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Judgment
K.M. Agarwal, J.—Having lost his suit for declaration and possession of the suit schedule property in the trial Court and the first appeal before a learned single Judge of this Court, the plaintiff has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal.
Without going into the merits of the appeal, we are of the view that it is liable to be dismissed on the short ground that the plaint disclosed no cause of action. As disclosed by the impugned judgment and also stated by the learned counsel for the appellant, the suit schedule property initially belonged to one Nagendrappa. He executed a will on 11-10-1935, creating life interest in respect of the suit schedule property in favour of his wife and the remainder after the death of the wife to one Naganna. Nagendrappa, the testator died on 30-10-1935 and, thereafter, his wife came into possession of the property under the will. The reversioner Naganna died in 1945 during the life time of the limited owner. The plaintiff-appellant obtained a sale deed dated 25-1-1957 (Ex.A-1) from the daughter of Naganna, who was to get the suit schedule property after the death of the limited owner, i.e., the widow of the testator. The limited owner was alive on the date of this sale deed, but died on 29-12-1966. After the death of the limited owner, the purchaser under the sale deed dated 25-1-1957 (Ex.A-1) filed the present suit on the basis of this sale deed. On the date of this sale, the plaintiff''s vendor had derived no title under the Will dated 11-10-1935, because the limited owner was alive. Accordingly the plaintiff derived no title under his sale deed Ex.A-1 so as to maintain his suit on its basis. Subsequent to the date of death of the limited owner also, the plaintiff could claim no title under the sale deed Ex. A-1, because as noted by Mulla at Note (6) u/s 6 of his Transfer of Property Act,:
"By the Hindu law the right of a reversionary heir expectant on the death of a Hindu Widow is a spes successionis and its transfer is a nullity and has no effect in law. In Amrit Narayan v. Gaya Singh, the Privy Council said - "A Hindu reversioner has no right or interest in praesenti in the property which the female owner holds for her life. Until it vests in him on her death, should he survive her, he has nothing to assign or relinquish or even to transmit to his heirs. His right becomes concrete only on her demise; until then it is mere spes successions" For the same reason a relinquishment by or on behalf of a reversionary heir of the reversionary right to succeed is invalid."
The fact that there was an earlier remand order by a learned single Judge of this Court, permitting the plaintiff to amend the plaint and to include a relief for partition would not confer any right on the plaintiff where there was none.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in this appeal and accordingly it is hereby dismissed, but without any order as to costs.
