Tribunals and CommissionsFull Bench(2024) 07 NCLAT CK 1954

Kay Jay Leasing Ltd. vs Piramal Enterprises Ltd.

National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi · Decided on 26 July 2024

CASE NUMBER
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 175 & 176 of 2024 & I.A. No. 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 2608, 2609 of 2024

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Judgment

16 paragraphs · 926 words

Per: Justice Rakesh Kumar Jain (Oral)

This order shall dispose of two appeals bearing Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 175 & 176 of 2024 titled as ‘Kay Jay Leasing Ltd. Vs. Piramal Enterprises Ltd. (hereinafter referred to the 1st appeal) and Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 177 & 178 of 2024 titled as ‘Eurotherm Hema Radiators India Ltd. Vs. Piramal Enterprises Ltd.’ (hereinafter referred to the 2nd appeal). Both the appeals have arisen from the order dated 05.12.2023, dismissing the application filed by the appellant under Section 7 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘Code’) on the ground that the date and default falls within the period prescribed therein and dismissed the application of the Corporate Guarantor and allowed the application of the Corporate Debtor seeking amendment of the date of default.

2.

Shorn of unnecessary details, application under Section 7 of the Code was filed by Piramal Enterprises Ltd. against Kay Jay Leasing Ltd. bearing C.P. (I.B) No. 359/ND/2021 (herein after referred to as the 1st appeal) and Piramal Enterprises Ltd. filed an application under section 7 bearing C.P. (I.B) No. 335/ND/2021 against Eurotherm Hema Radiators India Ltd.

3.

In both the applications, the respondent herein mentioned that the default commenced w.e.f 30.09.2020 and it continued. It was mentioned that the amount in default is Rs.443,36,21,727/-. The demand letter was sent on 24.02.2021 in both the cases.

4.

It is pertinent to mention that the main Corporate Debtor, namely, Hema Engineering Industries Ltd. is already into insolvency w.e.f 05.04.2021 and now it is in liquidation.

5.

The appellant filed an application bearing I.A. No. 1452 of 2023 on 13.03.2023 for dismissal of the application filed under Section 7, inter alia, on the ground that the date of default was within the period prescribed under Section 10A of the Code.

6.

At the same time, the respondent filed an application bearing I.A. No. 1547 of 2023 on 15.03.2023 seeking amendment in Part-IV of the application filed under Section 7, much less the date of default alleging that the date of default shall be read as 05.04.2021 in view of Clause 14 (e) of the loan agreement as it has to correlate with the insolvency of the principal borrower.

7.

In the second appeal, the appellant filed an application bearing I.A. No. 1447 of 2023 for dismissal of the application filed under Section 7 on the same ground that the date of default falls within the period prescribed under Section 10A of the code whereas an application bearing I.A. No. 1503 of 2023 was filed by the respondent for seeking amendment in CP (IB) No. 335/ND/2021 for an order to change the date of default.

8.

However, in the second appeal the application bearing I.A. No.1503 of 2023 was dismissed on 21.03.2023 not only for non-appearance of the appellant but also on merit.

9.

In the second appeal another application no. 1673 of 2023 was filed on 21.03.2023 which has now been allowed by the impugned order.

10.

Counsels for the appellant has vehemently argued that the Ld. Tribunal while dismissing the application of the appellant has not referred to the arguments and the law relied upon in his favour and only discussed the argument of the respondent as well as the Judgment relied upon by them and thus committed a patent error as it is against the principle of natural justice as the order is non-speaking.

11.

While arguing before us, counsel for the appellant has referred to various documents on record, namely, deed of guarantee, invocation of the Corporate guarantee, demand notice etc. and also various judgments in support of his submissions which are conspicuous by its absence in the findings recorded by the Tribunal in the impugned order. He has thus submitted that the Tribunal has not applied its mind to the contention raised by the appellant and thus the order is non-speaking.

12.

Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent could not deny this fact because it is apparent from the finding recorded in the impugned order.

13.

In such circumstances, we are of the unanimous view that this is one case in which the impugned order deserves to be set aside and the matter deserves to be remanded back to the Tribunal who is seized of the matter to decide it again after taking into consideration the pleadings as well as the entire evidence brought on record along with the law relied upon by both the parties and then pass a considered order.

14.

At this stage, counsel for the appellant has pointed out that arguments in the main application filed under Section 7 has already been heard and the order is likely to be pronounced at any time. It was submitted that until and unless a direction is issued by this court to the Tribunal to keep the order in abeyance which is to be passed on the application under Section 7, the remand of this case shall be meaningless.

15.

The submissions made by the appellant is logical, therefore, while setting aside the impugned order in both the cases, remanding the matter back while restoring the applications filed by both the parties which has been disposed of by the impugned order, we direct the Ld. Tribunal, seized of this matter, not to pronounce the order before the aforesaid four applications are deciding in accordance with law, after affording opportunity of hearing to both the parties, and by passing a speaking order. The parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal on the date which is already fixed i.e. 07.08.2024.