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R.V. Vasanthakumar, J.—Writ Appeals Nos. 1612/89, 1641/89, 1642/89 and 2018/ 89 are filed by the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation. W.A. No. 1612/89 is directed against the order dated 12-6-1989 passed in W.P. No. 36866/82. W.As. 1641/89 and 1642/89 are directed against the order dated 12-6-1989 passed in W.P. Nos. 36814-36815/82.
1.2 W.A. No. 2018/89 is directed against the order dated 3-7-89 passed in W.P. No 21287/81. One T.G. Bhodha Shetty applied for variation of state carriage permit for operating two more additional trips between Bangalore to Balathotapalli lying on Inter State route, which was granted by State Transport Authority Tamil Nadu and countersigned by State Authority. K.S.R.T.C., objected for the counter-signature as the route lies in Anekal Pocket Scheme. K.S.R.T.C. filed a Writ Petition against the variation countersigned by the S.T.A. and the petition was numbered as W.P. 36806/82. The Learned Single Judge placing reliance on the orders passed in W.P. Nos. 36814/82 and W.P. 36815/82 which are the impugned orders in W.A. Nos. 1641 and 1642/89 dismissed the petition.
1.3 In Writ Petition Nos. 36814/82 and 36815/82 K.S.R.T.C. challenged variation of conditions of stage carriage permit granted to two operators on the ground that route lies on Anekal Pocket Scheme but they were dismissed, placing reliance on ratio decidendi of two cases decided in W.P. No. 3467/69 (DD 19-11-70) and W.P. 1483/89, wherein this Court held that Anekal Pocket Scheme envisaged partial exclusion of private operators, and variations could be granted notwithstanding portion of route overlapping Bangalore Anekal Pocket Scheme. Another operator by name B.V. Nagarathamma assailed the Order of State Transport Appellate Tribunal wherein the Tribunal set-aside the order of grant as well as variations permitted on the route in question and the writ petition was numbered as Writ Petition 21287/81 and it was allowed in view of its earlier decision in W.P. 36814 and 36815/82 decided on 12-6-82 and this order is subject matter of W.A. No. 2018/89.
1.4 Writ Petition 14902 to 14908/93 are filed by operators who were holding stage carriage permits with counter signatures on the route lying on the Anekal Pocket Scheme, and whose permits and those counter signatures were set aside by virtue of the order dated 30-4-93 passed by Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, in Appeal No. 55/90 and R.P. 166/92 and other connected matters. Similarly other operators who had the benefit of the grant of permits, counter signatures and variations, aggrieved by the common order dated 30-4-93 filed writ petitions assailing the order and they are :
W.P. 16951 to W.P. 16952/93
W.P. 18992 to W.P. 18993/93
WP. 18948 to W.P. 18950/93
The common question involved in all these matters, is, whether Anekal Pocket Scheme, is a scheme of complete exclusion or of partial exclusion under Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
3.1 The Anekal Pocket Scheme was approved by Government of Mysore u/s 68(D)(2) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called as ''the Act'') and the same was published on 23 4-1959 u/s 68-D(3) of the Act and the relevant Clauses of the Scheme are :
Col. 3 : As in statement-1 appended--The route or routes (with their starting points, termini, intermediate stations and route length) in which the State Transport Undertaking will introduce its services to the exclusion of private operations.
Col. 4 : As in statement-2 appended--The number of existing stage carriages on each route with the number of trips and the name of their operators.
Col. 5 : The maximum and minimum number of carriages to be operated as in statement-1 appended--The maximum and minimum number of stage carriages to be operated by the State Road Transport Undertaking to the exclusion of private operators in relation to each route and the type and seating capacity of each vehicle.
Co. 6: As in statement-1 appended--The maximum number of trips to be performed on each route.
3.2. The Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, in its order dated 30-4-1993 set-aside all the permits and the variations granted as also the counter signatures, on the ground that these permits, variations and counter signatures are opposed to Anekal Pocked Scheme, which is, in substance, a scheme of total exclusion of private operators, since portions of the routes overlap the routes covered by the scheme as notified. The private operators contend that all along, these years the scheme was being considered as a partial exclusion scheme (since over a period of 34 years) not only by the State Transport Authorities, the K.S.R.T.C. but also by the Courts reflected in the decisions of the Supreme Court and this High Court.
Since relevant principles are settled by judicial pronouncements, we proceed to refer to them. In Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. and Ors. reported in 1955 S.C.R. 707 the doctrine of franchise or privilege as recognised in America and England was referred and in relation to India, it was said:
...According to English law, which has been applied all along in India, a highway has its origin, apart from statute, in dedication, either express or implied by the owner of land of a right of passage over it to the public and the acceptance of that right by the public (Vide Pratt & Mackenzie on Law of Highways, 19th Edn., Page 13). In the large majority of cases this dedication is presumed from long and uninterrupted user of a way by the public, and the presumption in such cases is so strong as to dispense with all enquiry into the actual intention of the owner of the soil and it is not even material to enquire who the owner was (Ibid Page 28). The fact that the members of the public have a right of passing and repassing over a highway does not mean however that all highways could be legitimately used as foot passages only and that any other user is possible only with the permission or sufferance of the State. It is from the nature of the user that the extent of the right of passage has to be inferred and the settled principle is that the right extends to all forms of traffic which have been usual and accustomed and also to all which are reasonably similar and incidental thereto (Ibid page 35).
Further it was held:
... Within the limits imposed by State regulations, any member of the public can ply Motor Vehicle on a public road. To that extent he can also carry on the business of transporting passengers with the aid of the vehicles. It is to this carrying on of the trade or business that the guarantee in Article 19(1)(g) is attracted and a citizen can legitimately complain if any legislation takes away or curtails that right any more than is permissible under Clause (6) of that article.
As to State monopoly and the reasonableness of the law creating it, it was held:
In order to judge whether State monopoly is reasonable or not, regard, therefore, must be had to the facts of each particular case in its own setting of time and circumstances. It is not enough to say that as an efficient Transport Service is conducive to the interests of the people, a legislation which makes provision for such service must always be held valid irrespective of the fact as to what the effect of such legislation would be and irrespective of the particular conditions and circumstances under which the legislation was passed. It is not enough that the restrictions are for the benefit of the pubic, they must be reasonable as well and the reasonableness could be decided only on a conspectus of all the relevant facts and circumstances.
However, as to the monopoly created after the Amendment of Article 19(6) by the earlier Amendment Act 1951, monopoly can be justified by relying on the said Article 19(6). The Supreme Court observed:
...The new Clause in Article 19(6) has no doubt been introduced with a view to provide that a State can create a monopoly in its own favour in respect of any trade or business; but the amendment does not make the establishment of such monopoly a reasonable restriction within the meaning of the first Clause of Article 19(6). The result of the amendment is that the State would not have to justify such action as reasonable at all in a Court of law and no objection could be taken to it on the ground that it is an infringement of the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. It is quite true that if the present statute was passed after the coming into force of the new Clause in Article 19(6) of the Constitution, the question of reasonableness would not have arisen at all and the appellants'' case on this point, at any rate, would have been unarguable. These are, however, considerations which cannot affect our decision in the present case. The amendment of the Constitution, which came later, cannot be invoked to validate an earlier legislation which must be regarded as unconstitutional when it was passed.
Immediately on the approval of Anekal Pocket Scheme, several private operators challenged its validity. The challenge was considered by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the scheme was approved in relation to fourteen notified routes and not in relation to a notified area. The Court noted that the scheme envisaged the State Undertaking to introduce its service to the exclusion of private operators on the specified routes; therefore the scheme was held to be one for the fourteen notified routes. The decision of the Supreme Court is reported in H.C. Narayanappa and Others Vs. The State of Mysore and Others, Main grounds of attack on the scheme is at para-6:
The petitioners claims that they have a fundamental right to carry on the business of plying stage carriage and the scheme framed by the 2nd respondent and approved by the State of Mysore unlawfully deprives them of their fundamental right to carry on the business of plying stage carriages in the Anekal area. The diverse grounds on which the writ is claimed by the petitioners need not be set out, because, at the hearing of the petition, counsel for the petitioners has restricted his argument to the following four heads:
(i) that the scheme violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because only fourteen out of a total of thirty-one routes on which stage carriages, were plied for public transport in the Anekal area were covered by the scheme and that even from among the operators on the fourteen routes notified, two operators were left out, thereby making a flagrant discrimination between the operators even on those fourteen routes;
(2) that by Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, Parliament had merely attempted to regulate the procedure for entry by the States into the business of motor transport in the State, and in the absence of registration expressly undertaken by the State of Mysore in that behalf, that State was incompetent to enter into the arena of motor transport business to the exclusion of private operators;
(3) That the Chief Minister who heard the objections to the scheme was biased against the petitioners and that in any event, the objections raised by the operators were not considered judicially; and
(4) That the Chief Minister did not give "genuine consideration" to the objections raised by the operators to the scheme in the light of the conditions prescribed by the Legislature.
In Para-5 the Supreme Court observed:
...In this case, it is unnecessary to decide whether it is open to a State Transport Undertaking under a scheme framed for a notified area to limit its application to some of the routes, only because on true reading of the scheme, it is amply clear that the scheme was approved in relation to fourteen notified routes and not in relation to a notified area. The approved scheme is in the form prescribed by the rules, and in the form prescribed by Column I, the area in relation to which the scheme is approved is required to be set out. But a scheme u/s 68C must be one in relation to an area or any route or portion thereof wherein the transport service is to be undertaken by the State Transport Undertaking to the exclusion, either complete or partial, of other operators. Column I of the approved scheme undoubtedly describes the area in relation to which the scheme is approved but by the designation of the area in the scheme, an intention to exclude either wholly or partially the operators of stage carriage from that area is not evinced either expressly or by implication. By Column 3, the scheme expressly directs that State Transport Undertaking will introduce its service to the exclusion of private operators on the specified routes. The scheme must, therefore, be regarded as one for the fourteen notified routes and not in relation to the area described in column 1.
Para 9 reads: By Chapter IVA, the State Transport Undertaking which is either a department of the State or a Corporation owned or controlled by the State on the approval of a scheme is entitled, consistently with the scheme, to exclusive right to carry on Motor Transport business. The Regional Transport Authority is bound to grant permit for the routes covered by the scheme to the State Transport Undertaking if that authority applies for the same and the Regional Transport Authority is also bound in giving effect to the approved scheme, to modify the terms of existing permits and to refuse to entertain applications for renewal of permits of private operators. Chapter I VA is not merely regulatory of the procedure for carrying on business of road transport by the State; it enables the State Transport Undertaking, subject to the provisions of the scheme, to exclude private operators and to acquire a monopoly, partial or complete, in carrying on transport business, in a notified area or on notified routes.
Para-12: In any event, the expression "law" as defined in Article 13(3)(a) includes any ordinance, order, by-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom etc., and the scheme framed u/s 68C may properly be regarded as "law" within the meaning of Article 19(6) made by the State excluding private operators from notified routes or notified areas, and immune from the attack that it infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g).
In the year 1961, the Supreme Court while dealing with law for nationalisation of Road Transport Service observed at Paras-10,11, 12 and para 19 in Dosa Satyanarayanamurty etc. Vs. The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, as follows:
Para-10: The answer to this argument depends upon the true meaning of the provisions of the said Article. Under Sub-clause (ii) of Article 19(6), the State can make a law relating to the carrying on by the State or by a Corporation, owned or controlled by the State, of any particular business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise. Article 19(6) is only a saving provision and the law made empowering the State to carry on a business is secured from attack on the ground of infringement of the fundamental rights of a citizen to the extent it does not exceed the limits of the scope of the said provision. Sub-clause (ii) is couched in very wide terms. Under it the State can make law for carrying on a business or service, to the exclusion complete or partial of citizens or otherwise. The law, therefore, can provide for carrying on a service to the exclusion of all the citizens; it may exclude some of the citizens only, it may do business in the entire State or a portion of the State, in a specified route or a part thereof. The word "service" is wide enough to take in not only the general motor service. There are, therefore, no limitations on the State''s power to make laws conferring monopoly on it in respect of an area, and person or persons to be excluded. In this view, it must be held that Section 68C does not exceed the limits prescribed by Article 10(6)(ii) of the Constitution.
Para-11: Re (3): The next contention is that the provisions of Ch. IVA of the Act and particularly those of Section 68C thereof, offend against Article 14 of the Constitution. The argument is that Ch. IVA enables the State to make a discrimination between the State Road Transport Corporation on the one hand and private operators and private transport undertakings on the other, and also to make a similar discrimination between the private operators or the private transport undertakings, and that this discrimination is left to the arbitrary discretion of the Transport Corporation. It is true that the provisions of this Chapter enable a scheme to be framed conferring a monopoly on the State in respect of transport services to the partial or complete exclusion of other persons. However, the provisions of the scheme do not make any distinction between individuals operating a transport service and private transport undertakings; they are all treated as one class and the classification is only made between the State Transport Undertaking and private transport undertakings whether the business is carried on by individuals or firms or companies. The only question, therefore, is whether such a classification offends against the equality clause of the Constitution. Article 14 says:
The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. This doctrine of equality has been so frequently considered by this Court that it does not require any further consideration. It has been held that this Article does not prohibit reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation, but such a classification cannot be arbitrary but must be based upon differences which have rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. Doubtless in the present case the legislature placed the State Transport Undertaking in a class different from other undertakings. The question is whether the classification made in Ch. IVA of the Act is just and has reasonable relation to the object pf the legislation. The object of Ch. IVA, as disclosed by the provisions of Section 68C, is to provide in the interest of the public an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport service. To achieve that object Section 68C confers a power on the State Transport Undertaking to prepare a scheme to run the service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise. The classification has certainly reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Ordinarily a State Transport Undertaking, compared with persons or private undertakings, should be in a better position than others to carry on the said services, for the benefit of the public; administratively, financially and technically it can be expected to be in a far better position than others. It can provide more well-equipped buses, give better amenities to the travelling public, keep regular timings, repair or replace the buses in emergencies. It may also employ efficient supervisory staff to keep things going at an appreciably high standard. We are not suggesting that there are no individuals or private companies who can efficiently run the service. But the State, compared with individuals, should certainly be in a better position to achieve the object, namely, to improve the road transport service in all its diverse aspects. In such a situation, when the legislature which must be presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs of its own people, makes a classification between a State Transport Undertaking and others carrying on the business of transport services, we cannot say that there is no reasonable basis for such a classification.
Para-12: But it is said that Section 68C of the Act and other provisions of Ch. IV-A thereof confer an arbitrary power upon the State Transport Undertaking to discriminate between individuals and the said undertaking, between individuals and private undertakings, and between individuals and individuals. But the scheme of Ch. IV-A, which has been considered by this Court in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and Others Vs. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Another, evolves a machinery for keeping the State Transport Undertaking within bounds and from acting in an arbitrary manner, for Section 68C lays down the legislative policy in clear and understandable terms and the State Transport Undertaking can initiate a scheme only for providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport service. Another condition which it lays down is that the scheme is necessary in the public interest. The scheme so framed is published, with all necessary particulars, in the Official Gazette and also in such, manner as the State Government may direct; persons affected by the scheme may file objections within the prescribed time; the State Government, after considering the objections and giving an opportunity to the objectors or their representatives and the representatives of the State Transport Undertaking to be heard in the matter may approve or modify the scheme; the scheme so approved or modified is published. The rules framed under the Act provide for personal hearing. If the State Transport Undertaking seeks to modify a scheme, it will have to follow the same procedure before doing so: See Section 68C, 68D and 68E of the Act. It will be seen from the provisions of Ch. IVA of the Act that the State Transport Undertaking, before propounding a scheme, arrives at the decision on objective criteria. The parties affected and the public are given every opportunity to place their objections before the Government, and the Government, after following the prescribed quasi-judicial procedure, confirms or modifies the scheme. The scheme, before it is finalised, is subjected to public gaze and scrutiny and the validity and appropriateness of the provisions are tested by a quasi-judicial process. The Government cannot be equated to a Court; but the procedure prescribed accords with the principles of natural justice. It is said that the State Transport Undertaking is either the State Government or a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, and as such the entire quasi-judicial procedure prescribed is only a cloak to screen the exercise of an absolute and arbitrary power on the part of the Government. We cannot say that Ch. IVA is such a device. The legislature made a sincere attempt to protect as far as possible individual rights from the arbitrary acts of the executive. Once it is conceded that Ch. IVA of the Act is constitutionally good and that the legislature can validly make law for nationalization of the road transport service, the procedure laid down for implementing the said policy cannot, in our view, be said to be unreasonable. If, in any particular case, the mala fides of the authorities concerned and collusion between the State Transport Undertaking and the State Government to deprive particular persons of their right to do road transport business or to drive out particular persons from the trade on extraneous considerations, are established, that may be a ground for striking down that particular scheme. But the provisions of Ch. IVA cannot be struck down on the ground that they confer an arbitrary power on the State Transport Undertaking and on the State Government to discriminate between individuals and the State Transport Undertaking, between individuals and private undertakings, and between individuals and individuals.
Para-19 "...Under Section 68C of the Act the scheme may be framed in respect of any area or a route or a portion of a route. There is no inherent inconsistency between an "area" and a "route". The proposed route is also an area limited to the route proposed. The scheme may as well propose to operate a transport service in respect of a new route from point A to point B and that route would certainly be an area within the meaning of Section 68C. We, therefore, hold that Section 68C certainly empowers the State Transport Undertaking to propose a scheme to include new routes."
In Nilkanth Prasad and Others Vs. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court reiterated, the relevant principle as follows:
(Para-6)
In Abdul Gafoor Vs. State of Mysore, the effect of notifying a scheme was considered by this Court and it was there stated that when a scheme has been notified under Chapt. IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and an application is made for the grant of a permit on a route notified under the scheme by a private operator, the Regional Transport Authority has no option but to refuse the permit to the private operator, if the State Transport Undertaking has either applied for a permit or has already been granted one
While dealing with notified route and routes applied for being common to some extent Supreme Court observed (in para-5)
This means that even in those cases where the notified route and the route applied for run over a common sector, the curtailment by virtue of the notified scheme would be by excluding that portion of the route or, in other words, the "road'' common to both. The distinction between "route" as the notional line and "road" as the physical track disappears in the working of Chap. IVA, because you cannot curtail the route without curtailing a portion of the road, and the ruling of the Court to which we have referred, would also show that even if the route was different, the area at least would be the same. The ruling of the Judicial Committee cannot be made applicable to the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly Chap. IVA, where the intention is to exclude private operators completely from running over certain sectors or routes vested in State Transport Undertakings. In our opinion, therefore, the appellants were rightly held to be disentitled to run over those portions of their routes which were notified as part of the scheme. Those portions cannot be said to be different routes, but must be regarded as portions of the routes of the private operators, from which the private operators stood excluded u/s 68F(2)(c)(ii) of the Act. The decision under appeal was, therefore, correct in all the circumstances of the case.
It is quite clear that the Supreme Court rejected the distinction between the Road and the route and held that when route "AB" was a notified route (under a scheme of nationalisation) the entire road of which "AB" was a part gets affected. The curtailment of the length of the route, excluding the portion which overlapped a notified route was upheld. The last but one para of the Supreme Court decision upholds another Bench decision of the Patna High Court, which is reported in Deep Narain Pandey and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, In the said decision, the Bench observed at Page 580;
It is manifest from the language of Section 68F(2) that the grant of a monopoly to a State Road Transport Corporation in pursuance of an approved scheme u/s 68C (sic) disqualifies, a private operator from plying his vehicles in three classes of cases; (1) on self-same route as the notified route, (2) between any two intermediate points on the notified route, and (3) on any portion of the route of the private operator which overlaps any portion of the notified route. By enacting Section 68F the legislature contemplated that when an exclusive monopoly has been created by a scheme regarding a notified route, a private operator cannot ply his vehicle on any portion of the notified route. It is manifest that Section 68(F)(c)(iii) gives power to the Regional Transport Authority to "curtail the area or route covered by the permit in so far as such permit relates to the notified area or notified route", This clearly contemplates that where there is partial overlapping of the route of the operator over the notified route, the Regional Transport Authority has power to curtail the length of the route covered by the permit in so far as such permit overlaps the notified route. It is manifest that the power of the Regional Transport Authority to curtail the route u/s 68F(2)(c)(iii) is coextensive with the power of refusal of permit u/s 68F, (2)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. In other words, the content of the power of renewal u/s 68F(2)(a) is co-extensive with the content of power of modification of the terms of the existing permit u/s 68F(2)(c).
This observation also shows that under the complete exclusion scheme, a private operator cannot ply his vehicle on any portions of the notified route, only because, a portion of the notified route by itself is part of another larger route which is not notified, even though, at the same time that portion also is part of the notified route; the distinction between the road and route having vanished in India, this exclusion is inevitable.
The principles stated by a Full Bench of this Court in The Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. The Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal and Ors. 1967(1) Mys. L.J. 148 :
(1) Whether it is competent for the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, to grant to a private operator, in respect of a route which overlaps any part of a notified route in approved scheme, a permit (or renewal of a permit) subject to the condition that he should not pick up or set down passengers on the notified route, depends upon the nature and extent of the exclusion of private operators brought about by a scheme.
(2) If the approved scheme is construed as one providing for complete or total exclusion of private operators from the notified area or route, the authorities under the Act have no jurisdiction to grant them a permit even with the restriction of making it ineffective in respect of the overlapping part of the notified area or route.
(3) Where the approved scheme does not exclude private operators completely and the manner of partial exclusion is also incorporated in the scheme itself, any grant or renewal of permit, by the Authorities under the Act to a private operator in respect of a notified route should conform to the said provision for partial exclusion.
(4) Where though the approved scheme docs not make an express provision for the manner of partial exclusion, but it is clear that the Scheme does not intend to totally exclude private operators from the notified routes, the Authorities under the Act may grant or renew permits rendering them ineffective in respect of the overlapping parts, provided the Authorities are satisfied that by such grant or renewal the Scheme will not be impaired.
In Ramnath Verma Vs. State of Rajasthan, the Supreme Court held:
...Under Section 68C, it is open to frame a scheme in which there is partial exclusion of private operators. Making the permit ineffective for the overlapping part only amounts to partial exclusion of the private operators from that route. In the circumstances an cider making the permit ineffective for the overlapping part would be justified u/s 68-C. As to the second point, there is no doubt that where the permit is made ineffective the permit-holder would not be entitled to any compensation u/s 68-G. It is said that this amounts to discrimination between those whose permits have been cancelled for the overlapping part and who would get compensation and these whose permits have been made ineffective and who would, therefore, not get compensation. Now we should have thought that the making of the permit ineffective for the overlapping part of the route and allowing the permit-holder to pick up passengers on the overlapping route for destinations beyond that portion of the route would be to the advantage of the permit-holder. In any case, if any permit-holder feels that he would rather have he permit cancelled for the overlapping route and get compensation it is for him to raise that objection before the Suite Government or the officer hearing objections. If he does not do so, he cannot be heard to say that there is discrimination because his permit has been rendered ineffective and he gets no compensation, for it may very well be that he is still better off than the person whose permit has been cancelled for the overlapping part of the route. In any case unless facts are brought on the record which would show that in spite of the advantage which the permit holder, whose permit has been made ineffective for the overlapping part of the route, gets by picking up passengers on the overlapping route for destinations beyond that part is not equal to the compensation which he would get in case his permit is cancelled for the overlapping part of the route, there would be no case for discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution. In the present appeals no such case has been made out on the facts and, therefore, we must reject this argument based upon discrimination.
In Capital Multi-purpose Co-operative Society Bhopal and Others Vs. The State of M.P. and Others, the Supreme Court pointed out the requirements of a scheme and it is unnecessary to refer to the decision, because, we are not concerned with the validity of the scheme.
In Standard Motor Union v. Kerala reported in 1969(1) SCR 464 the Supreme Court observed at Page 466 while dealing with the scope of Section 68-C of Motor Vehicle Act as follows:
Section 68-C envisages the scheme of road transport services in relation to any area, or routes or portion thereof whether to the exclusion complete or partial, of other portion or otherwise. Rule 3 of the Kerala Motor Vehicle (State Transport Undertaking) Rules 1960 speaks of schemes of Road Transport Service in complete or partial exclusion of existing road transport service From the language of Section 68C and Rule 3 it appears that a complete exclusion scheme in relation to any area or route would be a scheme which completely excludes the existing road services of private operators on the area or route in question. The route includes the highway over which it runs. If other existing services are allowed to continue over a part of the highway relating to the notified route the scheme is not one of complete exclusion.
A stage carriage permit is granted u/s 46 to 48 for a specified area. The word ''road'' included in the proposed route or area in Section 47(1)(f) implies that route includes the road or physical track. Section 68(F)(2)(iii) implies that portion of the route of an existing permit may relate to notified route. This happens when the two routes have a common road Sector. Section 68F(2)(iii) authorises exclusion of common portion of road from existing permit for giving effect to the scheme for a notified route. For the purposes of Chapters IV and IVA there is no practical distinction between the route or the notional line from one terminus to another for which the permit is granted and the road over which the transport services are run and operated. As pointed out in Nilakanth Prasad and Ors. v. State of Bihar 1962 Supp. 1 SCR 728 the distinction between ''route* as the notional line and road as the physical track disappears in the working of Chapt. IVA. The route is also an area (See Dosa Satyanarayanamurty etc. Vs. The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, and C.P.C. Motor Service, Mysore Vs. The State of Mysore and Another, .
The concept of ''route'' is not statutorily clarified. By virtue of Act 56/69, Section 2(28A) was inserted, effective from 2-3-1970. Section 2(28-A) reads:
"Route" means a line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a Motor Vehicle between the terminus and another.:
In consequence of rejection of renewal of permit due to the scheme operating in Anekal Pocket one M.G. Narayanaswamy filed a petition under Art 32 of the Constitution of India before the Supreme Court, as per W.P. No. 72/63. The Court observed:
This Court has held in Abdul Gafoor Vs. State of Mysore, that u/s 68F(1) the Regional Transport Authority has no option to refuse the grant of the permit provided the application from the State Transport Undertaking has been made in pursuance of an approved scheme and in the manner specified in Ch. IV. The duty of the Regional Transport Authority in receipt of the application from the State Transport Undertaking for a permit is to examine the application for itself to see whether it is in pursuance of the approved scheme and in the manner specified in Ch. IV. The Regional Transport Authority acts u/s 68F(1) wholly in a ministerial capacity while dealing with the applications from the State Transport Undertaking and its functions are not quasi-judicial when there is a valid scheme brought before it, the Regional Transport Authority has no option but to give effect to the scheme. By Section 68F of the Motor Vehicles Act under Sub-section (2), the Regional Transport Authority has for purpose of giving effect to the approved scheme in respect of notified area or notified route has power to refuse to entertain any application for the renewal of any other permit, to cancel any existing permit, to modify the terms of the existing permit, to cancel any existing permit to modify the terms of any existing permit by rendering the permit ineffective beyond a specified date to reduce the number of vehicles authorised to be used under the permit and to curtail the area or route covered by the permit in so far as such permit relates to the notified area or notified route. The approved scheme does provide for cancellation of the permits of 56 named operators to the extent if their permits overlaps the fourteen notified routes. The Regional Transport Authority had to give effect to the scheme and for that purpose to cancel or modify the existing permits as may be found necessary. The Regional Transport Authority was also right in refusing to cancel those permits or parts thereof which were not covered by the fourteen routes. The pleas or mala fides sought to be raised by the petitioner that the routes were so adjusted as to benefit certain influential persons is not supported by any evidence.
Further, the Supreme Court observed that under Clause (a) or Section 68F(2) it is true that Regional Transport Authority may refuse to entertain any application for the renewal of any other permit. But that does not mean that when the route of an existing operator is only partially covered by a notified route, the Regional Transport Authority has the power to modify the terms of any existing permit curtailing inter alia the area or route covered by the permit, in so far as such permit relates to the notified area or notified route. It would be idle formality on the part of Regional Transport Authority first to grant an application for renewal for the route in its entirety and then forth with to curtail the permit to give effect to the approved scheme in so far as the permit relates to the notified route under Clause (a) and (c), it would be open in granting renewal of a permit to curtail the area or route covered by earlier permit in so far as such permit relates to the notified area or notified route. Further it is to be noted that the Supreme Court observed that:
If there is unlawful discrimination between persons similarly circumstanced in the implementation of the scheme which is duly approved and is otherwise valid a person who is prejudicially affected because of such unlawful discrimination may approach competent court for enforcement of their right to equal protection of laws.
It is also to be seen that in W.P. No. 73 of 63 in a petition filed by an operator by name C.J. Webster in respect of variation of the conditions of permit pertaining to Anekal Pocket, the Supreme Court, placing reliance on ratio decidendi in W.P. 72/63, made certain observations. The variation of the permit held by C.J. Webster was to the following effect:
As the route for which the permit is held overlaps the route notified by the Government of Mysore in its notification No. R-B-39-EMB 59 dated 15th April 1959 no passengers from any point situated in the notified route other than those desirous of alighting or boarding at any point beyond Hosakote shall be carried in the vehicle or vehicles covered by such permits.
Relevant observations of the Supreme Court are:
We have already observed in delivering the judgment in W.P. No. 72/63 that the scheme framed u/s 68(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act by the State excluding private operators from notified routes or notified areas is immune from the attack that it infringes the fundamental rights of the operators guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) in H.C. Narayanappa and Ors. v. The State of Mysore (1) By the Scheme framed u/s 68-C the right of all operators plying vehicles on the notified routes is restricted and the Regional Transport Authority is authorised to give effect to that restriction, to modify existing permits u/s 68F(2)(c). The validity of Section 68F(2)(c) is not challenged before sis, The Statute having authorised the Regional Transport Authority to take steps to give effect to the scheme, and the authority having taken steps in the direction, the restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioner cannot be regarded as unreasonable.
The Full Bench of this Court, in The Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. The Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal and Ors. 1967 (1) Mys. L.J. 148 pointed out, while considering the very Anekal Pocket Scheme :
The condition imposed on Webster''s permit by the Regional Transport Authority rendering the permit ineffective over the overlapping part was considered as one falling within the scope of Section 68F(2)(c). No question, however, arose directly for decision in that case whether the scheme provided for exclusive operation by the State Transport Undertaking on the notified routes or it was one of partial exclusion.
Therefore, we have direct authority of a Larger Bench of this Court, as to the ratio of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Webster''s case. The contention of the private operators, that the Supreme Court recognised Anekal Pocket Scheme, as a scheme of partial exclusion, in Webster''s case, cannot be accepted.
From a reading of Sections 42, 45, 46 and 48 of the Act, it could be inferred that a primary permit which purports to be an inter-state permit granted by the authority of one State becomes an inter-state permit only when it is countersigned by the concerned authority of that other State and not until then. It is well settled that in the case of inter-state route, what is granted u/s 48(2) is subject to Section 63(1) of the Act. As such no R.T.A. issuing a permit in respect of an inter-state route can say in its permit that it is valid not only for the route within the State but also for the route beyond the frontiers of the State. As such, the mere grant of a permit in respect of an inter-state route by R.T.A. having jurisdiction under the second proviso to Section 45 does not at once make it a permit valid for the operation of the vehicle on any part of the route beyond such part of it as lies within the frontier of the State in which authority is functioning.
The argument of some operators who are permit holders of inter-state route that cancellation of the permits by the authorities concerned as being beyond the scope of their power cannot be legally entertained since the cancellation pertains to the route for which either the grant has been made or countersigned within the frontiers of this State. As far as inter-state operators are concerned, it is argued that the Supreme Court in Mysore State Road Transport v. The Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal and Ors. (1915) 1 SCR 493 has observed as far as Anekal Scheme is concerned that the preamble is silent about the scheme being of total exclusion and further upheld the observations of the High Court that where such an intention of total prohibition of even the use of a portion of the notified route is present the intention must be communicated in clear enough language so as not to leave the transport authorities in any doubt as to what they are, to enforce. Relevant observations of the Supreme Court in the above Civil Appeals are :
It may be mentioned here that Clauses 3 and 4 of the three schemes are apparently intended to carry out the provisions of Sub-rules 3 and 4 of the State Transport Undertaking Mysore State Rules, 1958, set out above. In the Anekal Scheme, the appended statement mentioned in Clause 3 (in purported, compliance of Sub-rule 3) gives the termini with intermediate points thereby indicating that the exclusive service, on each route is intended to be one which takes place only between the termini given there an not as a mere incident of service between other termini. The second statement, mentioned in Clause 4 (in purported compliance of Sub-rule 4) gives the number of the existing stage carriages and the names of their operators serving the prohibited routes indicates in terms of their termini. The strongest point of the inter-stale operators is that their names are not mentioned in the second appended statement. Hence they could not either object as persons whose rights were meant to be affected or who could be compensated u/s 68C after necessary modification or cancellation of their permits for the overlapping portions. We, therefore, think that the contention that inter-state operators were apparently not meant to be denied the mere use of the overlapping portions of routes covered by this scheme is well supported. In fact, this is the more reasonable inference.
The Supreme Court further observed, while dealing with the question whether route could also be an area, in view of the decisions in Dosa Satyanarayanamurty etc. Vs. The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, and Nilakanth Prasad''s Case (1962 (1) Suppl. SCR 728), as follows :
Whatever may be said about the correctness of the decision of this Court in Nilkanth Prasad''s case (supra) in the context of the scheme before this Court for consideration in that case and the provisions of the Act as they stood then, we do not think that the Ratio Decidendi of that case is applicable here. Upon the contents of the schemes before us for interpretation we find that only operators named therein or those who seek to provide ''services'' upon the routes mentioned in the schemes, in the sense that they carry passengers travelling from one place to another situated only upon the notified routes could be totally excluded from using the highways which the notified routes cover. We think that conditions were rightly imposed by the final Transport Appellate Authority on the permits of inter-state operators to bring out what it understood the scheme to mean in each case.
Subsequently, in Mysore State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal, the Supreme Court disagreed with the above view. The Court pointed out that in considering the question whether when one party has a monopoly over a route, a licence can be granted to another party over any part of that route, the distinction between ''route'' and ''highway'' is not at all. relevant. After referring to Section 2(28-A) of the Act, the Court held:
This definition correlates the notional line of travel between two termini with the portion of the highway which has to be traversed on that route. It is, therefore, apparent that where a private transport owner makes an application to operate on a route which overlaps even a portion of the notified route, i.e., where the part of the highway to be used by the private transport owner traverses on a line on the same highway on the notified route, then that application has to be considered only in the light of the scheme as notified. If any conditions are placed then those conditions have to be fulfilled and if there is a total prohibition then the application must be rejected.
This Court has consistently "taken the view that if there is a prohibition to operate on a notified route or routes no licences can be granted to any private operator whose route traversed on notified route. The inter-section of the notified route may not, in our view, amount of traversing or overlapping the route because the prohibition imposed applies to a whole or a part of the route on the highway on the same line of the route. An intersection cannot be said to be traversing the same line, as it cuts across it.
It was also argued that inter-state agreement has been entered into between State of Karnataka and State of Tamil Nadu in respect of the inter-state route and as such the authorities have no power to over-ride the said agreements. In S. Abdul Khader Saheb Vs. The Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore and Others, the Supreme Court observed, at para 7:
The next point on which a great deal of emphasis has been laid on behalf of the appellant is that an inter-state route comes into existence by virtue of an agreement between the States through which the route passes. The main provisions in that respect are to be found in Section 63 of the Act. Any scheme of nationalisation of a route by a State as approved u/s 68-D cannot over-ride the inter-state agreements in respect of inter-State routes. This Court has in T.N. Raghunatha Reddy Vs. Mysore State Transport Authority, answered this question in the negative. It has been held that the Inter-state agreement is not law and to hold that an Inter-State :agreement over-rides the Chapter IV-A would be to completely disregard the provisions of Section 68-B of the Act. In other words, a scheme of Nationalisation approved u/s 68-D would prevail over in Inter-State agreement in respect of an Inter-State.
At page 537, the Court held:
It may be that that portion overlaps the inter-state route from Bellary to Mantralaya but so long as it is an inter-state route it could be nationalised.
Ratio of several decisions rendered by the Supreme Court point out that when permit is sought by a private operator in respect of a route which overlaps the notified route, then no permit could be granted to the private operator over the notified route if the scheme does not contemplate the granting of such a permit.
The question cropped up again and was considered by a Bench of Five Judges in Adarsh Travels Bus Service and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others, . The question that arose for consideration was, where a route was nationalised under Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, whether a private operator with a permit to ply a stage carriage over another route but which has a common overlapping sector with the nationalised route can ply his vehicle over that part of the overlapping common sector, if he does not pick up or drop passengers on the overlapping part of the route. The Court held at page 324 para 6:
A careful and diligent perusal of Section 68C, Section 68D(3) and Section 68FF in the light of the definition of the expression ''route'' in Section 2(28A) appears to make it manifestly clear that once a scheme is published u/s 68D in relation to any area of route or portion thereof, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial of other persons or otherwise, no person other than the State Transport Undertaking may operate on the notified area or notified route except as provided in the scheme itself. A necessary consequence of these provisions is that no private operator can operate his vehicle on any part or portion of a notified area or notified route unless authorised so by the terms of the scheme itself. He may not operate on any part or portion of the notified route or area on the mere ground that the permit as originally granted to him covered the notified route or area. We are not impressed by the various submissions made on behalf of the appellants by their several counsel. The foremost argument was that based on great inconvenience which may be caused to the travelling public if a passenger is not allowed to travel, say, straight from A to B on a stage carriage, to ply which on the route A to B a person X has a permit, merely because a part of the route from C to D somewhere between the points A and B is part of a notified route. The answer to the question is that this is a factor which will necessarily be taken into consideration by the State Transport Undertaking before publishing the scheme u/s 68C by the Government u/s 68D when considering the objections to the scheme and thereafter either by the State Transport Undertaking or by the Government when the inconveniences experienced by the travelling public are brought to their notice. The question is one of weighing in the balance the advantages conferred on the public by the nationalisation of the route C-D against the inconveniences suffered by the public wanting to travel straight from A to B. On the other hand, it is quite well known that under the guise of the so-called ''corridor restrictions'' permits over long routes which cover shorter notified routes or ''overlapping'' parts of notified routes are more often than not misutilised since it is next nigh impossible to keep a proper check at every point of the route. It is also well known that often times permits for plying stage carriages from a point a short distance beyond one terminus to a point a short distance beyond another terminus of a notified route have been applied for and granted subject to the so-called ''corridor restrictions'' which are but mere ruses or traps to obtain permits and to frustrate the scheme. If indeed there is any need for protecting the travelling public from inconvenience as suggested by the learned Counsel we have no doubt that the State Transport Undertaking and the Government will make a sufficient provision in the scheme itself to avoid inconvenience being caused to the travelling public.
(under finding is done here)
The earlier decision in Mysore State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal, was referred with approval. The Court dissented from the decision found in Mysore State Road Transport Corporation Vs. The Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal and Others,
In the concluding para, the Supreme Court held:
We are, therefore, unable to see any merit in any of the Civil Appeals since none of the schemes placed before us contain any saving clause in favour of operators plying or wanting to ply stage carriages on common sectors. On the other hand we found that invariably there is a clause to the following effect: "No person other than the State Government Undertaking will be permitted to provide road transport services on the routes specified in paragraph 2 or any part thereof, In the face of a provision of this nature in the scheme totally prohibiting private operator from plying stage carriages on a whole or part of the notified routes, it is futile to contend that any of the appellants can claim to ply their vehicles on the notified routes or part of the notified rotues. All the Appeals and Special Leave Petitions are, therefore, dismissed, with costs which we quantify at Rs. 2,500/- in each. All the interim orders of this Court which enabled the appellants to operate their vehicles on notified routes or part of notified routes or which enabled the appellants to apply for and obtain permits to so operate, with or without the so-called corridor restrictions are hereby vacated. Appeals dismissed.
Private operators T.V. Nataraj and others challenged the order dated 10-4-1984 passed by this Court in W.P. Nos. 3496-98/82 and W.P. No. 3489-90 of 1979, before the Supreme Court the proceedings being numbered as Civil Appeal Nos. 1198 to 1202 of 1985 wherein this Court allowed the Writ Petitions filed by the Suite Transport Authority Karnataka holding that the draft scheme of Anna. Transport Corporation has provided for the exclusion of Private operators only from terminus to terminus and that grant of permits to private operators on the intermediary sections of the routes included in the draft scheme as being not prohibited. The Supreme Court while disposing of the Civil appeals passed the following order.
Order reads:
Having heard these appeals at some length, we do not find it necessary to pronounce upon the merits of the contentions urged in support of these appeals at this stage. All the contentions of the appellants against the decision of the High Court are left open to be decided, if necessary, at a later stage if any of the parties approaches this Court in any of these cases.
The Karnataka State Transport Authority shall, however, proceed to decide the cases which are now remanded to it keeping in view the decision of this Court reported in Adarsh Travels Bus Service and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others, .
Private operators have pleaded that since the time, the scheme pertaining to Anekal Pocket was approved, the authorities have understood that Anekal Scheme as being of partial exclusion and further the Supreme Court while dealing with cases pertaining to Anekal Scheme has also observed that scheme as being of partial exclusion and providing corridor facilities as being in conformity with the scheme.
The Counsel for the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation submitted that the K.S.R.T.C., at no length of time has treated Anekal Scheme as being one of partial exclusion, but as a matter of fact has been taking the stand that scheme as being that of complete exclusion of private operators. He invited this Court''s attention to Clause 3 of the scheme which reads:
The route or routes (with their starting points, terminal, intermediate stations and route length) in which the State Transport Undertaking will introduce its services to the exclusion of private operators, as in statement 1 appended.
The statement 1 appended denotes routes, intermediate point. Route length number of buses to be operated, maximum and minimum and number of tips to be formed on each route. Further certain documents relating to Map, statement of population and percentage of increase in vehicles, statement about vehicles, list of permits, agreement, copy of letter dated 2-7-1993 were filed during the course of arguments and contesting parties had no objection for receiving the same. The sum and substance of the documents produced is to highlight that K.S.R.T.C. is keeping pace with the demands of the public in collaboration with authorities of Tamil Nadu by virtue of Inter-State agreement entered into. It was brought to the notice of the Court that as early as in the year 1969 in Writ Petition No. 3647 of 1969, K.S.R.T.C. (the then Mysore State Road Transport Corporation) assailed the renewals granted to private operators.
In Writ Petition No. 3647 of 1969, while disposing of the Writ Petition on 19-11-1970 it was observed :
The question whether Anekal Pocket Scheme provides for exclusion of private operators holding inter-state permits on the notified routes holding that inter-state permits on the notified routes was considered by this Court in Writ Petition No. 484/69. The petitioner therein was holder of an inter-state permit and transport authorities in Mysore imposed a condition that he should not pick up or set down passengers on any part of the notified route. There also the Corporation had contended that petitioner''s permit should be curtailed in respect of the portion of his route overlapping the notified route under the Anekal Pocket Scheme. But that contention was negatived and this Court held the scheme does not provide for complete exclusion of operation on notified routes by private operators holding inter-state permits. In view of the aforesaid decisions, the contention of the Corporation that the State Transport Authority should not have renewed the Inter-State permit between Bangalore and Chikbennur but should have curtailed that permit between Bangalore and Attibele must be rejected.
We have not come across any decision of the Supreme Court declaring the Anekal Pocket Scheme as a scheme of partial exclusion. The decision in H.C. Narayanappa and Others Vs. The State of Mysore and Others, declares it to be a scheme of nationalising 14 routes. From this it cannot be said, scheme envisaged only a partial exclusion. Nowhere the scheme provides for imposing corridor restrictions enabling the private operators to ply on these 14 routes to reach a destination beyond the routes.
The golden rule that has stood the test of time in the nationalisation of the routes is that Section 68-C of the Motor Vehicle Act empowers that State Transport Undertaking to exclude the private operators completely or partially from an area or route or part thereof in the scheme and getting an exclusive power to offer transport services in that area or route or part thereof. The scheme has to be looked into, to find out whether private operators are to be permitted to operate on the nationalised routes; If the scheme indicates that the State Undertaking will introduce its services to the exclusion of private operators ''there is no scope for the private operators to ply in the said routes, unless the scheme saves their rights elsewhere in the scheme. Making the permits ineffective for overlapping parts, amounts to partial exclusion of the private operators from that route. But when the scheme is specific regarding the exclusion of private operators, in respect of the routes (with their starting points, termini, intermediate stations and route length as found in Clause -3 of Anekal Pocket Scheme), the practice of making the permits ineffective for the overlapping part only is deprecated. It was observed in Adarsh Travels Bus Service and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others, as follows:
It is well known that under the guise of the so-called ''corridor restrictions'' permits over longer routes or overlapping parts of notified routes are more often than not misutilised since it is next to impossible to keep a proper check at every point for the route often times permits for plying stage carriages from a point of a short distance beyond one terminus to a point at a short distance beyond another terminus of a notified route have been applied for and granted subject to the so-called ''carridor restrictions'' which are but mere ruses or traps to obtain permits and to frustrate the scheme. If indeed there is any need for protecting the travelling public from inconvenience the State Transport undertaking and the Government will have to make sufficient provisions in the scheme itself to avoid inconvenience being caused to the travelling public.
The other contentions advanced by the private operators regarding their having acquired right to ply their vehicles on the notified routes by virtue of doctrine of legitimate expectation and doctrine of promissory estoppal has no legal foundation in view of the declaration of law and principles evolved by the Supreme Court that there cannot be estoppel against law and that the scheme is nothing but law.
Annexure ''M'' (in W.P. 14902 to 14908 of 1993) is a proceeding of the R.T.A. Kolar dated 7-12-1962, wherein request of the State Undertaking (M.S.R.T.C.) to impose conditions on certain operators was considered. The contention of the M.S.R.T.C. that, in view of Anekal Pocket Scheme, R.T.A. was competent to make those private permits ineffective by imposing conditions on the overlapping portion of the notified approved scheme, was accepted by the R.T.A. Kolar. Annexure ''N'' is another proceeding of such nature, of R.T.A., Bangalore dated 14-3-1963. Subject No. 4 is alleged to touch the routes notified under Anekal Pocket Scheme, R.T.A. accepted the scheme of the K.S.R.T.C. to impose conditions to be given the overlapping portion. One of the permit holder was Webster in the above proceeding and we have already referred to the observation of the Full Bench of this Court wherein, it was held that Webster''s case (before the Supreme Court) did not involve the real question as to whether Anekal Pocket Scheme was a scheme of complete exclusion or not. The representative of the K.S.R.T.C. urged the need to impose corridor restrictions in respect of the routes notified under Anekal Pocket Scheme. In subsequent proceedings of the years commenced in or about the year 1970 etc., the State Undertaking had been contending that the Anekal Pocket Scheme was a scheme of complete exclusion. (Vide Writ Appeals of the K.S.R.T.C. which are decided in this batch). Further, scheme being the law and other relevant principles are once again elaborated in Adarsh Travels Bus Service and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others, the State undertaking cannot be tied down by the application of the rule of estoppel.
It was also contended that the scheme is of the year 1959 and in the course of these years it has become outmoded and, therefore, requires to be nullified. Principle stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Motor General Traders AIR 1984 SC 121 was relied upon. We are of the view that material placed before the Court is insufficient to consider this contention and consequently we do not express any opinion either as to the permissibility of such a contention or as to its merits.
We are of the view that the impugned order of the State Appellate Tribunal is based on a correct understanding of the law. Consequently, the Writ Appeals filed by the K.S.R.T.C. are allowed; The Writ Petitions of the private operators are dismissed.
No order as to costs.
ORDER ON ORAL APPLICATION
An oral application is made seeking certificate for appeal to Supreme Court since we have only applied the principles stated in Adarsh Travels Case we do not think we can certify these matters as involving questions requiring consideration by the Supreme Court. However, since the private operators have been plying for several years, the operation of our orders are stayed for a period of 10 weeks so that the status quo as on today prior to this Judgment shall continue as far as these parties are concerned.