench of High Court, have passed an order on 03.11.2025, dismissing the Writ Petition, holding thereof that, the Appellant has got an alternative remedy to approach before this Appellate Tribunal. After passing of the order by the Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh on 03.11.2025, the Company Appeal, being Company Appeal (AT)
(Ins) No. 21/2026, has been preferred by the Appellant on 2111.2025.
It is seen that the Appellant while putting a challenge to the order of 13.06.2025 as passed in IA (IBC) 24/2025, under Section 42 of the Code, has filed the company appeal before the Registry of this Appellate Tribunal on 24.11.2025, on which the Registry has reported that, the appeal has been filed by 87 days of delay. But the Appellant has filed an IA No. 55/2026 seeking condonation of 14 days of delay only in filing the appeal, on the plea that the recall application was filed within limitation on 31.07.2025, that it was heard and disposed of on 20.08.2025, that the order of dismissal was uploaded on NCLT website on 25.08.2025, that since the order was passed in gross violation of natural justice, he had approached Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh by filing a Writ Petition No. 30061 of 2025 on 17.09.2025 which was within the period of limitation and after it was decided on 03.11.2025, he had filed the subsequent appeal on 24.11.2025 which is again within 30 days of the passing of the order by Hon’ble High Court, and therefore the period spent in litigation in recall application proceedings and in the proceedings before the High Court, should be excluded from the computation of limitation period in the light of the provisions contained under Section 14 of the Limitation Act and the resultant delay in filing the appeal as against the order of 13.06.2025 deserves to be condoned.
We have got our own reservations to accept the said plea. Further, even if we accept the plea that Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable, and that the proceedings before a wrong forum have been carried in a bona fide manner, still the company appeal deserves to be rejected on the ground of limitation itself because the Appellant had opted to file the recall application seeking recall of the order 13.06.2025, on 31.07.2025 only, well after the expiry of limitation period prescribed for preferring an appeal under section 61(2) of the Code and hence the Appellant will not be entitled to receive the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which would apply for the proceedings carried on before Hon’ble High Court. Accordingly, IA No. 55/2026 seeking condonation of delay deserves rejection and consequentially, the appeal CA(AT)(INS)No. 22/2026 too deserves to be dismissed.
Further, if we look into the issue where the Appellant puts a challenge to the order of IA (IBC)/24/2025 after a lapse of 87 days, from another perspective, we find from the proceedings of the said IA that, the Appellant was heard, he was a party to the proceedings, he had knowledge, and despite of having the knowledge, he has chosen to file a "recall" of an order, which has been passed on merits, after hearing the Appellant, on the grounds that he was not made a party in the said IA and no notice was served upon him and the order has been passed without hearing him. Under such circumstances, the recall would not be maintainable, because there is no provision of recall of an order, which has been passed on merits after hearing the party. At the most, he could have preferred an appeal against the impugned order of 13.06.2025 under Section 61 of the Code, which he has chosen not to file, for which he has to blame himself. Since, the recall itself is not maintainable under law and more particularly, since the recall application was filed on 31.07.2025 after the expiry of period of limitation prescribed for filing of an appeal against the order of 13.06.2025 under section 61(2) of the Code, the appeal would not be maintainable in the eyes of law because even under the general law, that is, Order XXI Rule 105 of CPC, the prescribed time limit to file recall against an order is 30 days.
The recourse to file the recall application, should not have been resorted to by the Appellant in a manner to override the effect of limitation under the I&B Code, by filing at first, a recall application at a belated stage and upon its dismissal, filing the Writ Petition and thereafter, filing the Company Appeal with a plea to condone the delay under the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
The Appellant has also preferred an appeal as against the impugned order of 20.08.2025, i.e., against the rejection of his recall application, being IA (IBC) 272/2025, which is accompanied with a delay condonation application being IA No. 53/2026, seeking condonation of 12 days of delay in filing the appeal. However, as far as this application is concerned, taking a pragmatic view, owing to the grounds taken, particularly in context of the order passed by the Hon’ble High Court on 03.11.2025, the delay of 12 days would stand condoned and we have to proceed to hear the Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No. 21/2026, as against the order of rejection of the recall, on its own merits.
The Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No. 21/2026, as against the rejection of recall would not be maintainable, owing the following observations which we are making by way of a repetition.
I. The Appellant was heard when the Ld. Tribunal passed the order on 13.06.2025.
II. He was represented by his counsel, who was conscious of the proceedings. It would mean that the Appellant too had and would be deemed to have knowledge of the proceedings when his counsel appeared and contested the proceedings.
III. If in a proceeding, where several IAs are being considered and decided together and if the Appellant had participated in one of the IAs, it will be deemed that he had knowledge of the proceedings of all other IAs, which were decided by a common order.
IV. If the Appellant had participated in the proceedings, and he was heard, the ground taken in the recall application itself that the order of 13.06.2025 suffers from the vices of Audi alteram partem is not sustainable.
V. The finding recorded in the order of 13.06.2025, itself speaks volumes about the conduct of the Appellant who had actively participated in the proceedings.
VI. The recall will not be maintainable, having been preferred beyond the prescribed period of limitation for filing of an appeal against the order of 13.06.2025, or even beyond time prescribed to file a recall.
VII. Recall cannot be permitted to be adopted as a recourse to carve out a distinction to take the benefit of limitation, which is otherwise not directly available to the Appellant, as against the impugned order of 13.06.2025. Since the order of 13.06.2025, as apparent from the order itself, is an order on merits after hearing the Appellant, hence no recall is maintainable.
VIII. A recall of an order is only permissible when there is some apparent and inherent lacuna in passing of an order by the Ld. Tribunal due to its own procedural flaw. There is no procedural flaw in the order sought to be recalled apparent from records or pleaded by the Appellant in the recall application, which could maintain his application for recall.
IX. The Appellant has argued that, he was not a party to the IA. But as we have already observed, he was represented by his counsel and was heard. If the Appellant was consciously participating in the proceedings, and was arguing the proceedings on merits, he cannot subsequently, after passing of order against him, at an appellate stage, take a plea that he was not made a party to the IA, and that he was not heard.
X. Representing a cause and being heard in a cause itself will amount to that the proceedings is in the knowledge of the Appellant, and that would itself suffice the purpose of effective service of notice, even if he has not been made a party to the application and once he addresses the application itself on merits, without seeking a liberty or raising an objection of not being made as a party, he cannot seek a recall of an order on the grounds of being not made a party in the application.
XI. Thus, the rejection of the recall application for the above reason is absolutely tenable in the eyes of law, and the pleas taken cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and that has been rightly rejected by the impugned order of 20.08.2025 as passed in IA (IBC) 272/2025 preferred by the Appellant in IA (IBC) 24 / 2025 in IA (IBC)/407/2023 in CP(IB) No. 77/9/AMR/2021, which is subject matter of consideration in Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No. 21/2026. Hence this Company Appeal lacks merit and is accordingly ‘dismissed’.
So far as the Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No. 22/2026 is concerned, the same would too stand ‘dismissed’ because, I. The appeal was preferred at a belated stage after a delay of 87 days, which we have declined to condone, because the Appellant had the knowledge of the order of 13.06.2025, and it was incumbent upon him to have filed an appeal under Section 61 of the I & B Code within the limitation period, instead of which, he had chosen to file a recall, that too after the lapse of the limitation period.
II. The order is being challenged exclusively on the ground that; the Appellant was not heard. It may not be the ground available to the Appellant in view of what has been extracted by this Appellate Tribunal by taking out the excerpts from the impugned order where the Appellant was represented by the counsel, he was heard and then only the order of 13.06.2025 was passed. Be that as it may. But since the appeal is barred by limitation, as the grounds for condonation of delay is not maintainable as decided by us in preceding paragraphs, Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No. 22/2026 too would stand dismissed.
III. All interlocutory applications pending consideration in both the company appeals would stand rejected.
[Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma] Member (Judicial) [Jatindranath Swain] Member (Technical)