K. N. Raman Nair vs M. Govinda Swaml Naidu

This civil revision petition raises a question as to the power of the Rent Controller to admit evidence after the enquiry into the case has been concluded. The petition out of which this civil revision petition arises was filed by the respondent for eviction of the petitioner, his tenant, from a certain shop. The evidence in the case was closed on 23rd January 1962, and it was posted for arguments two days later. On that date, the landlord represented that he had in his possession certain documents which would have a bearing on the question in controversy. The Rent Controller reopened the case and permitted the additional documents to be filed. Against the order permitting the reception of the additional documents, an appeal was filed to the Appellate Authority. That authority agreed with the Rent Controller that the latter had the power to reopen a case once concluded and admit evidence. In this civil revision petition, it is contended, on behalf of the petitioner that, as the Rent Controller is a statutory authority with powers defined by the statute, he would have no inherent power to reopen the case once concluded, and that therefore, he had no jurisdiction to receive the additional documents. I am, however, unable to accept the contention. The duty to be performed by the Rent Controller is a quasi-judicial one; that is to say, he has to adjudicate the rights of parties in the matters entrusted to him. That means that he will have a power to take evidence and decide on the basis of such evidence. The conduct of the case so long as it is pending is entirely in his hands; he being statutorily vested with the authority to decide it. But when he has given a judgment, in a particular case, he will become functus officio, and, thereafter, there will be no power In him to review the judgment, unless the statute which created the authority, itself gives him the power to do so. If the case has not been concluded, the trial or enquiry into the case must be within his jurisdiction and no distinction can be made in this respect between a case in which evidence has not been closed and one where it is closed. Thus the mere circumstance that the Rent Controller had beard and closed the arguments in one case will not disentitle him to reopen the matter in a case where he feels any doubt or where he feels that further elucidation is necessary in the shape of evidence or by way of inspecting the premises etc. On the tame point, it will follow that, where a party, for good and sufficient reasons, convinces the authority that he could not let in evidence before the case was concluded, and that the evidence, being available, should be taken by that authority, it would be open to that authority to reopen the case, receive such evidence and decide the case on the basis of such evidence. The only condition is that he should give a fair opportunity to the other side to meet that evidence. This power is really a pat of his power to decide the question entrusted to him and not an independent Inherent power. The power can be exercised till the matter referred to him has not been disposed of. Therefore the Rent Controller had sufficient jurisdiction to reopen the case in the present Instance the arguments in which were concluded on 25th January 1962, and receive the additional evidence let in by the landlord. The civil revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs.