High CourtsSingle Bench(2016) 01 KAR CK 0221

Kamala vs The Principal, S.D.M. College of Dental Science and Others

Karnataka High Court · Decided on 14 January 2016

HON’BLE JUDGES
H. Billappa, J.
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 66139/2009 (L-TER)

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Judgment

24 paragraphs · 1,594 words

H. Billappa, J.—1. In this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has called in question the award dated 20.02.2009 passed by the Principal Labour Court, Hubli, in KID No. 50/1999 vide Annexure-''F''.

2.

By the impugned order at Annexure-F, the Principal Labour Court, Hubli, has quashed the termination order dated 04.08.1998 and the 1st respondent has been directed to pay a sum of Rs. 40,000/- in full and final settlement of the claim of the petitioner.

3.

Aggrieved by that, the petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking direction to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with full backwages and consequential benefits.

4.

Briefly stated the facts are; The petitioner was appointed as a sweeper by the respondents on 29.10.1991 on temporary basis. She was continued in service. On 04.08.1998, the petitioner was terminated from service without issuing any charge-sheet, without conducting any enquiry, without complying the principles of natural justice and without paying any retrenchment compensation. The petitioner approached the Labour Court in KID No. 50/1999 challenging the termination order. The Labour Court by its award dated 20.02.2009 has quashed the termination order dated 4.8.1998 and has directed the first respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 40,000/- in full and final settlement of the claim of the petitioner. Aggrieved by that, the petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking direction to the respondents to reinstate her into service with full backwages and consequential benefits.

5.

The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned award passed by the Labour Court insofar as it relates to the direction to the 1st respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 40,000/- in full and final settlement of the claim of the petitioner is concerned, it cannot be sustained in law. It is without any basis. The Labour Court having held that the termination was bad in law and the petitioner was the permanent employee ought to have directed reinstatement with full backwages and consequential benefits. The Labour Court has erred while directing to pay a sum of Rs. 40,000/- in full and final settlement of the claim of the petitioner. Therefore, the impugned award needs to be modified directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with full backwages and all consequential benefits. In support of his submission, he placed reliance on the following decisions;

i) STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH vs. CHARAN SINGH reported in 2015-II-LLJ 366 (SC),

ii) M/S. REETU MARBLES VS. PRABHAKANT SHUKLA reported in , AIR 2010 SC 397,

iii) FARIDAN VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH reported in , (2010) 1 SCC 497.

6.

As against this, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the impugned award does not call for interference. He also submitted that the petitioner has not produced anything to show that she was the permanent employee. The petitioner used to remain continuously absent for duty on several occasions. In fact, the petitioner has tendered her unconditional apology as per Annexure-M9. In spite of that, the petitioner continued to remain absent for duty. Therefore, she has been terminated from service after issuing due notice. Further, he submitted that the petitioner has accepted the amount on 28.05.2009 in full and final settlement of her claim and thereafter, has filed this writ petition. The petitioner was an employee of a private educational institution and removed under Section 94 of the Karnataka Education Act. Therefore, the writ petition cannot be entertained.

7.

In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner placing reliance on the decision reported in 2015 (1) KCCR Short Notes 17 submitted that the Labour Court as well as the Educational Tribunal have jurisdiction.

8.

I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties.

9.

The point that arises for my consideration is;

Whether the impugned award passed by the Labour Court vide Annexure-''F'' calls for interference?

10.

It is relevant to note, the petitioner was appointed as a Sweeper on 29.10.1991 is not in dispute. In the statement of objections filed to the claim statement, the respondents have admitted that the petitioner was employed as a Sweeper on 29.10.1991 on temporary basis. Thereafter, the petitioner has been removed from service on 4.8.1998. The petitioner has approached the Labour Court in KID. No. 50/1999 challenging the termination order. The Labour Court by its award dated 20.2.2009 has quashed the termination order dated 4.8.1998 and has directed the first respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 40,000/- in full and final settlement of the claim of the petitioner. The Labour Court considering the material on record and the evidence of M.W. 1 stating that from 1.6.1994 the petitioner was appointed permanently has held that the petitioner was the permanent employee of the respondent and the termination was bad in law. Having held that the petitioner was permanent employee and her termination was bad in law, the Labour Court has directed to pay a sum of Rs. 40,000/- in full and final settlement which is without any basis. Having held that the petitioner was permanent employee and the termination was bad in law, the Labour Court was not justified in not directing reinstatement and to pay backwages.

11.

In STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH vs. CHARAN SINGH reported in 2015-II-LLJ page 366, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has observed as follows at para 18:

"The denial of backwages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the employee concerned and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay backwages including the emoluments."

At para 24, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:

"In so far as the awarding of full back wages to the respondent by the High Court in its judgment and order dated 18.07.2006 for the period 24.02.1997 to 31.01.2005 is concerned, we retain the same. The appellant is further directed to pay full back wages to the respondent after computing the same on the basis of the revised pay-scale and pay him all other monetary benefits as well. The aforesaid direction shall be complied with by the appellant within four weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order."

12.

In M/s. REETU MARBLES vs. PRABHAKANT SHUKLA reported in , AIR 2010 SC page 397, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held, the Labour Court having found the termination to be illegal was unjustified in not granting any backwages.

13.

In the present case, the Labour Court has held that the petitioner was an employee of the respondent and there is an admission that the petitioner was the permanent employee. Further, the Labour Court has held that the termination was bad in law and has quashed the termination order. Having done that, the Labour Court has proceeded to direct the first respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 40,000/- in full and final settlement of the claim of the petitioner. No doubt the petitioner has received the amount on 28.05.2009. It is pleaded in the writ petition that the petitioner was misguided stating that to challenge the award the petitioner must first receive the amount. Believing that, the petitioner received the amount. Admittedly, the petitioner was a Sweeper. She has been misguided. Therefore, the respondents cannot contend that the amount of Rs. 40,000/- has been received by the petitioner in full and final settlement and therefore, the petitioner cannot challenge the award. The petitioner was aged about 41 years when she approached the Labour Court. She was left with lot of service. Her termination is bad in law. A finding is recorded that she was permanently employed. In that background, mere receiving of the amount by the petitioner will not take away her right to challenge the award. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the contention that the petitioner cannot challenge the award having accepted the amount and accordingly, it is rejected.

14.

The Labour Court having held that the petitioner is a permanent employee and the termination was bad in law should have directed reinstatement. Instead of that, it has only directed to pay a sum of Rs. 40,000/- which is not correct. As the petitioner has received the amount, she can be denied backwages from that date i.e., 28.5.2009. Insofar as backwages from the date of termination i.e., 4.8.1998 till 28.5.2009 is concerned, in the circumstances of the case the petitioner can be granted 50% of the backwages.

15.

It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, in view of section 94 of the Karnataka Education Act, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction.

16.

In W.P. No. 10693/2005 c/w. W.P. No. 10691/2005 disposed of on 31.01.2013, this Court in SOMASHEKAR SANGAPPA JIDAGI vs. THE MANAGEMENT OF BASAVESHWARA VIDYAVARDHAKA SANGHA, BAGALKOT & Another, following the judgment of the Division Bench in W.A. No. 2476/2001 has held that the Labour Court has jurisdiction. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction and accordingly, it is rejected.

For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court in KID No. 50/99 is modified directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Further, the respondents are directed to pay 50% of the backwages from 4.8.1998 till 28.5.2009. The petitioner shall not be entitled to any backwages from 28.5.2009 till the date of reinstatement. However, the petitioner shall be entitled to other consequential benefits.