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Judgment
V. Ratnam, J.—The tenant is the petitioner. The respondents-landlords filed a petition in R. C. O. P No. 7 of 1979 for an order of eviction
against the petitioner under Sections 10(2) (i) and 10(3) (a) (i) of the Tamil Nadu Building Lease and Rent Control) Act, XVIII of 1960 as
amended by Act XXIII of 1973(herenafter referred to as the Act). According to the case of the respondents, the property in the occupation of the
petitioner belonged to the joint family of respondents 1 to 3, their father and their brother one deceased Gopalan. in 1963, the father renounced the
world and became an ascetic and also released his share in the property in favour of his sons, the respondents 1 to 3 herein and Gapalan. Gopalan,
the brother of respondents 1 to 3 herein and the husband of the 4th respondent and the father of respondents 5 and 6, died subsequently and the
respondents became the owners of the property in question. The petitioner, according to the case of the respondents, became a tenant in respect
of the property through one Venkatanathan On an earlier occasion an application for eviction in R C. O. P No. 14 of 1971 was filed by the first
respondent herein against the said Venkatanathan, since deceased and the petitioner on the ground of wilful default and that the petitioner is a
sublessee under Venkatanathan and the application for eviction was allowed by the Rent Controller and the order was affirmed in appeal. But in C
R P. No 2418 of 1973, it was held that the petitioner was a direct tenant of the first respondent and others. The respondents stated that the mother
of respondents 1 to 3 is an old, pious, religious and orthodex lady and is anxious to spend the evening of her life at Kumbakonam with a view to
take dips in the holy Cauvery and have worship of the deity in the temple in order to secure salvation for her soul. It was also the further case of
the respondents that the third respondent had been insane for some years and that the doctors had advised that his recovery would be faster if their
is a change of climate and environment and, therefore, the respondents bona fide needed the premises in the occupation of the petitioner for those
purposes. The respondent further stated that in spite of the adjudication in C. R P. No. 2418 of 1973, the petitioner did not pay any rent from
October, 1973 till the end of 1978, though the tenancy commenced from May, 1970 onwards and he default in the payment of rents committed by
the petitioner was characterised as wilful default. The respondents also stated that as regards the advance of Rs, 2,000 which was directed by the
order in C. R.P.No. 2413 of 1973 to be adjusted against the rents payable by the petitioner, it could not be so done because the petitioner
instituted a suit in O. S. No. 238 of 1973, District Munsif''s Court, Kumbakonam, against Venkatanathan and the first respondent herein and also
obtained a decree against the said Venkatanathan. Alleging that in spite of several notices, the petitioner had not paid the rents and that such
nonpayment was wilful, the respondents filed the application for eviction as aforesaid Under Sections 10(2)(i) and 10(3) (a) (i) of the Act.
The petitioner, while accepting the status of the first respondent as landlord, disputed that of the respondents 2 to 6 According to the case of the
petitioner, Venkatanathan, an agent of the first respondent required a sum of Rs 2,000 to be given as advance to be adjusted towards the future
rents for the purpose of carrying out repairs to the building and that when the building was so let out in 1970 the petitioner paid a sum of Rs. 2 0
00 But Venkatanathan did not effect any repairs nor did he provide water tap connection as promised. In addition, the petitioner also claimed that
municipal taxes repair charges, water tap connection charges, additional electric deposits, etc, have all been paid by him and these amounts as well
as the amount of Rs 2,000 have to be adjusted as against the rents payable by the petitioner Referring to the proceedings initiated on the former
occasion in R. C. O. P. No. 14 of 1971 by the first respondent herein, the petitioner stated that it was only on account of the stand taken by the
first respondent regarding the advance amount of Rs. 2,000 that the petitioner was obliged to institute the suit in O. S. No. 238 of 1973 and
obtained a decree against Venkatanathan and claimed that the costs in that suit has also to be adjusted towards the rent. The petitioner appended
the details of the amounts paid and expense incurred by him and according to this statement, the rent payable by the petitioner for the period in
question would be Rs. 10,600 while the amounts expended by him in respect of the house, in the payment of property taxes, under tap connection
charges, repair charges, additional electricity deposit, etc., totalled upto Rs. 10,928 46. In other words, the petitioner pleaded that there was an
excess amount in a sum of Rs. 328-46 p. to his credit which had to be adjusted towards the rent for future months The patitioner, therefore,
contended that there was no question of any default much less wilful default in the payment of rents as claimed by the respondents. The
requirement by the respondents of the premises in question for the purpose of the mother of the respondents 1 to 3 as wall as for accommodating
the third respondent was stated to be not bona fide. An objection that the petition for eviction is also bad for misjoinder of respondents 2 to 6 who
are not landlords was also taken. On these grounds, the petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the application for eviction filed by the respondents
The learned Rent Controller (District Munsif) Kumbakonam, on a consideration of the oral as well as the documentary evidence, held that the
application filed by the respondents is maintainable and that the claim of adjustment made by the petitioner in respect of all the amounts detailed in
the counter cannot be allowed and that even deducting such adjustable and allowable amounts as have been claimed by the petitioner, the
petitioner owes considerable amounts to the respondents and that there was no justification whatever for the not payment of the rents ever since
the date of inception of the tenancy and that such non payment of the rents, in the circumstances of the case would be nothing but wilful On the
question whether the respondents nave established that they bana fide require the premises in the occupation of the petitioner, the Rent Controller
took into account the circumstances of the cases and on the evidence concluded that the respondents have astablished that they bona fide require
the building for accommodating their mother. On these conclusions, an order for eviction was passed against the petitioner. Aggrieved by this, the
petitioner preferred an appeal in C. M. A. No. 43 of 1979 to the Appellate Authority (Sub-Court), Kumabakonam. The Appellate Authority, on a
consideration of the stand taken by the petitioner in the reply notice issued by the petitioner as well as in the course of the proceedings in R. C. O.
P. No. 14 of 1971, said that the application for eviction at the instance of the respondents was maintainable, as the petitioner had admitted that the
respondents would be the landlords in respect of the property in his occupation. On the question of wilful default, the Appellate Authority held that
certain amounts claimed by the petitioner by way of adjustment could not be so adjusted as the expenditure was incurred by the petitioner without
the consent of the respondents and that even after adjusting some of the payments made by the petitioner, the petitioner had not satisfactorily
explained the non-payment of the rents for several years after the commencement of the tenancy and in that view held that the petitioner had
committed wilful default in the payment of rents. As regards the bana fide requirement of respondents, the Appellate Authority concluded that it
had not been established that the third respondent is an insane person and that for the purpose of accommodating him and also for the purpose of
enabling the mother of respondents Nos. 1 to 3 to spend the evening of her life at Kumbakonam, the premises is required bona fide. In view of the
conclusions arrived at on the question of wilful default, the order for eviction passed by the Rent Controller was upheld and the appeal was
dismissed.
The question of the maintainability of the application for eviction by the respondent herein has been found in their favour by the authorities
below. Indeed, the learned counsel for the petitioner did not in any manner challenge this finding of the authorities below. Even otherwise, it is
found from the terms o? the release deed Exhibit A-l, dated 28th January, 1963 that the fattier of respondents 1 to 3 Srinivasaraghavachariar had
become au (sic) and had released his share in the property in favour of his sons, namely, respondents 1 to 3 herein and deceased Gopalan and,
therefore, all the four sons became ent(sic)led to the property and after the death of Gopalan, the respondents 4 to 6 are also entitled to the share
of the deceased Gopalan. It is thus obvious that the respondents are the parsons who are entitled to the property and also entitled to receive rents
therefrom and would undoubtedly be landlords in relation to the building in the occupation of the petitioner. Exhibit A-4 is the certified copy of the
reply notice dated 5th January, 1971, sent by the petitioner''s advocate in R. C. O. P. No. 4 of 1971 and Exhibit A-5 is the counter filed by the
petitioner in those procerdings. Under Exhibits A-l and A-5, the petitioner has specifically taken up the position that the first respondent herein
alone is not the owner of the premises and that it belongs to his other brothers as well. As a matter of fact, under Exhibit A-5, the petitioner has
stated that the application filed by the first respondent in R C. O. P. No. 14 of 1971 is bad for the non joinder of the other brothers. In the course
of the deposition of the petitioner who has been examined as R.W.-1 the petitioner has admitted the correctness of what his been stated under
Exhibits A-4 and A 5 Under these circumstances, the objection raised by the petitioner that the application for eviction filed by the respondents is
not maintainable cannot be sustained. The finding of the authorities below that the petitioner had accepted in the prior proceedings that all the
brothers of the first respondent would be landlords and, therefore, the respondents 1 to (sic) and the legal representatives of the deceased brother
Gopalan who are respondents 4 to 6 would be landlords entitled to maintain the application, is perfectly correct and does not suffer from any
infirmity.
The question whether the petitioner committed wilful default in the payment of rents may be now considered. In the application for eviction, the
respondents have stated that the petitioner came into possession of the property in May, 1970 through one Venkatanathan and that the rents had
remained unpaid from October, 1973 till the end of 1978. In answer to this, the petitioner claimed that he is entitled to adjust the rents payable by
him as against the amounts expended by him and detailed in the counter filed by him. It is not in dispute that even since the inception of the tenancy,
no amount had been a paid by the petitioner towards rent to the respondents. It would be convenient to take up the items mentioned in the counter
of the petitioner and to find out how far the petitioner is in order in claiming an adjustment with reference to those amounts.
The first item mentioned by the petitioner is a sum of Rs. 2,000 paid on 23rd April, 1970, by cheque as advance. It is found from the evidence
that this cheque was cashed by one Venkatanathan who had been held to be the agent of the first respondent in Civil Revision Petition No 2418 of
1973. R. C. O P. No. 14 of 197l was filed by the first respondent herein against Venkatanathan and the petitioner on the ground of wilful default in
the payment of rents and that Veakatanathan was the main tenant and the petitions was a sublessee under him and therefore, an order for eviction
should be passed. Though the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority in C. M A. No. 25 of 1972 upheld the contention of the first
respondent herein, in C. R. P No. 2418 of 1973 disposed of on 16th January, 1974, it was held that the petitioner was the tenant of the first
respondent and that Venkatanathan merely functioned as the agent of the first respondent and that there was no default in the payment of rents. It
was also further found that Veakatanathan had received the amount of Rs. 2,000 from the petitioner as advance to be adjusted in future rents.
Though this was the final adjudication in the Civil Revision Petition, yet, even during its pendency, the petitioner instituted a suit in O S No. 238 of
1973, District Munsif''s Court, Kutnbakonam, for the recovery of the sum of Rs. 2,00) against Venkatanathan and the first respondent herein. The
suit was decreed against Venkatanathan and was dismissed against the first respondent. The plaint in that suit has been marked as Exhibit A-7 and
in the judgment disposing of C. R. P. No. 2118 of 1973, this Court proceeded on the footing that the amount of Rs 2,000 received by
Venkatanathan as advance would be available for adjustment. But the subsequent events, namely, the institution of O. S No. 238 of 1973 District
Munsif''s Court, Kumbakoman and the obtaining to a decree for that amount against Venkatanathan rendered the adjustment impossible, with the
result that it is not open to the petitioner to claim that the amount should be adjusted as against the rents payable by the petitioner in respect of his
occupation of the premises belonging to the respondents herein. The evidence of the petitioner examined as R. W. I. also indicates that the amount
of Rs. 2,000 advanced to Venkatanathan is shown in the loan account and that it is not mentioned that it was in respect of advance towards the
house. It is also the further evidence of R. W. No. 1 that he filed an application for executing the decree in O S. No. 238 of 1973 and that he did
not file any full satisfaction memo therein This evidence of R W No. 1 would clearly indicate that the sum of Rs. 2,000 had nothing whatever to do
with the advance as such and that even if it was paid to Venkatanathan as such, the petitioner had obtained a decree against him and had also
executed that decree and had not entered a full satisfaction, with the result that the decree is still outstanding Under those circumstances, the
amount of Rs 2,000 cannot be treated to be advance as such received by the first respondent in respect of the property and, therefore, adjustable
towards rent at the instance of the petitioner.
The next two items in respect of which the petitioner claims an adjustment are (1) interest on the said amount of Rs. 2,000 at 12 per cent per
annum from 22nd April, 1970 to 31st January, 1974; and (2) interest from 1st February, 1974 to 31st January, 1979 at 6 per cent per annum,
amounting to Rs. 900 and Rs. 610 respectively. The suit in O. S. No. 238 of 1973, District Munsif''s Court, Kumbakonam, as noticed already
was dismissed against the first respondent and decreed only against Venkatanathan. The decree provided for the payment of interest at 6 per cent
per annum on Rs. 2,000 from 1st March, 1972 till the date of payment only against Venkatanathan. Since the suit had been dismissed against the
first respondent, no interest payable on the amount decreed can be adjusted against the first respondent herein towards the rents payable by the
petitioner. In addition, the petitioner has also not succeeded in establishing that there was any agreement between him and the respondents that the
petitioner is entitled to interest on the amounts decreed as against Venkatanathan and such interest is also adjustable as against the rents payable by
the petitioner. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to adjust the interest on the amount of advance of Rs. 2,000 namely, Rs.
900 and Rs. 610 towards rents payable by the petitioner.
The next item relates to the payment of municipal taxes in respect of the premises in the occupation of the petitioner from the second half year
1973-74 to the first half year 1978-79. No doubt, it will be the duty of the owner of the premises to pay the municipal taxes. But the petitioner has
paid under Exhibit B-3 the tax due to the Municipality as an occupier, though. the petitioner, in the course of his evidence would admit that no
notice with reference to the payment of municipal taxes was sent to him in his capacity as an occupier and no distraint proceedings were also
taken. Even though it does not appear that there was any agreement as such between the petitioner and the respondents with reference to the
payment of municipal taxes, yet, since the primary liability for the payment thereof rests with the landlords-respondents and that liability had been
discharged by the petitioner by payment amounting to Rs. 1,951.29, this payment must be given effect to and adjusted towards the rents payable
by the petitioner.
The petitioner claims an adjustment of a sum of Rs. 162.17, with reference to charges paid for securing a water tap connection. The evidence of
the petitioner in this regard is to the effect that he did not secure any permission to writing from anyone for installing the water tap connection. It is
also his further evidence that in the agreement no mention whatever was made as regards the water tap connection. Though the petitioner would
now claim that Venkatanathan agreed to provide water tap connection even at the time when the tenancy commenced, the petitioner would admit
that he did not give any notice to Venkatanathan complaining that no such water tap connection had been provided. It is also not the case of the
petitioner that there was any agreement that the expenses incurred by him in connection with the securing of water tap connection can be adjusted
towards the rent for the premises. Under these circumstances, the ineurring of the expenditure by the petitioner in a sum of Rs. 162.17 cannot be
held to be an expenditure which would be binding on the respondents and adjustable as such against the rents payable by the petitioner.
The next item adjustment of which is claimed by the petitioner relates to costs incurred with reference to the institution of O. S. No. 238 of
1973, District Munsif''s Court, Kumbakonam. Even here, the petitioner is not entitled to claim any adjustment as against the respondents since the,
petitioner has admitted that the suit O. S. No. 233 of 1973 was decreed against Venkatanathan with costs. If the petitioner had secured a decree
for costs against Venkatanathan, even according to him, it is not permissible for the petitioner to claim adjustment of the costs awarded under the
decree in O. S. No. 238 of 1973 against Venkatanathan against the rents payable by the petitioner to the respondents.
The next item in respect of which the petitioner claims an adjustment is a sum of Rs. 655 stated to have been spent for repairs effected. In
order to substantiate this, the petitioner relies upon Exhibits B-6, B-7 and B-8, the carbon copy of the bill book belonging to his shop. No doubt,
these documents may establish the supply of some planks, but there is nothing therein to indicate that the respondents or even Venkatanathan ever
authorised the petitioner to carry out any repairs in the premises in question. The evidence of P W. 1 is to the effect that the respondents had not
authorised the petitioner to do any repairs. Equally, the evidence of the petitioner examined as R. W. 1 shows that no notice was ever given by him
with reference to the need for repairs and that no proceedings were also initiated for the purpose of enabling the effecting of the repairs. If really
repairs were needed to the premises in the occupation of the petitioner he should have issued a notice to the respondents asking them to carry out
the necessary repairs or at least the petitioner should have secured the authorisation from the respondents to carry out the repairs and to adjust the
expenses incurred therein towards the rents payable. But no such document or authorisation is forthcoming. In addition, the petitioner has not made
any attempt whatever to examine any of those persons who were employed in the carrying out of the so-called repairs to the building. It has also
not been established that the consent of the respondents was taken to incur the expenditure for repairs and to adjust the same against the rent.
Further, before the tenant can carry out the repairs at his expense, the procedure u/s 22 of the Act has to be followed by issuing a notice to the
landlord to carry out the repairs within a reasonable time and if it is not so done, then the Controller should be moved, who thereafter, may direct
the carrying out of such repairs by the tenant and the deduction of the cost thereof from the rent payable for the building. The proviso to Section 22
of the Act also limits the incurring of such expenditure towards repairs to one-twelfth of the rent payable in respect of the building for a year. In the
absence of a notice by the petitioner to the respondents calling upon them to carry out the repairs, it cannot be readily assumed that there was an
omission on the part of the respondents to carry out the repairs which would justify the effecting of such repairs by the petitionerand deduction of
the amount so expanded from out of the rents. Section 22 of the Act makes provision for such a case and even assuming that there was a refusal
by the respondents, the petitioner cannot, without recourse to Section 22 of the Act, proceed to carry out the repairs and mulct the landlords
respondents with the expenses of such repairs and claim an adjustment of such amounts as well. The claim of adjustment of Rs. 655 by the
petitioner under this head is, therefore not in order.
A sum of Rs. 45 towards additional electric deposit made is sought to be adjusted by the petitioner against the rents payable by him. The
person in whose name the connection stands is the person who is also liable to pay the deposit. The amount, therefore, should have been paid by
the respondents in the usual course. But instead it was paid by the petitioner. However, the respondents would claim that since the petitioner
consumed more electricity, it became necessary to call for an additional deposit and, therefore, the respondents cannot be made to pay the excess
deposit. The demand for additional deposit cannot be stated to be due to the higher consumption of electricity. The deposit would also ensure to
the benefit of the respondents. The petitioners''s claim of adjustment with reference to this amount is in order.
A sum of Rs. 4,350 is stated to have been deposited by the petitioner towards rent during the pendency of the eviction proceedings in R. C.
O. P. No. 14 of 1971 and C. M. A. No. 25 of 1978. With reference to this claim, the Appellate Authority has pointed out, after verifying the
concerned, register, that the petitioner has paid four sums of Rs. 1,450 Rs. 400, Rs. 200 and Rs. 200, totalling to Rs. 2,250 only and not Rs. 4,
350 as claimed by the petitioner. The amount of Rs. 2,250 so deposited by the petitioner has necessarily to be given credit to and adjusted
towards the rents payable by the petitioner. The claim of the petitioner to the extent of Rs, 2,250 as against Rs. 4,350 made by him, would be in
order. Thus, the petitioner is entitled only to claim an adjustment with reference to three items only and no more, namely, (1) Municipal taxes paid
to the tune of Rs. 1,951.29. (2) additional electricity deposit Rs. 45 and (3) rents deposited into Court Rs. 2, 250 totalling to Rs 4,246 29. Even
according to the petitioner, the rents payable since the inception of the tenancy is Rs. 10,600, out of which the petitioner is entitled to claim an
adjustment only as regards Rs. 4,246.29. There is no justification whatever for not paying the balance. It is necessary to point out that after the
disposal of the Civil Revision Petition No. 2418 of 1973, the petitioner could have been expected to be regular in the payment of rents, but he did
not do so. Indeed, the petitioner had admitted in the course of his evidence that the adjustment was thought of only when a reply to Exhibit A-11,
dated 3rd December, 1978 was sent and not before. It is thus obvious that not having paid any rent whatever for a period of nearly 8 years since
the inception of the tenancy, the petitioner entertained the idea of adjustment of the amounts only in 1978 and not before. This shows that the claim
of the petitioner to adjust the rents is not bona fide at all and has been thought of only as a device to cover up the laches on the part of the
petitioner in not having paid the rents for a very long period, while being fully aware of his obligation to pay the monthly rents to the respondents.
The conclusion of the authorities below that the petitioner has committed wilful default in the payment of rents has been clearly established by the
evidence on record and the conduct of the petitioner.
It is now necessary to notice the contention of Mr. S. Govind Swaminathan, the learned counsel for the respondents that the Appellate
Authority was in error in holding that the respondents have not made out their bona fide requirement of the premises in the occupation of the
petitioner for their own use. On this aspect, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the two grounds on on which the
respondents rested their application u/s 10(3) (a) (i) of the Act have not been made out and, therefore, the refusal by the Appellate Authority to
grant an order for eviction is correct. A further point was also raised that it may not-be open to the respondents who have succeeded in secured an
order for eviction on one ground to challenge the correctness of the conclusion of the Appellate Authority on another ground on which such an
order was refused. No doubt, the respondents are per one who have been affected by the finding of the Appellate Authority on the question of
bona fide requirement, though the ultimate decision is in their favour. Having secured an order in their favour, it is not open to the respondents to
prefer an appeal against the decision of the Appellate Authority on this point atone, as the ultimate order is in their favour. A landlord, who urges
before the authorities below several grounds to secure an order for eviction against the tenant and succeeds in establishing one of such grounds and
fails in the other and secures ultimately an order in his favour, is neverless a person aggrieved with reference to those findings against him, if the
ultimate decision of the authorities below is challenged by the opposite party. In addition, the functionaries under the Act are authorities with
jurisdiction to enquire in to applications for eviction, fixation of fair rent, etc., and though the entire gamut of the procedure applicable to civil courts
below be applied to those authorities, yet, rules of justise, equity and good conscience should be invoked to relieve difficulties and assist situations
like the present. In the instant case, the respondents were not able to persuade the Appellate Authority on the question of bona fide requirement
which they urged successfully before the Rent Controller The respondents, by the order of the Rent Controller, secured an order for eviction on
two grounds and by the order of the Appellate Authority, one of those grounds was taken away, though the ultimate order was in their favour. It
may even be stated that the respondents have been relieved of the right to an order of eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement by the
Appellate Authority. The respondents, would, therefore, be persons aggrieved in so far as the finding on this aspect went against them before the
Appellate Authority. Under those circumstances, is it not open to the respondents to sustain the order of eviction on the other ground as well? I am
of the view that they can.
A decision reported in Seetaram and Others Vs. Smt. Ramabai and Another, supports this view. Hidayatullah, Chief Justice of that Court (as
he then was) considered the question, who is a person aggrieved. Quoting with approval Lord Wacher in Ex parte Official Receiver in re Reed
Rowen Co. (1977) 19 QBD 174 the learned Judge observed that a person aggrieved must be a man against whom a decision has been
pronounced which has wrongfully refused him something which ha had a right to demand. The learned Judge further observed as follows:
In our opinion, without having to decide whether Order 41, rule 22 of the CPC applies or not to rent control proceedings and appeals arising
therefrom, we are quite satisfied that on general principles, a party who has an order in its favour is entitled to show that the order is justified on
some ground which was decided against it by the Court below.
Ramaprasada Rao, J. (as he then was) in G. Jayalakshmi Ammal v. N. Pattabiramayya and Ors. C. M P. No. 2597 of 1965, dated 10th
January, 1969 applied the aforesaid principles to a case where out of four grounds urged in support of an application for eviction, only one was
found in favour of the landlady and the Appellate Authority in the appeal filed against the order of eviction declined to go into the contention that
the land lady should be given an opportunity to urge the other three points as well before the Appellate Authority. No doubt, the revisional
jurisdiction u/s 25 of the Act is invoked by a person aggrieved by an order of the Appellate Authority, But the scope of the exercise of the
revisional powers is not merely restricted to the particular ground on which the decision is rested but extends to the correctness, legality or
propriety of any decision or order passed in the proceeding and this would include, in my view, the power to examine the correctness or otherwise
of a finding adverse to the respondents. It would, therefore, be undoubtedly open to the respondents to canvass the correctness of the finding of
the Appellate Authority on the question of bona fide requirement and claim that the order of eviction should be rested on that ground as well.
The two grounds upon which the respondents projected their case u/s 10(3) (a) (i) of the Act are that the mother of the respondents 1 to 3 is
an orthodox lady and a believer in sastrie pursuits and eager to spend the evening of her life desiring worship of the Lord everyday and that the
third respondent who has been insane for some years has been advised a change of place and environment so that he can recover. The petitioner
disputed this requirement. The Rent Controller upheld this claim of the respondents while the Appellate Authority rejected the case. The evidence
discloses that the mother of the respondents J to 3 is an orthodox, pious and religious lady. Being the wife of a person who has renounced the
world, there is nothing unnatural in this bent of mind of the mother of respondents 1 to 3 and her desire to spend the rest of her lifetime in
Kumbakonam giving her an opportunity to take dips in the holy Cauvery and to worship her Istha Devata. The evidence of P. W. 1 would disclose
that the mother is aged about 60 years and that she is capable of doing work and looking after herself. The Appellate Authority would appear to
discountenance this claim of the respondents on the ground that it is improbable that an old lady should leave her sons at Madras and settle down
with an insane son at Kumbakonam, without any male help. That would only be a general statement inapplicable to the facts of the present case as
disclosed by the evidence. As stated already, the fact that the father of the respondents 1 to 3 had become a sanyasi must have influenced the mind
of the mother of the respondents 1 to 3 to lead a highly religious and orthodox life for the rest of her lifetime and there is no evidence to indicate
that the mother of the respondents 1 to 3 is depending upon the help of others even for her daily routine. On the other hand, the evidence points
out that the mother of respondents 1 to 3 can look after herself and can do the work as well by herself and, therefore, the circumstance that the
mother of respondents 1 to 3 wants to settle down at Kurabakooam to spend the rest of her lifetime without any male help cannot be put against
the requirement of the respondents for that purpose. The omission to mention this as a ground in 1971 in P. C. OP. No 14 of 1971 cannot be
considered to be fatal to such a claim in the altered circumstances which obtained in 1979. There is nothing wrong in a person, specially the wife of
an ascetic, entertaining the idea of spending the rest of her lifetime devoting herself to the worship of God and other pursuits predominantly religious
and orthodox. The requirement of the house in order to enable the mother of the respondents to do so cannot in any manner be characterised as
not bona fide. No doubt, no satisfactory materials have been placed before the authorities below to show that the third respondent bad been
advised to have a change of place and that that would facilitate his improving and, therefore, the authorities below were quite right is not upholding
the claim of bona fide requirement on this ground. However, there is absolutely no justification for the Appellate Authority to differ from the
conclusion of the Rent Controller with reference to the requirement of the respondents bona fide for the purpose of accommodating tae mother of
respondents 1 to 3 who wants to go to Kumbakonam and spend peacefully the rest of her days in this world. The order of the Appellate Authority
declining to grant an order for eviction on this ground cannot therefore, be sustained and the respondents are entitled to an order for eviction on
this ground as well. Consequent to the conclusions arrived at above, the order of eviction passed by the authorities below has to be upheld and the
Civil Revision Petition dismissed with costs.