Kanhailal Samadhiya vs State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been filed seeking following relief (s):-

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was appointed as Platoon Commander in SAF on 06.05.2013 and his post was changed to SI, SAF in the year 2016. Thereafter, by order dated 21.08.2019 issued by the DGP, the petitioner was sent on deputation from SAF to STF. However, he was repatriated to SAF by order dated 13.02.2020.

It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that after about five years of his repatriation, PHQ STF issued the impugned charge-sheet dated 02.05.2025 proposing departmental enquiry against the petitioner in respect of alleged interference in the investigation of STF after his repatriation to SAF. The petitioner submitted a representation dated 11.07.2025 before SAF requesting that the departmental enquiry be transferred to SAF, as STF had no jurisdiction to proceed against him after his repatriation to his parent department.

It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P. No.307/2016 (Santosh Singh Yadav Vs. State of M.P. & Ors.), vide order dated 26.07.2023, has held that after repatriation, the borrowing department cannot proceed departmentally against the employee, as the master-servant relationship comes to an end.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned charge-sheet dated 02.05.2025 and order dated 01.06.2026 are without jurisdiction and contrary to the aforesaid judgment. It is also by learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that STF has adopted a different approach in the case of the petitioner, despite having recalled the charge-sheet in the similar case of Shri Manna Singh, which is arbitrary and illegal. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the charge-sheet and appointment of the Enquiry Officer were made after more than one year, despite the petitioner having already submitted a representation regarding the lack of jurisdiction of STF after his repatriation. The respondents have thus acted contrary to the applicable rules and the law laid down by this Court.

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the present writ petition is misconceived, premature and liable to be dismissed. The petitioner was appointed as Platoon Commander in SAF on 06.05.2013 and his post was subsequently changed to Sub-Inspector (SAF). The petitioner was sent to STF by order dated 21.08.2019 and thereafter was directed to work in his original posting unit by order dated 13.02.2020.

It is submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner has wrongly treated his posting in STF as deputation. STF is not a separate department or statutory body but is a part of the Police Department under the administrative control of the DGP and the Home Department. SAF, STF, Civil Police, Crime Branch, Cyber Cell, ATS and other police units are different wings of the same Police Department. Therefore, the petitioner has always remained an employee of the Police Department and there was no change in his employer or master-servant relationship.

Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the use of the word “deputation” in the order dated 21.08.2019 is only a matter of nomenclature. The subsequent order dated 05.09.2019 also shows that the petitioner was posted in STF, and the order dated 13.02.2020 directed him to work in his original posting unit. Thus, the petitioner's posting from SAF to STF was only an internal posting within the same department and not a deputation in the legal sense. His service conditions also continued to be governed by the same rules.

It is further submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that the charge-sheet dated 02.05.2025 was issued by the competent authority after considering the material available on record. The allegations relate to serious misconduct concerning the discipline, integrity and functioning of the Police Department. The charge-sheet is only initiation of disciplinary proceedings and does not amount to recording any finding of guilt. The order dated 01.06.2026 appointing the Enquiry Officer is only a consequential procedural step.

Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the petitioner has an adequate opportunity to submit his reply to the charge-sheet, participate in the enquiry, produce evidence, cross-examine witnesses and raise all factual and legal objections, including the objection regarding jurisdiction. The petitioner has approached this Court without availing the said remedy. The correctness of the allegations and sufficiency of evidence are matters to be examined by the disciplinary authority and Enquiry Officer and cannot be adjudicated at this stage under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Special Director & Another Vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse & Another, (2004) 3 SCC 440, Union of India & Another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28 and Secretary, Ministry of Defence & Others Vs. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, (2012) 11 SCC 565, wherein it has been held that ordinarily a writ petition against a charge-sheet is not maintainable unless exceptional circumstances such as patent lack of jurisdiction or mala fide are established.

It is further submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner has not pleaded any specific mala fide against any officer and has also not shown violation of natural justice. The charge-sheet itself provides an opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself. The petitioner has also failed to explain the delay in challenging the charge-sheet dated 02.05.2025. The subsequent order dated 01.06.2026 appointing the Enquiry Officer is only a consequential order and does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The petition is therefore also liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

As regards the case of Shri Manna Singh, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the said case was decided on its own facts and cannot confer any right upon the petitioner. Similarly, the judgment in W.P. No.307/2016 (Santosh Singh Yadav Vs. State of M.P. & Ors.), relied upon by the petitioner, is distinguishable on facts and has no application to the present case, as the petitioner has remained an employee of the same Police Department throughout.

It is, therefore, submitted learned counsel for the respondents that the impugned charge-sheet dated 02.05.2025 and order dated 01.06.2026 have been issued in accordance with the applicable rules and by the competent authority. The writ petition raises disputed questions relating to the alleged misconduct and jurisdiction, which can be considered in the departmental enquiry. The petitioner has failed to establish any exceptional circumstance warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. Hence, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, in rejoinder, submits that the present petition challenges the charge-sheet dated 02.05.2025 and the order dated 01.06.2026 appointing the Enquiry Officer, both issued by STF after the petitioner had already been repatriated to his parent unit, SAF. This Court, vide order dated 12.06.2026, has stayed the effect and operation of both the impugned orders.

It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondents have taken the stand that SAF and STF are units of the same Police Department and, therefore, the petitioner's movement from STF to SAF was only a posting and not repatriation. However, the said stand is contrary to the respondents' own action in the case of Shri Manna Singh (supra), who was involved in the same incident. Although a charge-sheet was issued to Shri Manna Singh by STF, the same was recalled vide order dated 02.07.2025 on the ground that he had already been repatriated to SAF and it was for SAF to decide whether any charge-sheet was to be issued against him.

Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the respondents are therefore adopting a different yardstick in the case of the petitioner, despite the petitioner being similarly situated and involved in the same incident. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Police Department's circulars, including GOP No.129/2008 dated 27.10.2008 and GOP No.144/2018 dated 23.06.2018, clearly recognize deputation and repatriation between different police units and provide that, in case of misconduct by an officer on deputation, he may be repatriated to his parent unit, which is competent to take action against him. It is, therefore, submitted that the stand taken by the respondents is contrary to their own action in the case of Shri Manna Singh as well as the aforesaid departmental circulars.

No other ground is pressed by the learned counsel for the parties.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

The order of DGP dated 21.08.2019, by which the petitioner was sent on deputation from SAF to STF reads as under for ready reference and convenience.

The petitioner was repatriated from STF to SAF by order dated 13.02.2020 which reads as under;

The question for consideration before this Court is as to whether the procedure contemplated under Rule 20 of the Rules 1966 is applicable only when the employee continues on deputation or can be invoked even after the period of deputation is over or the employee is repatriated back to his Parent department. The aforesaid question is no more res integra. Similar issue was before the Division Bench of this Court in the case of B.L. Satyarthi vs. State of M.P. reported in 2015(1) MPLJ wherein in paragraph No.12, it has been held as under:

From the above decision, it is very well clear that Rule 20 of the Rules 1966, gives power to the Borrowing Department to take disciplinary action against a Government servant who is on deputation and the powers to the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority are conferred on the borrowing department but the said powers can be exercised by the borrowing department so long as the relationship of master and servant. Once the relationship of master and servant or employer and employee comes to an end the Borrowing Department has no authority to take action against the employee concerned.

The contention of learned counsel for the respondents that STF is not a separate department or statutory body, but is only a part of the Police Department under the administrative control of the DGP and the Home Department, cannot be accepted. The petitioner has relied upon GOP No.129/08, which provides for deputation to specialised police units. Significantly, the said GOP specifically provides for sending personnel on deputation to the Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS). This shows that, for the purpose of deputation, such specialised units are treated as separate units to which personnel can be deputed. Merely because the ATS or STF functions under the overall administrative control of the Police Department, it cannot be said that there can be no deputation to such units. The relevant part of said GOP is reads as under for ready reference and convenience;

In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the petitioner was sent on deputation vide order dated 21.08.2019 from SAF to STF and he was repatriated to SAF by order dated 13.02.2020 and the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on 02.05.2025 after about five years of his repatriation but the said powers can be exercised by the borrowing department so long as the relationship of master and servant. Once the relationship of master and servant or employer and employee comes to an end the Borrowing Department has no authority to take action against the employee concerned. Since this Court had come to conclusion that such types of exercise could not have been done by the Borrowing Department, the very issuance of charge-sheet to the petitioner was illegal. Consequently, the entire process thereof conducted by the borrowing department cannot be sustained.

As the very inquiry has been held to be bad the impugned charge-sheet dated 02.05.2025 (Annexure P/1) and the order appointing Enquiry Officer dated 01.06.2026 (Annexure P/2) issued by STF cannot be sustained. Hence, both the orders are hereby set aside. Accordingly, the petition is allowed to the extent above.

However, liberty is granted to the respondents to take appropriate action as per law, if so advised.

With the aforesaid observation and direction, the petition is disposed of finally.