Kali Charan Roy vs Maharaja Bahadur Kesho Prasad Singh

Das, J.—These analogous appeals come before me from an order of the District Judge of Shahabad rejecting the appellants'' appeals to that Court on the ground that proper Court-fees were not paid by the appellants, and the only question which I have to determine is, did the appellants pay proper Court fees on their appeals to that Court?

The appellants were the defendants in the actions which were for assessment of rent and for recovery of specific sums of money as damages for use and occupation of the land. The learned Munsif who heard the suits held that Rs. 10-20, besides cess, per bigha would be a fair and equitable rent for the holdings in suit. In the result, the learned Munsif made a declaration to that effect and gave the plaintiff a decree for damages calculated at Rs. 10-20 per bigha for six years from 1317 to 1322.

The tenants defendants preferred appeals to the Court of the District Judge at Shahabad. They paid Court-fees on the amount decreed against them u/s 7, clause (iv)(c), of the Court Fees Act. The learned District Judge, however, was of opinion that section 7, clause (ii), of the Court Fees Act applied and called upon the appellants to pay the proper Court fees on the principle enunciated in that clause. The appellants took time to pay, but ultimately they were unable to comply with the order. The District Judge thereupon rejected their appeals.

It seems to me that the plaintiff''s suits were suits "to obtain declaratory decrees or orders where consequential reliefs are prayed" and that prima facie section 7, clause (iv)(c), would apply, but it is argued that the suits were suits for a sum payable periodically, and that, therefore, section 7, clause (ii), would apply.

Section 7, clause (ii), runs as follows:--"In suits for maintenance and annuities or other sums payable periodically, according to the value of the subject-matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be ten times the amount claimed to be payable for one year." It is urged on behalf of the appellants that the suits were substantially suits for assessment of rent which would be payable periodically and that, therefore, the learned District Judge was right in asking the appellants to pay according to the principle laid down in section 7, clause (ii). The critical question for my determination, therefore, is, what effect must be given to the words "or other sums payable periodically" which immediately follow the words "In suits for maintenance and annuities."

It will be noticed that I have to construe certain general words which follow particular and specific words. Clearly, the suits were suits neither for maintenance nor for annuities. Were they suits for other sums payable periodically?

"I accede to the principle", said Lord Campbell in R.V. Edmundson (1859) 28 L.J.M.C. 213 : 2 El. & El. 77 : 5 Jur. (N.S.) 1351 : 7 W.R. 565 : 8 Cox C.C. 212 : 38 L.T.O.S. 237, 119 R.R. 631 : 121 E.R. 30, "laid down in all the oases which have been cited, that, where there are general words following particular and specific words, the general words mast be confined to things of the same kind as those specified." In Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Company v. Riche (1875) 7 H.L. 653, 44 L.J. Ex. 185 : 3 L.T. 451 : 24 W.R. 794 a question arose as to the meaning of the words "general contractors." "Upon all ordinary principles of construction", said Lord Cairns, "these words must be referred to the part of the sentence which immediately precedes them ............ therefore ............ the term ''general contractors'' would be referred to that which goes immediately before, and would indicate the making generally of contracts connected with the business of Mechanical Engineers." In the same case Lord Chelmsford said: "It seems to me that the generality of the expression is limited by its association with the previous words ''Mechanical Engineers'' and it ought to be confined to contracts connected with that business."

It seems to me that we must apply this rule of ejusdem generis for the purpose of construing section 7, clause (ii) of the Indian Court Fees Act, for it is difficult to conceive why the Legislature should have taken the trouble to specify in this section certain classes of suits, which undoubtedly are suits for sums payable periodically, except to limit the generality of the expression that follows and to indicate that the general words most be confined to things of the same kind as those specified.

In my opinion, the generality of the expression "other sums payable periodically" must be limited by the specific words that precede, and, when so limited, section 7, clause (ii) would read as follows:--"In suits for maintenance and annuities or other sums of the same kind payable periodically................".

Now, can it be said that a sum of money payable as rent is of the same kind as a sum of money payable as maintenance or annuity? I think not, and, therefore, I must hold that the Court fees paid by the appellants u/s 7, clause (iv)(c) of the Act were sufficient.

In this connection it is necessary to remember that a series of cases of the highest authority have repeatedly laid down that fiscal enactments should, as far as possible, be construed in favour of the subject, and that, in cases of a doubt, the construction most beneficial to the subject is to be adopted.

I allow these appeals and remand the cases to the lower Appellate Court to be disposed of according to law.

The respondent must pay the costs of these appeals. The costs incurred in the Courts below will abide the result and will be disposed of by the lower Appellate Court.

The appellant is entitled to a certificate authorising him to receive back from the Collector the full amount of fee paid on the memorandum of appeal to this Court.