K. Vaidyanathan vs State Bank of India

S.S. Sodhi, J.—The impugned order of the trial Court declining leave to the petitioners to defend the suit and the consequent decree passed against them warrants no interference in revision.

Leave was sought by the petitioner, Shri K.Vaidyanathan on the ground that the suit against them was barred by time and the acknowledgement sought to be relied upon by the respondent-Bank had not been signed by him. During arguments, however, a totally different plea was sought to be raised with regard to this acknowledgement. It was specifically accepted by the petitioners that the acknowledgement was indeed signed by him, but doubt was sought to be created with regard to it on the ground that the revival letter of February 7, 1985 purports to have been executed at Kharar whereas the place of business of the petitioner was Mohali and no material had been brought on record to show how this letter came to be executed at Kharar. This is clearly no ground to question the denial of leave to defend to the petitioner hen signatures on the document stand admitted by the petitioners and there is no other circumstance to show that there is any reasonable or plausible defence that the petitioner, in this situation, can raise against it.

Turning to the petitioner Satish Kumar, he sought leave to defend the suit of the respondent-Bank on the plea that by virtue of the dissolution of the partnership between him and the other petitioner K.Vaidyanathan on November 25, 1983, he stood absolved from liability for the loan taken by the firm from the Bank. Reference as, in this behalf made to a letter said to have been written by the petitioner K. Vaidyanathan to the respondent Bank on February 7,1984 and also to be reply of the petitioner Satish Kumar on June 25,1985 to the registered notice sent to him by the Bank, where by the Bank was specifically informed that the firm had been dissolved.

The law is well-settled that mere dissolution of a firm cannot absolve a partner from liability to any third party for the acts of the firm done before his retirement or dissolution of the firm except by agreement made by him with such third party and the partners of the reconstituted firm. Admittedly, no such agreement exists in the present case nor could counsel point to any course of conduct or delaying between the petitioner and the respondent - Bank and the reconstituted firm by virtue of which such agreement could be inferred. Such being the situation, there is clearly no merit thus in either of the revisions petitions and they are consequently hereby dismissed with costs.