AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
K. Chandru, J.—The petitioners were retired Headmasters and at present their age is 64 and 65 years respectively. In these two Writ
Petitions, the petitioners are seeking for a direction to the respondents to extend the benefit of the GO Ms. No. 210 School Education Department
dated 14.8.2009 insofar as the petitioners are concerned and also award selection grade/special grade of pay in the post of Middle School Head
Master by taking into account the service rendered by them in the post of Secondary Grade Assistant as given to 65 persons in GO Ms. No. 210
School Education Department dated 14.8.2009. The said G.O. came to be issued on special circumstances where 65 Middle School
Headmasters went to the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal and got a direction that their services should be counted even before their promotion
and pay to be fixed. Subsequently, an attempt made by the State Government was negatived by this Court and therefore having passed the final
order, the State Government issued the said G.O. granting relief only to 65 persons who had the benefit of the Court orders.
In the present cases, the petitioners while they were in service, never made any claim in terms of the said G.O. On the other hand, subsequently,
when there were number of Writ Petitions were filed seeking for application of the benefit of G.O.Ms. No. 210, the State Government as an one
time measure issued G.O.Ms. No. 146, School Education Department dated 19.6.2012. By the aforesaid order, the State Government had given
the benefit to another 260 persons who have got similar relief from the Court and also confined the relief to the persons who have retired from
1.6.1988 to 30.9.1994. But, the petitioners admittedly got retired from service on 31.8.2005 and 3.6.1996 respectively. The petitioners have not
chosen to challenge the said G.O., which fixes the cut off date and gives the benefit for the persons who have retired upto 30.9.1994. The
petitioners'' present attempt, long after their retirement, seeking for the relief in terms of G.O.Ms. No. 210, School Education Department dated
14.8.2009 cannot be countenanced by this Court, as it was confined only to the persons who have got the benefit of court order and not the
persons like the petitioners. The petitioners are said to be not beneficiaries in terms of the G.O.Ms. No. 146, School Education Department dated
19.6.2012, which was issued as an one time measure and the benefit was extended to the persons who have retired upto 30.9.1994.
In this context, it is necessary to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Col. (Retd.) B.J. Akkara Vs. The Govt. of India and Others, ,
wherein the Supreme Court had observed as follows:
A particular judgment of the High Court may not be challenged by the State where the financial repercussions are negligible or where the appeal is
barred by limitation. It may also not be challenged due to negligence or oversight of the dealing officers or on account of wrong legal advice, or on
account of the non-comprehension of the seriousness or magnitude of the issue involved. However, when similar matters subsequently crop up and
the magnitude of the financial implications is realised, the State is not prevented or barred from challenging the subsequent decisions or resisting
subsequent writ petitions, even though judgment in a case involving similar issue was allowed to reach finality in the case of others. Of course, the
position would be viewed differently, if petitioners plead and prove that the State had adopted a pick-and-choose method only to exclude
petitioners on account of mala fides or ulterior motives. Be that as it may. On the facts and circumstances, neither the principle of res judicata nor
the principle of estoppel is attracted. The administrative law principles of legitimate expectation or fairness in action are also not attracted.
Therefore, the fact that in some cases the validity of the circular dated 29-10-1999 (corresponding to the Defence Ministry circular dated 11-9-
2001) has been upheld and that decision has attained finality will not come in the way of the State defending or enforcing its circular dated 11-9-
2001.
Further, during the service tenure of the petitioners or immediately thereafter the petitioners never made any grievance. Long after their
retirement, they cannot revive the state or old cause of actions, as held by the Supreme Court in in C. Jacob Vs. Director of Geology and Mining
Indus. Est. and Another, , wherein the Supreme Court had observed in paragraphs 6 to 8 as follows:
Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the termination. But nearly two
decades later, say in the year 2000, he decides to challenge the termination. He is aware that any such challenge would be rejected at the threshold
on the ground of delay (if the application is made before Tribunal) or on the ground of delay and laches (if a writ petition is filed before a High
Court). Therefore, instead of challenging the termination, he gives a representation requesting that he may be taken back to service. Normally,
there will be considerable delay in replying such representations relating to old matters. Taking advantage of this position, the ex-employee files an
application/writ petition before the Tribunal/High Court seeking a direction to the employer to consider and dispose of his representation. The
Tribunals/High Courts routinely allow or dispose of such applications/petitions (many a time even without notice to the other side), without
examining the matter on merits, with a direction to consider and dispose of the representation. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that
every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does
not involve any ''decision'' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to ''consider''. If the
representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason
of the direction to ''consider''. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference
to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made
for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain
such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this
manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored.
Every representation to the government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become state or
barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the
department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the department or to inform the appropriate department.
Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a
fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim.
When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the
matter on merits, being under the impression that failure to do may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the
claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the state claim, nor amount to some
kind of ''acknowledgment of a jural relationship'' to give rise to a fresh cause of action.
In the light of the same, the writ petitions stand dismissed. No costs. The connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.