Kalyanasundaram, Proprietor, K.P. Lorry Transport vs Indrani and Others

Srinivasan, J.—This revision is directed against the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Madurai, in LA. No. 7 of 1993 in

W.C. No. 174 of 1990.

The facts shortly are as follows:

W.C.No. 174 of 1990 was filed by the defendants of one Balraj claiming compensation on the ground that the said Balraj died of heart attack

while driving lorry No. TCT.4988 belonging to the petitioner herein. The petitioner was impleaded in the said case. The case was dismissed for

default on 27.12.1989 but subsequently restored to file by an order dated 25.7.1990. According to the applicants in the said case, the deceased

Balraj was employed under the petitioner herein and he died while he was in the service of the petitioner. The petitioner filed a counter before the

Deputy Commissioner stating that the said Balraj was never under his employment in any capacity and he did not own the lorry till 6.8.1988

whereas the said Balraj died on 29.2.1988. An application was filed by the applicants in the main case to implead Yoganan, from whom the

petitioner had purchased the lorry. Yoganan as well as the United India Insurance Company Limited, Madras, were impleaded as parties. On

24.12.1991, the petitioner was exonerated by the Deputy Commissioner. About a year thereafter, Yoganan filed a counter in the main case in

September, 1992 stating that the vehicle was sold on 27.5.1987 to one Nizar and the petitioner purchased the vehicle from the said Nizar on

30.1.1988. An application under LA. No.7 of 1993 was filed by the applicants in the main case on 2.8.1993 to implead the petitioner herein as a

party once again. The petitioner contested the application by filing a counter. But the Deputy Commissioner overruled the objections of the

petitioner and passed an order on 8.11.1993 impleading the petitioner as a party to the proceedings. Thereafter, the main proceedings was heard

and a final order was passed on 2.6.1994.

The present revision petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner challenging the order in I. A. No. 7 of 1993

impleading the petitioner as a party to the main proceedings. When the matter came up for admission, I questioned the counsel as to how the

revision petition was maintainable in view of the fact that the main proceedings had already been disposed of. Learned Counsel submitted that the

Supreme Court has deprecated the practice of approaching this Court at interlocutory stages in D.P. Maheshwari Vs. Delhi Administration and

Others, , and therefore the only stage at which the petitioner could have challenged the interlocutory order is at present. I am unable to agree with

this contention. The judgment of the Supreme Court only reads that the interlocutory orders passed by tribunals should not be challenged in the

High Court then and there and if any party is aggrieved, it could be done only after final order is passed against him. That does not mean that the

Supreme Court has held that the interlocutory order could be challenged without challenging the final order even after a final order is passed.

Learned Counsel invites my attention to the judgment of Patna Court in Basudeo Rai v. Jagarnath Singh (1982) I L.L.J. 637 and contends that

the Deputy Commissioner has no jurisdiction whatever to pass a fresh order in LA. No. 7 of 1993 impleading the petitioner once again as a party

when the earlier order passed by him exonerating the petitioner from the case, was in force. According to the learned Counsel, the Deputy

Commissioner had no jurisdiction to review his earlier order. This question does not arise as at present. The present revision petition is not

maintainable as the main proceeding has been concluded. It is certainly open to the petitioner herein to challenge the order passed in the main

proceeding and in such a proceeding question the order passed in LA. No. 7 of 1993. It is not open to him to file a revision only against the

interlocutory order and incidentally challenge the order passed in main proceeding. This is not a case of a dependent order. The main proceeding

could well have been disposed in favour of the petitioner in spite of the petitioner having been impleaded as a party by order in I.A. No. 7 of 1993.

But in this case the order has been passed against the petitioner in the main case. That does not enable the petitioner to challenge the interlocutory

order alone after the main proceeding is disposed of. Even if this revision petition is allowed, that will not dislodge the order passed in the main

proceeding in W.C. No. 174 of 1990. Hence, this revision petition is not maintainable.

The proper remedy for the petitioner is only to file a regular appeal, which is available to him under the statute, against the order passed in W.C.

No. 174 of 1990 and raise a ground in that appeal as against the correctness of the order passed in I.A. No. 7 of 1993. The revision petition is

dismissed with the above observation.