High CourtsDivision Bench(1938) 11 MAD CK 0034

Kasi Mangalath Illath Vishnu Nambudiri and Others vs Pattath Ramunni Marar and Others

Madras High Court · Decided on 25 November 1938 · Citation: AIR 1940 Mad 208

HON’BLE JUDGES
Venkataramana Rao, J

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Judgment

59 paragraphs · 1,410 words

Venkataramana Rao, J.—This second appeal arises out of a suit to recover possession of the plaint Siva temple called, Vatakketath by

plaintiffs who constitute the board of trustees of the Tiruvangad devaswom appointed by the decree in O.S. No 8 of 1925 on the file of the District

Court of North Malabar. The basis of the claim is that this Siva temple is a shrine subordinate to the Sri Rama temple of the devaswom and situate

in the same compound but the defendants who are the archakas of the Siva temple have set up a hostile title thereto alleging that they own it. The

main defence is that the plaint temple does not belong to the Tiruvangad devaswom and it is not a sub-ordinate shrine as alleged in the plaint. The

defendants further pleaded that the plaint temple belongs to their illom in jenm right and their illom has been in exclusive possession of the plaint

temple to the knowledge of and against the trustees of the Tiruvangad devaswom. They also pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation and

adverse possession. Two main questions to which both the lower Courts addressed themselves were the following : (1) whether the plaint temple

belongs to the Tiruvangad devaswom or whether it belongs to the defendant''s illom; and (2) whether the suit is barred by limitation and adverse

possession. Both the Courts have concurrently found that the plaint temple belongs to the Tiruvangad devaswom and is not the private property of

the defendants'' illom, but in regard to the question of adverse possession the lower Courts differed. The learned Subordinate Judge was of the

opinion that the right of the Tiruvangad devaswom to the plaint temple was barred by adverse possession while the learned District Judge held it

was not and he therefore gave a decree for possession in favour of the plaintiffs.

2.

Mr. Kuttikrishna Menon on behalf of the defendants-appellants contends that the view taken by the learned District Judge in regard to the

adverse possession was wrong, that even assuming the right of the Tiruvangad devaswom was not barred by adverse possession, the plaintiffs can

have no right to oust the defendants from their possession of the suit temple on the ground that they have acquired a right to the exclusive

management of the suit temple by prescription and that the suit is liable to be dismissed even on the findings of both the Courts. The concurrent

finding of both the Courts is that the plaint temple is a subordinate temple of the Tiruvangad devaswom. Tiruvangad temple is admittedly a public

temple and there can be no doubt that the plaint temple in also a public temple. In deciding the question of adverse possession it seems to me that

both the Courts have not kept in view this fact. Being a public temple and therefore res extra commercium it is not open to a private individual to

acquire by prescription any private ownership in regard thereto. The character of the temple as a public temple cannot be taken away by any

assertion of private right and there is no evidence that the public have ever been excluded therefrom. Mr. Kuttikriahna Menon rightly concedes

before me that he would not dispute the fact of the temple ''being a public temple. The plaint temple must therefore be deemed to be a public

temple and a subordinate shrine to the main Tiruvangad temple. But the question still remains, are the plaintiffs entitled to oust the defendants from

their possession of the suit temple? The concurrent finding of both the Courts in regard to the possession is that an ancestor of the defendants was

introduced into this temple as an archaka and that after his death, his descendants continued to be in possession doing archaka service. Both the

Courts have also found that the defendants have set up an exclusive right to the possession and management of the temple at any rate from 1903.

None of the trustees of the temple ever sought to interfere with the management or possession of the defendants'' family. The learned District Judge

observes thus:

It does not also appear that the trustees of the devasthanam attempted at any time to exercise any acts of control in the plaint temple...

3.

It is in evidence that the defendants'' family have been always performing puja and appropriating all perquisites and offerings received at the

temple and were generally attending to the management of the temple and at no time the trustees ever interfered with such management or claimed

to receive any portion of the perquisites or offerings, even after the open assertion by the defendants of their absolute rights. It is also in evidence

that such repairs as were needed have been done by the defendants in assertion of their absolute rights. It may be that the omission of the trustees

of the Tiruvangad devaswom to interfere with such control may have been due to long continued mismanagement of the trustees of the main temple

which necessitated the framing of a scheme by the Court. But if the defendants have been openly setting up exclusive right to the possession and

management of the temple adverse to the right of the management which may inhere in the trustees of the main temple by virtue of the fact that the

suit temple was a subordinate shrine, the right of the trustees of the temple would certainly be lost by adverse possession. Probably the absence of

such control is due to the fact that the usage is that the archaka should be in such possession and management subject to general supervision the

trustees of the main temple may have over them. The terms under which the defendants'' ancestor was introduced into the temple are not known.

On the findings of both the Courts, there can be no doubt that the defendants'' family at any rate for a period of 30 years has been setting up a right

of exclusive possession and management to the knowledge of the trustees. Therefore, the facts I of this case warrant the inference that the

defendants have acquired the right of being hereditary archakas of the suit temple and as such to be in possession and management of it. They are

therefore entitled to be in possession of the said temple, to perform the puja and appropriate the perquisites and offerings offered at the temple for

their own use subject of course to the obligation of performing the puja. The plaintiffs-trustees have no right to interfere with the said management

except to exercise a general supervision over them as trustees of the main temple. The plaintiffs would not therefore be entitled to a decree for

possession. In my opinion the defendants are the hereditary archakas of the suit temple subject to the supervision of the trustees of the main temple

as mentioned by me aforesaid.

4.

In the view I have taken that the defendants are the hereditary archakas of the suit temple subject to the supervision of the trustees of the main

temple as mentioned by me as aforesaid, the decree of the lower Appellate Court negativing their right must be reversed and the decree of the

subordinate Judge dismissing the suit must be upheld on the basis that the defendants are entitled to be in possession as hereditary archakas. The

result is that the plaintiffs'' suit will be dismissed, but I direct each party to bear their own costs throughout. Leave to appeal is refused.

5.

Some doubt was raised by the office with regard to the refund of court-fee in this case. I issued notice to the Government Pleader. Mr. Krishna

Rao on behalf of the Government Pleader frankly stated to me that refund should be ordered and I think he is right. Apart from Sections 13, 14

and 15, Court-fees Act, the Court has got inherent power to refund court-fee: vide Thammayya Naidu v. Venkataramanamma AIR (1932) Mad.

438 As the temple in this case is incapable of valuation I think the appellants are entitled to a refund of the excess court-fee paid by them. The

proper court-fee in this case is Rs. 100. The appellants are therefore entitled to a certificate for the refund of the balance. Mr. Govinda Menon

asks me to make an order also in his client''s favour. I cannot do so in this appeal. If so advised, he is entitled to make an application to the lower

Court.