Jharna Mandal vs State of Jharkhand and Another

Amareshwar Sahay, J.—Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.

The petitioner, who is the informant, has challenged the judgment dated 26.5.2005 (sic) of the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Courts) Jamtara, whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge has acquitted the accused Lakhikant Mandal from the charges u/s 376, IPC holding that no offence of rape as defined u/s 375, IPC is made out.

From perusal of the impugned judgment, I find that on the basis of the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution the learned trial Court held that the cohabitation was with the consent of the prosecutrix as it was apparent from the evidence that she was pregnant and on the alleged date of occurrence she was having 8 to 9 months pregnancy.

The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the consent, if any, of the prosecutrix was on the belief that she was legally wedded wife of the accused and, therefore, the said consent of intercourse was misconception of fact which comes under clause 4 of Section 375 of the IPC.

The Supreme Court in the case of Uday Vs. State of Karnataka, on the similar facts as in the present case has held that where the prosecutrix aged about 19 years and had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance arid moral quality of the act she was consenting to, it is difficult to impute that the prosecutrix had consented inconsequence of a misconception of fact arising from his promise.

On perusal of the impugned judgment of acquittal, I find that the learned trial Court has rightly come to the conclusion that it was a case of consent and no case of rape could be proved against the accused.

Consequently, having found no merit in this application it is dismissed.