Jangir Kaur vs Dashmesh Bus Service (Regd) Raikot and another

S.S. Sodhi, J.—The matter here concerns the maintainability of a claim for compensation under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, (hereafter referred to as ''the Act''). The question posed being, does the filing of a claim for compensation u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, which is later withdrawn, debar subsequent recourse to the provisions of the Act for seeking compensation on the same cause of action ?

The facts leading to the controversy here are that Ajit Singh, who was employed as a driver with Dashmesh Bus Service, met with an accident while driving their bus PUM-7105. It is said that this bus was being driven by him in the course of his employments This happened on December 15, 1975. Two days later, that is, on December, 17, 1975, he succumbed to the injuries sustained by him in the accident, and died.

The said Ajit Singh died leaving behind his widow Jangir Kaur and their four minor children. A claim for compensation was filed by them before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. This claim was, however, withdrawn before it could be adjudicated.

An application was then filed by Jangir Kaur and her children under the relevant provisions of the Act seeking compensation thereunder in respect of the accident in question. This claim was negatived by the Commissioner under the Act as not maintainable, on the ground that having elected to avail of the remedy under the Motor Vehicles Act, the claim with regard to the same cause of action under the Workmen''s Compensation Act was barred.

The accepted position here is that the claim for compensation in the present case was competent both under the Act as also u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is also well settled that in such a situation, it is open to the claimant to choose his forum, but he cannot be granted compensation both under the Act as also by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal

The point, however, arises, does the mere filing of a claim for compensation, whether under the Act or under the Motor Vehicles Act bar a claim on the same cause of action under the other Act ? The obiter dicta of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh with regard to this matter in Radhabai Bhikaji v. Baluram Daluram 1970 A.C.J. 408, was "the disqualification for proceeding in the Workmen''s Compensation Commissioner''s Court does not start when the claimant obtains compensation elsewhere, but starts the moment he moves another Court. Similarly, the disqualification to move any other Tribunal starts rot when the Workmen''s Compensation Commissioner awards compensation but the moment he is approached with a claim". These observations were made while dealing with the cafe of the claimant who having already been granted compensation by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal then sought compensation under the Act. The claim for compensation under the Act was negatived on this ground. This was the authority which the Commissioner under the Act relied upon in the present case to hold that the claim of the present applicants under the Act was not maintainable.

A more liberal and broader view was taken by the High Court of Gujrat when a similar question arose in Parsingh Sardar Parmar v. Ruddaji Pannaji 1975 A.C.J. 528. This was a case where a claim for compensation on the lame set of facts had been made both under the Act as also under the Motor Vehicles Act. It was held that the claimants could not claim compensation under both the Acts the Commissioner under the Workmen''s Compensation Act has to call upon the claimants to choose their forum. In other words, this ruling implied that one of the pending claims either under Act or the Motor Vehicles Act would have to be withdrawn. If this view is accepted then on principle there appears to be no reason to hold a claim for compensation under the Act to be barred merely because an earlier claim filed by the claimants under the Motor Vehicles Act had been withdrawn before the claim under the Act had been filed. In this context, it would indeed be anamolous to hold where claims under both the Acts are pending, with the withdrawal of one, the other can proceed, but if one had been withdrawn (before its adjudication) before the filing of the other, the latter would be barred,

In a case like the present, where two views are possible, the Court would be reluctant to stand upon the letter of the statute to deny the claimants the remedy of seeking compensation under the Act, it would rather adopt a broad and liberal inter-pretation more in accord in legislative intent to advance the remedy which the Act conferred. The view expressed in Parsingh Sardar Parmar and another''s case (supra) must accordingly be preferred and it follows that the filing of a claim for compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and its withdrawal before compensation was sought under the Act, constitutes no bar to this remedy.

In the result, the impugned order of the Commissioner is hereby set aside and the case is remanded for decision on merits according to law.

It may be mentioned here that counsel for the claimants had sought an opportunity to amend his claim application with a view to claim the amount which the claimants were entitled to under the provisions of the Act. In view of the fact that the case is being remanded for fresh decision, it would be open to the claimants to seek such amendment from the Commissioner.

This appeal is accordingly hereby accepted with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 300/-.

Parties are directed to appear before the Commissioner on August 16, 1983.