K. Narayana Rao and Others vs The Vysya Bank Limited

P. Ramakrishnam Raju, J.—Different tenants are the petitioners in all the five revision petitions while the respondent-bank is their landlord. The respondent is the owner of the premises bearing M.Nos. 3-3-795,796,797,798,788,789 and 770 situated at General Bazar, Secunderabad. The respondent is having its banking business in the I floor of the premises while petitioner-tenants are carrying on business in the mulgies and godowns as tenants in the ground floor. As the respondent-bank bona fide requires the ground floor also, for extension of business, it filed R.Cs. 375 to 379 of 1983 for eviction of the petitioner-tenants. As the learned Rent Controller dismissed those applications, the respondent-bank filed the appeals in R.A.Nos. 288 to 292 of 1989 which were allowed. Hence these revisions by the tenants. Although the Rent Controller disposed of the rent control cases by separate orders the appeals were disposed of by the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court by a common order since the building from which eviction is sought is one and the same and as common questions arise for consideration in all the appeals. Hence it would be convenient to dispose of these revision petitions by a common order.

The case of the respondent-bank is that it is the owner of a double storeyed building bearing the aforesaid municipal numbers; the said building was constructed prior to 1957 and therefore, the provisions of the A.P. Building (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1960 (for short ''the Act'') apply to the premises; the petitioners are tenants of specific and separate mulgies and godowns in the ground floor of the premises; the respondent is carrying on banking business under the name and style of Vysya Bank Limited in the I Floor; as it was insufficient for its business and inconvenient for its customers, the respondent-bank proposes to have banking business in the ground floor also in order to cater to the banking needs of its customers; it would also facilitate easy access to the sick, old aged and disabled customers, who find it difficult to climb the stairs; the bank also proposes to have several safe deposit lockers and deposit counters in the ground floor; lift in the building is not working properly and therefore, the respondent-bank by written notices requested the petitioner- tenants to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the suit premises in their respective possession for the use and occupation of the bank. As the tenants did not co-operate, the bank was constrained to file eviction petitions.

Petitioners besides denying those allegations stated that petitions for eviction were filed as petitioners could not meet the demand of enhancement of rent made by the respondent-bank and therefore, petitions are filed with a mala fide intention to harass the tenants.

The respondent-bank examined the branch manager, Vysya Bank, General Bazar Branch, Secunderabad in addition to marking notices that passed between the parties and the postal acknowledgements while the petitioners tenants examined some of the tenants including partner of one of the firms in support of their respective contentions. No documents were marked on their side. The learned Rent Controller dismissed the petitions holding that the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide since none of the customers was examined to establish the grievances or hardship experienced by them in climbing the steps, the lift was neglected without repairs, II floor of the building is vacant and is available for the bank for extension of its business and therefore, the requirement of the bank is anything but bona fide. In view of these circumstances, the comparative hardship is more to the tenants than the landlord. On appeal the learned Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court reversed the said finding and found that the requirement of the respondent-bank is bona fide. He found that there is no truth in the assertion of the tenants that these petitions are filed only to coerce the tenants to enhance the rents as there was no evidence at all about any attempt on the part of the bank seeking enhancement of rent. He also found that for the purposes of location of safe deposit lockers, the ground floor would be more convenient in view of their heavy weight. He also found that comparative hardship is more on the bank if they are not allowed to occupy the ground floor for their additional accommodation as the business of the bank has increased many fold, and they also intend to open deposit counters as well as safe deposit lockers. Hence the need of the bank is genuine and pressing and he allowed the appeals and ordered eviction of the tenants. Hence these revisions.

The petitioners have filed C.M.Ps. 15635, 15636 and 15637 of 1994 to receive the photograph as additional evidence and mark the same as Ex.P-4. This photograph is filed to show that the I floor is airconditioned with renovation and a strong room was constructed there to keep safe deposit lockers. As this has been done pending this litigation, the subsequent events can be taken note of and therefore, the document may be received as additional evidence. But without the negative the photograph cannot be received in evidence. Still I allow these applications to enable the tenants to rely on subsequent event. Even then the renovation of the I floor or airconditioning the same, or construction of a strong room with safe deposit lockers does not in any way affect the claim of the respondent/defendant.

The claim of the respondent is that it is a nationalised bank and a leading bank under the private sector. There are six branches in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and all the other branches are accommodated in spacious premises.

The evidence of P.W.I, who is the Branch Manager shows that as the business of the bank has increased by several folds, there is need for additional accommodation for conveniently locating the deposit counters as well as the safe deposit lockers. In the petition for eviction filed by the bank, it is clearly stated that the I floor in which the banking business is carried on, is not sufficient as well as inconvenient for the customers. Apart from that, bank proposes to have deposit counters as well as safe deposit lockers in the ground floor. Therefore, the claim of the bank is for additional accommodation as the existing floor is not sufficient apart from being inconvenient to the customers. Therefore, the mere fact that the I floor is renovated or air-conditioned does not in any way satisfy the need for additional accommodation of the bank even if a strong room is constructed and some lockers are placed in the I floor which is not an answer to the claim of the bank for additional accommodation. Besides keeping the lockers, bank proposes to have deposit counters also in the ground floor. Therefore, in any view, the additional ground or the subsequent event mentioned by the petitioners does not help them.

Sri C. Poornaiah, the learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that as the II floor is available with the bank, there is no bona fide requirement for the bank seeking ground floor by evicting the petitioners. It is also his contention that the bank has not pleaded that the II floor has been occupied for the residence of the Manager and for recreation of its members and therefore, the evidence regarding the same cannot be accepted. The respondent/bank came forward with a petition seeking additional accommodation as a bona fide requirement. It is stated that the banking business is carried in the I floor which is insufficient as their business has increased over the years. It is also the contention that the old, aged, sick and disabled customers are finding it difficult to climb the stairs and that they propose to open deposit counters as well as deposit lockers in the ground floor. If the tenants dispute that the requirement is not bona fide, it is for them to plead that the bank is in possession of the II floor also which is vacant and therefore, the requirement of the bank can be met by utilising the said floor. But none of the petitioners has taken the said plea. However, the learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the II floor is vacant and available to the bank even without there being any plea taken by the tenants. In fact R.W.I in R.C. 377 of 1983 admitted that the (Petitioner) Bank got business in the I floor and in the II floor Branch Manager''s residence is there along with staff recreation and dining. P.W.1 has also stated that in the II floor he is residing and some portion is also utilised for recreation and dining by the staff of the bank. Therefore, the contention that the respondent-bank has not taken a plea that the II floor is being utilised for the residence of its Manager or for recreation of its members and so the same cannot be accepted has no force. On the contrary, it is the tenants that should have pleaded and proved that accommodation is available in the II floor which is vacant. The tenants have not only not taken this plea but also admitted in evidence that the bank manager is residing in the II floor and a portion of it is being used for recreation and dining of its members. Therefore, it is clear that the II floor is not vacant and so if there is bona fide requirement by the bank, it can make use of II floor instead of asking ground floor, has no basis. Hence the finding of the Rent Controller was rightly set aside by the learned Chief Judge in appeals in this regard. Hence this contention has no force.

The learned Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in D.V.V.G. Satyanarayana v. S.V. Raghavaiah, AIR 1987 SC 407 for the proposition that a plea which was to raised cannot be considered and any evidence in that regard cannot be looked into. For the reasons already stated, this decision has no application to the facts of this case.

The learned Counsel for the petitioners next contended that in view of the definition of the building as contained in Section 2(iii) of the Act each mulgi and godown which is having a separate municipal number is a building by itself and therefore, the landlord who is in possession of a non-residential building cannot seek eviction of the tenants from the other non-residential buildings.

The petition is filed u/s 10 (3) of the Act. Clause (C) of '' Section 10 (3) runs as follows:

"......The landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential or non-residential, may notwithstanding anything in clause (a) apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any part of or the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purpose or for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be".

Interpreting Section 10 (3) of the Act, Chandrasekhara Sastry, J., in Gangaram v. N. Shankar Reddy, 1961 (1) An.W.R. 400 held that the said provision applies to a case where the landlord is occupying a part of the building and still requires the remaining part for the purpose of his own business as additional accommodation. Again Ramachandra Rao, J., (as he then was), a learned single Judge of this Court had on occasion to consider the effect of this provision in G. Papachary v. Country Tobacco Merchants Association, 1974(2) An.W.R. 91 wherein the learned Judge observed as follows:

"Apart from the aforesaid ground, it is also contended that the Association requires the ground floor as additional accommodation and is entitled to seek eviction of the tenant u/s 10 (3) (c) of the Act. This submission is well founded. The learned Subordinate Judge upheld this pea of the Association. The evidence on record discloses that the Association required additional accommodation for providing lodging facilities to its customers and members and also to construct an auditorium, a library a reading room and a hospital to render medical aid to the members of the Association and their staff. It is found that for carrying those objects, the Association would be requiring this additional accommodation. Therefore, the provisions of Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act, are attracted to the facts of the present case and the Association is entitled to seek eviction of the tenants".

Again in the year 1980 Mukthadar, J. also had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act in G. Prabhakar Rao v. L.I. C. of India, 1980 (1)APLJ 280 wherein, the learned Judge observed as follows:-

"....... ........... .......... to my mind Section 10 (3) (c) would apply only when a landlord is occupying a part of the building and wants the other part of the building as additional accommodation".

The Full Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) and Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act Vidyavathi Bai v. Shanker Lal, 1987 (2) ALT 550. The Full Bench clearly observed that these two provisions are independent and not complimentary to one another and held that the two situations are not comparable as in one case a person who is already in occupation of the entire building seeks to recover possession of another non-residential building and in the other case a person in occupation of only a part of a non-residential building seeks to recover another part of the same building to meet his bona fide requirement. The Full Bench held that the language employed in both the provisions is entirely different and therefore, the embargo contained in Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) to recover another non-residential building will not come in the way of a landlord recovering a portion only of a non-residential building although he is in occupation of the other portion. The Supreme Court has referred to the observation of Chandrasekhara Sastry, J., referred to above in Gangaram''s case (2 supra) with approval in Gangaram Vs. N. Shankar Reddy, . The Supreme Court held that Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act has been properly construed by Justice Chandrasekhara Sastry in the said decision. Therefore, I have no hesitation to reject the contention of the petitioners that the landlord cannot seek for eviction of the tenant from a portion of a non-residential building for his bona fide requirement for expansion to his business although he is in possession of the other part of the non-residential building.

Even then, the learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in J. Pandu Vs. R. Narsubai, in support of his contention.

In the abovesaid case the tenant who has taken a mulgie on lease was sought to be evicted on the ground of bona fide requirement of the owner. The Supreme Court observed that the requirement for the son''s business cannot be held to be different from that of the landlady and therefore, a narrow construction cannot be placed on 10 (3) (a) (iii). Ultimately, the Supreme Court confirmed the finding recorded by the Courts below that the landlady has been using the entire house purchased by her including the mulgies for residential purposes and that she is forced to run the family business in a rented premises in the same locality and therefore, the Courts below are justified in holding that the landlady''s requirement of the building is bona fide. This decision does not in any way help the petitioners.

The contention of the petitioners is that since the municipality has allotted separate numbers to each of the portions under the occupation of the petitioners, Section 10 (3) (c) has no application and they must be held as independent buildings within the meaning of Section 2 (iii) of the Act. The building in question consists of two floors apart from ground floor. Therefore, the entire premises is one building only. In view of the decisions already referred to above, construction placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted and therefore, this contention has no force.

The learned Counsel for the petitioners next contended that the petitioners are carrying on business in brass, hardware, paints, bangles etc. since a long time and the locality in which the premises in question is situated in General Bazar which is eminently suited for its business and if they are evicted, they will be put to great hardship and therefore, the hardship caused to the tenants if compared with the hardship caused to the respondent-bank, the petitioners should not be evicted.

Sri Ramakrishnaiah the learned Counsel for the respondent countered this argument saying that u/s 10 (3) (b) the bank is public institution and therefore, the hardship caused to the public institution should outweigh the hardship caused to the individual tenants. He relies upon the decision in G. Prabhakar Rao''s case (4 supra) and according to him in view of Section 10 (3) (b) where the building is required for the purpose of public institution, the hardship caused to the institution would outweigh the hardship caused to the individual tenants. Following the said decision, I am of the opinion that the respondent-bank is a public institution and therefore, the premises is required for the benefit of the public and the hardship that may be caused to the individual tenants should yield to the hardship that may be caused to the public institution for the benefit of the public. Therefore, this contention also fails and is accordingly rejected.

Therefore, for all the above reasons, I am of the view that the requirement of the bank is bona fide. Accordingly I do not find any error in the order of the lower appellate Court.

The revision petitions are devoid of merits and they are accordingly dismissed. No costs. Time for vacating the premises in each case 3 months.