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Judgment
Gopal Singh, J.—This regular first appeal has been filed by Jarnail Singh and others plaintiffs against Intzamia Committee Dharamshala Baba Dopehar Dass and others defendants. It is directed against the judgment of Shri Des Raj Dhamija, Senior Subordinate Judge, Ludhiana dated November 28, 1958 refusing to grant relief to the plaintiffs for rendition of accounts. The defendants-respondents have also filed cross-objections as trustees in charge of the said institution against the decree for relief of removal of the defendants granted to the plaintiffs.
The dispute pertains to the religious institution described in the plaint as Dharamshala Baba Dopehar Dass in village Guram in the district of Ludhiana. There is attached to the institution agricultural land measuring about 340 bighas Till 1930, the institution was being managed by Mahants. The last Mahant of the institution was Harnarm Dass. He was a man of bad character. The inhabitants of the village were not satisfied with his management. A claim as to the institution being a Sikh Gurdwara came up for disposal before the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal By judgment dated December 29, 1933, the institution was declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara. In the meantime, Harnam Dass left the institution. The inhabitants of the village constituted a managing committee of the institution. Although, the judgment of the Tribunal was on appeal reversed by the High Court, by its judgment dated February 27, 1935, Harnam Dass did not succeed in being restored as Mahant in spite of attempts made by him by means of two civil suits. The said managing committee continued in management of the institution. Nahar Singh was the first President of that managing committee. He was succeeded by Pakhar Singh. Rur Singh defendant No. 2 followed Pakhar Singh. The institution was being run as Gurdwara. The Managing Committee, defendant No. 1 and others impleaded as defendants including Rur Singh; defendant No. 2 as President of the Committee, have been in charge as trustees of the institution since 1947. The plaintiffs, who are worshippers in the institution filed suit on March 27, 1957 on the ground that the defendants had been making attempts to convert the institution from Dharamshala into a Sikh Gurdwara, that they have been misappropriating the income of the institution both from donations and agricultural land attached to it, that they are not maintaining proper accounts of the income and expenses of the institution nor are they getting them audited, that they have been asserting a title adverse to that of the institution and that considering their criminal activities and on account of their acts of mis-feasance and mal-feasance, they are not fit persons to continue as trustees of the institution. In the suit, it was prayed that the defendants be removed from the management and trustship of the institution and the properties attached thereto, that the defendants but ordered to render accounts of all the income and expenditure of the institution, that a scheme be settled for better management of the institution and that new trustees be appointed for its management.
In their written statement, the defendants pleaded that since the year 1932, the institution ceased to be Dharamshala Baba Dopehar Dass, that since then it was known as Gurdwara Baba Deep Singh Shaheed and that the institution was a Gurdwara and not a Dharamshala and the agricultural land was attached to the said Gurdwara. They denied that the institution known as Dharamshala Baba Dopehar Dass was a trust created for public purposes of a religious or charitable nature. The defendants also denied that they had either mismanaged the affairs of the institution or had ever misappropriated any of its funds. They asserted that regular accounts of the income and expenditure of the institution had been maintained by them. They, however, conceded that the same had not been audited. The defendants stated that since 1932, defendant No. 1 continued to be in adverse possession of the property of the institution, which had ever-since been maintained as a Sikh Gurdwara.
The above pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues:-
(1) Whether Dharamshala Baba Dopehar Dass was a public and religious institution and what were its objects?
(2) Whether the property in dispute appertains to the aforesaid reilgious institution?
(3) Whether the members of the Intzamia Committee, defendant No. 1 entered in the management of the property in dispute as its trustees?
(4) If issue No. 3 is found in the affirmative, whether the defendants can legally set up the plea of adverse possession?
(5) If issue No. 4 is found in the affirmative, whether the defendants'' title to the suit property has become absolute by adverse possession.
(6) If issue No. 3 is found in the negative, whether the defendants have acquired absolute title over the property in dispute by adverse possession?
(7) Whether the defendants are guilty of malversation and as such liable to account for the income of the institution?
(7-A) Whether the defendants have committed breach of trust or are guilty of mismanagement as alleged in para 9 of the plaint?
(8) What should be the scheme?
The trial Court found on issue No. 1 that the institution was a public and religious institution and it was being run for religious and charitable purposes. The trial Court held under issue No. 2 that the property in dispute was the property of the institution. On issue No. 3, it found that the members of the managing committee entered in the management of the institution including its property as its trustees. Under issue No. 4, the finding given by the trial Court is that the defendants cannot legally set up plea of possession adverse to that of the institution. The answers to issues Nos. 5 and 6 have been given in the negative. Issues Nos. 7 and 7-A were discussed together. It was held that the defendants were not guilty of malversation of the funds of the trust but their assertion of a hostile title against the institution amounts to breach of trust and consequently they are liable to removal. The trial Court, however, found that the prayer of the plaintiffs for rendition of the accounts could not be granted.
The only point argued on behalf of the plaintiffs is that the defendants having been ordered to be removed. the decision given by the trial Court that they are not liable to render accounts is unwarranted. On behalf of the defendants, the only point of argument urged as arising out of their cross-objections is that the order of removal of the defendants is uncalled for and that in any case, the defendants could not be called upon to render accounts maintained by them.
Taking up the justification of the order of removal, I may refer to the following portion of para 1 of the written statement filed on behalf of the defendants:-
It is not admitted that the institution known as Dharamshala Baba Dopehar Dass was a trust created for public purposes of a religious or charitable nature. 7. The defendants had been managing the institution and the property attached to it as its trustees. It ill lies in their mouth to deny that the institution is not a trust and to assert that the trust had not been created for public purposes of religious or charitable nature. This rebellious plea raised on behalf of the defendants goes counter to their obligation to discharge their functions as trustees of the institution. It amounts to the very denial of their being trustees of the institution. The defendants also asserted in para 5 of the written statement that they were in possession of the institution and its property adverse to that of the institution.
Under Section 14 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, hereinafter called ''the Act'', a trustee must not for himself or another set up or aid any title to the trust-property adverse to the interest of the beneficiary. The above pleas raised on behalf of the defendants in their written statement disentitle the defendants to continue as trustees. There is no reason why the defendants should not be ordered to be removed. It has been found by the trial Court under issue No. 1 that the institution is a public institution with its objects of being used for religious and charitable purposes. The correctness of that finding has not been assailed on behalf of the defendants. It has also been found by the trial Court under issue No. 2 that the property in dispute appertains to the institution and that there is no justification of for assertion of possession or title on the part of the defendants adverse to that of the institution. Under issue No. 3, the correctness of which has rot been challenged, it was held that the defendants having entered in the management of the property in dispute as trustees, they could not be heard to say that the institution is not a trust and a trust created for public purposes of religious or charitable nature. Being trustees, the defendants could not set up any plea of adverse possession or title counter to the interest of the institution. The correctness of the finding given under issue No. 4 by the trial court that the defendants cannot set up the plea of adverse possession has not been assailed. The above referred to two pleas raised on behalf of the defendants are repugnant to the sweepingly prohibitive provision of Section 14 of the Act, according to which a trustee must not either for himself or for another person set up or aid any title to the trust property adverse to the interest of the beneficiaries of the institution. In the present case the public entitled to worship in the institution and to manage its affairs are the beneficiaries. Any trustee acting counter to the injunction enjoined by the provision of Section 14 of the Act is liable to removal. The defendants have not only raised these pleas antagonistic to their obligations as trustees and counter to the interest of the institution but also led evidence by themselves going into the witness box and producing evidence of other witnesses to make good those pleas. They have thus by this conduct of their disentitled themselves to continue as trustees. There has been led evidence by the plaintiffs to show that the institution was used as a Dharamshala and by the defendants to establish that it had been being used as a Gurdwara Although there is ample evidence to show that since 1932, the institution has been used as a Gurdwara but in the face of the stand taken by the defendants inconsistent with the interests of the institution, it is unnecessary to give a finding about the actual user of the institution, whethere as a Gurdwara or as a Dharamshala. The above referred to pleas urged on behalf of the defendants and their assertive conduct in support thereof both anterior and posterior to the date when raised in the written statement are condemnatory of their being fit persons to hold office as trustees. The defendants have thus disentitled themselves to continue as trustees. There is every justification for being maintained the order of the trial Court as to the defendants being liable to removal from their office as trustees.
Now I come to the second point The trial Court has without assigning any reasons held that the plaintiffs'' prayer for rendition of accounts by the defendants cannot be granted. Under section 19 of the Act, the defendants are not only bound to maintain accounts but also to render accounts to their beneficiaries. Section 19 runs as follow:-
A trustee is bound (a) to keep clear and accurate accounts of the trust-property, and (b), at all reasonable times, at the request of the beneficiary, to furnish him with full and accurate information as to the amount and state of the trust-property. 10. It has been conceded on behalf of the defendants in their written statement and also by Rur Singh in examination that the defendants have been maintaining accounts of the trust-property. The defendants have been in possession of the trust-property and been managing the same. The defendants have been managing the entire trust-property including the agricultural land. The institution has been receiving donations and the worshippers have been making offerings in cash and in kind right from the year 1947. There is no reason, especially when the fact of maintenance of accounts by the defendants is admitted, why the defendants should not render accounts. Under section 19, it is not only the duty of a trustee to maintain accurate accounts of the trust-property but also a duty, may an obligation to furnish the beneficiaries with full and accurate information as to the amount and the condition of the trust-property. The second obligation cast upon a trustee carries with it the obligation to account for the income of the trust-property and render accounts in respect thereof, if and when called upon by a beneficiary to do so. The defendants having been ordered to be removed and serious allegations of mismanagements of the property and of malversation and misappropriation of the funds of the institution having been made by the plaintiffs against the defendants, there is no reason why the defendants should not be directed to render accounts about the assets and liabilities and income and expenditure of the trust-property of the institution including the agricultural land attached thereto. They have to render accounts from 1947, when they were appointed as trustees of the institution up to the date of their removal. This period of time for rendition of accounts does not appear to be unreasonable, when it is conceded by the defendants that they have been maintaining the accounts.
The counsel for the defendants argued that the alleged grounds given in para 9 of the plaint relied upon by the plaintiffs as acts of breach of trust had not been proved and consequently the order for rendition of accounts could not be passed. His contention is that the plaintiffs could succeed in their relief for rendition of accounts sought against the defendants only if any one of those grounds is established. As already referred to, the defendants have claimed possession of the property in dispute adverse to that of the institution. Their assertion of hostile title is nothing but breach of trust. They have also denied the existence of trust and the trust being one for public purposes of religious and charitable character. Not only these grounds constitute sufficient cause for their removal but also render the defendants liable for rendition of accounts, if they are ordered to be removed. Moreover, under Section 19 of the Act, a trustee is not only duty bound to maintain accounts but also to render those accounts to this beneficiary. The purpose of maintenance of accounts by a trustee is their rendition to his beneficiary. Without the concimmitant of rendition of accounts by a trustee, their maintenance is fruitless and illusory. It is not necessary that order of rendition of accounts could be passed only if any act of breach of trust has been committed by a trustee. His liability to render accounts is inherent in the discharge of his duty to manage the trust-property and maintain its accounts. The following observations of the Supreme Court in Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple Vs. Induru Pattabhirami Reddy, , admit of no doubt that order for rendition of accounts could be passed irrespective of any default or breach of trust on the part of a trustee:-
it is common place that no trustee can get a discharge unless he renders accounts of his management. This liability is irrespective of any question of negligence or wilful default. 12. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal of the plaintiffs is allowed and their claim for rendition of the accounts by the defendants is decreed. The cross-objections of the defendants are disallowed. The parties shall bear their own costs.
P.C. Pandit, J.
I agree.