K. Thangavelu vs State of Tamil Nadu and Tamil Nadu Electricity Board

R. Jayasimha Babu, J.—Petitioner claims that he should be given power supply at a concessional rate on the ground that the application for sanction of additional load was only for the purpose of expansion of an industry and therefore, the notification issued by the State Government on 18.5.94 u/s 4 of the Tamil Nadu Revision of Tariff Rate on Supply of Electrical Energy, Act, 1978 (Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1979) should not be applied to the case of the Petitioner. The Petitioner has also challenged that notification as being discriminatory.

The operative portion of the notification reads this:

With effect on and from eighteenth May, 1994 the new steel industry who get sanction of load on or after that date shall not be eligible for any tariff concessions.

That notification of 18-5-1994 also sets out that there has been negative effect of power tariff concession provided to new steel industries, as many of the steel industries were closed down after the period of three years and it was, therefore, felt necessary to withdraw the concession to the new steel industries. It is also stated therein that the old steel industries could not compete with the new steel industries which enjoy tariff concession.

The extent to which concession should be granted cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The provisions of the Act under which the notification has been issued empower the Government to specify the extent of the concession. The fact that the concessions are given to some, would not entitle those who are not given the concession to claim a right to be granted that concession. When the class to which the concession is to be granted is specified, it is only the members of that class who can claim the concession and on one else.

The right to receive supply of electrical energy is not a fundamental right. It is a matter governed by commercial consideration, although to a substantial degree the supply of electricity is in the nature of public utility and there is an obligation to make the supply available to those who desire it. Here, it is not a case of denial of service. The energy, admittedly, is being supplied. What is in dispute is the rate of charge-whether it should be at a regular rate or at a concessional rate.

The Act governing the supply of electrical energy does not require that every new steel industry is supplied with energy at a concessional rate. If the State, having regard to it''s policy in relation to the industries in the State, considers that concessional supply of electrical energy is to be given only to old steel industries and not to the new steel industries, it is well with in the power of the State to make such a Classification.

The sanction of the additional load was admittedly made on 12.8.1994, few months after the impugned notification. The condition imposed in that order of sanction that the Petitioner will not be eligible to new industry tariff concession is in conformity with the notification that had been issued under the Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1979.

As regards the submission that expansion does not amount to setting up of a new industry, the class to which the concession had been extended should be ascertained having regard to the language of the notification as also the background to the extent it is necessary also being considered to that notification. The clear language of the notification is that "new steel industries who get sanction of load on or after the date" shall not be eligible for the concession. The term new in this context refers to the establishment of a new capacity. It does not matter whether that new capacity is a part of the industry newly started from scratch or a new capacity which is added to an existing unit. The notification also states that the concession will not be available to those new industries who get sanction of load on or after the date of notification. In this case, sanction was after the date of notification and was for the purpose of a new capacity which was established in an existing industry.

Although the word new as also industry'' are capable of being understood in different ways in different contexts, either in a narrow sense or in a broader sense, the sense in which they are to be understood must be gathered from the context in which they are used and the objects sought to be achieved by the user. The purpose of the notification obviously is to limit the concession only to those who squarely fall within the category of not being new steel industries, who had got sanction of loan prior to the date of notification. The Petitioner cannot be said to fall in that category of not being a new steel industry. Sometimes, the meanings of a term is more effectively ascertained by looking at what is excluded from it. If the Petitioner cannot be regard as not being an old steel industry, it clearly is a new steel industry with respect to it''s newly installed capacity for the manufacture of steel for which it had obtained sanctioned of load after the date of the notification.

The Petitioner''s challenge to the impugned notification and to the order denying concession, therefore, cannot be sustained. The writ petitions are dismissed.