Kalegowda vs State of Karnataka and Another

K.V. Narayana Raju, M.-This appeal under Section 49 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act is from the order dated 9-7-1980 (as amended substituting that date for 18-8-1980) passed by the learned Special Duputy Commissioner, Mandya District in LAD. CR. 67/ 79-80 directing the lease of 9 guntas of kharab adjacent to Sy. Nos. 489 and 490 of Doddarasinakere village and Sy. No. 103 of Huligerepura, Maddur Taluk to respondent Chengaiah (Kengaiah?). Appellant Kelegowda is the owner of Sy. Nos. 488 and 490/1 of Doddarasinakere village, Maddur and he has been contending that he has been in possession and enjoyment of that kharab land and also applied for the same on the ground that it was necessary for the better enjoyment or cultivation of his own land. Respondent also has been claiming same land, contending that he too was in wrongful occupation. He had also applied for land in Sy. No. 54/1 of Chatrada Hosahalli. The Executive Engineer, Mandya has said in his letter dated 3-3-1980 that the land in question is on Maddur Shiva Samudra Highway and so should be reserved.

A petition dated 20-3-1979 given by respondent Kengaiah appears to have been forwarded by the Revenue Commissioner and Secretary to Government to the Special Deputy Commissioner saying that if the petitioner was a released bonded labourer he should be granted laed in his possession and enjoyment. That petition addressed to the Hon''ble Minister is found in the record and the petitioner therein claimed that he was in possession and enjoyment of Sy. No. 54/1 of Chartada Hosahalli and not the land in question in this appeal. The Deputy Commissioner called for a report and the Tahsildar by his letter dated 26-3-1980 stated that Sy. No. 54/1 was Nala Phut Kharab, and that however the land in question was under unauthorised cultivation, and further that both the appellant and the respondent claimed to be in possession.

The learned Deputy Commissioner inspected the land on 9-7-1980 and recorded that the land was beyond the road margin, that adjacent holders had already cultivated their lands up to the level of the land in question all along the road, and so the question of leaving this bit of waste land for road margin was meaningless, and that pending opinion from the P.W. Department and the formalities contemplated under the Land Grant Rules, the Tahsildar is directed to lease out the 9 guntas of land to Kengaiah at an annual rent of Rs. 50/- per acre as he was a released bonded labourer belonging to schedule caste community.

The appellant preferred appeal saying that such appeal was from an order dated 18-8-1980 passed by the Deputy Commissioner. He did not produce copies of such order but filed an endorsement dated 27-8-1980 issued by the Special Deputy Commissioner in reply to an application for copy of the order dated 18-8-1980 saying that there was only a letter written to the Tahsildar and so copy could not be given. It is now found that the order affecting the appellant is in fact contained in the Inspection Notes prepared by the Deputy Commissioner at the time of his spot inspection on 9-7-1980 and communicated by letter dated 18-8-1980.

The appellant has contended that the learned Deputy Commissioner has failed to see that he had made applications for grant of this land which was in his possession for over 25 years and had spent huge amount for improvements; that he was a displaced person and the land in question was necessary as a passage to his own land and also for effective and beneficial enjoyment of that land. It is also contended that the respondent was not a bonafide agriculturist and not qualified for grant of land.

The counsel for the contending parties have been heard. The simple question for consideration is whether the learned Deputy Commissioner was right in directing the lease of the land in question to respondent Kengaiah. Rule 19 of the Land Grant Rules authorised the Deputy Commissioner to lease lands to any individual, company etc.........for purposes of agriculture. But the power to lease lands to individuals was taken away by omitting the word ''individual'' in Rule 19(d) by Notification dated 9-5-1973. There can be no doubt that the purpose of such omission was to see that no individual got the land on lease for agriculture. By the same Notification sub clause (d)(i) was added in clause (2) of the same Rule 19 saying "the extent of land that may be leased to any individual shall not together with any land already held by him exceed the limits prescribed for a sufficient holder in Rule 215". This Sub-Clause, in our opinion cannot be regarded as authorising lease of lands to individuals for purpose of agriculture. Any other construction would defeat the very purpose of omitting the word ''individual'' in Rule 19(1)(d). Rule 19(2)(d) deales with leases to company or association for non-agricultural purposes, and in that clause also the word ''individual'' was omitted by the same Notification dated 9-5-1973. In the context of all those changes we cannot understand sub-clause (d)(1) in any way other than that it was intended only to restrict the extent of land leased before the Notification dated 9-5-1973. In this view of the matter we should hold that after 9-5-1973 Deputy Commissioner has no power at all to grant lease to individuals. What is more in the present case the learned Deputy Commissioner himself has not granted but only directed the Tahsildar to do so. The Tahsildar is not competent to grant a lease.

The learned Deputy Commissioner has directed grant of lease of the land which was claimed by the appellant to be in his own possession and also required for beneficial enjoyment or better cultivation of his own adjacent land. Even assuming that the Deputy Commissioner has power to lease or direct lease of the land, we are of the opinion that he was not right in directing the lease of the land in question which both parties claimed was in their wrongful occupation. There does not appear to have been any enquiry into the claims of the rival parties before directing the lease. Therefore we are of the opinion that the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner must be set aside.

In the result, the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner is set aside and the appeal is allowed.