Karamjit Singh and Another vs Ravi Kanta Malhan and Others

L.N. Mittal. J.—In this Execution Second Appeal, decree-holders have assailed order dated 19.07.2012 passed by learned lower appellate court. In execution proceedings launched by appellants, property of respondents/judgment-debtors was sold. They filed objections alleging that the property in question is their only residential house and is, therefore, exempt from attachment. Learned Executing Court, vide order dated 15.04.2010, dismissed the objection petition. However, in appeal preferred by respondents No. 1 to 3, learned lower appellate court, vide impugned order dated 19.07.2012, has remanded the case to the Executing Court for fresh decision after giving proper opportunities to the objectors for leading evidence after framing issues on the plea raised by the objectors. Feeling aggrieved, decree-holders have filed this Execution Second Appeal.

I have heard Learned Counsel for the appellants and perused the case file.

Counsel for the appellants contended that due notice of the execution proceedings was given to the respondents, but they failed to respond and they filed objections immediately after the property was sold. However, the impugned order cannot be set aside on the basis of this contention. Conduct of the decree-holders has also been commented upon by the lower appellate court inasmuch as the appellants got the property attached depicting it to be vacant land, although now the plea of the decree-holders is that it is multi-storeyed building. Be that as it may, sole residential house of the judgment-debtors is exempt from attachment u/s 60(1)(ccc) of the Code of Civil Procedure, as applicable to Punjab. Consequently, the question, whether property attached and sold in execution proceedings is the sole residential house of the judgment-debtors or not, can be determined only after giving opportunity of leading evidence to both the parties. However, the Executing Court summarily dismissed the objections of judgment-debtors without granting opportunity of leading evidence to the parties. In these circumstances, lower appellate court has rightly remanded the case to the Executing Court for fresh decision after framing issues and after giving opportunity of leading evidence to both the parties. In view of the aforesaid, I find no infirmity, much less perversity or illegality in impugned order of the lower appellate court. The instant appeal is meritless and is accordingly dismissed in limine.