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Judgment
C.S.Dias,J.
The transfer petition is filed under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking transfer of O.P. No. 1276 of 2023 from the Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram, to the Family Court, Attingal.
The petitioner’s case in the transfer petition, in brief, are as follows:
The respondent has filed the above original petition against the petitioner to declare that their marriage solemnised on 18.06.2000 stands dissolved by virtue of talaq pronounced by the respondent.
The Family Court had decreed the original petition. However, in Mat. Appeal No.192 of 2024, this Court set aside the decree and remitted the matter back to the Family Court for fresh consideration.
After remand, the petitioner made sincere attempts to preserve the marriage. But the efforts were in vain. It was impossible for the petitioner to travel from Dubai due to a travel ban obtained by the respondent against the minor daughter, who is in the petitioner’s custody.
The petitioner had filed an application to enable her to overcome the travel restraint and participate in the proceedings, but the same was dismissed by the Family Court. The review petition was also dismissed. She then filed O.P.(FC) No.415 of 2026 before this Court, which was dismissed as infructuous since the petitioner managed to come down to India with the minor child.
The petitioner also filed an application to refer the parties to mediation, but the same was also dismissed by the Family Court. She challenged the order before this Court in O.P.(FC) No.544 of 2026. A Division Bench of this Court interacted with the parties and found that there was no scope for mediation; the petitioner did not press the petition.
Apart from the present original petition, there are four other proceedings between the parties before the Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram, namely, O.P. Nos.2161 of 2022 and 2246 of 2022 relating to the custody of the children, O.P. No.1715 of 2025 seeking return of money and gold ornaments, and M.C. No.460 of 2022 seeking maintenance. The petitioner filed an application for the joint trial of all the proceedings. The Family Court dismissed the application. The connected matters have been adjourned, but the present case is being proceeded with independently and has reached a crucial stage. Both parties have filed their affidavits in lieu of chief examination. The petitioner’s applications for accepting the witness list and the documents are pending consideration. Despite the above, the Family Court has posted the case for hearing. The above circumstances have given rise to a genuine and reasonable apprehension in the petitioner’s mind that she may not be afforded a fair and effective opportunity. Hence, she is constrained to file the transfer petition.
The respondent has filed a counter affidavit opposing the transfer petition. He contends that the petitioner has not raised any specific allegation of bias, prejudice or misconduct against the learned Judge of the Family Court. Mere dissatisfaction with interlocutory orders passed against the petitioner is not a valid ground for transfer. It is his case that the petitioner returned to India with the minor child on 28.05.2026, but thereafter failed to appear before the Family Court on several postings to adduce evidence. He has further contended that the applications seeking mediation and joint trial were considered and dismissed after hearing both sides. The petitioner has been instituting successive proceedings with the intention of protracting the disposal of the present original petition. He also points out that this Court, while remanding the matter, has directed the expeditious disposal of the present original petition. If the case is ordered to be transferred at this stage, it would further delay and prejudice the respondent. He, therefore, seeks the dismissal of the transfer petition.
The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit controverting the allegations in the counter affidavit. She has reiterated that the transfer petition is not founded merely on her inconvenience or dissatisfaction of the interlocutory orders, but on the circumstances that have unfolded after the remand. Her grievance is regarding the manner in which her applications concerning the production of evidence and the joint trial of the connected proceedings were dealt with. She has disputed the allegation that she had deliberately sought to delay the proceedings. Hence, she prays the transfer petition be allowed.
When the transfer petition was taken up for consideration, this Court had called for a report from the Family Court regarding the allegations in the transfer petition.
The learned Judge of the Family Court has submitted a report dated 02.11.2026, inter alia, reporting as follows:
“2.The OP.1276/2023 on the file of this Court has been filed by the husband of the respondent to declare that their marriage has been dissolved by pronouncement of a Talaq. The respondent/wife appeared and filed objection challenging the validity of the Talaq. But when I posted the case for inquiry, she did not file an affidavit in support of her contention. Adhering to the principles laid down by the Hon'ble High Court in X v. Y (2021 (2) KHC 709) and Ashi K.N. v. Hashim M.U. (2021 (6) KLT 292), I allowed that petition.
3.Later, the Hon'ble High Court, vide judgment in Mat Appeal 192/2024, set aside that order and remanded the case back. The Hon'ble High Court directed this Court to dispose the OP after giving opportunity to the respondent to adduce evidence. Both sides were directed to appear on 14/10/2025.
4.On 22/10/2025, the respondent/wife appeared and filed a petition to lift her travel ban imposed by a Court in Dubai. After hearing both sides, I dismissed that petition (1.A.2/2025), vide a reasoned order.
5.Respondent submitted that she is preferring an appeal against the said order, but she later filed a petition to review that order (IA.5/2026) along with a delay condonation petition (IA.6/2026). I dismissed those petitions after hearing both sides.
6.Again the proceedings were delayed as the respondent submitted that appeal preferred against those orders was pending before the Hon'ble High Court. She later filed I.A. 10/2026 to refer the parties for mediation, along with other connected matters. I dismissed that petition finding that the subject matter of this petition is not suitable for mediation. The Hon'ble High Court later upheld that order.
7.The respondent then filed I.A.11/2026 for joint trial of this petition with other four connected cases between the parties. I dismissed that petition finding that in view of the decisions referred above the scope of inquiry in this petition is very limited and, therefore, this is not a fit case to be tried jointly with the other cases pending between the parties.
8.In the meantime, the Hon'ble High Court stayed the further proceedings in this case vide order in OP(FC)611/2026. On 05/10/2026, the Hon'ble High Court directed this court to dispose two petitions i.e., I.A.16/2026 and I.A.17/2026 filed by the respondent. I.A.16/2026 was filed to accept the witness schedule and I.A.17/2026 was filed to accept certain documents. Relying on the judicial precedents - especially the latest decision of the Hon'ble High Court in Kuryodath Masabah v. Isra Askar Parappan (2026 KHC online 872) - I found that a detailed inquiry is neither essential nor desirable in a proceeding initiated by either of the parties for endorsement of an extra judicial divorce. Therefore, I dismissed those petitions as well.
9.I may submit that I have disposed of all those petitions based on the judicial precedents. To my knowledge, non of those decisions were reversed by the Hon'ble High Court. I do not have any prejudice or bias towards any of the parties in this petition. Though the respondent did not raise an allegation that I have personal bias in this case, the nature of allegations would show that she apprehends that she may not get justice from this Court. I may submit that in my tenure as the Judge of the Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram for the last 50 months, this is the first time a party is raising such an apprehension. The said apprehension is without any basis but, in view of her apprehension, I may humbly submit that it will not be just and proper for me to further try this case and to dispose of the same. This is for favour of information and necessary orders.”
I have heard Sri. Thomas Abraham, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri. Harish Vasudevan, the learned Counsel for the respondent.
It is well-nigh settled in a myriad of judicial precedents that the power to transfer under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is discretionary.
It is trite; the convenience of the women and children has to be given due consideration and preference while considering a petition for transfer. Nevertheless, the above principles do not apply in the present case because the petitioner has sought the transfer of the petition on the allegation of bias against the learned Judge of the Family Court.
O.P.No.1276 of 2023 was filed by the respondent before the Family Court on 28.05.2023. The petition was allowed, but this Court set aside the judgment on 25.09.2025 in Mat.Appeal No.192 of 2024, and remitted the matter back to the Family Court with a direction to dispose of the petition expeditiously, considering the fact that the petition is of the year 2023.
It is pertinent to point out that the petitioner did not have any apprehension in her mind regarding the conduct of the learned Judge of the Family Court when the appeal was considered, that she would not be afforded a fair, effective and meaningful opportunity to contest the case before the present court. It is more than a year after the appeal was disposed of that the petitioner has raised the present allegation, and that too after remand with a time frame and suffering a string of adverse orders.
A careful reading of the allegations in the transfer petition reveals that the petitioner has not raised any specific allegation of bias against the learned Judge. She assumes, due to the adverse orders passed against her, that she would not get a fair and effective opportunity to contest the proceedings.
In Govt. of T.N. v. Munuswamy Mudaliar and Another [1988 Supp SCC 651], the Honourable Supreme Court has held thus:
“12.……... A predisposition to decide for or against one party, without proper regard to the true merits of the dispute is bias. There must be reasonable apprehension of that predisposition. The reasonable apprehension must be based on cogent materials. See the observations of Mustill and Boyd, Commercial Arbitration 1982 Edn., p. 214. Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 2, para 551, p. 282 describe that the test for bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man, fully apprised of all the circumstances, would feel a serious apprehension of bias”.
While dealing with the transfer of cases, on the ground of bias, the Honourable Supreme Court in R.Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala [(2000) 7 SCC 129], held as follows:
“10 …………....It is true that one of the principles of administration of justice is that justice should not only be done but it should be seen to have been done. However, a mere allegation that there is the apprehension that justice will not be done in a given case is not sufficient. Before transferring the case court has to find out whether the apprehension appears to be reasonable. To Judge the reasonableness of the apprehension, the state of mind of the person who entertains the apprehension is no doubt relevant but that is not all. The apprehension must appear to the court to be reasonable, genuine and justifiable. In the present day scenario, if these types of applications are entertained, the entire judicial administration would be polluted with frivolous petitions for various reasons”.
Almost on the above identical lines, the Honourable Supreme Court in Harita Sunil Parab v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Others, [(2018) 6 SCC 358] has reiterated the proposition on the law of transfer of a case on the ground of bias, thus:
“8.The apprehension of not getting a fair and impartial enquiry or trial is required to be reasonable and not imaginary, based upon conjectures and surmises. No universal or hard and fast rule can be prescribed for deciding a transfer petition which will always have to be decided on the facts of each case.”
In Abraham Thomas Puthooran v. Manju Abraham [2022 (1) KLT 317], a Division Bench of this Court held as follows:
“32.When transfer of a case is sought on the allegation of bias of the Presiding Officer of a court or on the ground of fear of not getting justice, it becomes the bounden duty of the court to ascertain as to whether the ground of transfer has been substantiated by the litigant or not, since transfer of a case on such grounds casts aspersion upon integrity and competence of the Presiding Officer. A petition filed under Section 24 of the Code seeking transfer of case shall not be based on conjectures and mystic maybes. The onus is on the person who alleges bias to substantiate that his apprehensions are reasonable genuine and justifiable”.
The exposition of law casts the onus of proof on the shoulders of the person alleging bias to substantiate that his apprehensions are reasonable, genuine and justifiable.
The petitioner has questioned the honesty and impartiality of the learned Judge. The reason; the learned Judge has passed a string of orders against the petitioner. There is no foundation or material to corroborate the accusation other than the bald and wild allegations in the transfer petition.
Irrefutably, the petitioner has unsuccessfully challenged some of the adverse orders passed against her, and the orders have attained finality.
There are profusion of precedents on the point that an erroneous order cannot be labelled as an order passed with ‘bias’ or ‘favouritism’.
In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P. [(1984) 3 SCC 405], the Honourable Supreme Court observed as follows:
“7.We have yet to come across a Judge who can take a decision which does not displease one side or the other. By the very nature of his work he has to decide matters against one or other of the parties. If the fact that he renders a decision which is resented to by a litigant or his lawyer were to expose him to such risk, it will sound the death knell of the institution. A line has therefore to be drawn somewhere, someday, by someone”.
On a comprehensive appreciation of the factual matrix and in the background of the principles laid down in the above-referred precedents, the inevitable conclusion is that the petitioner has miserably failed to substantiate the allegation of bias. The circumstances alleged by the petitioner do not establish that she would not get a fair and impartial hearing before the Family Court, especially after a judgment of remand passed by this Court. The petitioner’s mere assumptions, therefore, do not warrant the exercise of the discretionary powers of this Court under Section 24 of the Code. The above assumption seems to be with the sole intention to protract the culmination of the original petition, that too by making unwarranted and unsubstantiated insinuations against the learned Judge of the Family Court.
In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik ( Smt.) and others [(2007) 14 SCC 1], the Honourable Supreme Court has observed that Judge bashing and using derogatory and contemptuous language against Judges has become a favourite pastime of some people. These statements tend to scandalise and lower the authority of the courts and cannot be permitted because, for the functioning of democracy, an independent judiciary to dispense justice without fear or favour is paramount. Its strength is the faith and confidence of the people in that institution. That cannot be permitted to be undermined because that will be against the public interest. The judiciary should not be reduced to the position of flies in the hands of wanton boys. Judge bashing is not and cannot be a substitute for constructive criticism”
The transfer petition is meritless and is hence dismissed with costs of Rs.50,000/- to be paid by the petitioner to the High Court Mediation and Conciliation Centre within two weeks from today, and the receipt be filed before the Family Court, failing which the Family Court shall take steps to recover the amount in accordance with law.
