Jodhbir Singh @ Jodha vs State of Punjab

The present petition is the second attempt under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the BNSS’) for grant of pre-arrest/anticipatory bail to the petitioner in case FIR No.212 dated 08.09.2025, registered under Sections 21 and 23 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and Section 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (added later on), at Police Station Sadar Faridkot, District Faridkot.

The petitioner had earlier applied for grant of pre-arrest/anticipatory bail before this Court which was dismissed as withdrawn on 25.03.2026. The relevant part of said order reads as under:-

The FIR in question relates to recovery of 12 kilograms 600 grams of heroin (as mentioned in the order passed by the trial Court) which admittedly falls within the commercial quantity, and the petitioner (herein) has been nominated as an accused on the basis of disclosure statement of co-accused Sukhpreet Singh.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner is innocent and has been falsely implicated into the FIR in question. Learned counsel has further iterated that the recovery of heroin has been effected from co-accused Sukhpreet Singh and Kadar Singh and no recovery whatsoever has been effected from the petitioner. It has been further contended that the petitioner was neither present at the spot nor named in the FIR and his implication is based solely on the disclosure statement of a co-accused which has no evidentiary value in the eyes of law. Learned counsel has emphasized that the petitioner was in custody in another case at the relevant time and, therefore, it would not have been possible for the petitioner to have arranged/dealt with such a huge quantity of heroin. According to learned counsel, the police had earlier visited the house of the petitioner and after finding no evidence/material to connect the petitioner, subsequently threatened the petitioner to implicate him in a false case. It has been further argued that there is no need for custodial interrogation of the petitioner as he has no connection with the alleged recovery. Learned counsel has further contended that the petitioner is willing to join investigation as and when require; shall not tamper with evidence or influence any witness & abide by all the condition(s) that may be imposed by this Court in case he is enlarged on pre-arrest bail. On the strength of aforesaid submissions, the grant of anticipatory bail is entreated for.

In oppugnation, learned State counsel (on the strength of advance notice) has vehemently opposed the grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioner by arguing that the present petition is not maintainable as it is the second petition for grant of anticipatory bail and there exists no substantial change in circumstances. On merits, learned State counsel has opposed the grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioner by arguing that the quantity of heroin recovered from the co-accused is 12 kilograms 600 grams, which is commercial quantity and that the petitioner has subsequently been nominated in the present case under Section 29 of the NDPS Act. It has been further contended that the investigation has revealed the involvement of the petitioner in the supply of the contraband and his custodial interrogation is necessary for tracing the source of the narcotic substance, unearthing the entire chain of supply and identifying other persons involved in the illegal drug trade. Furthermore, granting bail to the petitioner at this stage may seriously hamper the ongoing investigation. Given the gravity of the offence, the larger public interest involved in curbing the menace of drug trafficking and the potential threat to the fair conduct of the investigation/trial, it is submitted that the petitioner does not deserve the concession of anticipatory bail & dismissal of the petition in hand is prayed for.

I have heard the learned counsel for the rival parties and have gone through the available record of the case.

It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by this Court in a case titled as Bhisham Singh vs. State of Haryana, 2024(3) RCR(Criminal) 65, relevant whereof reads as under:-

At the outset, it deserves to be noted herein that the earlier order dated 25.03.2026 passed by this Court clearly reflects that after arguing for some time, learned counsel for the petitioner had sought permission to withdraw the petition and had also submitted that the petitioner would cause appearance before the concerned trial Court within 10 days and would seek regular bail which shall be decided expeditiously. The said statement was recorded in the aforesaid order and the petition was dismissed as withdrawn accordingly. The instant petition is, therefore, a second attempt to seek the same relief for grant of anticipatory bail. The gravamen of the case in hand involves recovery of 12 kilograms 600 grams of heroin, which is a quantity far in excess of the notified commercial quantity and the name of the petitioner has surfaced subsequently in the disclosure statement of co-accused following which he was nominated as an accused in the case in hand. Indubitably, the first petition (for grant of anticipatory bail) preferred by the petitioner was dismissed as withdrawn by this Court on 25.03.2026 after considering the material placed on record and since the dismissal of the earlier petition by this Court, no substantial change in circumstances has been established. Thereafter, in the instant petition i.e. second petition (for grant of anticipatory bail), the petitioner has only reiterated the grounds previously taken (at the time of rejection of the first petition on 25.03.2026). It is well settled that a successive petition for anticipatory bail would be maintainable only if there is a substantial change in circumstances or if substantial new grounds have arisen after the dismissal of the earlier petition. In the present case, learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any such material change in circumstances which would justify reconsideration of the matter. The fact that the petitioner has not been named in the original FIR or no recovery was effected from his possession cannot, at this stage, be treated as sufficient ground to grant him the concession of anticipatory bail. Whether the disclosure statement and the other material collected during the course of investigation establish the alleged conspiracy or abetment is a matter which would have to be examined at the appropriate stage.

It is also significant to note herein that the petitioner was specifically granted liberty by this Court vide order dated 25.03.2026 to surrender before the concerned trial Court and seek the concession of regular bail. Instead of availing the remedy, the petitioner has chosen to file the present petition for grant of anticipatory bail without demonstrating any change in circumstances. The plea of false implication raised by the petitioner is a disputed question of fact and involves appreciation of evidence, which cannot be adjudicated upon at this stage. The same can only be adjudicated upon the conclusion of the investigation or during the course of trial. In the considered opinion of this Court, granting anticipatory bail at this stage is likely to hamper the on-going investigation. No cause nay plausible cause has been shown, at this stage, from which it can be deciphered that the petitioner has been falsely implicated into the present FIR. Furthermore, the Court below has already declined the plea of the petitioner after considering the relevant factors, including the manner in which the name of the petitioner surfaced during investigation. It is befitting to mention here that while considering a plea for grant of anticipatory bail, the Court has to equilibrate between safeguarding individual rights and protecting societal interests. The Court ought to reckon with the magnitude and nature of the offence; the role attributed to the accused; the need for fair and free investigation as also the deeper and wider impact of such alleged iniquities on the society. At this stage, there is no material on record to hold that prima facie case is not made out against the petitioner. The material which has come on record and preliminary investigation, appear to establish a reasonable basis for the accusations. Thus, it is not appropriate to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner, as it would necessarily cause impediment in effective investigation. In State v. Anil Sharma, (1997) 7 SCC 187 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1039, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under : (SCC p. 189, para 6)

There is another aspect nay vital aspect of the matter which deserves to be addressed by this Court.

The judicial process operates on the foundational presumption that statements made by a counsel at the Bar are made with full authority and reflect the true intent of the litigant concerned. This principle ensures that the Court can effectively adjudicate without being compelled to verify the internal communications between a lawyer and the client at every state of proceedings. By executing a Vaqalatnama, a litigant clothes the counsel engaged with express as well as implied authority to plead, act and appear in the best interest of the client. If a litigant were permitted to resile from an adjudication/order made premised upon the statement/argument advanced by his/her counsel, it would render every court proceeding tentative and every judicial order vulnerable to being reopened, simply because the litigant has had a change of heart or has engaged a new counsel. Pertinently, entertaining such a plea would pave the way for a dangerous precedent, effectively allowing a second bite at the apple. It is to be borne in mind that a counsel is an officer of the court and not merely a mechanical agent of the litigant; and owes a duty to the court to ensure the smooth administration of justice. If an act, conduct or concession given by a counsel is not deemed to be authorized by the litigant, the entire adjudicatory framework would stall, as no opposing party or presiding officer could ever rely upon a statement made by a legal representative.

A litigant who misuses the process of law or take liberties with the truth should be left in no doubt about the consequences to follow. Others should be discouraged not to venture along the same path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency or indulgence. Exemplary costs, in such a situation are inevitable and necessary, so as to ensure that in litigation, as in the law which is rather practiced in our Country, there is no premium on the truth. Such misleading plea(s) which are deficient in any reasonability, have to be construed as trifling with the Courts and the process of justice.

In view of the prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus: