Khaleel & Ors. vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

The present criminal revision has been filed by petitioners under Section 438/442 of BNSS, against the order dated 24/07/2025 (Annexure P/1) passed by learned Additional Session Judge, Lateri District Vidisha in Sessions Trial No.26/2025; whereby, charges under Sections 294, 323, 34, 307/34 and 506-II of IPC have been framed against the petitioners.

Prosecution story, in short, is that on 20/6/2024 at about 04:30 PM, the complainant Mohd. Umar Khan, along with his brother Ashad Khan and aunt Sakeela Bi, was constructing a temporary shed (tapra) at his home. At that time, the petitioners namely Khalil Khan armed with an axe and Imam Khan armed with a stick/lathi along with Sahjadi Bi came at the spot with common intention on account of old enmity relating to land dispute. Khalil Khan started abusing the complainant with filthy language. When the complainant’s younger brother, Ashad Khan, objected to the same, Khalil Khan, with an intention to cause death, assaulted Ashad Khan on his head with an axe. As a result of which, he fell down. Thereafter, Imam Khan inflicted danda blow on left elbow of complainant Mohammad Umar Khan and also gave 2-3 fist blows near his left eye and mouth, due to which blood started oozing out. On hearing crying of complainant party, Anees Khan and Kadir Khan intervened in the matter to save them. While fleeing the spot, the accused persons also threatened the complainant party to kill, if the shed was not removed. The injured Ashad Khan along with Sakeela Bi was immediately taken to the Government Hospital, Lateri for medical treatment.

On the basis of the allegations made, FIR has been registered under Sections 307, 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC at police Station, Murwas, Distt. Vidisha, at crime No.97/2024. The victims were taken for MLC and thereafter, statements of witnesses were recorded.

After completion of investigation, charge-sheet (Annexure-P/2) was filed before the JMFC and the case was committed to the Sessions Court. The Sessions Court framed charges against the petitioners under Sections 294, 323 (in the alternative 323/34), 307 (in the alternative 307/34) and 506 Part II of IPC which is under challenge in the present revision.

At the very outset, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that he is not pressing this revision petition for discharging the petitioners from the charges framed under Sections 294, 323 (in the alternative 323/34, and 506 (Part-II) of the IPC. He confined his arguments solely to as regards framing of charge under Section 307 (in the alternative 307/34 of IPC).

Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that evidence collected by the prosecution during the course of investigation does not prima facie constitute the offence under Section 307 (in the alternative 307/34 of IPC) against the petitioners.

It is further submitted that on the complaint made from the side of the petitioners, police has registered a cross-case for the offence under Section 325 of IPC against the complainant side and charge-sheet (Anexure P/3) has been filed; whereas, in the present case, charge-sheet has been filed for the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC. It is further submitted that the medical evidence is the most important factor to determine the seriousness of the injured. The medical examination of the injured Ashad Khan was conducted and the same shows that the injury was simple and not dangerous to life with no bony injury found in the CT Scan. Upon a specific query raised by the Investigating Officer vide letter dated 09.10.2024 regarding the nature of injuries sustained by injured Ashad Khan, Dr. Arvind Diwakar, Surgery Department, ABVGMC, Vidisha, submitted a Query Report dated 15.10.2024, wherein he categorically opined that the injuries were simple in nature and not dangerous to life.

It is further submitted that as per letter dated 01.11.2024 sent by the SHO, Police Station Murwas, District Vidisha to Superintendent of Police, Vidisha, the SHO has stated that in view of the medical opinion, no offence under Section 307 of the IPC is made out and has sought permission to expunge the charge under Section 307 of IPC. The SDOP has also opined that the charge-sheet should not be filed under Section 307 of IPC. It is further submitted that the case diary further reveals that based on the medical reports and the existence of a cross-case, the District Public Prosecution Officer (DPO), Vidisha, vide letter dated 20.01.2025 had opined that the offence under Section 307 IPC was not made out and the charge sheet should be filed by dropping the said section.

It is further submitted that despite the medical opinion, reports of the Investigating Officer/SHO, the SDOP as well as the DPO, the Superintendent of Police, Vidisha vide letter dated 31.01.2025 directed the inclusion of Section 307 IPC, observing that the allegations mentioned in the FIR clearly indicate an intention to cause death by using an axe on the head and therefore, it would be appropriate to get the case decided by the Hon’ble Court under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code along with other relevant sections.

He further submitted that in a sudden/free fight over a property dispute, a single blow causing a simple injury cannot be treated as an attempt to murder only on the basis of exaggerated oral allegations and especially when there is no medical opinion suggesting the injuries were sufficient to cause death. To substantiate his argument, he placed heavy reliance on the judgments of this Court in the cases of Kanhaiya Lal & Ors. vs. State of M.P. reported in ILR 2011 MP 2601 (Para 7&8), Anil alias Noni Panda & Anr. Vs. State of M.P. reported in ILR 2012 MP 1081 (Para 7 &8), Suresh Sharma and others V. State of M.P. reported in 2017 (1) MPWN 69 (Para 3, 5 & 6), Brahmanand @ Brahmajeet Singh v. State of M.P reported in 2013 (3) MPWN 76 (Para 8 & 12), Gulab & Anr Vs. State of M.P. reported in ILR 2012 MP 1055 and Roop Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. reported in ILR 2012 MP 1048.

With the aforesaid submissions, it is prayed that the impugned order of framing of charge dated 24/07/2025 (Annexure P/1) be set aside and petitioners be discharged from the charge under Section 307 of IPC.

Per contra, learned counsel for the State as well as learned counsel for the complainant supported the impugned order and prays for rejection of the revision petition. It is submitted that at the stage of framing of charges, only prima facie case is to be seen. Material on record discloses the offence for which charge-sheet has been filed against the petitioner. It is further submitted that there are specific allegations against the petitioners that they with common intention to cause death of injured Ashad Khan caused injury to the injured. The said allegations are corroborated from FIR, 161 Cr.P.C. statements of witnesses as well as material available in charge-sheet. Learned Sessions Court has correctly passed the order after considering the statements and documents on record. Therefore, instant revision petition is nothing but a gross misuse of process of law and needs to be dismissed.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended thereto.

In the present case, it is an admitted position that the injury sustained by the injured is on the vital part of the body, i.e. head by means of axe. The sole contention of the petitioner is that as opined by the doctor, the injury is simple in nature and not dangerous to life. The District Public Prosecutor as well as the SDOP, looking to the nature of injury, had opined that the offence under Section 307 of IPC was not made out. Therefore, the learned Court below has erred in framing the charge under Section 307 of IPC.

In view of the aforesaid submissions, the moot question for consideration before this Court is, “whether looking to the nature of injury, the learned Court below has erred in framing the charge under Section 307 of IPC ?”

To deal with the said question, it would be apt to consider relevant provision and essential ingredients in law to constitute the offence under Section 307 of IPC. Section 307 of IPC reads as under:

A plain reading of Section 307 of IPC shows that it is in two parts. The first part makes any act committed with the intention or knowledge that it would amount to murder if the act caused death, punishable with imprisonment up to 10 years. The second part makes such an act punishable with imprisonment for life if hurt is caused thereby. Thus, even if the act does not cause any injury, it is punishable with imprisonment up to 10 years. If it does cause an injury and therefore hurt, it is punishable with imprisonment with life. Thus, the section itself does not take into consideration the effect of the act of the accused except as a measure of the sentence to be imposed upon him.

The legal position regarding the scope and ambit of Section 307 of IPC is no longer res integra. In the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Balram Bama Patil reported in (1983) 2 SCC 28, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is not necessary that a bodily injury sufficient under normal circumstances to cause death should have been inflicted. Relevant extract of which is reproduced as under :-

(Emphasis supplied)

In the case of Vasant Vithu Jadhav Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2004) 9 SCC 31, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the aforesaid principle and held that to justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted and the intention to kill or knowledge that the death will be caused is the essential ingredient.

Similarly, in the case of Hari Mohan Mandal Vs. State of Jharkhand reported in (2004) 12 SCC 220, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that it is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. If the injury inflicted has been with the avowed object or intention to cause death, the actual nature, extent, or character of the injury, or whether such injury is sufficient to actually cause death, are really factors which are wholly irrelevant for adjudging the culpability under Section 307 IPC. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result if any. The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section. Therefore, it is not correct to acquit an accused of the charge under Section 307 IPC merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.

In the case of State of M.P. Vs. Saleem reported in (2005) 5 SCC 554, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the settled principle and held as under:-

(Emphasis supplied)

In light of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is clear that if intention is present coupled with some overt act in execution thereof is sufficient to constitute offence under Section 307 of IPC. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act was done with the intention or knowledge and under what circumstances. Therefore, only because injury inflicted on victim is simple in nature, an accused charged under Section 307 of IPC cannot be acquitted.

Likewise, in the case of Jage Ram & Others Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2015) 11 SCC 366, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that for the purpose of conviction under Section 307 of IPC, the prosecution has to establish the intention to commit murder and the act done by the accused. To justify a conviction, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused.

Again, in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Kanha @ Omprakash reported in (2019) 3 SCC 605, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for the offence under Section 307 of IPC.

From the aforesaid pronouncements of law, it is clear that any injury or nature of the injury is not determinative factor to constitute the offence under Section 307 of IPC. The essential ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 307 of IPC are, (i) the accused did an act; (ii) intention and knowledge of the accused; and (iii) the circumstances in which the act is done. Thus, to constitute an offence under Section 307 of IPC, an act with an intention under the circumstances has to be done. The intention is gathered from the circumstances under which the act is done and not merely from the consequences that ensue.

In the case of Hari Singh Vs. Sukhbir Singh reported in AIR 1988 SC 2127, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the manner in which the intention of the accused is to be inferred. It was held that the intention is gathered from the nature of the weapon used, manner in which it is used, motive for the crime, severity of the blow, the part of the body where the injury is inflicted. These are some factors that may be taken into consideration to determine the intention. The state of mind of the accused has to be established from surrounding circumstances and the motive would be relevant circumstance in the case of Section 307 of IPC.

The principles governing determination of intention were elaborately explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pulicherla Nagaraju Vs. State of A.P. reported in (2006) 11 SCC 444. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under :-

From the aforesaid pronouncements of law, it is clear that the intention can be gathered from various circumstances and the same cannot be inferred only on the basis of result of the action.

Now, question is, “whether at the stage of framing of charge, intention can be gathered ?”

The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from combination of a few or several circumstances. Whether a person had the intention to commit an offence is a matter of fact. Thus, it can be determine only after the trial Court records and examines the evidence of the witnesses and other material.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shoyeb Raja Vs. State of M.P. & Ors (Criminal Appeal No.3327/2024 decided on 25/09/2024) has categorically held that the question of intention to kill or the knowledge of death in terms of Section 307 of IPC is a question of fact and not one of law.

Similarly, in the case of Anjani Kumar Chaudhary Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2014) 12 SCC 286, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after relying upon the order passed in the case of Vasant Vithu Jadhav (supra), has reiterated that the question as to whether there was an intention to kill or knowledge that death will be caused is a question of fact and would depend on the facts of a given case which has to be attributed on evidence by the trial court.

At the framing of charge, the Court cannot gather the intention because same is the question of fact which can only be determined only after recording of evidence. The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of section 227 or 228 of the code of criminal procedure 1973. It is only in the trial, the guilt of the offence of the accused can be determined and not at the stage of framing of charge. Therefore, the Court need not undertake an elaborate enquiry. Nor it is necessary to dwell into various aspects. All that the Court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record, if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more is required to look into.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Soma Chakravarty v. State reported in (2007) 5 SCC 403, wherein it was held as under :-

It is, therefore, well settled that the stage of framing of the charge is different from the recording of a judgment of conviction. A distinction must be borne in mind that at the time of framing of the charge, the Court may take into consideration the fact as to whether the accused might have committed the offense or not. But at the time of recording a judgment of conviction, the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offense.

As discussed hereinabove, the intention contemplated under Section 307 of IPC is essentially a question of fact and can be gathered after considering the various circumstances. Thus, at the time of framing of charge, the said question of fact cannot be enquired into by the Court because it is a matter of fact.

It is equally well settled that the nature or gravity of the injury is not an essential ingredient for constituting an offence under Section 307 of the IPC. Consequently, the contention of the petitioner that since the injury is simple in nature and not dangerous to life, therefore, the offence under Section 307 of the IPC is not attracted, cannot be accepted, especially looking to the fact that the injury was caused on vital part of body i.e. head by means of sharp object i.e. axe. Therefore, the said contention is hereby rejected.

The submission of petitioner regarding the existence of a cross-case, bearing Crime No. 96/2024, in which complainant/respondent No. 2 and his family members have themselves been charge-sheeted for the same occurrence and that the incident was a free fight, also does not command acceptance at this stage. This Court cannot alter the current charge just because there are conflicting stories, as this is a matter of trial to discover the truth by relying upon actual evidence and cross-examinations.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon certain decisions in support of his contentions. However, with utmost respect, this Court is of the opinion that the judgments relied upon by the petitioner were based upon different factual footing and the attention of the Court does not appear to have been drawn to the consistent legal position settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court which directly governs the issue involved in the present case. Therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the said judgments are not of much assistance to the petitioner. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is binding upon this Court. Accordingly, relying upon the same, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court has not erred in framing the charge under Section 307 of the IPC.

In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 24/07/2025 (Annexure P/1) does not suffer from any illegality, perversity, impropriety or material irregularity. Consequently, this Court does not find any ground warranting interference with the impugned order passed by the learned Court below.

Consequently, this revision sans merits and is hereby dismissed. The impugned order is hereby upheld and confirmed.

It is, however, made clear that all observations made in this order are confined to the determination of the present revision and shall not be construed as a final expression of opinion on the guilt or innocence of the petitioner. The learned Court below shall now proceed with the trial on its own merits, uninfluenced by any observation made in this order.