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Judgment
This criminal petition is filed under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code (for short "Cr.P.C.") to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.130 of 2016 on the file of Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate at Huzurabad, Karimnagar District for the offence punishable under Section 500 of Indian Penal Code (for short "I.P.C.") and under Section 5B (1) and (2) of Cinematograph Act, 1952.
Respondent No.1-Yathipathi Arun Kumar, a practicing advocate at Huzurabad Town, Karimnagar District filed a private complaint before the Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Huzurabad against 22 accused for the offence punishable under Section 500 of I.P.C. and under Section 5B (1) and (2) of Cinematograph Act 1952 alleging that on 10.07.2014 when the respondent No.1 switched on his T.V., on the screen in E.T.V. Telugu channel one programme was exhibiting at 09.30 p.m. under the name and style of "Jabardasth Katharnak Comedy Show" Episode No.75 and in one skit of the said episode i.e. in a court scene the accused A.11, A.15 and A.18 acted as lawyers and judge respectively. "The legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation. It is a noble calling and all those who belong to it are its honourable members", but in the said skit of Episode No.75 the actors acted and performed programme insulting and defaming the legal profession and decorum of the Court proceedings. The performance of the actors is not only insulted the legal profession but also lowered the image and dignity of the Court in the eye of the public. On viewing the Episode No.75 of the said programme, the respondent No.1 felt insulted and suffered mental agony. Episode Nos.9 and 72 found on You Tube and E.T.V. Channel also in the same manner defaming the legal profession as in Episode No.75.
The respondent No.1 continued to watch the programme "Jabardasth Katharnak Comedy Show" on every Thursday and Friday and in some skits of Episode Nos.82, 87, 88 and 91 he noticed the same state of action insulting the legal profession and the dignity of the Court. The said show was exhibited on the screen date wise and episode wise since 04.04.2013 to 31.10.2014 and out of seven episodes (skits) which are specifically written in Telugu language appended along with the complaint by mentioning important dialogues, words and conversation among the actors which clearly prove how and in what manner the accused defamed the dignity of judiciary and insulted, decreased the holiness of the judiciary and advocacy in the society and created a wrong opinion in general public regarding legal profession and judiciary.
Petitioner Nos.3 and 4 (accused Nos.19 and 20) were anchors of the skit programme, they also supported the performance of the actors and danced along with the accused persons A.10 to A.18 along with skit team members at the end of skit programme. Accused No.19 petitioner No.3 acted as judge in one Episode other than the above mentioned seven episodes in internet by accused No.1 (Mallamala Entertainments Pvt. Ltd.). Accused Nos.8 and 9 petitioner Nos.1 and 2 acted as judges in all the episodes, being the judges they would have condemn and discourage such kind of programme but they have also appreciated the performance of the actors by applauding them at the end of the programme, knowing fully well that the producers and Directors i.e. A.1 to A.7 and A.21 have picturised the programme defaming and insulting the judiciary and advocacy. The judges of the Episode instead of condemn the acts of accused Nos.10 to 18, appreciated the questionable acts of the actors of the episodes by awarding more than the fixed marks. .
Even though, the accused No.9 Petitioner No.2 was elected as Member of Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh, which is an important statutory organ in our constitution of India, in Episode No.82 (one skit) dated 28.08.2014 (Lawyer''s Saikumar "Chikkan Tikka"), wherein accused No.11 acted as an advocate along with his team members, she along with accused No.8 petitioner No.1 elected accused No.11 as best performer of the episode, it is nothing but to defame the judiciary and the said day is a black day to entire judiciary.
The petitioners with utter disregard to their social responsibility and without caring the moral values, dignity and decency of judiciary and with an intention to earn money, they defamed the legal fraternity and in one way or the other they created bad impression in the minds of the viewers, who are general public and such acts would amount to defamation. Respondent No.1 further alleged that such skits lowered the dignity and esteem of not only the advocate but also the judiciary and prayed to take the complaint on file for the offences referred above and punish the petitioners in accordance with law.
The petitioners herein challenged the proceedings in C.C.No.130 of 2016 on the file of Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate at Huzurabad, Karimnagar District mainly on the following grounds. (a) Petitioners are falsely implicated in the above case by filing a private complaint and they are innocent people. (b) The complaint is silent as to how the dignity of judiciary and advocates was lowered and wrong opinion was created in the minds of general public towards advocates'' profession and judiciary and in the absence of such allegations, the complaint is liable to be quashed. (c) The complaint is bereft of details and consequences or the dialogues in any particular episode purporting to defame the judiciary and advocate profession. In the absence of any such details, the complaint is not maintainable and liable to be quashed. (d) The programme was designed to entertain the public and it is purely fictional and a caution notice to that effect was displayed at the beginning of every episode of the programme and there cannot be defamation of indeterminate class like legal profession, judiciary, police, teachers etc. (e) In the complaint no criminal intention or knowledge is attributed to the petitioners to attract the offences referred in the complaint. (f) Even according to the respondent No.1, the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 are the judges and petitioner Nos.3 and 4 are the anchors, against whom no overt acts are attributed and they merely took part in the programme as per the script given to them and the complainant is not aggrieved party within the meaning of Section 199 of Cr.P.C. and he has no locus standi to fie the complaint, as such the complaint is not maintainable; on this ground, so also on the other ground that the allegations in the complaint even if taken as true, they do not make out any offence and filing of such complaint is an abuse of process of Court, thereby prayed to quash the proceedings.
During arguments, Sri B.Nalinkumar, learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that the respondent No.1 being a member of legal profession is one among the indeterminate group of advocates practicing in various courts in the entire country; when any statement is made against indeterminate group, that would not attract any offence of defamation punishable under Section 500 of I.P.C. "Jabardasth Katharnak Comedy Show" is only for entertaining the viewers at large, but not with any criminal intention, that apart the petition is lacking very details to constitute offence punishable under Section 500 of I.P.C. and filing of such complaint by an advocate, who is a member of Bar Association or a member of indeterminate class is only to create a sensation and treat it as high profile case in view of participation of petitioner No.2 and thereby such complaint cannot be continued before the Magistrate, as it is an abuse of process of the Court.
Learned counsel for the petitioners also filed written brief reiterating the contentions urged in the petition and drawn the attention of this Court to various judgments of Apex Court to substantiate his contentions.
The first and foremost contention raised in the written brief is that the complaint lodged by a member of indeterminate class cannot be maintained and placed reliance on a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in "S.Khushboo v. Kanniammal, 2010 5 SCC 60 0" and in "G.Narasimhan v. T.V.Chokkappa, 1972 2 SCC 68 0". Learned counsel for the petitioners further drawn the attention of this Court to an unreported judgment in "Asha Parekh v. The State of Bihar, 1977 CrLJ 21 (Pat)", which relates to a complaint filed against actress Asha Parekh by advocates for the defamation, which will be dealt with in details at appropriate stage. He also relied on an unreported judgment in "Shah Rukh Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2008 1 RajLW 809 Raj " and "Vishwa Nath v. Shambhu Nath Pandey, ", "K.M.Mathew v. T.V.Balan, 1985 CrLJ 1039" and "Sasikumar B.Menon v. Vijayan, 1998 2 ALT(Cri) 458 (Ker.) " in support of his contentions and prayed to quash the proceedings.
Respondent No.1 argued in support of his complaint and mainly highlighted the legal and moral values and ethical values of advocates and judiciary and contended that such skits or episodes would defame the legal profession at large in the general public view. On account of such skits, the public will loose confidence on the judiciary, which would degrade or denounce the dignity of legal profession, also the judiciary and creating such impression, certainly, amounts to defamation as defined under Section 499 of I.P.C., punishable under Section 500 of I.P.C.
Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 contended that the respondent No.1 being the member of noble legal profession is competent to file complaint against the petitioners, who defamed the entire body of legal fraternity in the country and also the judiciary and thereby his locus standi to file the compliant cannot be questioned.
Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 contended that the word of caution at the beginning of every episode would not have any impact on the minds of viewers, but still it amounts to defamation and drawn the attention of this Court to an unreported judgment in "Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2016 AIR(SC) 3302 ", wherein the Apex Court highlighted the esteem of legal profession and similarly in "Daroga Singh v. B.K.Pandey, 2004 CrLJ 2084" and also in "M.C.Ratheesh v. The Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, 2015 AIR(Ker) 86 " High Court of Kerala at Eenakulam considered the phrase "aggrieved person" and concluded that "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic and to an extent an elusive concept and it cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition and based on the above definition, he contended that the respondent No.1 is aggrieved person. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 drawn the attention of this Court to a judgment of Delhi High Court rendered in "Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Delhi Development Authority, 1982 CrLJ 2230 " "Prem Pal Singh v. Phool Singh, 1980 WLN(Raj) 483" and unreported judgment of Delhi High Court in "Utv software Communications Pvt. Ltd v. Union of India, 2012 132 DRJ 143", wherein the Court discussed about the disclaimer/statutory warning put on screen for 15 seconds in the beginning of the film etc. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 drawn the attention of this Court to the judgments in "Sony Pictures Releasing of India v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 2006 4 CTC 193", and unreported judgment of Apex Court in "Sanjoy Narayan Editor in Chief Hindustan v. High Court of Allahabad, 2011 3 AllCriR 3528 (SC) " "K.M.Mathew v. K.A.Abraham, 2002 AIR(SC) 2989" "Gambhirsinh R.Dekare v. Falgunbhai Chimanbhai Patel, 2013 AIR(SC) 1590" "Jeffrey J.Diermeier v. State of West Bengal, 2010 2 AllCriR 1831 (SC)" "Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, Ministry of Lawand Ors, 2016 AIR(SC) 2728 "
Based on the principles laid down in the above judgments, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 contended that the respondent No.1 being a member of advocates group and he being the officer of the Court, he is entitled to file a complaint and thereby his locus standi cannot be questioned by the petitioners and prayed to dismiss the petition.
Considering rival contentions and perusing the material available on record, the points that arise for consideration are: (1) Whether the respondent No.1 is competent to file a complaint against the petitioners for the offence punishable under Section 500 of I.P.C?
(2) Whether absence of details of defamatory statement in the complaint vitiates the entire proceedings in C.C.No.130 of 2016 on the file of Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate at Huzurabad, Karimnagar District?
(3) Whether the funny episode to attract the viewers of the T.V. and dialogues therein would lower the prestige and esteem of indeterminate group of advocates and judiciary, if so, the complainant be allowed to proceed against the petitioners?
Before deciding the points formulated for consideration, it is apposite to advert to the definition of defamation.
Section 499 of I.P.C. defines offence of defamation and it is as follows: "499. Defamation:- Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person. Explanation 1:- It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person, if the imputation would harm the reputation of that person if living, and is intended to be hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives. Explanation 2:- It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such. Explanation 3:- An imputation in the form of an alternative or expressed ironically, may amount to defamation. Explanation 4:- No imputation is said to harm a person''s reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful."
Halsburys Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. 28, defines ''defamatory statement'' as under: "A defamatory statement is a statement which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right thinking members of the society generally or to cause him to be shunned or avoided or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to convey an imputation on him disparaging or injurious to him in his office, profession, calling trade or business."
While speaking about reputation, William Hazlitt observed that "a man''s reputation is not in his own keeping, but lies at the mercy of the profligacy of others. Calumny requires no proof. The throwing out of malicious imputations against any character leaves a stain, which no after-refutation can wipe out. To create an unfavourable impression, it is not necessary that certain things should be true, but that they have been said. The imagination is of so delicate a texture that even words wound it."
Reputation which is not only the salt of life, but also the purest treasure and the most precious perfume of life. It is a revenue generator for the present as well as for the posterity. (vide "Vishwanath Agrawal v. Saral Vishwanath Agrawal, 2012 7 SCC 288 at para 55")
In "Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, 1996 2 SCC 648" the Apex Court observed that the right to reputation is a natural right and considered various covenants such as Universal declaration on Human Rights, International covenant on Civil and Political Rights, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, etc and thereafter considered Perception of the Courts in various countries and observed as follows: "While deliberating on possible balance between the right to reputation and freedom of expression, in "Campbell v. MGN Ltd., 2004 UKHL 22" , it has been stated that Both reflect important civilized values, but, as often happens, neither can be given effect in full measure without restricting the other, How are they to be reconciled in a particular case" There is in my view no question of automatic priority. Nor is there a presumption in favour of one rather than the other. The question is rather the extent to which it is necessary to qualify the one right in order to protect the underlying value which is protected by the other. And the extent of the qualification must be proportionate to the need." Thus, causing any damage to the reputation of an individual, which caused injury to his reputation lowering him in the society would amount to defamation. The essential nature of a defamatory statement is that it is one that causes an adverse effect on a person''s reputation i.e., how it is viewed by others. A statement made should have a tendency to lower or adversely affect a person''s reputation or if it exposes a person to "hatred or ridicule'', or causes him to be ''shunned or avoided'', or injures his reputation in the conduct of his trade or business or professional activity. To be defamatory, a statement need only have the tendency to affect a person''s reputation; it need not actually lower it. However, the standard to be applied is whether his reputation is affected in the estimation of right-thinking members of the society generally as held in "B.Kalyani v. District Collector, Villupuram, 2012 2 MadLJ 881 "
The word "defamation", general term for words spoken (slander) or written (libel) to the prejudice of a person''s character, in such way as to support an action by such person against the speaker or writer.
Thus, any statement published if affects reputation of any person, it would amount to defamation.
Defamation may contain either slander or libel.
In common law the origins of defamation lie in the torts of "slander" (harmful statement in a transient form, especially speech), each of which gives a common law right of action. Defamation is the general terms used internationally, libel is in written form. Libel and slander both require publication. The fundamental distinction between libel and slander lies solely in the form in which the defamatory matter is published. If the offending material is published in some fleeting form, as by spoken words of sounds, sign language, gestures or the like, then it is slander.
Thus, criminal defamation may contain either "libel" or "slander". But in the present case, the allegation made against the petitioners is a slander i.e. harmful statement in a transient form especially speech and also by gestures while performing the skit in "Jabardasth Katharnak Comedy Show" in Episode No.75 and also in Episode Nos.9 and 72 in E.TV., which is allegedly a funny show to entertain the viewers. Now, in view of the definition and requirements of defamation, I will have to examine the points in details. P O I N T No.1:
Respondent No.1 is a practicing advocate at Huzurabad Town and a member of Bar Council of United State of Andhra Pradesh. According to him the skit in Episode No.75 of "Jabardasth Katharnak Comedy Show" reduced or lowered the esteem of the advocates and on viewing the episodes he became panic and suffered mental agony being a member of group of advocates as a class. The dialogues and gestures in the said skit or episode totally maligned the reputation of advocates as a group and also the judges conveying wrong message to the viewers of those episodes and creating wrong impression in the minds of the public at large that the proceedings in the Courts are going on in the manner in which they exhibited in the episode No.75. Though it is a funny show, which would create a wrong impression in the minds of general public i.e. viewers about Court proceedings, more particularly about the acts of advocates and Judges and such statement either spoken or by gestures would amount to criminal defamation as it is slander.
The first and foremost contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the respondent No.1 is not a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of Section 199 of Cr.P.C.
Section 199 of Cr.P.C. is a special provision dealing with prosecution for defamation. Sub-Section (1) of Section 199 of Cr.P.C. created a bar to take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XXI of the I.P.C. except upon a complaint made by some "person aggrieved" by the offence. ''Aggrieved by the offence'' assumes importance in view of specific contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners as he challenged the competency of the petitioner to file the present complaint.
The words "person aggrieved" in sub-section (1) of Section 199 of Cr.P.C. have a wider connotation than the words "person defamed", which is made clear by the use of the word "some" before the words "person aggrieved". If on the allegations made the reputation of the entire family is at stake, his close relations who are directly or indirectly affected thereby, will be covered by the expression "aggrieved person". Persons who are affected by the defamation are also aggrieved persons and hence can file complaint. A member of a certain community whose feelings have been injured by a defamatory statement against the spiritual head of that community is not an aggrieved person within the meaning of Section 199 and he cannot file complaint in view of the law declared in "M.J.Akhar v. Nurul Alam, 1965 AIR(SC) 1451" and in "Narottamdas v. Subanali, 1985 2 GLR 1278"
But the ''person aggrieved by defamation'' is not defined any where in Indian Penal Code.
In "John Thomas v. K.Jagadeesamy, 2001 AIR(SC) 2651 " the words "by some persons aggrieved" are considered and held that the collection of the words "by some persons aggrieved" in Section 199 of Cr.P.C. definitely indicates that the complainant not necessarily be the defamed person himself. Thus, a Director of the company comes within the aforesaid words in case of imputations against company.
Therefore, the person aggrieved includes a person, who is affected by such imputation, which is defamatory in nature.
When similar question came up before the Apex Court in "S.Khushboo v. Kanniammal" in the above judgment S.Khushboo made a specific comment that women are indulged in pre-marital sex, but some of the associations filed several complaints against Smt.Khushboo and she filed applications before High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., but those petitions were dismissed on various grounds. Then the matter carried to Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court considered the purport of Section 199 (1) of Cr.P.c. and concluded that Section 199 Cr.PC mandates that the Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence only upon receiving a complaint by a person who is aggrieved. This limitation on the power to take cognizance of defamation serves the rational purpose of discouraging filing of frivolous complaints which would otherwise clog the Magistrate''s Courts. There is of course some room for complaints to be brought by persons other than those who are aggrieved, for instance when the aggrieved person has passed away or is otherwise unable to initiate legal proceedings. However, in given facts of the present case, the High Court unable to see how the complainants can be properly described as ''persons aggrieved'' within the meaning of Section 199 (1) (b) Cr.PC. As explained earlier, there was no specific legal injury caused to any of the complainants since the appellant''s remarks were not directed at any individual or a readily identifiable group of people.
The respondent No.1 being the member of Bar Association and Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh has neither suffered any damage to his reputation as an individual nor suffered any loss on account of such imputation made against the advocates. In the absence of such allegation that on account of such slanderous statement i.e. hatred statement by words or by gestures in the (skits) in Episode No.75 or in other episodes degraded the reputation of advocates at large and the judges, lowering their prestige either in the profession of the advocates or in discharge of duties of the judges, it is difficult to accept the contention of the respondent No.1.
In "Sasikumar B.Menon v. S.Vijayan" the Kerala High Court considered the scope of defamation against the community, i.e. group defamation its maintainability and held that there cannot be defamation against the community as such and the community as such may not have a reputation, but the reputation will only be of individual members of the community. Identity of the collection of the people will have to be established in relation to the defamatory imputations. Where persons in the association or collection as such are ascertainable and the imputations are shown to be against all the persons in the association or collection as such, any one of the members could make a complaint.
The law laid down by various Courts in different countries on the group defamation is varying from country to country. Group libel or slander has been on many occasions shown to be found by United States courts to be a crime which was punishable under common law. There were two notable early cases in United States law which found group libel to be a criminal offence. The first case was "State v. Brady,1890 24 Pac 948 , where the Court held that the law is elementary that libel need not be on a particular person, but may be upon a family, or a class of persons, if the tendency of the publication is to stir up riot and disorder, and incite to a breach of the peace.
In "Jones v. State of Texas, 38 Tex.Cr.R.364 " which took place a few years after Brady''s case and took a similar view on group libel as that of Brady''s case .
But the law laid down in India on the group libel is entirely different from the law laid down on libel or slander in United States. The law, which I discussed in the earlier paragraphs is sufficient to distinguish the group libel or slander in United States and India.
Learned Counsel for the respondent No.1 in his written arguments drawn the attention of this Court to definition of "Collection of persons" referred in Explanation 2 to Section 499 of I.P.C. that collection of persons must be identifiable in the sense that one could, with certainty, the legal profession/judiciary group of particular people has been defamed, as distinguished from the rest of the community. But in the facts of the case, it is held that the defamation of legal profession, as a matter of fact, the respondent No.1 was certainly a member of such identifiable group or collection of persons and there was nothing indefinite about it, but the advocates as class are not a member of identifiable group as the advocates are spread though out the country and cannot be identified. Thus, the respondent No.1 laid emphasis on the concept of identifiability and definitiveness as regards collection of persons and placed reliance on a judgment of "M.C.Ratheesh v. The Secretary, Regional Transport Authority" High Court of Kerala at Eenakulam" held as follows: " In the said context the Apex Court had occasion to consider the meaning of the phrase "aggrieved person". The Apex Court has laid down in paragraph 13 of the judgment that expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic and to an extent, an elusive concept, which cannot be confined within the bounds of a W.A.Nos.385, 576 and 412/111 rigid, exact and comprehensive definition."
In paragraph No.13 of the said judgment, the expression used in explanation 2 of Section 499 of I.P.C. is as follows: "The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and to an extent an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in a broad tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner''s interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. English Courts have sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a wide construction on the expression "aggrieved person". However, some general tests have been devised to ascertain whether an applicant is eligible for this category so as to have the necessary locus standi or "standing" to invoke certiorari jurisdiction."
Simple meaning of the words "person aggrieved" in the context of this section, therefore, should be a person having suffered loss or injury, a victim of the crime. This will also include a person or an authority who is by or under any law charged with the duty to administer it and to prosecute those who violate its provisions; as a matter of fact, in a criminal case, any person can set the law into motion and in case of a non-conforming user, besides the Delhi Development Authority, neighbour or even a local resident will be a ''person aggrieved, it is a sort of public interest litigation (Vide "Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Delhi Development Authority"
In "Prem Pal Singh v. Phool Singh" the Court adverting to Section 199 Cr.P.C. held that when the expression "aggrieved person" came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in "Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed, 1976 AIR(SC) 578 " in order to determine as to who has locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Justice Sarkaria speaking for the Court held that the meaning of the words ''aggrieved person may vary according to the Statute. Sometimes the words are given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal right. A more, liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with the property rights but deal with the professional conduct and morality. In "M.C.Ratheesh v. The Secretary, Regional Transport Authority" and "Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed" the Courts discussed about the locus of a person in certiorari jurisdiction not in specific offence like defamation which is controlled by specific provision in the Code, the interpretation given to the word "person aggrieved" cannot be applied.
In "G.Narasimhan v. T.V.Chokkappa" the language of the Explanation is wide, and therefore, besides a company or an association, any collection of persons would be covered by it. But such a collection of persons must be an identifiable body so that it is possible to say with definiteness that a group of particular persons, as distinguished from the rest of the community, was defamed Therefore, in a case where Explanation (2) is resorted to, the identity of the company or the association or the collection of persons must be established so as to be relatable to the defamatory words or imputations. Where a writing in weighs against mankind in general, or against a particular order of men, e.g., men of gown, it is no libel. It must descend to particulars and individuals to make it a libel. In England also criminal proceedings would lie in the case of libel against a class provided such a class is not indefinite, e.g., men of science, but a definite one, such as, the clergy of the diocese of Durham, the justices of the peace for the county of Middlesex. If a well-defined class is defamed, every particular member of that class can file a complaint even if the defamatory imputation in question does not mention him by name. Test would be whether the words would reasonably lead people acquainted with him to the conclusion that he was the person referred to. The question whether they did so in fact would not arise if they could not in law be regarded as capable of referring to him and that was not so as the imputations were in regard respect of the party which was in Paris and America.
This being position in law, the person, who is a member of identifiable group or class can be aggrieved, as the imputations in question were made against an indefinite or unidentifiable body of advocates. In such a case, the petitioner being a member of the unidentifiable group or class of advocates is incompetent to file complaint. (vide G.Narasimhan v. T.V.Chokkappa as defamatory statement is not against specific group of advocates.
As a general rule, a complaint can be filed by anybody, whether he is an aggrieved person or not. Section 199 Cr. P.C. engrafts an exception to that general rule. In relation to offences covered by Sections 499 to 502 occurring in Chapter XXI, I.P.C. only an aggrieved person can move the Magistrate. The section is mandatory. If a complaint is filed by one who is not an aggrieved person, the trial and conviction would be void. Section 499, read along with Explanation 2, a defamatory imputation against a collection of persons would fall within the definition of defamation. The language of the ''Explanation'' is no doubt wide. Nevertheless, the collection of the persons must be an identifiable body so that it is possible to say with definiteness that the particular group of persons, as distinguished from the rest of the community, was defamed. The identity of the collection of persons must be established as relatable to the defamatory words or imputations. When an identifiable body was defamed, any one of the member of body of person has locus to institute proceedings under Section 500 of I.P.C. (vide K.M.Mathew v. T.V.Balan)
In "Sahib Singh Mehra v. State of U.P., 1965 AIR(SC) 1451 " an identical question came up for consideration wherein the prosecuting officers of Aligarh of Uttar Pradesh were defamed by a statement, and the Apex Court while deciding locus of the persons, who filed the complaint, held that "the question to determine is whether it is essential for the purpose of an offence under section 500 I.P.C. that the person defamed must be an individual and that the prosecuting staff at Aligarh or of the State of Uttar Pradesh could not be said to be a ''person'' which could be defamed. Section 499 I.P.C. defines ''defamation'' and provides inter alia that whoever makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputations will harm, them reputation of such person, is said, except in cases covered by the exceptions to the Section, to defame that person. Explanation 2 provides that it may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such. It is clear therefore that there could be defamation of an individual person and also of a collection of persons as such. The contention of the appellant then reduces itself to the question whether the prosecuting staff at Aligarh can be considered to be such a collection of persons as is contemplated by Explanation 2. The language of Explanation 2 is general and any collection of persons would be covered by it. Of course, that collection of persons must be identifiable in the sense that one could, with certainty, say that this group of particular people has been defamed, as distinguished from the rest of the community. The prosecuting staff of Aligarh or, as a matter of fact, the prosecuting staff in the State of Uttar Pradesh, is certainly such an identifiable group or collection of persons. There is nothing indefinite about it. This group consists of all members of the prosecuting staff in the service of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. Within this general group of Public Prosecutors of U.P. there is again an identifiable group of prosecuting staff, consisting of Public Prosecutors and Assistant Public Prosecutors, at Aligarh. This group of persons would be covered by Explanation 2 and could therefore be the subject of defamation."
A similar question came up for consideration before Patna High Court in "Asha Parekh v. The State of Bihar" where Patna High Court dealt with a case where a group of lawyers had filed a defamation case against the actors, the actress, the director, the producer, the script. writer, etc., of the movie "Nadan." The case before this Court is, in fact, is identical in its content. In that case, the complainant alleged that one of the characters had played the role of an advocate and that there were defamatory statements made against the lawyers as a class. The Patna High Court while deciding the case, observed that the essence of the offence of defamation consists in calling that description of pain which is felt by a person who knows himself to be the object of the unfavourable sentiments of his fellow creatures and those inconveniences to which a person who is the object of such unfavourable sentiment is exposed. The words or visible representation, therefore, complaint must contain an imputation concerning some particular person or persons whose identity can be established. If they contain no reflection upon a particular individual or individuals, but equally apply to others although belonging to the same class, an action for defamation will not lie. Further, although the word ''person'' in Section 499 of the Code includes a company or an association or a collection of persons as well as provided in explanation 2 of Section 499, but the class of person attributed to must be a small determinate body. Advocates as a class are incapable of being defamed. If any publication can be shown to refer specifically to particular individuals then alone an action for defamation may lie, not otherwise.
Relying on "Asha Parekh v. The State of Bihar" the Rajasthan High Court in "Shah Rukh Khan v. State of Rajasthan" actor Shah Rukh Khan played the role of an advocate in the movie and some of the dialogues were defamatory against the community of lawyers practicing in India. It was claimed by the advocates community that because of the said dialogue, the respondents were subjected to ridicule and anger from those who were sitting in the movie theatre. The advocates also alleged that their neighbours also ridiculed them as well. Therefore, filed complaint against Mr. Shah Rukh Khan and others for defaming the lawyers community practicing in India. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, Rajasthan High Court held that the law requires that the defamatory statement, in order to be actionable, be made against a definite and an identifiable group. However, lawyers taken as a class cannot be identified with any particular individual-indeterminate, indefinite, and unidentifiable as the members are: Firstly, the members of this class are too varied to be reduced to a few traits. There is not a homogenous class, but a heterogeneous one, madeup of wonderfully different individuals. Secondly, they are spread over the length and the breadth of the land. Thirdly, the class is always in flux, ever changing, as new lawyers enter and old ones depart the profession. The entire members of the class are clearly unidentifiable and indeterminable. Moreover, it is not the case of the respondent No. 2 to 7, that the Petitioner said anything specific about the lawyers of Kota, who arguably would form a definite collection of persons. The remark made by the petitioner was applicable to the lawyers as a community. Thus, a group of lawyers could not file a complaint against the petitioner for offence Under Section s 499 and 500 IPC. Therefore, the complaint is not even maintainable.
The Rajasthan High Court distinguished the facts of the case "Shah Rukh Khan v. State of Rajasthan" and "Sahib Singh Mehra v. State of U.P" . The learned Counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 to 7 in the said case has relied on the case of Sahib Singh Mehra in order to argue that a group of lawyers can, indeed, file a complaint for the offence of defamation. But the said case is clearly distinguishable from Shah Rukh Khan case on the basis of factual matrix. In the case of Sahib Singh Mehra, the publisher had published an article defaming the Public Prosecutors and Assistant Public Prosecutors working in Aligarh. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the Public Prosecutors of Aligarh formed a definite and identifiable group of persons. Hence, any one of them can file a complaint against the publisher of the defamatory article. However, in the present case the alleged statement has not been made specifically against the lawyers working in Kota. The Rajasthan High Court came to a conclusion that since the statement has been made against the lawyers as a class, the case of Sahib Singh Mehra cannot be relied upon. But here, in the present case, the defamation of advocates as a whole is not an identifiable group, since the advocates are spread over the world. If such defamatory imputation is against advocates practicing at Huzurabad town or at lest in Karimnagar District, the petitioner being one among them can be an "aggrieved person."
Thus, action for group defamation of an unidentifiable group would not lie in a Criminal Court.
According to Explanation No. (2) of Section 499 IPC, defamation is not restricted to an individual alone; it may also be committed against "a company or an association or collection of persons". However, the association or collection of persons should be definite and identifiable. In 1858, in the case of Eastwood v. Hollmes, 1860 1 F&F 347 Willie J. observed that "If a man wrote that all lawyers were thieves, no particular lawyer could sue him unless there is something to point to the particular individual." Lord Atkins also expressed similar views in Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper, 1944 AC 116.
The law in respect to the defamation of a class of persons, as enunciated by "Salmond" is that in every case where the plaintiff is not named the test whether the words used refer to him is the question whether the words are such as would reasonably lead persons acquainted with the plaintiff to believe that he was the person referred to. If the words can be regarded as capable of referring to the plaintiff, the jury will have to decide the question, of lact--Do they lead reasonable people, who know him, to the conclusion that they do refer to him. The reason why a libel published of a large or indeterminate number of persons described by some general name generally falls to be actionable is the difficulty of establishing that the plaintiff was, in fact, included in the defamatory statements, for the habit of making unfounded generalizations is ingrained in ill educated or vulgar minds, or the words are occasionally intended to be facetious exaggeration. Thus no action would lie at the suit of anyone for saying that all mankind is vicious and depraved or even for alleging that all clergymen are hypocrites or all lawyers dishonest. For charges so general in their nature are merely vulgar generalization. (Salmond & Heuston On the Law of Torts, Twentieth Edition, 150).
In view of the law referred above, the defamatory statement must be against the identifiable group or class. But here, the skits or episodes referred above described the role of Advocates and Judges as a whole in a unholy manner and described the Court room as a cricket ground. Telecasting such show for public viewing certainly denounces the prestige and esteem of the Advocates and Judges as a whole. Therefore, it is a group defamation, but not an identifiable group. In view of the law declared by the Apex Court in "G. Narasimhan and ors. V. T.V. Chokkappa" and persuaded by the judgments of Patna and Rajasthan High Courts in "Asha Parekh v. The State of Bihar" and "Shah Rukh Khan v. State of Rajasthan" respectively, no action for defamation would lie.
In view of my foregoing discussion, the petitioners being members of unidentifiable group of advocates who did not suffer any injury on account of such slanderous statement are incompetent to institute criminal proceedings against the respondents and thereby the proceedings are liable to be quashed. Accordingly, the point is held in favour of the petitioners and against the first respondent. P O I N T No.2:
Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the complaint is bereft of details of imputations, thereby the complaint is not maintainable and liable to be quashed.
At this stage, it is relevant to advert to the allegations made in the complaint, more particularly, the defamatory statement allegedly made against the respondent No.1.
In the complaint, no specific defamatory allegations are extracted so as to enable the accused to know the specific imputations allegedly made by them in the form of slander, but filed C.D. of Episode Nos.09, 72, 75, 82, 87, 88 and 91 and skit wise programme in the said episodes.
In paragraph No.3 of the complaint, it is specifically stated that the episodes Nos.09, 72, 75, 82, 87, 88 and 91 of "Jabardasth Katharnak Comedy Show" which were exhibited on screen date wise since 04.04.2013 to 31.10.2014 are specifically written in Telugu by mentioning the important dialogues, words and conversation among the actors, which prima facie establish as to how and in what manner the accused defamed the dignity of judiciary and insulting, decreasing the holiness of the judiciary and advocacy in the society, but the said dialogues are not extracted in the complaint. However, a C.D. was annexed to the complaint so as to enable the accused to know the details of defamatory statements. But the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in the absence of any details in the complaint, the same cannot be maintained and drawn the attention of this Court to a judgment of Kerala High Court rendered in "Sasikumar B.Menon v. Vijayan" , in paragraph No.9, the Kerala High Court discussed about the effect of absence of allegations and held as follows: "Moreover, apart from the words extracted in paragraph 3 of the order, the complaint does not contain any statement which can be said to be defamatory. The words, "a policeman had foisted something which does not contain even 1 % of truth which was later entrusted to a journalist", will not be per se defamatory at all. It is not the case of the complainant that the policeman referred to therein is himself. It might be any member of the police force. Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner can maintain an action for defamation. It is not known under what context the words "in order to prevent any mark on the hip, a wooden plank was kept and assaulted by beating thereon" has been made by accused 2 to 4. It is also not known whether the words refer to the police at all. At any rate, there is no reference in the complaint as to the person who inflicted injury on the accused. It is a matter for guess. The material broadcasted has not been produced in its entirety. The cassette which contains the broadcasted material should have been produced in Court by the complainant along with the complaint in order to understand what the defamatory words are and under what context such words were used in the interview. The petitioner is called upon to answer the accusations in the complaint. Absence of any valid allegations in the complaint cannot be made good by evidence during trial. Cause of action is the allegation in the complaint. What is required further is only to adduce evidence in support of the allegations. The accused is entitled to know what are the allegations raised against them. For that purpose, they cannot be asked to look into the evidence, oral or documentary. Absence of extractions of the words which constitute defamation in the complaint or production of the defamatory material in its entirety is a defect in the complaint which cannot be cured at a subsequent stage in the course of trial. Hence, it could very well be said that the accused will be prejudiced in his defence. So, the complaint should not have been taken cognizance of for that reason also."
In the present case, C.D. is enclosed to the complaint, which forms part of the complaint besides dialogues both in verna-cular language and translated into English are annexed. Thus, when a C.D. and other material enclosed to the complaint as a part of the complaint while annexing a copy of the dialogues in verna-cular language is sufficient to know what defamatory statements are made against the advocates as a class.
The 1st document annexed to the complaint is C.D. relating to Episode Nos.09,72,75, 82, 87, 88 and 91, 2nd document is skit wise programme in Episodes Nos.09,72,75,82,87, 88 and 91 and 3rd document is skit wise programme mentioning important dialogues written in Telugu.
The documents annexed to the complaint are also part of the record and those allegations made in the complaint cannot be read in isolation. Therefore, annexing C.Ds and skit wise programmes in Episodes is sufficient to enable the accused/petitioners to know what were the specific allegations made against them. Annexing C.D. to the complaint, which forms part of the complaint, is sufficient and thereby the law declared by the Kerala High Court in "Sasikumar B.Menon v. Vijayan" is not applicable to the present facts of the case, even otherwise it is not binding precedent, but it has persuasive value, moreover the facts of the above case are different in material particulars from the facts of the present case. Hence, failure to mention the specific allegations in the complaint is not a ground to quash the proceedings by exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. as C.D. and skit wise dialogues and translation copies are annexed to the complaint. Hence, this point is held against the petitioners and in favour of the respondent No.1.
The specific dialogues in relevant Episodes referred in the complaint are extracted in Telugu and annexed to the complaint and also filed C.D pertaining to the skits. The dialogues therein and the way in which the actors playing the role of judge, advocate and accused etc. and using word "prostituter" instead of "prosecutor" and used abusive language against one another and entering into court hall with cricket bat and hurling cricket bat and other gestures of actors in those episodes would certainly amounts to defamatory, which lowered the dignity and decorum of the courts and its officers i.e. Judges and courts.
In view of the specific allegations raised by the respondent No.1, it is relevant to have a glance at the contents in toto of the annexure to the complaint, which form a part of the judgment and they read as follows:
T.V.Shows, more particularly the comedy shows are being viewed by public at large, inclusive of highly educated, semi literates, illiterates and person of rural background, but as far as semiliterate and illiterate with rural background people are concerned, those dialogues and the behaviour of advocates and Judges in those episodes may create an impression that proceedings in Courts are being conducted in such manner. Therefore, the programme would certainly create bad impression in the minds of general public and reduce the decency and decorum of the Court and its officers i.e. Judges and Advocates.
In a contempt case "In Re:S.Mulgaokar, 1978 AIR(SC) 727 " the Apex Court held that the judiciary cannot be immune from criticism. But, when that criticism is based on obvious distortion or gross misstatement and made in a manner which seems designed to lower respect for the judiciary and destroy public confidence in it, it cannot be ignored. I am not one of those who thinks that an action for contempt of Court, which is discretionary, should be frequently or lightly taken. But, at the same time, I do not think that we should abstain from using this weapon even when its use is needed to correct standards of behavior in a grossly and repeatedly erring quarter. It may be better in many cases for the judiciary to adopt a magnanimously charitable attitude even when utterly uncharitable and unfair criticism of its operations is made out of bona fide concern for improvement. But, when there appears some scheme and a design to bring about results which must damage confidence in our judicial system and demoralize Judges of the highest court by making malicious attacks, anyone interested in maintaining high standards of fearless, impartial, and unbending justice will feel perturbed. although, the question whether an attack is malicious or ill-intentioned, may be often difficult to determine, yet, the language in which it is made, the fairness, the factual accuracy, the logical soundness of it, the care taken in justly and properly analysing the materials before the maker of it, are important considerations. Moreover, in judging whether it constitutes a contempt of Court or not we are concerned more with the reasonable and probable effects of what is said or written than with the motives lying behind what is done. A decision on the question whether the discretion to take action for contempt of Court should be exercised in one way or the other must depend on the totality of facts and circumstances.
Justice Krishna Iyer made strong comments against making such criticism or unfounded attacks on the Judges, where the attack is calculated to obstruct or destroy the judicial process that the Court is willing to ignore, by a majestic liberalism, trifling and venial offences. The second principle must be to harmonize the constitutional values of free criticism, the fourth estate included, and the need for a fearless curial process and its presiding functionary, the judge. A happy balance has to be struck, the benefit of the doubt being given generously against the judge, slurring over marginal deviations but severely proving the supremacy of the law over pugnacious, vicious, unrepentant and malignant contemners, be they the powerful press, gang-up of vested interests, veteran columnists or Olympian establishmentarians. Not because the judge, the human symbol of a high value, is personally armoured by a regal privilege but because ''be you-the contemnor ever so high, the law-the People''s expression of Justice-is above you. Curial courage overpowers arrogant might even as judicial benignity forgives errant or exaggerated critics. Indeed, to criticise the judge fairly, albeit fiercely, is no crime but a necessary right, twice blessed in a democracy. For, it blessed him that gives and him that takes. Where freedom of expression, fairly exercised, subserves public interest in reasonable measure, public justice cannot gag it or manacle it, constitutionally speaking. A free people are the ultimate guarantors of fearless justice. Such is the cornerstone of our Constitution; such is the touchstone of our Contempt Power, oriented on the confluence of free speech and fair justice which is the scriptural essence of our Fundamental Law. Speaking of the social philosophy and philosophy of law in an integrated manner as applicable to contempt of court, there is no conceptual polarity but a delicate balance, and judicial ''sapience'' draws the line. As it happens, our Constitution makers foresaw the need for balancing all these competing interests.
The third principle is to avoid confusion between personal protection of a libeled judge and prevention of obstruction of public justice and the community''s confidence in that great process. The former is not contempt, the latter is, although overlapping spaces abound. Because the law of contempt exists to protect public confidence in the administration of justice, the offence will not be committed by attacks upon the personal reputation of individual judges as such.
The fourth functional canon which channels discretionary exercise of the contempt power is that the Fourth Estate which is an indispensable intermediary between the State and the people and necessary instrumentality in strengthening the forces of democracy, should be given free play within responsible limits even when the focus of its critical attention is the court, including the highest Court.
The fifth normative guideline for the judges to observe in this jurisdiction is not to be hypersensitive even where distortions and criticisms overstep the limits, but to deflate vulgar denunciation by dignified bearing, condescending indifference and repudiation: by judicial rectitude.
The sixth consideration is that, after evaluating the totality of factors, if the court considers the attack on the judge or judges scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory or malicious beyond condonable limits, the strong arm of the law must, in the name of public interest and public justice, strike, a blow on him who challenges the supremacy of the rule of law by fouling its source and stream.
In "Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of Uttar Pradesh" , wherein the Apex Court highlighted the esteem of legal profession and held as follows: "The legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation. It is a noble calling and all those who belong to it are its honourable members. Although the entry to the profession can be had by acquiring merely the qualification of technical competence, the honour as a professional has to be maintained by the its members by their exemplary conduct both in and outside the court. The legal profession is different from other professions in that what the lawyers do, affects not only an individual but the administration of justice which is the foundation of the civilised society. Both as a leading member of the intelligential of the society and as a responsible citizen, the lawyer has to conduct himself as a model for others both in his professional and in his private and public life. The society has a right to expect of him such ideal behavior. It must not be forgotten that the legal profession has always been held in high esteem and its members have played an enviable role in public life. The regard for the legal and judicial systems in this country is in no small measure due to the tiredness role played by the stalwarts in the profession to strengthen them. They took their profession seriously and practised it with dignity, deference and devotion. If the profession is to survive, the judicial system has to be vitalised. No service will be too small in making the system efficient, effective and credible. The casualness and indifference with which some members practise the profession are certainly not calculated to achieve that purpose or to enhance the prestige either of the profession or of the institution they are serving. If people lose confidence in the profession on account of the deviant ways of some of its members, it is not only the profession which will suffer but also the administration of justice as a whole. The present trend unless checked is likely to lead to a stage when the system will be found wrecked from within before it is wrecked from outside. It is for the members of the profession to introspect and take the corrective steps in time and also spare the courts the unpleasant duty. We say no more. Now to the legal issue bearing on canons of professional conduct. The rule of law cannot be built on the ruins of democracy, for where law ends tyranny begins. If such be the keynote thought for the very survival of our Republic, the integral bond between the lawyer and the public is unbreakable. And the vital role of the lawyer depends upon (his probity and professional life style. Be it remembered that the central function of the legal profession is to promote the administration of justice. If the practice of law is thus a public utility of great implications and a monopoly is statutorily granted by the nation, it obligates the lawyer to observe scrupulously those norms which make him worthy of the confidence of the community in him as a vehicle of justice-social justice. The Bar cannot behave with doubtful scruples or strive to thrive on litigation. Canons of conduct cannot be crystallised into rigid rules but felt by the collective conscience of the practitioners as right: It must be a conscience alive to the proprieties and the improprieties incident to the discharge of a sacred public trust. It must be a conscience governed by the rejection of self-interest and selfish ambition. It must be a conscience propelled by a consuming desire to play a leading role in the fair and impartial administration of justice, to the end that public confidence may be kept undiminished at all times in the belief that we shall always seek truth and justice in the preservation of the rule of law. It must be a conscience, not shaped by rigid rules of doubtful validity, but answerable only to a moral code which would drive irresponsible judges from the profession. Without such a conscience, there should be no judge, and, we may add, no lawyer. Such is the high standard set for professional conduct as expounded by courts in this country and elsewhere."
Earlier Justice Sethi observed in a judgment that "the lawyers, who have been acknowledged being sober, task oriented, professionally responsible stratum of the population, are further obliged to utilize their skills for socio-political modernization of the country" and "the legal profession is different from other professions in that what they lawyers do, affects not only an individual but the administration of justice which is the foundation of the civilized society. Both as a member of the intelligentsia of the society and as a responsible citizen, the lawyer has to conduct himself as a model for other both in his professional and in his private and public life."
In "Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, Ministry of Law and Ors" the Apex Court laid down certain principles to maintain a case for defamation: (1) To constitute the offence of "defamation", there has to be imputation and it must have made in the manner as provided in the provision with the intention of causing harm or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of the person about whom it is made. Causing harm to the reputation of a person is the basis on which the offence is founded and mens rea is a condition precedent to constitute the said offence. The complainant has to show that the accused had intended or known or had reason to believe that the imputation made by him would harm the reputation of the complainant. (2) The criminal offence emphasizes on the intention or harm. Section 44 of Indian Penal Code defines "injury". It denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property. Thus, the word "injury" encapsulates harm caused to the reputation of any person. It also takes into account the harm caused to a person''s body and mind. Section 499 provides for harm caused to the reputation of a person, that is, the complainant. (3) Reasonableness and proportionality of a restriction is examined from the stand point of the interest of the general public and not from the point of view of the person upon whom the restrictions are imposed. Applying this standard, the Court judged the criminal defamation laws to be proportionate. It rejected the contention that defamation is fundamentally a notion of the majority meant to cripple the freedom of speech and expression as too broad a proposition to be treated as guiding principle to adjudge the reasonableness of a restriction.
In view of the law declared in "Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, Ministry of Law and Ors" mens rea and intention are primary requirements to prosecute the person for the offence punishable under Section 500 of I.P.C. Such intention or mens rea is a question of fact, which cannot be gone into at the stage of deciding application filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that "Jabardasth Katharnak Comedy Show" is a funny programme and it is not intended to defame any one and claiming immunity in view of exception contained under Section 499 of I.P.C., when their claim is based on exceptions, the petitioners have to prove their independent case by adducing relevant evidence. But at this stage, the above said contention needs no consideration.
The other offence allegedly committed by the petitioners is punishable under Section 5B (1) and (2) of Cinematograph Act, 1952, but the allegations made in the complaint would not attract prima facie case under Section 5B (1) and (2) of Cinematograph Act. Section 5B of Cinematograph Act, 1952 deals with principles for guidance in certifying films, which is not a penal provision. However, Section 5 B (1) of the Act says that a film shall not be certified for public exhibition if, in the opinion of the authority competent to grant the certificate, the film or any part of it is against the interests of (the sovereignty and integrity of India) the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or involves defamation or contempt of court or is likely to incite the commission of any offence. Section 5B (2) of the Act says that subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (1), the Central Government may issue such directions as it may think fit setting out the principles which shall guide the authority competent to grant certificates under this Act in sanctioning films for pubic exhibition.
But here, the slanderous statements are made in the episode Nos. 09, 72, 75, 82, 87, 88, and 91 of Jabardasth Katharnak Comedy Show, in such case the certificate can be issued. Moreover, as per Section 21 of the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995 the provisions of the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act shall be applicable in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the Pharmacy Act, 1948, the Emblems and Names (Prevention of Improper Use) Act, 1950, the Drugs (Control) Act, 1950, the Cinematograph Act, 1952 etc. Therefore, Section 5B (1) and (2) of Cinematograph Act, 1952 read with 21 of Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995 though applicable to Jabardasth Katharnak Comedy Show, it is not a penal provision.
Legal profession is a noble profession. But, describing lawyers in such a manner as exhibited in Jabardasth Katharnak Comedy Show reduces the dignity and decorum of Courts and its officers, and the same would not only amount to defamation against lawyers as a group, but also reduces the esteem of the Courts and its officers i.e. Judges. Since such programmes though intended for fun would create an impression that the proceedings will be conducted in the manner in which they exhibited in T.V. show "Jabardasth Katharnak Comedy Show" in the minds of poor gullible people with rural background.
Exhibiting such shows like "Jabardasth Katharnak Comedy Show" would denounce prestige of Courts in the eye of public and sometimes it may create an impression in the minds of litigant public that they will not get justice on account of such proceedings exhibited in the said show. Till today, no law prohibits such programmes though various television channels telecasting such shows but unchecked. Unless certain guidelines are framed for telecasting such programmes to have check on programmes, by telecasting such programmes, channel operators would cause further damage to reputation of judicial institutions.
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is an obvious proposition that when a court has authority to make any order, it must have also power to carry that order into effect. If an order can lawfully be made, it must be carried out; otherwise it would be useless to make it. The authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court must have power to prevent that abuse. In the absence of such power the administration of law would fail to serve the purpose for which alone the court exists, namely to promote justice and to prevent injustice.
The essential object of the criminal law is to protect society against criminals and law breakers. For this purpose, the law holds out threats of punishments to prospective lawbreakers as well as attempts to make the actual offenders suffer with prescribed punishment for the offences they committed and at the same time, the procedure is intended to protect the innocent people from unlawful prosecutions at the threshold itself, to avoid peril of facing trial. Thus, Section 482 of Cr.P.C. vests unbridled power on the courts to exercise its jurisdiction to give effect to an order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of Court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The Code also controls and regulates the working of the machinery set up for the investigation and trial of offences. On the one hand it has to give adequately wide powers to make the investigation and adjudicatory processes strong, effective and efficient, and on the other hand, it has to take precautions against errors of judgment and human failures and to provide safeguards against probable abuse of powers by the police or judicial officers. This often involves a "nice balancing of conflicting considerations, a delicate weighing of opposing claims clamouring for recognition and the extremely difficult task of deciding which of them should predominate". Thus, the Code obviously conferred power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings in crime by conferring inherent power on the High Courts of all the States being higher court of the State.
The law is settled on the powers as to when such inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised and cannot be exercised in various perspective pronouncements of the Apex Court. The leading case on this aspect is "State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, 1992 Supp1 SCC 335", wherein the Apex Court laid down the following seven guidelines: "(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
In "State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, 1977 AIR(SC) 1489" the Supreme Court while considering scope and jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C, has held as under: "In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court''s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction."
In view of guideline No.6 in "State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal" when there is a legal bar to maintain complaint by the respondent No.1 and by applying the principle laid down in "State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy" further proceedings in C.C.No.130 of 2016 on the file of Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Huzurabad, Karimnagar shall not be allowed to continue and the said proceedings are liable to be quashed due to incompetency of respondent No.1 and the institution of such proceedings is an abuse of process of Law.
In view of my foregoing discussion, the first respondent being an advocate is incompetent to maintain the action for defamation in Criminal Court. Therefore, on this ground, the proceedings in C.C.No.130 of 2016 on the file of Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate at Huzurabad, Karimnagar District are liable to be quashed. Accordingly, the point is answered in favour of the petitioners and against the respondents.
In the result, the criminal petition is allowed and the proceedings against the petitioners in C.C.No.130 of 2016 on the file of Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate at Huzurabad, Karimnagar District are hereby quashed. No costs.
Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall also stand closed.