K. Vithal Rao vs The Govt. of Andhra Pradesh and others

Jayachandra Reddy, J.—The question that arises for determination in this Writ Appeal preferred against the judgment of our learned brother Chinnappa Reddy, J. dismissing the writ petition is ''what is the definite and precise meaning of the words "in any local area" occurring in Section 231(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayats Act 1964'', hereinafter referred to as "the Act."

The essential facts that give rise to the question lie in a narrow compass. The appellant, who was elected as Sarpanch of Jukkal village was removed from the office by the proceeding dated 28-10-1972 of the Deputy Secretary to the Government, Panchayat Raj Department. This order of removal was also preceded by a show-cause notice issued by the Joint Secretary to the Government, Panchayati Raj Department. The principal contention in the writ petition was that the Dy. Secretary was not competent to pass the order of removal of Sarpanch as he was not a Commissioner of panchayat Raj as defined in the Act and that even u/s 231(2) of the Act as the Commissioner can by notification authorise any officer or person to exercise such power only "in any local area" in a State, the delegation of powers u/s 231(2) of the Act by the Commissioner to the Deputy Secretary authorising the latter to exercise the functions of the Commissioner u/s 50 of the Act throughout the State of Andhra Pradesh is invalid. The sum and substance of this argument is that the delegation by the Commissioner could only be with reference to a local area in the State and not with reference to the whole of the State. Our learned Brother Chinnappa Reddy, J. rejected this contention holding that the Commissioner could delegate his powers to the Deputy Secretary in respect of the whole of the State. It was also contended before the learned single judge that as regards the second charge the explanation submitted by the Sarpanch ought to have been accepted. This contention also was rejected by the learned single judge.

Sri P.A. Chowdary, the learned counsel for the appellant advanced the same argument before us. The learned counsel relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. and Another Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, wherein the meaning of the words ''Local area'' occurring in Entry 52 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India was considered, and the Lordships observed thus:

The phrase appears in several statutes, some passed by the central Legislature and some by the Provincial or State Legislatures; but in many of these the words have been defined. These definitions being for the peculiar purpose of the particular statute cannot be applied to the interpretation of the words "local area" as used in the Constitution. Nor can we derive any assistance from the judicial interpretation of the words ''local area'' as used in the Code of Criminal Procedure or other Acts like Bengal Tenancy Act as these interpretations were made with reference to the scope of the legislation in which the phrase occurs. Researches into dictionaries and law lexicons are also of no avail as none of these give the meaning of the phrase local area''. What they say as regards the meaning of the word ''local'' offers no guidance except that it is clear that the word ''local'' has different meaning in different contexts.

In the later part of the judgment their Lordships also added thus:-

Whether the entire area of the State is an area, we need not consider in the present case.

In the Act with which we are concerned the words ''local area'' have not been defined. It is not in dispute that the Commissioner can divide the State into several local areas and delegate to the same officer his powers in respect of each of the local areas. If that could be done, we do not see any reason why the Commissioner cannot delegate his powers in respect of the whole of the State, Further in the context, we are concerned with the words "in any local area in the State" A Full Bench of the Mysore High Court in Veerappa v. State of Mysore, AIR 1965 Mys 227 (FB) considered the meaning of the word "any" which occurs in Section 11A of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act (18 of 1925). Hegde, J. who spoke for the majority, after referring to the relevant provisions observed thus:-

The key words are ''qualified to be elected at the election for any ward of the Municipal Borough'' and ''every person whose name is in the list of voters''. If the words ''qualified to be elected at the election for any ward of the Municipal Borough'' mean that a person is qualified to be elected either in the ward in which his name is entered or any other ward, then that is what the impugned rule says.

The word ''any'' is a word which excludes limitation or qualification. It connotes wide generality. Its use points to distributive construction.

After considering the various authorities cited, Hegde, J. held that any person who is registered as a voter in any one of the wards can stand as a candidate for election in any of the wards. In B. Veeraswamy and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, , a Full Bench of this Court examined the meaning of the word ''any'' occurring in Section 44-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, and held thus:-

The word ''any'' occurring in Sec. 44-A inserted by Madras Act 20 of 1948, excludes limitation or qualification and connotes wide generality. It comprehends not only the officers whose subordination to the Transport Commissioner is statutorily determined, but all eligible subordinate officers.

So it is proper that the words ''in any local area'' must be interpreted as to connote wide generality and the words should be given a meaning as wide as possible in the context. u/s 50 of the Act the Commissioner may, by a notification, remove any Sarpanch or Upasarpanch for any of the reasons mentioned therein and he can exercise this power State-wide. When Sec. 231(2) empowers him to authorise any officer to exercise such power in any local area in the State, the words should be given a meaning as wide as possible in the context and when given so, in our opinion, the Commissioner could rightly delegate his powers to the Deputy Secretary in respect of the whole State. In Writ Appeal No. 350 of 1974 dated 11-2-1976 a Division Bench of this court of which one of us (the Hon''ble the Chief Justice) was a member, considered the scope of Section 231(2)of the Act and held thus:

Under sub-section (2) of Section 231 the Commissioner or the District Collector may, by notification, authorise any officer or person to exercise in any local area in the State or the revenue district, as the case may be, in regard to any gram panchayat or all gram panchayats in that area, any of the powers vested by the Act in the Commissioner or the District Collector, as the case may be and may in like manner withdraw such authority. By virtue of the power vested in the Commissioner, Panchayat Raj u/s 231(2) proceedings were issued delegating his powers u/s 50 to the Deputy Secretary to Government, Panchayat Raj Department. It is by virtue of that delegation of powers that the Deputy Secretary to Government Panchayat Raj Department issued a notice to the respondent.

In this view the Bench upheld the order of removal of a Sarpanch passed by the Deputy Secretary. No doubt in this case the meaning of the words ''local area'' was not considered, but the decision is to the effect that the Commissioner could delegate the powers to the Deputy Secretary in regard to any Gram Panchayat or all Gram Panchayats.

The learned counsel for the appellant next contended that the second charge, viz. that the Sarpanch debited a sum of Rs. 250/- for purchase of stationary without obtaining the sanction of the appropriate authority, was not proved, that the explanation submitted by the appellant ought to have been accepted and that the appellant was not given proper opportunity to rebut the shipment of the officers. The learned single Judge rejected this contention holding that such a ground was not raised in the writ petition. That being so, we cannot consider this point in this Writ Appeal.

For all these reasons, we dismiss the writ appeal with costs. Advocate''s fees Rs. 100/-.