AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging Rule 30(3)(c) of the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Rules, 2006 on several grounds. However, it was later informed to this Court by the counsel for both the sides that Rule 30(3)(c) has been repealed. In that view of the matter, the writ petition obviously has been rendered infructuous and accordingly could have been dismissed straight way.
However, counsel for the petitioner has vehemently tried to impress upon this Court that even though the writ petition might be treated infructuous, in so far as the challenge to Rule 30(3)(c) of the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Rules,2006 is concerned yet, this Court should adjudicate as to whether the demand notice which includes a demand of Rs. 31,62,127.51(Thirty one lakhs sixty two thousand one hundred twenty seven and paise fifty one) should be set aside as the said demand notice had been issued in pursuance to Rule 30(3)(c) of Rules, 2006.
However, this part of the contention was countered by the Standing Counsel, Mr. Rajendra Krishna who stated that the demand notice which had been issued to the petitioner was not under Rule 30(3)(c) of the Rules of 2006 but, is a notice under Rule 17(1), 31(3),32 and 32(9) of the Rules, 2006 and hence the same cannot be quashed and set aside without adjudication specially when the petitioner has an alternative remedy of appeal.
This averment appears to be correct on perusal of the notice of demand vide Annexure-2/1 which is the impugned notice. But the counsel for the petitioner still emphasized that the notice of demand ought to be construed as a notice under Rule 30(3)(c) of the Rules, 2006 and for this purpose, he sought to address this Court by inviting our attention to the assessment order passed by the authority.
The assessment order which had been passed by the authority, might have adjudicated the correctness of the notice for demand, but the fact remains that the notice was not issued under Rule 30(3)(c) of the Rules, 2006 as it clearly indicates that the same was issued under Rule 17(1), 31(3),32 and 32(9) of the Rules of 2006. In that view of the matter, it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioner that this demand notice had been issued under Rule 30(3)(c) of the Rules, 2006 and as this Rule has been repealed, the notice be quashed and set aside and we are not prepared to enter into the correctness of this demand notice for which the assessment order also had been passed.
Since the petitioner has an alternative remedy of appeal against the order he cannot expect this Court to adjudicate in regard to the correctness of the assessment order and the notice for demand by trying to establish that this should straight away be quashed by this Court as it is a notice under Rule 30(3)(c) of the Rules, 2006 and the same having been repealed, the action under this provision is not legally sustainable.
As already recorded hereinbefore, the demand notice itself reveals that it is not a notice under Rule 30(3)(c) of the Rules, 2006 and, therefore, the submission of the counsel that this Court should, quash and set aside the demand notice merely because Rule 30(3)(c) of the Rules of 2006 has been repealed, cannot be accepted specially when the petitioner has an alternative remedy of appeal against the order of assessment. In so far as the challenge to the Rule 30(3)(c) is concerned, the same is dismissed as infructuous.