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Judgment
Uday Kumar, J
This is an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, sought to quash an FIR (First Information Report), specifically Baranagar P.S. Case No. 296/18, dated May 19, 2018, under Sections 323, 325, 354, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1973, on the ground that the impugned proceedings were maliciously borne out of a long-standing and bitter family dispute primarily revolving around inheritance and constitutes a clear abuse of the process of law.
Impugned FIR was registered on the direction of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM), Barrackpore, given on May 11, 2018, in M.P. Case No. 857/18, to the Officer-in-Charge of the police station to treat the complaint of the opposite party no. 2, Smt. Soma Mukherjee, as an FIR.
The facts reveal a deep-rooted family dispute primarily revolved around inheritance and later escalated into cross-criminal complaints. The petitioner, Kakoli Chatterjee, is the widow of Late Kaushik Chatterjee, who tragically passed away intestate on September 23, 2016. The opposite party No. 2, Smt. Soma Mukherjee, is the sister of the deceased. The conflict initially stemmed from the proceeds of three Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) policies, where Smt. Soma Mukherjee was the nominee. The petitioner, along with her minor son, sought their rightful share of these proceeds, aligning with the Hindu Succession Act. The petitioner alleged that opposite party no. 2 and her mother conspired to deny them these shares. This led the petitioner to file a civil suit (Title Suit No. 01 of 2017) seeking a declaration of their rights and an injunction to prevent the withdrawal of the policy amounts. An ad-interim injunction was indeed granted in the petitioner's favor. An ad-interim injunction was indeed granted in the Petitioner's favour and remains in force. Alarmingly, the petitioner alleged that despite this injunction, opposite party no. 2 illicitly withdrew a substantial sum from one of the LIC branches, thus depriving the legitimate claimants.
The family animosity regrettably escalated into criminal complaints. The petitioner previously lodged her own complaint, resulting in FIR No. 174/18. The petitioner's complaint (FIR No. 174/18). On March 9, 2018, the petitioner visited her matrimonial home to seek financial assistance and the LIC funds. She alleged that she, along with her mother, was subjected to brutal assault and torture by opposite party no. 2 and others, necessitating medical treatment at R.G. Kar Medical College and Hospital. Following this, she lodged a written complaint on March 10, 2018, which culminated in the registration of Baranagar P.S. Case No. 174/18 on March 17, 2018. This FIR encompasses serious charges including Sections 120B, 326, 307, 498A, 420, and 406 I.P.C., alongside provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
In retaliation, opposite party no. 2 filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. She alleged that on April 20, 2018, the petitioner and others attacked her residence, verbally abused and assaulted her and her elderly mother, with male accused persons allegedly outraging their modesty. While this incident was purportedly reported to Baranagar P.S. on April 27, 2018 (GDE No. 2092/18) and subsequently to the Barrackpore Police Commissionerate on May 7, 2018, it was the order of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barrackpore, dated May 11, 2018, that directed the registration of Baranagar P.S. Case No. 296/18 on May 19, 2018, under Sections 323, 325, 354, and 34 I.P.C. The petitioner has since secured anticipatory bail in this latter case.
Mr. Anupam Kumar Bhattacharyya, Learned Advocate for the petitioner vehemently argued that FIR No. 296/18 is a malicious prosecution, as the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate had improperly exercised his jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., by directing to lodge FIR mechanically without due application of mind, and the complaint itself was misconceived and lacked a prima facie cognizable offence. Secondly, Mr. Dipankar Paramanick labels the complaint of opposite party no. 2 as a false and concocted story, devoid of any factual basis, orchestrated solely to falsely implicate her and others. Thirdly, a significant and unexplained delay in lodging opposite party no. 2's complaint is highlighted. An incident purportedly occurring on April 20, 2018, was reported to the local police only on April 27, 2018, and further to the Commissionerate on May 7, 2018, before the Magistrate's order on May 11, 2018. Such an inordinate and unexplained delay, it is argued, is fatal to the prosecution's case. Fourthly, it is submitted that the impugned FIR is a clear abuse of the process of law and a retaliatory measure, designed as a counter-blast to the more serious criminal case already lodged by the petitioner against opposite party no. 2 and her family members.
Finally, Mr. Bhattacharyaa pointed to the suppression of material facts by opposite party no. 2, specifically her failure to disclose the pre-existing criminal proceedings (FIR No. 174/18) against her and her family, and the ongoing civil suit concerning the LIC policies. This suppression, according to the petitioner, indicated bad faith on the part of opposite party no. 2 and further underscored the malicious nature of the impugned FIR. The petitioner concluded that allowing such a false and retaliatory FIR to stand would cause "immense harassment" and lead to a "failure of justice." Therefore the proceedings ought to be quashed.
Conversely, Mr. Paramanick Submitted that the FIR No. 296/18, was registered under cognizable offense and it should be decided on trial. He further submitted that opposite party no. 2 Soma Mukherjee filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. under impression that her initial attempts to report the incident to the police (on April 27, 2018, and May 7, 2018) had not yielded the desired result, necessitating a direct order from the Magistrate. Therefore, he contended that the Magistrate's order to register the FIR was a legitimate exercise of judicial power, based on the prima facie content of her complaint, and that it properly initiated an investigation into the alleged criminal acts.
Furthermore, Mr. Paramanick submitted that although the petitioner portrayed FIR No. 296/18 as a "counter-blast," but the same was not a retaliatory act of opposite party no.2, but a legitimate response to a distinct criminal offense committed against her and her mother.
Finally he submitted that the incident happened on April 20, 2018, was separate and independent from the prior disputes, and therefore, opposite party no.2’s complaint was a valid pursuit of justice. Any delay in reporting the incident was not malicious or fatal to her case, or that there were valid reasons for such a delay, which she believed did not undermine the truthfulness of her allegations.
Therefore, he submitted for dismissal of this application.
The fundamental question that this Court is called upon to determine is “whether Baranagar P.S. Case No. 296/18, along with the foundational order of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate dated May 11, 2018, constitutes an abuse of the process of law, warranting the exercise of this Court's inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for its quashing, considering the allegations of falsity, unexplained delay, and the backdrop of a civil dispute and cross-FIRs.”
The peculiar factual matrix of the case, marked by a bitter family dispute over financial assets, followed by reciprocal criminal complaints, immediately raises concerns about the potential for abuse of the criminal justice system. When criminal proceedings appear to be a weapon wielded to settle civil scores or to retaliate against pre-existing legal actions, the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. come into play. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335), in its seminal judgment, outlined various categories where such powers could be invoked. Notably, categories (e) and (g) of Bhajan Lal, pertaining to allegations that are "absurd and inherently improbable" or where the proceedings are "manifestly attended with mala fide and/ or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance," appear particularly relevant here.
The petitioner's challenge to the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate's order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is significant. This power is not to be exercised mechanically. The Magistrate must apply a judicial mind to the complaint, assessing whether it indeed discloses a cognizable offence justifying police investigation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. (2015) 6 SCC 287) unequivocally cautioned against the casual invocation of this provision, emphasizing the need for a prior approach to the police by the complainant and reasons for any delay, alongside supporting affidavits. The absence of such due diligence by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, if proven, would render the order unsustainable.
The substantial and unexplained delay of approximately 20 days between the alleged incident (April 20, 2018) and the Magistrate's order (May 11, 2018), with intermediate reports to the police, is a critical factor. While delay is not per se fatal, an inordinate and unexplained delay in a family dispute, particularly when a counter-case has already been registered, often casts a shadow of doubt on the veracity of the complaint and suggests an afterthought or an attempt at false implication. This aspect demands careful consideration as per established jurisprudence.
The ongoing Title Suit for declaration and injunction concerning the LIC policies underscores the deeply rooted civil nature of the core dispute. While a civil dispute does not inherently preclude a criminal action, the sequence of events and the nature of allegations in FIR No. 296/18, especially in light of the pre-existing FIR No. 174/18 and the alleged violation of the civil injunction, raise a strong suspicion that the criminal machinery is being misused to pressure the petitioner in the civil realm or to gain an upper hand in the overall family feud. The suppression of the previous FIR by opposite party no. 2 further undermines her credibility and suggests a calculated move rather than a genuine grievance.
Having meticulously considered the facts and circumstances, the arguments advanced by the Petitioner, and the settled principles of law, I find substantial merit in the petitioner's contentions. The confluence of a long-standing civil dispute over property, the filing of cross-FIRs, the significant and unexplained delay in lodging the impugned complaint, and the apparent suppression of material facts by opposite party no. 2, cumulatively lead to an inescapable conclusion. The initiation and continuation of Baranagar P.S. Case No. 296/18 appears to be an abuse of the process of law, designed to harass the petitioner and to retaliate against the legitimate legal actions initiated by her. Allowing such a proceeding to continue would not only defeat the ends of justice but also set a dangerous precedent for the misuse of criminal processes in civil disputes.
Consequently, the Court held that the impugned FIR, Baranagar P.S. Case No. 296/18, and the order of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate directing its registration, could not be sustained in the eyes of the law.
The Court therefore set aside the order dated May 11, 2018, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Barrackpore in M.P. Case No. 857 of 2018.
It also quashed the First Information Report being Baranagar P.S. Case No. 296/18, dated May 19, 2018, and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.
The revisional application, CRR No. 1436 of 2018, thus allowed, without costs.
All connected applications are disposed of.
There shall be no order as to costs.
Let a copy of this judgment be forwarded to the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barrackpore, and the Inspector-in-Charge, Baranagar Police Station, for necessary action and compliance.
CRAN 1 of 2025 stands disposed of, accordingly.
TCR, if any, shall be sent down to the Trial Court, at once.
Case Diary, if any, be returned forthwith.
Urgent certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of all requisite formalities.