Kalpana Maharana vs State Of Odisha And Others Vs

Harish Tandon, CJ.

Though the authorities did not take any conscious decision on an application taken out by the appellant claiming a benefit under the Odisha Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Condition of Service) Rules, 2002 but  in  course  of  the  hearing  of  the  writ  petition  being  W.P.(C) No.17178 of 2024 filed by the appellant alleging inaction on the part of the authority in taking the decision, it was brought to the notice of the Court that the husband of the appellant did not pay the contributory amount as mandated under the aforesaid rules and, therefore, ceased to be the member/beneficiary under the said scheme.

The learned single Judge proceeded to dismiss the said writ petition taking into account the relevant provisions of the said rules and held that the appellant is not entitled to get the benefits under the aforesaid rules as the husband did not pay the contributory amount for three consecutive years which invited the cessation of the membership as beneficiary under the aforesaid rules.

Learned counsel for the appellant is very much vocal in his submission that the cessation of a membership under the aforesaid rules is not automatic; even the beneficiary has not paid the contributory amount, the authority is required to intimate the beneficiary before initiating a proceeding for such cessation. He further submits that the said Rule further provides that in the event the beneficiary deposited his annual contribution, his membership would be registered afresh which means that the cessation is not automatic  but  dependent  upon  a  conscious  decision  taken  by  an authority.

To appreciate the contention of the counsel for the appellant, it would be relevant to quote the provisions contained in Rule 267 of the said rules amended in terms of a notification dated 30th May, 2019.

“(1) Every registered beneficiary shall contribute to the Fund at the rate of Rs.50/- (Rupees Fifty) per annum to be remitted to the Board through the Registering Officer entrusted with registration of beneficiaries. This contribution may be remitted in advance once during any time of the year to the Registering Officer appointed by the Board through due acknowledgement/ money receipt/ Bank Receipt. For the above purpose, “year” means financial year as defined u/r. 248(g).

(3) If a beneficiary commits default in the payment of contribution continuously for a period of three years, he shall cease to be a beneficiary of the fund. However, with the permission of the Secretary of the Board or any Officer authorized by him in this behalf, the membership may be resumed on payment of arrears of contribution on due satisfaction of the Secretary or authorized officer subject to the condition that such resumption shall not be allowed more than twice.

Provided that if a registered beneficiary is willing to deposit his annual contribution after cessation of membership, he may be registered afresh as a new beneficiary under the Board with due procedure as in case of new registration. But, he should not avail the entitled benefit or assistance which he has already availed during his previous registration.”

On a meaningful reading of the aforesaid provision, it is manifest that the benevolent scheme in the form of a Rule framed by the Government requires a reciprocal obligation on the part of the beneficiary to make a contribution to the fund at the rate of Rs.50 per annum. It further provides that in the event the beneficiary commits default in payment of a contribution for three consecutive years, he shall cease to be the beneficiary of the said fund.

The said provision does not warrant any communication or initiation of a proceeding for cessation of the membership. We are not unmindful of the proposition that the beneficial piece of legislation has to be interpreted in a pragmatic manner keeping in mind the object and purpose underlying the incorporation thereof. The beneficial piece of legislation has to be interpreted which would enure to the benefit of the beneficiaries thereunder and any pedantic view which offends the core intention should be eschewed.

The moment the welfare legislation has created an obligation on the beneficiary to make contribution to the fund of an amount specified therein together with the provision that in the event of a default in payment of such contribution the benefits or the membership shall cease, the conclusion in this regard is inescapable that in the event of a default, the membership ceases automatically. Any other interpretation to the expression “he shall cease to be the beneficiary of the fund” appearing in sub-rule 3 of Rule 267 would be opposed to the legislative intent and, therefore, the interpretation sought to be made by the appellant is unacceptable.

The shelter under the proviso appended to the said provision is misplaced for the reason that though the cessation may occur automatically on default in making payment of the contribution for three consecutive years yet, upon the deposit of the contribution, the said beneficiary may be registered afresh as a new beneficiary. It does not invite a situation where upon the payment of the defaulted amount of contribution, it would resurrect the membership.

However, the revival of the membership may be permissible as appearing in sub-rule 3 of Rule 267 of the said rules where the beneficiary may make the payment of the arrears of the contribution upon taking a permission of the Secretary of the Board who upon recording the due satisfaction in relation to the circumstances which attributed to the default by the beneficiary in making contribution but such benefit can only be given twice during the lifespan of the said membership and not beyond that.

Admittedly, the beneficiary during his lifetime did not make the payment of the arrears and remained in default; therefore, the cessation of the membership being automatic on default in payment of his contribution for three consecutive years, the appellant cannot avail the benefit arising from the said benevolent piece of legislation.

We thus do not find any infirmity or illegality in the order of the learned single Judge in dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.

After the dictation of the judgment in the open Court, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Court must also take into account the violation of the principle of natural justice i.e., at the time of cessation of the membership, an opportunity of hearing must have been afforded to the beneficiary under the said scheme. A plea of non-adherence of the legal maxim, audi alteram partem cannot be taken in an abstract manner nor shall be applied in isolation but must be taken into consideration in the context in which it is used. The provision which has a statutory flavour clearly postulates that on default in payment of a contribution for three consecutive years, the membership shall cease without containing any provision of initiation of the proceeding either by making any demand or by serving any notice, the principle of natural justice is not attracted in this regard. The moment the statutory provision invites an automatic cessation, the Court should not substitute or add some words into the statutory provision nor should supplement its view which would run counter to the legislative mandate.

Therefore, we do not find any substance in the aforesaid submission. The appeal sans merit. It is hereby dismissed.

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