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Judgment
Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
The Petitioner has instituted the present Civil Miscellaneous Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assailing the legality, propriety, and correctness of the order dated 02.05.2025 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jagatsinghpur, in C.S. No. 508 of 2014. By the impugned order, the learned Trial Court has partly allowed the amendment petition by way of a cryptic and non-speaking order, without recording any reasons or assigning any cogent basis for such conclusion. The impugned order, being devoid of reasons and reflecting complete non-application of judicial mind, has caused serious prejudice and grave hardship to the Petitioner. It is, therefore, liable to be set aside in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
The brief facts of the case are as follows:
As borne out from the case records, the Petitioner instituted C.S. No. 508 of 2014 before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jagatsinghpur, seeking, inter alia, a decree directing the Defendant to execute and register the sale deed in respect of the suit schedule property within a stipulated period. The Petitioner further prayed that, in the event of failure or default on the part of the Respondent to comply with such direction, the sale deed be executed and registered through the process of the Court in accordance with law.
The suit schedule property comprises land situated at Village: Neepur, consisting of Plot No. 2487 measuring Ac. 0.38 decimals, Plot No. 2503 measuring Ac. 0.25 decimals, and Plot No. 2504 measuring Ac. 0.08 decimals, aggregating to a total area of Ac. 0.73 decimals, recorded under Consolidation Khata No. 1039. The said lands stand recorded in the names of the original Respondent, namely Sukanta Chandra @ Sukanta Chandra Dash, and his deceased mother. Upon the demise of his mother, the original Respondent succeeded to her interest in the suit property as her sole legal heir.
It is the case of the Petitioner that the original Respondent , being in urgent need of funds for the marriage of his daughter, agreed to sell the suit schedule property to the Petitioner for a total sale consideration of Rs. 2,20,000/-
On 25.05.2011, the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- to the original Respondent towards the agreed sale consideration, whereupon an unregistered agreement to sell was executed between the parties. According to the Petitioner, it was agreed that the balance consideration of Rs. 20,000/- would be paid after the marriage of the Respondent’s daughter, whereupon the sale deed would be executed and registered.
It is further pleaded that, pursuant to the said agreement, the Petitioner was delivered physical possession of the suit schedule property and has remained in continuous possession thereof, while paying the Government rent in respect of the land on behalf of the Respondent. The Petitioner further alleges that, despite repeated requests and readiness to pay the balance consideration, the Respondent deferred the execution and registration of the sale deed on one pretext or another.
Upon the Respondent’s failure to execute and register the sale deed in terms of the aforesaid agreement, the Petitioner, having been left with no other efficacious alternative, caused a legal notice dated 14.04.2014 to be issued through his counsel, calling upon the Respondent to perform his obligations under the agreement. However, despite receipt of the said notice, the Respondent failed to comply with the demand made therein, which constrained the Petitioner to institute the present suit before the learned Trial Court seeking appropriate reliefs in accordance with law.
Thereby, on receiving the summons from the learned Trial Court, the original Respondent No.1 appeared before the learned Trial Court and filed his comprehensive written statement, repudiating the statements made in the plaint as Respondent categorically denies execution of any agreement for sale of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff or receipt of any consideration thereunder, stating that he only borrowed Rs. 2,00,000/- from the Petitioner’s husband for his daughter’s marriage, for which blank signed stamp papers were given as security and the later has been misused to fabricated a false sale agreement and the present suit.
Upon receipt of summons, the original Respondent No. 1 entered appearance before the learned Trial Court and filed his written statement contesting the suit. The original Respondent categorically denied having executed any agreement for sale in respect of the suit schedule property or having received any sale consideration from the Petitioner. It was his specific stand that he had merely borrowed a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- from the Petitioner’s husband to meet the expenses of his daughter's marriage and, by way of security for the said loan, had handed over certain blank signed stamp papers. The Respondent further alleged that the said signed stamp papers had subsequently been misused to fabricate the purported agreement for sale, on the basis of which the present suit came to be instituted.
Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 also entered appearance and filed their written statement contesting the suit. As a preliminary objection, they pleaded that the suit was not maintainable in law and was devoid of any cause of action. On merits, they denied the allegations made in the plaint concerning the alleged transaction relating to the suit schedule property involving the late Sukanta Chandra @ Sukanta Chandra Dash and prayed for dismissal of the suit.
Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 further pleaded that the allegations set out in the plaint were false, fabricated, and devoid of any factual basis. They specifically denied the existence of any agreement for sale between the Plaintiff and the original Respondent, as well as the alleged payment of the balance sale consideration of Rs. 20,000/-. It was further their case that the Petitioner had never been in possession of the suit schedule property and had sought to support his claim by relying upon fabricated and unauthorised documents.
During the pendency of the suit, the original Respondent No. 1 expired, whereupon his legal heirs were brought on record by way of substitution and were arrayed as Respondent Nos. 1(a) to 1(g). Thereafter, Respondent Nos. 1(a) and 1(c) filed a joint written statement, while Respondent Nos. 1(b), 1(d), 1(e), 1(f), and 1(g) also filed a separate joint written statement. In essence, the substituted Respondents raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the suit, contending that it was not maintainable in law and that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action for institution of the suit.
Thereafter, the suit was posted for trial. At the stage when the Petitioner was required to file her affidavit-in-chief for examination as a witness, she claimed to have noticed that certain material facts had inadvertently remained omitted from the plaint. According to the Petitioner, in view of the subsequent substitution of the legal representatives of the original Respondent No. 1 upon his demise, it had become necessary to incorporate certain consequential pleadings by way of amendment to facilitate an effective and complete adjudication of the disputes involved in the suit.
Thereafter, upon hearing the parties, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jagatsinghpur, by order dated 02.05.2025, partly allowed the Petitioner’s application for amendment of the plaint. By the said order, the proposed amendments contained in paragraphs 4 to 8 of the amendment petition were allowed, whereas the proposed amendments contained in paragraphs 1 to 3 were rejected. According to the Petitioner, the impugned order does not disclose any reasons for rejecting the amendments proposed in paragraphs 1 to 3, thereby giving rise to the present petition.
Being aggrieved by the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Appellant has been constrained to approach this Court by way of the present criminal appeal.
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
The learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions:
The Petitioner submits that the learned Trial Court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with law while passing the impugned order. The order has been rendered without due application of judicial mind and in a mechanical manner, inasmuch as it does not disclose any cogent or discernible reasons for the partial rejection of the amendment sought by the Petitioner. The absence of reasons renders the impugned order arbitrary, unsustainable in law, and violative of the settled principle that every judicial or quasi-judicial order affecting the rights of parties must be supported by reasons.
It is further submitted that the impugned order, being a non-speaking and unreasoned one, is contrary to the settled principles of law governing judicial decision-making, which mandate that every order affecting the rights of the parties must disclose the reasons that weighed with the Court in arriving at its conclusion. In the absence of any discernible reasoning, the impugned order fails to withstand judicial scrutiny and is, therefore, liable to be set aside.
The Petitioner contends that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the proposed amendments were merely explanatory and consequential in nature and did not alter or change the nature, character, or foundational cause of action of the suit. The proposed amendments neither introduced a new case nor sought to prejudice the rights of the Defendants, but were intended only to facilitate a complete and effective adjudication of the real controversy between the parties.
Had the learned Trial Court considered the amendment application in its proper perspective and in the light of the settled principles governing amendment of pleadings, it would not have rejected the proposed amendments contained therein. The impugned order, therefore, suffers from a manifest error of jurisdiction and is liable to be set aside.
The Petitioner further contends that the settled principles governing Order VI Rule 17 of the C.P.C, 1908 require the Court to adopt a liberal approach while considering applications for amendment of pleadings, particularly where the proposed amendments are necessary for determining the real questions in controversy and do not alter the nature or character of the suit.
In the present case, the proposed amendments were merely clarificatory and consequential in nature and did not introduce a new cause of action or set up a fundamentally different case. The learned Trial Court, therefore, ought to have exercised its discretion in favour of allowing the amendments in their entirety.
It is submitted that while passing the impugned order, the learned Trial Court rejected the proposed amendments contained in paragraphs 1 to 3 of the amendment petition without assigning any reason whatsoever for such rejection. The impugned order, to that extent, is ex facie a non-speaking and unreasoned order, reflecting a failure to record the reasons which weighed with the learned Trial Court in declining the said amendments.
It is a settled principle of law that reasons constitute the heartbeat of every judicial order, and the absence thereof renders the decision arbitrary and unsustainable in law. Consequently, the impugned order, insofar as it rejects the proposed amendments contained in paragraphs 1 to 3 of the amendment petition, is liable to be interfered with and set aside by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:
Per contra, the learned counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the submission that the present CMP deserves to be rejected in limine.
The Opposite Parties submit that, the present CMP has been preferred challenging the order dated 02.05.2025 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jagatsinghpur, whereby the learned Trial Court partly allowed the Petitioner's application for amendment by permitting the proposed amendments contained in paragraphs 4 to 8 of the amendment petition, having found that the said amendments did not alter the nature and character of the suit. It is further submitted that the Respondents had vehemently opposed the amendment application and raised specific objections to the proposed amendments before the learned Trial Court, which were duly considered while passing the impugned order.
It is further submitted that the suit has been pending since the year 2014, whereas the Petitioner chose to file an application under Order VI Rule 17 of the C.P.C., 1908 only in the year 2025, after an inordinate delay of nearly eleven years from the date of institution of the suit. It is submitted that, upon due consideration of the rival contentions, the learned Trial Court partly allowed the amendment application by permitting the proposed amendments contained in paragraphs 4 to 8, while declining the amendments proposed in paragraphs 1 to 3. Being dissatisfied with the partial rejection of the amendment application, the Petitioner has invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, contending that the proposed amendments do not alter the nature and character of the suit and, therefore, ought to have been allowed in their entirety.
The Opposite Parties contend that the proposed amendments sought by the Petitioner are not merely clarificatory in nature but are intended to materially alter the foundation of the suit and the nature of the original pleadings. According to the Respondents, the alleged agreement for sale dated 25.05.2011, purportedly executed by the deceased Sukanta Chandra @ Sukanta Chandra Dash in favour of the Petitioner, was never executed and is specifically denied.
On the contrary, the subsequent transaction involving Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 stands admitted on record. It is, therefore, contended that the proposed amendments seek to introduce a new and inconsistent case, which would seriously prejudice the rights of the Respondents and alter the scope of the suit.
It is further submitted that the amendment application, having been filed after an inordinate and unexplained delay, is barred by limitation and is otherwise impermissible in law. Consequently, the learned Trial Court was justified in declining the proposed amendments to that extent.
The Opposite Parties submit that the events relied upon by the Petitioner, having arisen subsequent to the death of the original Defendant No. 1, namely the deceased Sukanta Chandra @ Sukanta Chandra Dash, constitute a distinct and independent cause of action. It is contended that if the Petitioner intended to seek relief on the basis of such subsequent events, the appropriate remedy was to institute a fresh suit in accordance with law, and not to incorporate the same by way of amendment in the pending suit.
It is further submitted that the settled principles governing amendment of pleadings, as enunciated by the Supreme Court and this Court, do not permit an amendment which introduces a new cause of action or fundamentally alters the nature and scope of the original proceedings. Accordingly, the Respondents contend that the learned Trial Court rightly declined the proposed amendments to that extent.
It further contends that the proposed amendment contained in paragraph 8 of the amendment petition was, in the submission of the Respondents, wholly misconceived and not maintainable in law. It is contended that, despite the specific objections raised by the Respondents, the learned Trial Court, without properly appreciating the factual and legal aspects of the matter and without due application of judicial mind, erroneously allowed the said amendment. Accordingly, the Respondents submit that, to the extent the amendment proposed in paragraph 8 has been allowed, the impugned order also suffers from legal infirmity and is unsustainable in law.
The Opposite Parties further submit that the Petitioner has approached this Hon'ble Court seeking permission for incorporation of the proposed amendments contained in paragraphs 1 to 3 of the amendment petition, which had been rejected by the learned Trial Court.
The Opposite Parties have vehemently opposed the said prayer on the ground that the proposed amendments are not merely clarificatory but substantially alter the nature and character of the suit by introducing a new and inconsistent case, thereby causing serious prejudice to the Respondents. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned order does not warrant any interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and the present Civil Miscellaneous Petition is liable to be dismissed.
IV. COURT’S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:
Upon consideration of the rival submissions advanced, and upon an independent and comprehensive reappraisal of the entire evidentiary record, this Court finds that the learned Trial Court has not meticulously analyzed the oral and documentary evidence on record in its proper perspective.
The power to permit amendment of pleadings is traceable to Section 153 of the C.P.C., which embodies the legislative intent that procedural law should serve as a handmaid to the cause of justice rather than operate as its impediment. The provision confers a wide discretionary jurisdiction upon the Court to amend any defect or error in any proceeding at any stage of the suit, upon such terms as it may deem fit, so as to effectively determine the real question or issue in controversy between the parties. Section 153 of the Code states that: “The Court may at any time, and on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it may think fit, amend any deflect or error in any proceeding in a suit; and all necessary amendments shall be made for the purpose of determining the real question or issue raised or depending on such proceeding.”
This Court is of the considered opinion that an application for amendment of pleadings moved prior to the commencement of trial ordinarily deserves a liberal and pragmatic consideration. It is a well-settled principle of law that such an amendment ought to be permitted where it is necessary for determining the real controversy between the parties and does not alter the fundamental nature, character, or basic structure of the suit, nor introduce a wholly new and inconsistent cause of action. The underlying object of permitting amendments at the pre-trial stage is to ensure a complete, effective, and comprehensive adjudication of the disputes in issue, while avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and advancing the cause of substantive justice.
The principle governing amendment of pleadings embodied in Order VI Rule 17 states that:
“The Court at any stage of the proceeding allow either
party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties.
Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.”
A conjoint reading of the substantive part of Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 makes it abundantly clear that every amendment which is necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties ought ordinarily to be permitted, provided that such amendment neither causes irreparable prejudice or injustice to the opposite party nor fundamentally alters the nature and character of the proceedings. The legislative mandate is evident from the use of the expression "shall" in the latter part of the provision, thereby underscoring the obligation of the Court to allow such amendments as are indispensable for the effective and complete adjudication of the real dispute between the parties.
The settled judicial approach while dealing with applications for amendment of pleadings is to eschew undue technicalities and adopt a liberal, pragmatic, and justice-oriented interpretation. Procedural law is intended to facilitate, and not to frustrate, the administration of justice. Consequently, unless the proposed amendment is mala fide, introduces a wholly new and inconsistent cause of action, or causes such prejudice to the opposite party as cannot be compensated in law, the Court ought to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in favour of permitting the amendment so as to advance the cause of substantial justice and avoid multiplicity of proceedings.
The Court places reliance upon the authoriatative pronouncement of the Supreme Court decision in Pankahja v. Yellapa,1, wherein it has been held that:
“14.The law in this regard is also quite clear and consistent that there is no absolute rule that in every case where a relief is barred because of limitation an amendment should not be allowed. Discretion in such cases depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. The jurisdiction to allow or not allow an amendment being discretionary, the same will have to be exercised on a judicious evaluation of the facts and circumstances in which the amendment is sought. If the granting of an amendment really subserves the ultimate cayuse of justice and avoids further litigation the same should be allowed. There can be no straighjacket formula for allowing or disallowing an amendment of pleadings. Each case depends on the factual background of that case.”
The similar interpretation has reiterated by the Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation Of India v. Sanjeev Builders Pvt. Ltd & Anr,2 wherein it has been held that:
“71.11.Where the amendment is sough before commencement of trial, the court is required to be liberal in its approach. The court is required to bear in mind the fact the opposite party would have a chance to meet the case set up in amendment. As such where the amendment does not result in irreparable prejudice to the opposite party, or divest the opposite party of an advantage which it had secured as a result of an admission by the party seeking amendment, the amendment is required to be allowed. Equally where the amendment is necessary for the court to effectively adjudicate on the main issues in controversy between the parties, the amendment should be allowed.”
Applying the aforesaid settled principles to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the amendments sought by the Petitioner are, in essence, formal, explanatory, and consequential in nature, and are intended to bring the pleadings in conformity with the subsequent developments on record so as to facilitate an effective and complete adjudication of the real controversy between the parties. The proposed amendments neither introduce a new or inconsistent cause of action nor alter the fundamental nature and character of the suit.
It is further borne out from the record that the trial of the suit had not commenced on the date when the application for amendment came to be filed, inasmuch as the parties had not yet filed their affidavits in-chief nor adduced documentary evidence. Consequently, the embargo contained in the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which applies only after the commencement of trial, has no application to the facts of the present case. In such circumstances, the learned Trial Court was vested with ample and unfettered discretion to consider the amendment application on its own merits in accordance with the settled principles governing amendment of pleadings, with a view to ensuring complete and effectual adjudication of the disputes in issue between the parties.
Upon a careful perusal of the impugned order, this Court finds that the learned Trial Court has partly allowed the amendment application while rejecting the proposed amendments contained in paragraphs 1 to 4, without recording any cogent, intelligible, or discernible reasons for such rejection. The impugned order, to that extent, is manifestly a non-speaking and unreasoned order, bereft of any discussion reflecting due application of judicial mind to the relevant facts and the settled principles governing amendment of pleadings.
It is a well-established principle of law that the recording of reasons constitutes the very foundation of every judicial order. In the absence of any reasons justifying the rejection of the proposed amendments contained in paragraphs 1 to 4, while simultaneously allowing the remaining amendments, the impugned order suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and cannot be sustained to that extent. Consequently, the said order warrants interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
This Court is of the considered opinion that where a proposed amendment is necessary for the effective, complete, and proper adjudication of the real controversy between the parties, the same ordinarily deserves to be allowed in furtherance of the cause of justice. An amendment which enables the Court to precisely delineate the issues in controversy, comprehensively adjudicate the rival claims, and render a more effective, complete, and satisfactory decision ought not to be declined on mere technical considerations.
The primary object of permitting amendment of pleadings is to ensure that the real dispute between the parties is adjudicated upon in its entirety and that the rights of the parties are finally determined in the same proceeding. Such an approach not only advances the ends of substantive justice but also obviates multiplicity of litigation, prevents avoidable procedural complications, and promotes expeditious and effective adjudication. Therefore, unless the proposed amendment fundamentally alters the nature of the suit or causes irreparable prejudice to the opposite party, the Court should ordinarily lean in favour of allowing the amendment so that the controversy is resolved once and for all in the pending proceedings.
It is a well-settled principle of law that formal, clarificatory, and consequential amendments to pleadings ought ordinarily to be permitted, particularly where they are intended to rectify or amplify the existing averments so as to enable the Court to effectively adjudicate the real controversy between the parties. Procedural law is designed to facilitate the administration of justice and not to thwart it by adherence to hyper-technicalities.
This Court is of the considered opinion that where the proposed amendment neither alters the fundamental nature and character of the suit nor introduces a new and inconsistent with the cause of action, the Court should ordinarily exercise its discretion in favour of allowing such amendment. The underlying object is to ensure a fair, comprehensive, and effective adjudication of the disputes in issue, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, and to secure the ends of substantive justice. A liberal approach towards formal amendments not only advances the cause of justice but also enables the Court to render a complete, efficacious, and judicious determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties in the pending proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing analysis and upon an anxious and careful consideration of the material facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 02.05.2025, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jagatsinghpur, in C.S. No.508 of 2014, does not reflect a proper appreciation of the facts or a correct application of the governing legal principles. The rejection of the proposed amendments contained in paragraphs 1 to 4 of the amendment petition is unsupported by any cogent or discernible reasons.
The impugned order, therefore, suffers from manifest illegality and material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, this Court is inclined to set aside the impugned order and to grant the relief sought for by the Petitioner.
Accordingly, the C.M.P stands allowed.
Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.