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Judgment
S.C. Mohapatra, J.—This is an application u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by accused persons invoking inherent power of this Court to quash the prosecution in G.R. Case No. 5 of 1988.
Petitioner No. 1 is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956. Govind Ram Kedia, Petitioner No. 3 is the Managing ''Director of the company, Nanhayal Yadav, Petitioner No. 6 is the manager of the rice mill of the company. Petitioner No. 3 appointed Badriprasad Kedia (Petitioner No. 2) his father Giridharilal Kedia (Petitioner No. 4) his brother and Jayadayal Kedia (Petitioner, No. 5) his nephew as power of attorney holders in the document executed on 11-12-1985.
Petitioner No. 1 carries on business of purchase, storage and milling of paddy and rice and has established a mm where production started with effect from 1-4-1988. Company had licences under the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order. 1965 made under the essential Commodities Act (for short the ''Act'') which was valid till 31-3-1980. Obtaining a search warrant, investigating agency searched premises of Petitioner No. 1 on 9-4-1988. During search stock of rice and paddy were physically verified along with stock registers. Discrepancies in rice stock being found, Petitioner No. 6, the manager disclosed that rice bags had been kept in other godowns. Those godown were searched where some rice was found. After that in the First Information Report of the charge-sheet it has not been mentioned that Petitioners were either in charge of the business and responsible for the violation alleged and there is also no assertion that with their consent and connivance offence was committed. Mr. Jain submitted that application for renewal of licenses had been made and in the meantime they have been renewed.
Inherent power u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure is wide. Wider being the power, greater should be the restraint in exercising the same and such power should be sparingly used only when prejudice if any caused to a person cannot be mitigated otherwise or by the time he gets the remedy, he would completely be ruined. Unless this principle is kept in mind, this Court would be busy in scrutinising records of all prosecutions at any stage before judgment to examine whether there is material to bring home guilt of accused persons. This is not the object of inherent power exercised by the Court. Therefore, in deserving cases only wide power is to be exercised to quash proceedings. While so exercising the power, this Court is to strike a balance between the intention of accused to escape or face trial, and harassment that would be caused if accused faces the trial. In that view conduct of applicants is also to be kept in mind.
Mr. Jain has relied upon several decisions both of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court where prosecutions have been quashed and has also placed reliance on decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court where on merits acquittals have been made. In one of the decisions of this Court reported in 1985 C.L.R. 9, (Madan Mohan Agarwala v. State of Orissa), it has been observed that Court can quash a proceeding in exercise of inherent power even at a stage where some of the will 2S SeS have been examined.
As has already been discussed, inherent power of this Court is wide but it is discretionary for the Court to exercise such power. Court is to consider judicially whether such wide discretion would be exercised in the facts and circumstances of a given case in favour of accused. Possession of power does not mean that it is to be exercised. Precedents in cases of exercise of discretion are of persuasive value and have no binding effect since facts and circumstances of no two cases are equal and conduct of two persons are not equal. In each case Court has to carefully examine if inherent power is to be exercised. It would also depend upon the nature of offence committed and the persons who is alleged to have committed the offences.
As regards nature of the offence, business was carried on since 1985 and subsequently a company was registered. Prosecuting agency is of the opinion that terms of licence even though expired, have been violated. Discrepancies in the stock with entries in the stock registers were also prima facie found. The Act is one meant for social security. In such circumstances when evidence of three witnesses have been recorded and other nine witnesses named in the charge-sheet are to be examined, prosecution ought not to be thwarted even if on the materials as available now, conviction cannot be secured. Conviction would depend upon totality of evidence some of ''which are awaiting.
I am not inclined to accept prayer of Petitioners to quash prosecution at this stage. Therefore, I am not examining the materials as furnished by Petitioners to find out whether offence, has been made out. Taking back ground into consideration, there is no doubt that on perusal of the First information Report and the charge-sheet, there is legitimate suspicion that offence have been committed.
Since inherent power of the Court is to be exercised, applicant invoking such power is to be alert and in case of delay he is required to explain why he could not approach this Court earlier. Taking a chance for acquittal for some time by cross-examining witnesses a person should not normally be allowed to invoke inherent power for quashing the proceeding unless his prejudice would be to such an extent that it cannot be mitigated unless this Court exercises the power. This is not a case here.
From the order-sheet I find that Petitioners who are individuals are allowed to be represented though each day they are to apply for such representation. Thus, prejudicial of attending Court is no more there. No case has been made out that they could be financially or otherwise ruined by defending themselves. No case of bias and prejudice of investigating agency or bias or prejudice of persons of influence utilising the investigating agency has been made out. What the Appllants want at this stage is that this Court should exercise appellate power to scrutinise the evidence at a stage when there is no scope to exercise appellate power.
Petitioners are grossly negligent in invoking inherent power of the Court. An applicant cannot be permitted to invoke inherent power at his sweet will. From delay in approaching this Court an inference can be drawn that he is not really prejudiced but coming across some decisions in his favour he wants to escape trial. This is not intended by the legislature by giving wide power to this Court. Petitioners have not explained why they could not approach this Court earlier to May, 1990 when this application was filed.
In view of the aforesaid discussions, I am satisfied that no case has been made out by the Petitioners for exercise of inherent power by me. Any observation made by me in this order is for the purpose of considering whether I should invoke inherent power. They should not influence the trial Court while considering guilt of the accused persons. If there is likelihood of delay in completion of the trial, trial Court shall consider to allow representation of Petitioners until their presence would be felt necessary by the Court in case application to that effect would be made without waiting for such application each day.
In the result, there is no merit in this revision which is accordingly, dismissed at the stage of admission.
Revision dismissed.