Jaswant Singh vs Gurdarshan Singh Bedi and others

M.M. Punchhi, J.—Is the ejectment order passed in favour of the respondents in executable is the primary question which arises in this revision petition.

Broadly stated, the facts giving rise to this petition are these.

A house at Hoshiarpur was in the ownership of Bedi Dhanna Singh. On 15th May, 1967 he wrote an agreement in favour of Gurdarshan Singh Bedi, his son. agreeing to sell the said house to the latter for a sum of Rs. 9,500/-. Seemingly some consideration also passed at that time and thereafter. Under the terms of the agreement, Gurdarshan Singh Bedi respondent was handed over possession of the house. In the year 1973 Gurdarshan Singh Bedi respondent inducted the present petitioner, Jaswant Singh, in the said house as a tenant. Shortly thereafter disputes arose between the landlord and the tenant. The landlord filed an application for ejectment on a variety of grounds. Finally, he succeeded on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. The ejectment order was upheld by this Court in revision. The landlord wanting to execute the same applied to the Rent Controller for the purpose. The tenant raised objections thereto, which were disposed of by the impugned order. Warrants of possession were ordered to issue in favour of the landlord.

Now the scene shifts to the ownership question. Bedi Dhanna Singh, the original owner, died in the year 1969. Before hand, seemingly, he executed a will in favour of his two other sons, namely, Swaran Singh and Rachhpal Singh bequeathing the house in question in their favour. They on 27th June, 1980 executed a registered sale deed of the house in question in favour of Jaswant Singh petitioner. Claiming to have become the owner of the property, Jaswant Singh filed a suit for injunction before the Civil Court as also lying claim to the arrears of rent which he was made to deposit in the court of the rent Controller. This attracted a cross suit from Gurdarshan Singh Bedi respondent. He asserted that he had become owner of the house in question by making payment of the entire consideration of the house, of which he was in possession Both the suits were disposed of together by the Senior Subordinate Judge, Hoshiarpur. Four cross appeals were filed by the concerned parties. These are disposed of by the Additional District Judge, Hoshiarpur, by a common judgment on 17th August, 1983. The relevant findings for the purposes of this petition are that the sale deed executed by Rachhpal Singh and Swaarn Singh in favour of Jaswant Singh petitioner was held valid, but it was subject to the rights of Gurdarshan Singh Bedi. Those rights were said to accrue to him under the agreement of sale dated 15th May, 1977. It was held that Gurdarshan Singh Bedi alone was entitled to withdraw the arrears of rent deposited by the petitioner. It was furtehr held that Gurdarshan Singh had obtained possession of the property under the agreement dated 15th May, 1967.

Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contends that since Jaswant Singh petitioner has become owner of the property in dispute, the order of ejectment has become inexecutable as his status of a tenant stood merged with that of his becoming the owner of the property. The claim is opposed by the learned counsel for the respondents. Ordinarily when a tenant purchases a property tenanted to him and becomes the owner thereof, his status as a tenant gets merged with that of the landlord and landowner. But here the impediment which blocks such merger is the existence of the agreement dated 15th May, 1967, whereunder possession was transferred by Dhanna Singh Bedi to Gurdarshan Singh respondent. Now the word "landlord" as defined in the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949, is quite a large one. Its reproduction here whould be useful :--

(c) "landlord" means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised, and, every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord;

Though the owner of the property was Dhanna Singh Bedi, but the landlord vis-a-vis Jaswant Singh petitioner was Bedi Gurdarshan Singh, for the latter was the landlord who for the time being was entitled to receive rent in respect of the questioned building. Rather Gurdarshan Singh Bedi was entitled to receive rent from the petitioner on his own account and not on behalf of Dhanna Singh Bedi. If Bedi Gurdarshan Singh respondent had been collecting rent from Jaswant Singh petitioner on behalf of Dhanna Singh Bedi, then of course the doctrine of the merger could have set in. But, as said before, Bedi Gurdarshan Singh respondent was entitled to receive rent on his own account having come into possession of the property by virtue of the agreement for sale. The state of Dhanna Singh Bedi stood encumbered with the existence of that agreement for sale. His legatees Rachhpal Singh and Sawaran Singh took the estate in that condition and passed it on to Jaswant Singh petitioner on the same basis Thus derivedly the title of Jaswant Singh petitioner to the property was subjected to the obligation of the agreement of sale dated 15th May, 1967 whereunder Bedi Gurdarshan Singh stood delivered possesson of the house and who in turn was entitled to let out to anyone, including even the true owner. Thus, to my mind, the doctrine of merger could in no event come to play its part, and on that analysis the mere facts that the petitioner happens to be the owner of the house does not in any manner envelop his other status of being the tenant thereof. Thus in no case can the petitioner forestall the process of execution of the ejectment order. Cases are not unknown in which a man has acquired dual title to a property; one as an owner and the other as a tenant, at one and the same time. A common instance is that of the owner creating a mortgage with possession and becoming a tenant under the mortgagee. Somewhat analogous is the position in the instant case.

For the foregoing reasons, this petition has no merit and is ordered to be dismissed, but without any order as to costs.