Jarnail Singh vs Dilbagh Singh

S.K. Jain, J.

Bakhtaur Singh was the Lambardar of village Dulwan Tehsil Samrala District Ludhiana. On 10.1.1990, Dilbagh Singh (respondent herein) instituted a complaint under Sections 170, 197, 198, 199, 419, 205, 416 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code (Annexure P2) dated June 11, 1990, against Jarnail Singh (petitioner herein) in the court of Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Samrala. The allegations in the complaint are that Bakhtaur Singh, father of Jarnail Singh was the Lambardar of Patti Jattan of village Dulwan. The petitioner claimed to have been appointed Sarbrah Lambardar, Bakhtaur Singh died on March 13, 1980 but the petitioner continued to act as Lambardar without any authority and knowing fully well that after the death of his father, he ceased to be Sarbrah Lambardar. The petitioner had signed many documents as Lambardar and has also received Panjotra even after the death of his father. It was further alleged that even during the life time of his father, the petitioner was never appointed as Sarbrah Lambardar by the Collector, Ludhiana but he had been posing himself to be the Sarbrah Lambardar and collected Panjotra. In para No. 6 of the complaint, it is alleged that Patwri halqa had sent a request to the Tehsildar, Samrala on August 30, 1989, for appointment of Lambardar on account of the death of Bakhtaur Singh. The Tehsildar, Samrala, on his turn, requested the S.D.O. (Civil), Samrala, accordingly. On a complaint having been filed by the respondent to the Tehsildar, Samrala, Patwari halqa reported on 20.1.1989 that after the death of Bakhtaur Singh Lambardar on 13.3.1980, Jarnail Singh (petitioner herein) had been collecting and depositing Panjotra posing himself as a Lambardar.

After recording preliminary evidence, the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Samrala vide his order dated 30.4.1991 (Annexure P3), came to the conclusion that there was sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused under Section 170 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore he directed that the petitioner be summoned under the said section. Following Show Cause Notice (Annexure P5) was served on the accused :

"That your father Bakhtaur Singh was Lambardar of Patti Jattan of village Dulwan Tehsil Samrala. Said Bakhtaur Singh died on 13.3.1980. After his death, you went on acting as Lambardar without any order of competent authority fully knowing that you are not appointed as Lambardar. You were also not appointed Sarbrah Lambardar and collected the Land Revenue in the village posing as Lambardar and you also signed some documents i.e Will dated 17.8.1988 sale deeds dated 24..1983 and 18.11.1985 representing yourself to be a Lambardar. Your above noted act is Punishable under Section 170 IPC. Now show cause why you should not be tried from the said offence. And I direct you that you be tried under the above said notice."

The accused having pleaded not guilty and claimed trial, order dated October 8, 1991 (Annexure P4), was passed, directing the prosecution witnesses to be summoned for December 10, 1991.

Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner Jarnail Singh has sought to get the complaint (Annexure P2), summoning order (Annexure P3), order (Annexure P4), and notice (Annexure P5) and whole of the proceedings pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Samrala, quashed through this petitioner under Section 406 of Code of Criminal Procedure.

Pressing into service the Identity Card (Copy Annexure P1), learned Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the petitioner had been shown to be a regular Lambardar in Column No. 4 of the said Identity Card and that he had been acting as such in good faith and belief right from his appointment on May 2, 1968. He had been discharging the duties of a Lambardar without any objection whatsoever from any quarter. The Revenue Authorities had also been treating him as such. It was during 1989 when the proceedings for the appointment of a Lambardar were started by the Revenue Authorities, that he made an enquiry and came to know that as a matter of fact he was appointed as Sarbrah Lambardar and a regular Lambardar was proposed to be appointed. He then applied for being appointed as Lambardar. Developing his arguments further, he has urged that in view of the provisions of Section 21 read with Section 79 of the Indian Penal Code, the petitioner having worked as Lambardar in good faith and belief was justified by law in doing so, therefore, no offence whatsoever was made out. He has then urged that the respondent had filed the complaint mala fide for the following reasons :

(a) That the complaint has been filed in order to pressurise the petitioner to withdraw from the contest for the office of Lambardar so that the brother of the complainant could be appointed; and

(b) That the complainant along with his brothers had filed a suit (Annexure P6) for possession of land against the Gram Panchayat. The petitioner contested the suit being the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat. Ad interim injunction restraining the Gram Panchayat from raising any construction over the suit property was granted by the Court. The plaintiffs i.e. the complainant and his brothers had also filed an application under Section 39 Rule 2 and 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure (Annexure P70) for taking action against the petitioner for his having allegedly disobeyed the injunction order wilfully. The complaint has been instituted with a view to presurise the petitioner to suffer a decree in that suit against the Gram Panchayat and in favour of the complainant and his brothers."

In reply, learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that the petitioner had ceased to be a Sarbrah Lambardar on the death of his father namely, Bakhtaur Singh on March 13, 1980 but in spite thereof he had been acting as such knowing fully well that he had no authority to do so and, therefore, offences mentioned in the complaint were clearly made out.

I have given a thoughtful consideration to the rival arguments.

The Identity Card (Annexure P1) shows that the petitioner was appointed as Regular Lambardar on May 2, 1968. This Identity Card has been signed by the Tehsildar, Samrala, Sub Divisional Officer (Civil) Samrala on 5.9.1979 and by the Collector, Ludhiana on 9.9.1979. In para No. 4 of the complaint (Annexure P2) it is admitted on behalf of the complainant (respondent herein) that during the life time of Bakhtaur Singh (i.e. prior to 13.3.1980), the accused (petitioner) had been acting as Sarbrah Lambardar. He collected land revenue and received Panjotra and even after the death of Bakhtaur Singh Lambardar, the petitioner continued to discharge the functions of Lambardar including the attestation of documents including registered will dated 17.8.1988, and registered sale deeds dated 24.1.1983, and 18.1.1981 respectively. In para No. 8 of the complaint it is mentioned that Patwari Halqa had made a report on 20.1.1989 to the effect that land revenue of Patti Jattan had been collected by Jarnail Singh (petitioner) who deposited the same in the Government treasury and he had been receiving Panjotra posing himself to be the Lambardar. In para No. 7 of the petition, it is mentioned that in the year 1989 the petitioner was told that as he had been appointed as Sarbrah Lambardar as a substitute of his father and entry of the Identity Card as a regular Lambardar had been made inadvertently, steps were being taken to appoint a regular Lambardar whereupon he had applied for the said offence.

From the above material on record the conclusion that emerges is that (i) it is not the case of the petitioner that he had been appointed as Sarbrah Lambardar of his father; (ii) he had been acting as a regular Lambardar under bona fide belief that he was a regular Lambardar in view of the Identity Card (Annexure P1) (iii) even the revenue authorities, including the Tehsildar, Samrala, S.D.O. (Civil), Samrala and the Collector, Ludhiana, recognised him as Lambardar. The right holders of Patti Jattan of the village had been dealing with him as Lambardar and making the payment of the land revenue to him and he had been faithfully depositing the same in the Government treasury. He had also been receiving the Panjotra; (iv) other authorities like the SubRegistrar had been accepting him as a Lambardar for about 21 years.

Jurisprudentially viewed, an act may be an offence, definitionally speaking, but a forbidden act may not spell inevitable guilt if the law itself declares that in certain special, circumstances it is not to be regarded as an offence. The chapter on General Exceptions operates in this province. Section 79 of the Penal Code makes an offence a nonoffence only when the offending act is actually justified by law or is bona fide believed by mistake of fact to be so justified. It as here, the petitioner acting in good faith had collected land revenue depositing the same in the Government, treasury, received Panjotra and attested certain documents, he does enter the statutory harbour and is protected from prosecution under Section 170 of the Indian Penal Code because Section 79 exonerates him at least in view of his bona fide belief that the Identity Card (Annexure P1), was justificatory. Thus, the trial Court when it hears the case may be appropriately apprised of the identity card issued by Revenue Authorities and, it fills and bill under Section 79 of the Indian Penal Code, the charge is therefore rendered groundless. In this regard a reference may be had to Raj Kapoor v. Laxman, AIR 1980 Supreme Court 605 : 1980 Crl. L.J. 535.

As a sequal to the above discussion, I am of the considered view that complaint (Annexure 2) summoning order (Annexure P3), order of notice (Annexure P4) and notice Annexure P5) are unsustainable because Section 79 of the Indian Penal Code is exculpatory and, therefore, the same are quashed.

This petition is therefore, allowed.