Joginder Singh and Others vs State and Another

V.P. Gupta, J.—The provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1979 (hereinafter the Act) are applicable to the Municipal Corporation of Shimla (hereinafter the Corporation). Chapter VI of the Act relates to the Corporation officers and other Corporation employees and Section 70, which is found in this Chapter, reads as follows:

Posts in Corporation and appointments thereto.- (1) The Government may, by notification, constitute in the prescribed manner, all or any of the following Corporation Services, namely:

(i) the Himachal Pradesh Service of Corporation Engineers and Sectional Officers;

(ii) The Himachal Pradesh Service of Corporation Health Officers;

(iii) the Himachal Pradesh Service of Corporation Secretaries;

(iv) The Himachal Pradesh Service of Corporation Accounts Officers and Accountants; and

(v) such other Corporation Service as the Government may decide.

(2) The Government may make rules for regulating the recruitment and the conditions of service of members of the Corporation Services referred to in sub-section (1), and the classification of such services and for the duties and functions of the members of such services.

(3) The Government may transfer any member of a Corporation Service from a post in one Corporation to a post carrying the same scale of pay in Anr. Corporation.

(4) The salary, allowances, gratuity, annuity, pension and other payments required to be made to the members of the Corporation Services in accordance with the conditions of their service shall be charged from the Corporation Fund in the prescribed manner.

(5) Creation of posts in a Corporation Service and appointment of members thereto shall be made by the Government or by an authority empowered by the Government in this behalf after taking into consideration the requirements of the Corporation and their financial capacity but no such member shall be deemed to have been appointed to any civil service or post under the State.

(6) Every person who, immediately before the issue of a notification under sub-section (1), is serving in a city or a post in relation to which a Corporation Service is constituted, shall, on the issue of such notification, become a member of the corresponding Corporation Service if he is found fit by an authority appointed by the Government in this behalf for becoming such a member on the basis of his qualifications and service record and if he is not found fit the post on which he is serving shall be deemed to have been abolished:

Provided that the condition regarding determination of fitness for becoming a member of a Corporation Service shall not apply to a person who was found to be fit for becoming a member of the corresponding Municipal Service constituted u/s 37 of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act, 1968 (19 of 1968) or was recruited thereto at any time thereafter:

Provided further that the terms and conditions of service of a person who becomes a member of a Corporation Service in the manner referred to above, in so far as they relate to remuneration, gratuity and provident fund shall not be varied to his disadvantage on his becoming a member of the Corporation Service.

(7) In respect of a post other than those falling under sub-section (1), the power to create the same and to make appointment thereto shall vest in the Commissioner if the maximum of the grade of that post does not exceed five hundred rupees and in the Corporation if it so exceeds:

Provided that no post the maximum of the grade whereof exceeds one thousand rupees shall be created under this sub-section save with the prior approval of the Government.

(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force consultation with the Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission shall not be necessary in the case of appointment to any post referred to in this section, but appointment to any such post the initial pay whereof exceeds the prescribed limit shall be made on the recommendation of a selection committee constituted by the Government in that behalf and where the appointing authority does not agree with the recommendation of the selection committee the matter shall be referred to the Government for. decision.

(9) In making an appointment to any post referred to in this section, the appointing authority shall follow the instructions issued by the Government from time to time in relation to reservation of appointments or posts for scheduled castes, backward classes and any other special category of persons.

By Act No. 12 of 1984, known as Himachal Pradesh Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1984 (hereinafter the Amendment Act), Section 70-A was introduced in the Act. Subsequently Section 70-A was further amended by the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Corporation (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1984 (Act No. 20 of 1984). Now Section 70-A of the Act reads as follows:

70-A. Power to take over the employees of Municipal Corporation specified in the Third Schedule.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any other law in force, rules made thereunder and contract executed and orders made, the State Government, if it thinks fit that it is expedient and necessary to do so, may, by notification in the Official Gazette, take over all or any class of employees working in the Municipal Corporation specified in the Third Schedule of the Act.

(2) Where any class of employees are taken over under sub-section, l, such employees will become the employees of the State Government and shall be entitled to such remuneration and shall be governed by such rules and regulations as are applicable to the employees of the State Government on equivalent post.

(3) Where any class of employees are taken over by the State Government under sub-section (1), they shall be merged with the employees of that Department to which the State Government may order:

Provided further where such employees are so taken oyer from Municipal Corporation, the corresponding posts in the Municipal Corporation shall be filled in by deputation out of cadre of the Government Department concerned and the expenditure on account of pay and allowances etc. shall be borne by the Municipal Corporation.

(4) Any service rendered by such class of employees under Municipal Corporation before taking over such employees shall be deemed to be service rendered under the State Government:

Provided that where any class of employees are taken over by the State Government under sub-section (1), the employees whose services have been taken over shall be governed by the pensionary regulation as made applicable to Government employees provided they exercise their option to surrender their contributory fund alongwith interest thereon which amount will be deposited in their General Provident Fund Account in the Department concerned of the State Government and the share of the Municipal Corporation alongwith interest thereon shall be credited to the Consolidated fund of the State of Himachal Pradesh.

(5) Nothing in sub-sections (1) to (4) shall apply to any employee, who by notice in writing in that behalf to the State Government within a period of two months from the date of such taking over, intimates his option for not becoming an employee of the State Government, and where any employee gives such notice, his service under the Municipal Corporation shall stand terminated with effect from the date of the notice, and he shall be entitled to compensation from the Municipal Corporation, which shall be as follows:

(a) in the case of a permanent employee, a sum equivalent to his salary (including all allowances) for a period of three months or for the remaining period of his service, whichever is less;

(b) in the case of a temporary employee, a sum equivalent to his salary (including all allowances) for one month or for the remaining period of his service, whichever is less.

The Petitioners in these two writ petitions have chal lenged the validity of Section 70-A of the Act on the grounds that the section is ultra vires and violative of the provisions of the Constitution of India.

In C.W.P. No. 299 of 1984, the Petitioners nos. 1 to 11 are Junior Engineers, Petitioner No. 12 an Assistant Engineer and Petitioner No. 13 an Executive Engineer in the Corpora tion. Petitioners nos. 1 to 3, 10 to 13 joined the service of the erstwhile Municipal Committee Shimla and Petitioner nos. 4 to 9 joined the services of the Corporation. These Petitioners allege that Section 70-A of the Act is a colourable legislation.

This section was introduced to harm the interest of the Petitioners and its provisions are discriminatory and are actuated by malice being opposed to rule of law. The same are unreasonable, grossly unjust, irrational, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

They allege that they joined the service of the Municipal Committee/Corporation due to family circumstances because they wanted to remain in Shimla. No complaints were ever made regarding their efficiency, but the Corporation in order to get rid of their services and on extraneous reasons has removed them from service by taking action u/s 70-A of the Act and their services have now been taken over by the Himachal Pradesh P.W.D. They have now been posted in very remote areas to their disadvantage and they have been condemned without affording any opportunity of being heard.

In C.W.P. No. 316 of 1984, Ashok Kumar Petitioner alleges that Section 70-A is ultra vires and violative of Articles 14, 16, 19, 246 and 254 of the Constitution of India as also Section 82(6) and 95 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act and sec-tions 41, 42 and 52 of the State of Himachal Pradesh Act. He, after doing his B.V.Sc. and A.H. degree in 1969, joined the post of a Marketing Superintendent in the Corporation in February, 1970. He could get a job as a Veterinary Assistant Surgeon in various government departments but he preferred the job in the Corporation for having a stationary life in the capital/city in Northern India, where he could have chances of improving his academic qualifications and settling down in life permanently. He did his LL.B. in 1975, M.A. in Political Science in 1977, Post-graduate Diploma in Personnel Management and Labour Welfare in 1978 and M.A. in History in 1980. He was entrusted with several other jobs inter alia the attending the labour Court cases, acting as enquiry officer and presenting officer in departmental enquiries and also for drafting the bye-law of the Corporation. He was also en-trusted with the duty of Corporation Health Officer. He alleges that his services have been taken over by the Himachal Pradesh Government u/s 70-A of the Act and there is no corresponding cadre of Marketing Superintendent in the Animal Husbandry Department of the Himachal Pradesh Government. He has been transferred and posted against the post of a Veterinary Assistant Surgeon at Seed Multiplication Farm Suni (District Shimla). The duties of a Marketing Superintendent are quite distinct and dissimilar to the duties of the Assistant Veterinary Surgeon. It is alleged by him that the action of taking over his services by the Himachal Pradesh Govern-ment is a mala fide act to cause harm to him and the notification for including the post of Marketing Superintendent in the Third Schedule annexed to Section 70-A is neither expedient nor necessary in public interest.

In the reply affidavit Respondent No. 1 denied the allegations and alleged that numerous complaints were received about the inefficiency, lack of integrity and neglect of duties by the Petitioners from the public. The impugned legislation was enacted to improve the conditions of service of the Petitioners so that they could be accommodated in Government service with vast chances of further promotions, benefit of pension and regular pay scales with dearness and other allowances as are permissible to government servants. In case the Petitioners do not opt to accept the government service then they can get three months salary and quit the posts in view of sub-section (5) of Section 70-A. The service conditions of the Petitioners are being improved for their benefit and they have chances of showing their talent. The Corporation can also be benefited by-getting highly qualified personnel having experience and training in modern techniques for tonning up and improving the Municipal administration and thus rendering better service to the citizens of Shimla, which is a State capital. The legislation is valid and is not violative of any provisions of the Constitution or any other law and the same is in public interest.

Respondent No. 2 also filed a similar reply affidavit and contested the petition.

We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties in both the petitions.

The learned Counsel for the Petitioners contended that Section 70-A of the Amendment Act was arbitrary, ultra virs and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. There were no guidelines and the powers given were arbitrary. It was a colourable piece of legislation. There was no stagnation and the main purpose of enacting Section 70-A in the Act was to get rid of the Petitioners.

In C.W.P. No. 316 of 1984 it was further contended that there was no equivalent post to absorb the services of the Petitioner in the Health Department.

The learned Counsel for the Respondents contended that Section 70-A of the Amendment Act was valid and did not violate any of the provisions of the Constitution. It was not a colourable piece of legislation and the guidelines were found in the Objects and Reasons. All allegations of mala fide and colourable legislation were imaginary and the Petitioners could not be allowed any relief.

It was also contended that Ashok Kumar (Petitioner) in C.W.P. No. 316 of 1984 was primarily a Veterinary Assistant Surgeon and was posted as such. In any case, if he felt dissatisfied then he could approach the Respondents for being absorbed in an equivalent post.

We have considered the contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case.

As similar questions of law and fact are involved in these writ petitions, therefore, both these writ petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment.

At the out-set it may be mentioned that after arguing the case at length, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners finally contended and frankly and rightly conceded that the writ petitions be considered on the validity of Section 70-A of the Amennment Act only because this section was ultra vires and violative of the provisions of the Constitution of India. They did not press other grounds raised in the writ petitions. Their only contention which requires adjudication by this Court is that out of the four services constituted u/s 70-A, the Third Schedule to Act No. 74 and Section 70-A, only the Executive Engineers, Assistant Engineers, Junior Engineers and Marketing Superintendents have been taken over. The categories of the draftsmen, surveyors, fitters, foremen, turn-keymen, have not been taken over. Similarly, out of the Health service, the Health Officer, Sanitary Inspector, Chief Sanitary Inspector, Food Inspector, Laboratory Attendant, Safai staff etc. have not been taken over. Likewise, the post of Assistant Secretary, Accounts Officer, Chief Accountant and Accountants Cashier, Licence Inspector, Tax Inspector, Tax Superintendent have not been taken over. This action has resulted in clear discrimination because the aforementioned posts are equally important for increasing the efficiency and in public interest. The Petitioners have been discriminated in the matter of being taken over and merged with the employees of the Government. Such action will lead to inefficiency as the employees on deputation will be working under two masters.

Bill No. 12 of 1984 to amend the Act was introduced and the Minister incharge of the Local Self Government laid the statement of Objects and Reasons which is reproduced as under:

The provisions contained in sub- section (1) of Section 5 and Section 13 of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1979 do not prescribe any specific age for voters and for the councillors to be chosen from the municipal wards constituted under the said Act. Further, Section 9 of the said Act empowers the Corporation to alter or amend any order issued by the State Government u/s 8 relating to delimitation and reservation of wards. This provision apart from being excessive in delegation is also anomalous and impracticable for the reason that notifications in the Official Gazette can be published under the authority of State Government. Thus, it has become necessary to remove the said ambiguity in the aforesaid provisions.

Section 70 of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1979, provides for the constitution of Corporation services. The Government may transfer any member of a Corporation service from the post in one Corporation to a corresponding post in Anr. Corporation. Notwithstanding the above provisions, it is not possible to transfer any aforesaid member since Shimla is the only Municipal Corporation in the entire State. There is no likelihood of extending the provisions of the Municipal Corporation Act to any other town in Himachal Pradesh in the near future. This has resulted in stagnation, frustration and above all, inefficiency and the creeping in of gradual lowering of standards.

There is an immediate need to tone up the administration in certain fields of public utility services under the Corporation. In the totality of the circumstances, therefore, it is necessary that the Government should have the powers to take over any class of employees working in the Municipal Corporation merging them with the employees of the Government department concerned.

This Bill was passed by the Legislative Assembly and it became Act No. 12 of 1984 in which Section 70-A was introduced. This Section 70-A was subsequently amended by the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Corporation (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1984 (Act No. 20 of 1984). Section 70-A as it reads now has already been reproduced.

Third Schedule to Section 70-A as amended by Act No. 20 of 1984 reads as follows:

THE THIRD SCHEDULE (As amended by Himachal Pradesh Act 20 of 1984)

(See section 70-A)

SI. No. Class of employees 1. Executive Engineer/Municipal Engineer. 2. Assistant Engineer. 3. Junior Engineer. 4. Market Superintendent.

Now, whatever is stated in the objects and reasons at the time of the introduction of Bill No. 12 of 1984 is to be presumed to be correct and the Petitioners who challenge the validity of section 70-A of the Amendment Act have to plead and prove that such statements in the objects and reasons are incorrect or insufficient.

In K. Nagaraj and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, , it is held that ''the legislature cannot be accused of having passed a law for any extraneous purpose. Its reasons for passing a law are those that are stated in the objects and reasons and if none are stated, as appear from the provisions enacted by it''. The objects and reasons in the present case clearly mention that there was an immediate need to tone up the administration in certain fields of public utility services under the Corporation and the necessity to introduce such Bill arose because the Government had a right to transfer any member of the Corporation service from the post in one Corporation to a corresponding post in Anr. Corporation u/s 70 of the Act. The provisions of transfer u/s 70 of the Act could not be utilised because only Shimla Municipal Corporation was in existence in the entire State of Himachal Pradesh and there was no likelihood to extend the provisions of the Act to any other town in the State of Himachal Pradesh in the near future. It was felt that due to the practical inapplicability of section 70(3) of the Act, there was stagnation, frustration above all inefficiency and the creeping in of gradual lowering of standards.

It cannot, therefore, be said that the Government at the time of the introduction of the Bill did not apply its mind. The Petitioners have nowhere attacked section 70-A of the Amendment Act by precise, unambiguous and clear pleadings. The allegations of malafide are without any basis and vague and casual allegations cannot be accepted without proper pleadings and proof. Para 15 of the petition only mentions that the Petitioners are being forced to join the services of Respondent No. 1 against their wishes. Paras 16 to 18 of the petition state that the Petitioners have been posted in far-flung areas by Respondent No. 1 and that the action of the Respondent is arbitrary, irrational and unjust and violative of Article 14. Para 21 again states that the provisions of section 70-A are discriminatory, not for bona fide reasons actuated by malice, opposed to rule of law unreasonable, grossly unjust, irrational, arbitrary and based upon extraneous reasons other than the necessity of public interest as such the action is not only violative of Articles 14 and 16 but also Article 21 of the Constitution.

The legislature has always a power to enact a law provided it is not unconstitutional, that is, when it transgress the constitutional limits. The presumption always is that the legislative discretion is properly exercised and the motive of the legislature in passing a statute is beyond the scrutiny of the Courts. The propriety, expediency and necessity of a legislative act are for the determination of the legislative authority and are not for determination by the Courts. A statute cannot be invalid on the ground of non-application of mind and the same can only be invalid for contravention of the constitutional limitations. In taking this view we are supported by the observations made in T. Venkata Reddy and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, K. Nagaraj and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, and A.K. Roy and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others,

The Petitioners thus cannot challenge the validity of section 70-A of the Amendment Act on the ground that the same was passed with any mala fide intention or ulterior motive. It cannot also be treated to be a colourable legislation. The reasons and guidelines for this legislation are already enumerated in the statement of objects and reasons.

The next question is as to whether section 70-A of the Amendment Act is violative of the provisions of the Constitution.

It is an established proposition of law that the principle of equality does not absolutely prevent the State from making differentiations between persons and things. A classification has to be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from Ors. who are left out of the group and (ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act.

In Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. and Another Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, it was held that the working journalists are a group by themselves and could be classified as such apart from the other employees of the newspaper establishment. If the legislature embarked upon a legislation for the purpose of ameliorating their conditions of service there was nothing discriminatory about it. Such persons could be singled out thus for preferential treatment against the other employees of newspaper establishments and this type of classification could not come within the ban of Article 14 of the Constitution. The only thing which is prohibited under this Article is that persons belonging to a particular group or class should not be treated differently as amongst themselves and no such charge could be levelled against this piece of legislation. If this group of working journalists was specially treated in this manner, there was no scope for the objection that that group had a special legislation enacted for its benefit or that a special machinery was created for fixing the rates of its wages different from the machinery employed for other workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is further observed that the classification could well be founded on the geographical basis or according to the object or occupation and the like. The question for consideration would be whether there was a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act sought to be challenged. It was finally held that the classification was based on an intelligible differentia which distinguished the working journalists from other employees of newspaper establishments and that differentia had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved, that is, the amelioration of the conditions of service of working journalists.

In the present case, as is evident from the objects and reasons, only Shimla town in the whole of the State of Himachal Pradesh has a Corporation. The employees of Shimla Corporation are transferable u/s 70 of the Act, but they cannot be transferred as there is no Corporation in any town of Himachal Pradesh State. The consequence is that the employees stationed at Shimla are likely to feel stagnated, frustrated and as a result thereof they are likely to become inefficient. With this background, the Government in order to give further chances of promotion to the various employees of the Corporation'' enacted section 70-A by the Amendment Act. The main purpose is the uplift and betterment of these employees.

The legislature is the best judge of the needs of people and the particular classes and it has to adjust the legislation according to the existing exigency.

The contention of the Petitioners'' counsel that only certain categories of employees have been included in the Third Schedule and the remaining categories of the employees have been left out, cannot be accepted as violative of Article 14. A piece of legislation is always enacted for the achievement of a particular object and purpose, and to achieve this particular object and purpose a category of the employees can be selected, The remaining categories can be left out from the purview of such a legislation. If the purpose of the legislation is that one or a few evils should be reformed then the fact that certain other evils have not been reformed by this legislation cannot make the legislation invalid. It is for the legislation (sic) to look to the needs of the particular classes of persons and to find out as to how and in what manner it can legislate to adjust in accordance with the prevailing circumstances. There is no denial of the proposition that there can be a classification and a sub-classification within the classification for the purposes of judicial treatment. The State is always at liberty to classify a person or a group of persons for the legislative purposes and in order to redress the grievances of such a class of persons for whom the enactment is made. Reference may be made to Mohd. Hanif Quareshi and Others Vs. The State of Bihar, and AIR 1958 S.C. 956, (In re. Kerala Education Bill, 1957).

The learned Counsel for the Respondents also contended that the State was keen to legislate on an experimental basis and for that purpose categories of persons mentioned in the Third Schedule were initially taken. The other categories of persons were purposely left out, and if subsequently the State feels that the experiment is a successful one, then the State can achieve the object of applying this legislation to the other categories also.

The State should be satisfied that the classification/ sub-classification is in a manner that it is in the interest of public and is not unreasonable.

The Petitioners in para 25-C have made the allegation regarding discrimination and this was the only para upon which the Petitioners'' counsel finally claimed the relief.

No materials have been placed by the Petitioners to show about the unreasonableness or arbitrariness of section 70-A. A simple sweeping statement that the section is unreasonable, arbitrary, malafide, is not sufficient without a specific pleading or proof. The Petitioners have not been able to prove that the classification made by the State is irrational and has no nexus with the object intended to be achieved by the enactment. To prove that the classification is arbitrary, imaginary or unreasonable, the burden is very heavy upon the Petitioners.

The State is always at liberty to make a legislation and apply it to a certain class of persons as an experimental measure. Such a piece of legislation cannot be stated to be bad simply for the reason that the object or purpose is not all embracing.

In Sakhawat Ali Vs. The State of Orissa, it is held that a legislation enacted for the achievement of a particular object or purpose need not be all embracing. It is for the legislature to determine what categories it would embace within the scope of legislation and merely because certain categories which would stand on the same footing as those which are covered by the legislation are left out would not render legislation which has been enacted in any manner ''discriminatory and violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 14.

In the present case, as is contended by the learned Counsel for the Respondent, the State has selected certain categories for experimental purposes. The State after all has to start from somewhere to test as to whether the legislation which is being "enacted is for the benefit of the public and the State cannot by a stroke of pen make the legislation effective for all categories.

In AIR 1957 Pun 45, (Gopi Parshad v. State of Punjab), Punjab Tobacco Vend Fees Act was enacted by which the dealers in tobacco carrying on business within the municipal limits and notified area limit were to pay certain fees. Other manufacturers and dealers who carried their business in other parts of the State were not to pay such fees. It was held that the classification was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and it could not be said to be invalid on the ground that the State had discriminated between the dealer and dealer by imposing different fees on different classes of dealer in tobacco.

In Mohd. Hanif Quareshi and Others Vs. The State of Bihar, it has been held that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest and finally that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation. It is also held that a reasonable classification founded on intelligible differentia is always permissible provided such differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different basis, namely, geographical or according to the object or occupation or the like and what is necessary is that there must be nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration.

Similar observations were also made in AIR 1958 S.C. 956 (supra).

In A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar Vs. M. Venkitachalam Potti and Another, the classification, that is, one of evaders of substantial amount of Income Tax and those whose evasion was not of substantial amount was upheld. In The Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Ltd. and Another Vs. The Union of India and Another, the classification between sugar produced by the vaccum plant process selected for export and sugar produced by any other processes was upheld. In Gopal Narain Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, only tax was levied in a part of the municipality and not in the whole of the municipality, but such geographical classification was upheld for providing special amenities for a particular unit the peculiar circumstances whereof demanded them. Similarly, in Hirabhai Ashabhai Patel Vs. The State of Bombay, fixing of water measure in some part of the city of Bombay was held to be valid and it was observed in para 6 of the judgment:

Now, it is well settled that it is not necessary that a certain provision of law should apply at the same time to all members of a class. If a class is indicated as the object of legislation or the object of social reform, it is open to the legislature or to the authority upon whom the power is conferred to achieve the object or to carry out the social reform in stages or by instalments, and the Court will not hold that there is no equality of law because certain members of the class are affected and Ors. are not.

If it is reasonably clear that ultimately the whole class will come within the purview of the law, then the mere fact that at a particular point of time only certain members of the class are affected will not make the legislation or the exercise of power bad. That is exactly the position here. If the ultimate objective is to make every landlord or every property-owner in the city of Bombay to pay for water charges by measurement, then it is not open to the Petitioners to complain that today they alongwith a few Ors. are affected by this exercise of power and the Ors. are not affected. The short and simple answer to the Petitioners is that Ors. will also be affected in due course; that they are not being picked out arbitrarily or capriciously, but that they have had the misfortune of being singled out first because the Municipal Commissioner has to start somewhere and in this case he has started with the Petitioners for the very good reason that he has started with a locality where the consumption of water is very high.

In M.A. Rasheed and Others Vs. The State of Kerala, prohibition on the use of the machinery in some districts only was held to be valid and para 22 of the judgment reads as follows:

An argument was advanced that the notification offended Article 14. The course of action which the State adopted is that it became necessary to prohibit the use of machinery in the district of Trivandrum, Quilon and Alleppey in the traditional sector. It appears that out of 414 mechanised units in the State 283 units are in the Southern region of Kerala State consisting of Trivandrum, Quilon and Alleppey and the balance 131 mechanised units are in the remaining 8 districts of the State. The use of machinery for the purpose of extraction of fibre from husks in the region other than Trivandrum, Quilon and Alleppey districts has not at present affected the supply and availability at fair prices of husks for extraction of fibre in the traditional sector as in the case of the three Districts. The situation in the 8 disiricts does not require action at the present moment. The classification is reasonable. It bears a nexus to the obejcts sought to be achieved by the impugned notification. In order to secure equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of coconut husks in the remaining 8 districts of the State for production of fibre in the traditional sector, it is not necessary in the prevailing conditions to prohibit the use of machinery in the remaining 8 districts.

In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the enactment of section 70-A by the Amendment Act and inclusion of certain categories of employees in the Third Schedule is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

The Petitioners will be having better chances of further promotions in the Government service and they will be [getting all other pecuniary benefits after being absorbed in the Government service. They have also got an option not to join the Government service if they choose to do so. At the same time the Corporation will also be getting benefit of having experienced and trained personnel and the Municipal administration is likely to be toned up and improved for rendering better service to the citizens of Shimla.

In case Ashok Kumar Petitioner (C.W.P. No. 316 of 1984) feels dissatisfied with his present absorption then he is at liberty to approach the appropriate authority with a request that he may be absorbed in an equivalent post, but it cannot be said that the enactment is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

As a result of the above discussion, we do not find any merit in these writ petitions which are hereby dismissed without any order as to costs.