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Judgment
K. Veeraswami, C.J.—This appeal by Defendant 1 and the legal representatives of the second Defendant is directed against the decree of
Ganapatia Pillai, J., in so far as it held that the rent in question was not reduced from Rs. 1,500/- to Rs. 975/- and that the Plaintiffs were entitled to
recover exclusive possession of the premises set out in schedule A and the machinery set out in schedule 5 as well as the furniture in schedule to
the decree. The first Plaintiff is the widow of one Natesa Mudaliar who carried on a very prosperous and successful business in the manufacture
and sale of iron safes, mill and mill parts and, other hardware implements under the name and style of P. Natesa Mudaliar and Natarajan
Engineering Works with its head Office at 59, Broadway, Madras and branches at No. 17, Errabalu Chetty Street, and Nos. 5 and 17, Lawyer
Chinnathambi Mudali Street Madras. He died in August 1942, leaving behind his widow and two daughters who are the third Defendant and the
second Plaintiff respectively. He also left a Will dated September 20, 1940, and under that Will he devised his properties in favour of his wife and
two daughters appointing his wife as the sole executrix. The business was. under the terms of the Will, given to his widow and two daughters in
equal shares. It was contemplated by the testator that the actual conduct of the business should be in the hands of his sons-in-law. But as the
business could not be carried on without differences, Plaintiffs and the third Defendant took over exclusive possession and control thereof with the
entire stock and assets. By a deed dated September 30, 1946, Plaintiffs 1 and 2 and third Defendant leased out the properties and the business set
out in the schedule to the lease deed and, for the purpose of this appeal, it is not necessary to refer to the entire terms of the lease. The lease was in
favour of the first two Defendants and was for a period of five years in the first instance with an option for renewal for a further term of five years
on the same terms. The monthly rent reserved was a sum of Rs. 1,500/-. The option to renew was exercised and there is no dispute about this.
There after in or about February, 1954, the first two Defendants, whom we may hereafter call as the Appellants, wrote to the lessors that on
account of certain reasons mentioned by them, the rent should be reduced to Rs. 750/-per mensem from January 1, 1953. There was further
correspondence and eventually by a letter dated November 14, 1954 and written by the first two Plaintiff''s and the third Defendant, they agreed
to have the rent re-fixed at Rs. 975/- per mensem with effect from January 1, 1953. Several sums are claimed to have been remitted by the
Appellants from time to time including towards the rent so re-fixed. By a letter dated August 13, 1956, the first Plaintiff stated that she was unable
to agree with the account sent by the Appellants, except with regard to the amount paid to her towards the rent. In the circumstances the Plaintiffs
brought the suit for directing the Defendants 1 and 2 to deliver possession of the plaint schedule properties comprised in the lease deed and for
rendition of a true and correct account of the various amounts received and collected and for payment of such sum as may be found due eventually
to the Plaintiffs. There was also a claim for mesne profits. The suit was decreed for exclusive possession of the said premises and also in regard to
the money claimed, which was referred to a commissioner with certain directions.
The appeal before us is confined, as we mentioned at the outset, to the propriety of not giving effect to the reduced rent of Rs. 975/- per month
and of granting exclusive possession to the Plaintiffs and the third Defendant. The second aspect of the question is raised because it is claimed by
the Appellants that pendente lite they had acquired the share of the third Defendant in the suit property and business she was entitled to under the
terms of the Will of her father.
On the first question Ganapatia Pillai J., was of the view that the Appellants could not be permitted to rely on the reduction of the rent because
that was not reduced to writing and registered and in the absence of such a writing, they could not plead alteration of the rent fixed in the registered
lease deed. The learned judge also rejected the Appellants'' contention that there was acceptance by the Plaintiffs and the third Defendant of the
accounts rendered by the Appellants He was also of opinion that the claim for reduced rent could not be supported on any doctrine of part
performance or promissory estoppel. These aspects are reiterated before us.
It is contended that the lease deed was only for a term of five years and that the renewal did not make it one for ten years. In other words, it is
urged that the renewal itself being the subject-matter of correspondence and not being part of the registered lease deed, the objection that the rent
agreed to in such a renewal could not be relied on because of Section 92 of the Evidence Act could not be maintained. In support of this
contention Mr. Thyagarajan had relied on Dent Hall 36 L.T. 765, Boyd v. Kreig I.L.R.(1890) Cal. 548 and Khayali v. Hussain Baksh I.L.R.1886
All. 198. In our view, none of these cases is of assistance to the Appellants, When a lease deed contains a term for renewal for a further term on
the same terms as agreed to for the initial teem and the option to renew has been exercised, it seems to us that, although such a lease deed is not
for the combined term, the renewal nevertheless forms part and parcel of the deed as the option to renew is exercised. The option to renew is not
an agreement with in an agreement which has been reduced to writing and registered and for the operation of the renewal, no further document is
required. We are unable to accept the contention that when a renewal is made, it is a separate agreement which stands by itself de hors the original
document in which it was expressed. The cases which have been cited to us related to the admissibility of renewals by correspondence or means
other than by a separate registered document. It was held in those cases that, if a lease deed was for one year with an option to renew for one year
and the option was exercised, the lease deed could not be regarded as one for two years. But that is not the question before us. As we said, the
lease deed in this instance can in no sense be regarded as for ten years. But the right view to take, in our opinion is that the document being initially
for a term of five years by reason of the option contained in the document it was extended for a further period of five years and the terms of the
renewal are all those contained in the registered deed itself. We are of the view, therefore, that the term relating to the quantum of rent could only
be altered be another writing registered.
It is next urged that the Plaintiffs and the third Defendant having accepted the rendition of accounts by the Appellants, they were bound by it.
The simple answer to this claim is that record does not establish that there was any such acceptance. All that was said in the letter addressed by
the first Plaintiff on August 13, 1956, was that she was unable to agree with the account the Appellant had sent except the amount you had paid to
me towards the lease rent. No oral evidence has been adduced and from this statement alone in the letter, it is not possible to conclude that the
Plaintiffs and the third Defendant accepted the reduced rent. The claim for reduced rent is also put on the basis of part performance. We are
unable to appreciate this contention. In our opinion, payment of reduced rent, even assuming that it has been established, which it is not necessary
to find for present purposes, is not a step as would furnish the basis for application of the doctrine of part performance. Where a transferee has, in
part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in
possession, in part-performance of the contract, he may as well have laid the basis for the doctrine. But here we fail to see what act or step the
Appellants had done or taken in furtherance of the contract when they paid the reduced rent. They were already under an obligation under the
terms of renewal to pay the rent and when it is not established that the Plaintiffs and the third Defendant accepted the reduced rent, we cannot
possibly say that the payment is in furtherance of the contract. They were entitled to continue in possession even under the original terms of the
renewal. It was not the case of the Appellants that if the rent was not reduced they would give up possession and terminate the renewed lease. But
Mr. Thyagarajan invites our attention to Mill on Transfer of Property Act, where the learned authors observes at page 392 that payment of an
increased rent in terms of a new agreement would amount to part performance. That may well be so because such a payment would be to the
detriment of the payer and the observation, it should be remembered, was in the context of the lessee''s claim. It is true a learned single Judge of
the Calcutta High Court in Satyaniranjan Chakravarty and Others Vs. Habibar Sobhan, applied the doctrine of part performance to a case of
payment of reduced rent. But we are unable to accept this view as correct.
Lastly it is submitted on the strength of Sat Narain and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, and Central London Property Trust Ltd.
v. High Trust House Ltd. (1956) I All E.L. 956 that inasmuch as the Appellants had acted upon the acceptance by Plaintiffs and the third
Defendant of the reduced rent, the latter should on ground of promissory estoppel be prevented from resiling and claiming the original rent. Here
again, we fail to see the force of the contention in the context of the facts.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel can be invoked only if there was a representation by someone which another has to his detriment acted upon,
so that if the former is allowed to resile the latter by that means would stand to be prejudiced. That is not the case here. As a matter of fact in Sat
Narain and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, the learned Judge observed that in order to create estoppel, the party asserting it has to
show that he had been induced to act to his detriment or misled to his injury. That has not been established. We, therefore, agree with Ganapatia
Pillai J., that the Appellants are liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 1000/- per mensem.
On the second ground of the Appellants, it may appear at first blush that claiming as the Appellants do to have purchased pendente lite from the
third Defendant the share in the properties in question which she was entitled to under her father''s Will, they are entitled to joint possession. But
we are of the view that the decree of Ganapatia Pillai J., in this regard does not call for any interference. There can be no question that each tenant
in common could at common law make a lease in respect of his own share alone, the interest of each being separate and distinct, and if tenants in
common all join in one lease, it operates as a lease by each of his respective share, and a confirmation by each as to the shares of the others,
Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant makes this quite clear in the 27th edition of his book, page 63. Also it cannot be disputed that a transferee
acquiring a share of the joint interest would be entitled to the transferor''s right to joint possession. Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act is
clearly to that effect. Debendra v. Narendra (27) Cal. L.J. 504, which was cited by Mr. Thyagarajan does not take us any further. The point is that
the suit out of which the appeal arises was to recover possession on the basis of tenancy. The Appellants figured in the suit as tenants and
possession was sought from them in their capacity as tenants. The nature of the suit as such is not altered by reason of the alleged purchase by the
Appellants from the third Defendant. Whatever claim they may have on that basis will have to be adjudicated in a separate proceeding. Ganapatia
Pillai J., put it on the ground that it was well established that merger did not take place where a part of the landlord''s interest alone was acquired
by the tenant. We share this view, especially where the suit itself for possession is based on tenancy. But we may make it clear that by the decree
for exclusive possession, the claim of the Appellants based on the purchase from the third Defendant should not in any way be prejudiced in any
independent proceeding to enforce it.
The appeal is dismissed with costs. The Appellants will have four months from today for delivery.