Karnail Singh vs Jaswant Singh

M. Jeyapaul, J.—The plaintiffs Jaswant Singh and Karnail Kaur laid a suit as against their own brothers seeking partition of two houses which were the subject matter of the suit. The plaintiff Jaswant Singh was allotted 1/4th share in both the houses. The defendants took up the matter in the appeal as against the preliminary decree passed. They lost the first appeal. Same was the fate of the defendants in the second appeal preferred by them as against the preliminary decree. The plaintiff Jaswant Singh filed final decree application on 23.1.1999. The said application was dismissed as neither of the parties appeared before the trial Court.

It is the admitted position of both the parties that a compromise was entered into between the parties as on 9.2.1999. The plaintiff Jaswant Singh thereafter filed a fresh final decree application on 3.5.2003 praying for division of his 1/4th share in respect of one house only. It has been pleaded by the plaintiff Jaswant Singh that a compromise was struck between the parties as regards the other house and, therefore, he has filed a fresh final decree application on 3.5.2003 claiming his division of 1/4th share in the other house. The same was resisted by the defendant on the ground that the compromise was in fact struck between the parties concerning both the houses which were the subject matter of the suit. The trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court rejected such a plea set up by the defendants and based on the tenor of the compromise deed entered into between the parties, 1/4th share in the subject house was ordered to be divided as it was held that there was no compromise between the parties in respect of the house which is the subject matter of the dispute.

The learned counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that the very fact that both the parties failed to prosecute the final decree application originally filed by the plaintiff Jaswant Singh would go to show that there had been a compromise with respect to both the houses. Unless there was a compromise concerning both the houses the plaintiff Jaswant Singh would not have kept quite for two long years, it is submitted. The other plaintiff Karnail Kaur had not joined the plaintiff Jaswant Singh in filing a fresh final decree application on 3.5.2003 as there had been a compromise concerning both the houses, it is further submitted.

I find that there is no merit in the submission made by learned counsel appearing for the appellants. While interpreting the tenor of a document the Court will have to first look into the letter and spirit of the document. Only when If there is any ambiguity in the document, the Court of course will have to sit in the arm chair of the parties concerned and interpret the document, having due regard to the facts and circumstances which contributed for the execution of the document.

In the instant case it is found that there is a specific reference to the compromise clinched between the parties only with respect to one house. The other house which was the subject matter of the suit was totally kept out of preview by the parties while drafting the compromise deed. Therefore, the question of going by any extraneous circumstance to interpret the compromise deed which is quite clear without any ambiguity does not survive for consideration.

It is true that the parties did not prosecute the final decree application originally filed on 23.1.1999. A fresh final decree application was filed after a lapse of more than two years. The other plaintiff Karnail Kaur also did not join the plaintiff Jaswant Singh while filing the fresh final decree application.

In my considered view, these circumstances would not interpret the terms of compromise in a different way as the compromise deed is crystal clear that the parties had agreed to clinch a deal only with respect to one of the properties which was the subject matter of the dispute. In view of the above I find that both the Courts below have rightly held that the plaintiff Jaswant Singh is entitled to division of 1/4th share on the basis of the preliminary decree obtained by the plaintiffs. No substantial question of law has arisen for determination. Therefore, the appeal stands dismissed. There is no order as to costs.