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Judgment
K. Mohan Ram, J.—The above criminal revision is directed against the order of the learned VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town,
Chennai directing the return of the complaint filed by the petitioner for alleged offences under Sections 120(b) r/w 403 and 403 I.P.C. against the
respondents herein, for being filed before the proper Forum on the ground that the learned VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai
has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint which falls outside the limits of C1 to C5 police station limits.
The petitioner/complainant making various allegations against the respondents herein and alleging that such allegations constitute offences under
Sections 120(b) r/w 403 and 403 I.P.C. filed a complaint against the respondents in M.P. No. 2674 of 2007 before the learned VIII Metropolitan
Magistrate, George Town, Chennai. Before the learned VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai, the learned Counsel appearing for
the petitioner herein had admitted that the Egmore Court alone has got jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, but however basing reliance on the
Hon''ble Apex Court''s decision reported in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal 2000 SCC (Cri) 47 and also the decision of a learned
single Judge of this Court reported in The Catholic Syrian Bank v. A. Suguna Saraswathi 2007 (2) CTC 560 contended that the learned
Magistrate has got jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The learned Magistrate by referring to the distribution of business made by the learned
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate u/s 19(3) of the Cr.P.C. has held that since C1 to C5 police station limits alone fall within the territorial jurisdiction
earmarked for that Court, returned the complaint for being presented before the proper Forum. Being aggrieved by that the petitioner/complainant
is before this Court.
Heard Mr. V. Krishnamoorthy, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner.
The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the following decisions:
(i) Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal 2000 SCC (Cri) 47
(ii) The Catholic Syrian Bank v. A. Suguna Saraswathi 2007 (2) CTC 560
In the decision reported in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal 2000 SCC (Cri) 47 the Hon''ble Apex Court has in paragraphs 14 &
15 has observed as under:
The jurisdictional aspect becomes relevant only when the question of enquiry or trial arises. It is therefore a fallacious thinking that only a
Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case has the power to take cognizance of the offence. If he is a Magistrate of the First Class his power to
take cognizance of the offence is not impaired by territorial restrictions. After taking cognizance he may have to decide as to the court which has
jurisdiction to enquire into or try the offence and that situation would reach only during the post-cognizance stage and not earlier.
Unfortunately, the High Court, without considering any of the aforesaid legal aspects rushed to the erroneous conclusion that the ""Judicial
Magistrate of the First Class, Gandhidham has no power to take cognizance of the offences alleged"" merely because such offences could have
been committed outside the territorial limits of the State of Gujarat. Even otherwise, without being apprised of the fuller conspectus a decision on
the question of jurisdiction should not have been taken by the High Court at a grossly premature stage as this.
In the decision reported in The Catholic Syrian Bank v. A. Suguna Saraswathi 2007 (2) CTC 560 a learned single Judge of this Court has in
paragraphs 3 & 4 has observed as follows:
The impugned order of the learned Magistrate reads thus:
Complainant present. Heard and perused the entire documents. This Court finds that amount involved in the Complaint is Rs. 40 lakhs. Hence this
Court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the complainant for more than 5 lakhs. Hence this Complaint is returned to the complainant for filing
before the pecuniary jurisdiction Court. Hence returned.
No pecuniary jurisdiction is prescribed for the Magistrate Court and hence the impugned order is liable to be set aside. The observation of the
Division Bench in the decision referred to above is relevant and it is extracted below:
Law does not know or provide any other mode of dealing with the Complaint, much less returning the Complaint. It is not possible for a
Magistrate to return the Complaint for the so called defects and if the defects are there in the Complaint, the complainant has to suffer. There is no
warrant in the Criminal Procedure Code or the Criminal Rules of Practice empowering the Magistrate to return the Complaint just because he
thinks that there are any defects. In this behalf, the observation by both the learned Judges that the Magistrate has a power to return the Complaint
because he has a power to accept is clearly incorrect. In the first place, the Magistrate does not have a ""power"" to accept the Complaint. That is
not the power of the Court. That is the ""duty"" on the part of the Court in contradistinction of its ""powers"". Again, unless there is a specific provision
in the Code or the Rules, the Magistrate cannot find out his own procedure by returning the Complaint as it is. In fact, when the complainant
presents the case to the Magistrate that is not the stage of examining the defects and it is not the Magistrate to examine the so called defects in the
Complaint. All that the Magistrate has to do is to consider the same by ordering the examination of complainant and/or as the case may be, his
witnesses.
The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner fairly submitted that the cause of action for filing the complaint has not arisen within the
jurisdiction of the learned VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai and the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Egmore Court but yet the complaint was filed before the learned VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai, as in this Court,
sworn statements are being recorded speedily on the presentation of the complaints. Whereas in the Egmore Court it takes longer time even for
recording sworn statements and hence the complaint was filed before the learned VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai. The
learned Counsel further submitted that any Judicial Magistrate of the First Class has power to take cognizance of any offence which falls within his
jurisdiction or not and as per the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in A. Vinayagam and 3 others Vs. Dr. Subash Chandran and
another, the learned Magistrate cannot return the complaint.
The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner further submitted that the learned Magistrate ought to have taken the complaint on file and
thereafter transferred it to the jurisdictional Court. The allocation of business by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and limiting the
jurisdiction of the learned VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai to C1 to C5 police station limits cannot be a ground for returning
the complaint in the light of the decision of the Hon''ble Apex referred to above.
I have carefully considered the above said submission made by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and the decisions relied upon by
him.
It is no doubt true that in the decision reported in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal 2000 SCC (Cri) 47 the Hon''ble Apex Court
has observed that the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class has power to take cognizance of the offence and such power is not impaired by
territorial restrictions and the Hon''ble Apex Court has further observed that after taking cognizance, the learned Magistrate has to decide as to the
Court which has jurisdiction to enquire into or try the offence and that situation would reach only during the post-cognizance stage and not earlier.
But in a subsequent decision reported in Y. Abraham Ajith and Others Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another, another coordinate Bench
of the Hon''ble Apex Court while considering a similar question in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 19 has observed as follows:
The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court concerned. In terms of Section 177 of
the Code, it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused.
While in civil cases, normally the expression ""cause of action"" is used, in criminal cases as stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to the
local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different. The
expression ""cause of action"" is, therefore, not a stranger to criminal cases.
It is settled law that cause of action consists of a bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In
other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right to claim relief against the
opponent. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise.
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When the aforesaid legal principles are applied, to the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint petition, the inevitable
conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Chennai and, therefore, the Magistrate concerned had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter.
The proceedings are quashed. The complaint be returned to Respondent 2 who, if she so chooses, may file the same in the appropriate court to be
dealt with in accordance with law. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
If the law laid down by the Hon''ble Apex Court in Y. Abraham Ajith and Others Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another, is applied to
the facts of this case, as admittedly no part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned VIII Metropolitan
Magistrate, George Town, Chennai the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The decision reported in Trisuns Chemical
Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal 2000 SCC (Cri) 47 has not been brought to the notice of the Hon''ble Bench which has rendered the decision
reported in Y. Abraham Ajith and Others Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another, . But it is settled law that if there is a conflict between the
decisions rendered by two coordinate Benches on the same issue, the later decision has to be followed and as such this Court is bound to follow
the later decision namely Y. Abraham Ajith and Others Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another, . Therefore, this Court is unable to accept
the contentions put forth by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner.
A reading of the decision reported in The Catholic Syrian Bank v. A. Suguna Saraswathi 2007 (2) CTC 560 shows that the facts of that case
are totally different from the facts of this case. In that case the complaint was returned to the complainant on the ground that the amount involved in
the complaint was Rs. 40 lakhs and the learned Magistrate was of the view that he had no pecuniary jurisdiction to deal with the case. When that
order was challenged, the learned single Judge of this Court by observing that no pecuniary jurisdiction is prescribed for the Magistrate Court set
aside the impugned order. In the Division Bench decision reported in A. Vinayagam and 3 others Vs. Dr. Subash Chandran and another, the
complaint was returned for rectification of certain defects and while considering the validity of the order returning the complaint for rectification of
the defects, the Division Bench made the observations which are extracted in paragraph 4 of the decision reported in The Catholic Syrian Bank v.
A. Suguna Saraswathi 2007 (2) CTC 560. In that case the Division Bench was not dealing with a similar issue as has been decided by this Court.
Hence that decision is not applicable to the facts of this case.
Further it is pertinent to point out that several instances have come to the notice of this Court that complaints are being filed wantonly and
wilfully before the Courts having no territorial jurisdiction for some reason or the other. Such practice amounts to Forum Shopping, which in the
considered view of this Court cannot be allowed by this Court. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner was fair enough to submit that
since sworn statements of the complainants are being recorded at the earliest by the learned VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town,
Chennai, the petitioner/complainant herein has chosen that Court for filing the complaint in question to avoid delay. Simply because the Court
having territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint is not recording sworn statement of the complainant at the earliest but the sworn statement is
being recorded after some delay that cannot be a justification for filing the complaint before the Court which has no territorial jurisdiction.
Section 19(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:
Subordination of Metropolitan Magistrate:
(1). ...
(2). ...
(3) The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate may, from time to time, make rules or give special orders, consistent with this Code, as to the distribution of
business among the Metropolitan Magistrates and as to the allocation of business to an Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.
As observed by the learned Magistrate in his order, by exercising the power u/s 19(3) of the Cr.P.C. the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
has issued special orders regarding the distribution of business among the Metropolitan Magistrates and under such special order the territorial
limits of C1 to C5 police stations have been allotted to the learned VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai. This special order
issued by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate cannot be considered to be inconsistent with the Code of Criminal Procedure, when the same
is considered in the light of the decision of the Hon''ble Apex Court reported in Y. Abraham Ajith and Others Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai
and Another, .
The decision reported in Y. Abraham Ajith and Others Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another, squarely applies to the facts of this case
and as such the order sought to be revised being perfectly valid and legal cannot be interfered with and in such view of the matter, the above
criminal revision case fails and the same is dismissed.